concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in the majority’s resolution of all but one issue — its holding that the evidence was not sufficient to convict Crain for possession. The majority describes correctly our narrow and deferential standard of review when confronted with a sufficiency of the evidence challenge: a jury’s guilty verdict must be sustained if, “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (citation omitted; emphasis in original). In attempting to apply this strict standard of review, however, the majority invaded the province of the jury and, instead, elected to weigh the evidence itself.
The evidence supporting Crain’s possession conviction was not limited to the single fact that he was the driver of the vehicle in which the drugs were discovered. Maj. op. at 486-87 (quoting United States v. Wright, 24 F.3d 732, 735 (5th Cir.1994) (“... while dominion over the vehicle will certainly help the government’s case, it alone cannot establish constructive possession of [contraband] found in the vehicle_”)). In affirming Cram’s conviction for conspiracy, the majority recognized other evidence which proved Crain’s constructive possession of the cocaine.9 For example, it holds that the jury was entitled to infer from the evidence that Crain knew that Watkins was going to Fort Worth to obtain drugs, and that, with this knowledge, Crain agreed to accompany Watkins on the trip and help with the driving. Maj. op. at 486. Additionally, after travelling a great distance, Crain and Watkins spent only about two hours in Fort Worth before commencing their return to Abilene in the late evening.10 After pulling the car over, *489Trooper Willey initiated contact with the driver, Crain; Trooper Tone’s focus was concentrated on the passengers remaining in the vehicle. Trooper Tone testified that during his observation of the other occupants of the ear (Watkins and Thompson), he did not see Watkins lean over as if to place something under Crain’s seat, as Thompson later testified.11 Furthermore, the bag of drugs under Crain’s seat was not completely hidden — the bag protruded out for two to three inches, clearly within Crain’s grasp.
Through Thompson’s testimony, Crain may have introduced “countervailing evidence” which tended to link Watkins to the drugs, Maj. op. at 487; however, that evidence does not automatically dissociate Crain from the drugs.12 For example, the majority does not address the fact that Crain and Watkins could jointly possess the drugs.13 Most disturbing, however, is its sole reliance upon Thompson’s testimony to disregard the evidence which clearly supports the jury’s verdict. Thompson testified that after Crain exited the car to talk with the troopers, Watkins placed the drugs under Crain’s seat; however, his credibility was seriously questioned.14 Regardless, it goes without saying that the issue of credibility is for the jury, not this court.
Confronted with this sufficiency of the evidence challenge, the majority fails to adhere to the strict limitation placed upon appellate courts. Instead, it has substituted itself for the jury, electing to weigh the evidence and determine issues of credibility. Because a rational jury could have found Crain guilty of possession beyond a reasonable doubt, I must respectfully dissent from the reversal of his conviction on that charge.
. I disagree with the majority’s characterization of Crain's conspiracy conviction as being a "close” issue.
. According to the Rand McNally Road Atlas, the distance between Fort Worth and Abilene is 152 miles. Although this fact was never introduced at trial, it is easily within the common experience of a jury sitting in the Northern District of Texas at Abilene.
. As the majority notes, Thompson was not a defendant. Neither Crain nor Watkins testified.
. In fact, as the majority points out, Thompson was napping on the back seat when the vehicle was stopped. Obviously, while asleep, he could not have heard or understood any conversation Watkins and Crain may have had, to include about drugs.
. The jury instructions made the possibility of joint possession clear: "You may find that the element of possession ... is present if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants had actual or constructive possession, either alone or jointly with others” (emphasis added). As for constructive possession, the instruction provided that "[a] person who, although not in actual possession, knowingly has both the power and the intention, at a given time, to exercise dominion or control over a thing, either directly or through another person or persons, is then in constructive possession of it."
Eason v. United States, 281 F.2d 818, 821 (9th Cir.1960), held “evidence of close friendship, joint venture and general conduct ... sufficient to warrant a reasonable jury finding beyond reasonable doubt that possession was joint.” Subsequent cases suggest that this may be the outer edge for permitting finding possession. See United States v. Duke, 423 F.2d 387, 391 n. 3 (5th Cir.1970); but cfi United States v. Savinovich, 845 F.2d 834, 837 (9th Cir.) ("if there is a rational basis for attributing interest in the contraband to one party because of relationship with another, a trier of fact can infer sufficient knowledge to support a conviction for possession"), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 943, 109 S.Ct. 369, 102 L.Ed.2d 358 (1988). These factors are present here, but, in the light of the other evidence, are not necessary to consider in resolving this issue.
.Besides being related to Crain, Thompson had an extensive criminal record, and, when initially interviewed by the troopers, failed to mention that Watkins originally possessed the drugs and then placed them under Crain's seat.