*555KEITH, Circuit Judge, delivered the opinion of the court, in which CELEBREZZE, Senior Circuit Judge, joined. SUHRHEINRICH, Circuit Judge (pp. 557-60), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.
KEITH, Circuit Judge.Plaintiff-Appellant (“Plaintiff’) appeals a jury verdict finding the Defendants-Appel-lees (“Defendants”) did not violate the Fourth Amendment rights of decedent Lenora Daugherty (“Daugherty”). For the reasons stated below, we REVERSE the jury verdict and find as a matter of law Defendant Donal Campbell’s (“Campbell”) reliance on uncorroborated information is insufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion necessary to authorize a strip search of a prison visitor. Further, we GRANT Plaintiffs motion for judgment as a matter of law and REMAND for a determination on the issue of damages.
I. Facts
From September 30, 1986 until January' 16, 1988, Daugherty often visited her husband, a state inmate at the Turney Center (“Center”). Prior to her January 16, 1988 visit, Center Corrections Officer Robert Star-buck (“Starbuck”) allegedly told Campbell, the Warden of the Center, Daugherty was concealing drugs on her person and smuggling them into the Center.1 Additionally, Campbell received two letters which indicated Daugherty was smuggling drugs into the Center. The first dated January 7,1988 was an anonymous letter. The second dated January 12, 1988 was signed by Lori Elliot. Later, investigation revealed that “Lori Elliot” did not exist. Campbell, relying solely on Starbuck’s information, ordered a strip search of Daugherty and a search of her vehicle for narcotics prior to any visit with her husband.
On January 16, 1988, prison personnel instructed Daugherty to submit to a strip search,2 a visual body cavity search3 and a search of her vehicle. None of the searches revealed contraband.
On June 8, 1988, Daugherty filed a § 1983 claim in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee alleging the Defendants violated her Fourth Amendment rights. Campbell moved for judgment on the pleadings and to stay discovery. The district court referred all pretrial matters to a magistrate judge who recommended the district court deny Campbell’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity for Daugherty’s Fourth Amendment claims. Upon the request of the district court, the magistrate issued a second report recommending the district court grant the motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity for the vehicle search. The district court adopted both reports and recommendations. Campbell appealed the denial of summary judgment, and this court affirmed finding Campbell was not entitled to qualified immunity. See Daugherty v. Campbell, 935 F.2d 780 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 939, 117 L.Ed.2d 110 (1991).
On September 2, 1992, the district court granted Daugherty’s motion to amend her complaint to include a Fourteenth Amendment claim. The jury trial commenced the same day and ended September 4, 1992. At the close of all proof, the district court determined as a matter of law that the Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs Fourteenth Amendment claim and dismissed the claim. The jury returned a verdict for the Defendants on Daugherty’s Fourth Amendment claim.
On September 15, 1992, Plaintiff renewed her motion for judgment as a matter of law or in the alternative for a new trial. The district court denied the motion. This timely appeal followed.
*556II. Discussion
On appeal, Plaintiff argues the district court erred by:
(1) denying her motion for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of whether Campbell had reasonable suspicion and/or probable cause to authorize a strip search of her person;
(2) denying her motion for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of whether she consented to the search; and
(3) granting Defendants qualified immunity on the issue of her Fourteenth Amendment due process claim based on the search of her person.
We find Campbell’s reliance on wholly unsubstantiated information relayed by a correctional officer without corroboration is insufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion necessary to authorize a strip search of a prison visitor. We, therefore, decline to address Plaintiffs remaining allegations of error.
1. Standard of Review
When reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law, we consider de novo whether there is sufficient evidence to raise a question of fact for the jury. Hill v. Marshall, 962 F.2d 1209 (6th Cir.1992), cert. denied, Morris v. Hill, — U.S.-, 113 S.Ct. 2992, 125 L.Ed.2d 687 (1993). “Sufficient evidence will be found unless, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, there is either complete absence of proof on the issue or no controverted issues of fact upon which reasonable persons could differ.” Monette v. AM-7-7 Baking Co., 929 F.2d 276, 280 (6th Cir.1991) (citations omitted).
2. Reasonable Suspicion Standard
A strip search, regardless of how professionally and courteously conducted, is an embarrassing and humiliating experience. See Hunter v. Auger, 672 F.2d 668, 674 (8th Cir.1982); United States v. Sandler, 644 F.2d 1163, 1167 (5th Cir.1981) (en banc); United States v. Dorsey, 641 F.2d 1213, 1217 (7th Cir.1981); cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24-25, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1881-82, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (noting even a search of outer clothing for weapons is likely to be an annoying, frightening, and possibly humiliating experience). Consequently, reasonable suspicion must exist before a strip search is authorized for prison visitors. See Daugherty v. Campbell, 935 F.2d 780, 784 (6th Cir.1991); Long v. Norris, 929 F.2d 1111, 1113 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, Jones v. Long, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 187, 116 L.Ed.2d 148 (1991); Hunter, 672 F.2d at 674.
Campbell argues because Starbuck was a reliable corrections officer, his statements, unlike those from an anonymous informant, required no corroboration. We disagree. Here, Starbuck did not act as an informant but merely as a declarant. An officer’s recitation of a tip does not automatically vest the information with credibility or reliability, nor does it transform the officer into a reliable informant. Campbell could not rely on an uncorroborated anonymous tip merely because it was relayed by an officer.
Generalized suspicion of smuggling activity does not justify a strip search. Hunter v. Auger, 672 F.2d 668, 674 (8th Cir.1982); see also Daugherty v. Campbell, 935 F.2d at 785; Blackburn v. Snow, 771 F.2d 556 (1st Cir. 1985); Thome v. Jones, 765 F.2d 1270, 1276 (5th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016, 106 S.Ct. 1198, 89 L.Ed.2d 313 (1986); Smothers v. Gibson, 778 F.2d 470, 472 (8th Cir.1985). Instead, reasonable suspicion requires individualized suspicion, specifically directed toward the person targeted for the strip search. Hunter, 672 F.2d at 675. Reasonable suspicion exists only if the information contained in the tip is linked to other objective facts known by correctional authorities. Id. at 676.
We find the reasoning of our sister circuits persuasive on this issue. The Eighth Circuit held that “[a] strip search based on [a] bald assertion contained in [an] anonymous tip is clearly not based on a reasonable suspicion of drug smuggling activity.” Hunter, 672 F.2d at 676. Regardless of who relays such a tip, information in an anonymous tip must “possess indicia of reliability sufficient to give prison officials reasonable grounds to suspect drug smuggling activity.” Id. Before a tip may justify a search, “the nature of the tip, the reliability of the infor*557mant, the degree of corroboration, other factors contributing to suspicion or the lack thereof, and the nature and extent of the search must all be assessed.” United States v. Afanador, 567 F.2d 1325, 1329 n. 4 (5th Cir.1978); see also Smothers, 778 F.2d at 472; Thome, 765 F.2d at 1277. An anonymous tip requires some measure of corroboration to warrant official action. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1924, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972).
Here, Campbell relied solely on Starbuck’s uncorroborated allegation. His reliance on a wholly uncorroborated tip is, under the facts of this case, insufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion. First, the information was general in nature. The declarant baldly asserted Daugherty was smuggling drugs into the Center without any objective facts to corroborate the allegation. In fact, readily accessible information discredited the tip. Although over a two year period Daugherty frequently visited the Center, and officials were very familiar with her, she never had been suspected of smuggling activity. Additionally, Daugherty’s husband had never been caught with drugs or been involved in drug related activities in the Center.
Campbell received two letters, one from an anonymous inmate and one from a non-existent person. He concedes, however, the letters do not constitute reasonable suspicion. Indeed, neither the letters nor Starbuck’s alleged bald assertion have any indicia of reliability. Furthermore, the combination of the unsubstantiated letters and the disputed assertion have no indicia of reliability. We, therefore, find the uncorroborated information upon which Campbell relied did not constitute reasonable suspicion.
Despite the dissent’s assertions to the contrary, we do not impose a duty on wardens to investigate the reliability of all their officers’ conclusions. Rather, we hold as a matter of law, in this case, where no independent objective information existed, the information upon which Campbell relied was insufficient to warrant a strip search. While the dissent emphasizes Campbell received two anonymous tips, in reality one was from a nonexistent person, and therefore, had absolutely no probative value. Essentially, the dissent asserts that Starbuck’s status as a corrections officer automatically substantiated his allegation, and thus provided reasonable grounds for suspecting Daugherty was smuggling drugs. Absent independent evidence to support Starbuck’s alleged tip, status alone does not impart reasonable suspicion, nor does status combined with an anonymous tip and a tip from a non-existent person. This is especially true where neither the visitor nor the inmate had ever been suspected of previous smuggling activity and the corrections officer can not recall relaying the tip.
The operative principle of Fourth Amendment is its prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. To allow the scant information presented in this case to justify an intrusive and humiliating strip search of a prison visitor renders the Fourth Amendment’s protections meaningless. Using the dissent’s standard of reasonable suspicion, any time a corrections officer tells a warden a specific visitor is smuggling contraband on his person, a strip search is warranted. Clearly, strip searches of prison visitors based upon bare allegations of illegal activities, whether by anonymous informants or a corrections officer who later denies making such allegations, contravene the well-established protections of the Fourth Amendment.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, we REVERSE the jury verdict and hold Campbell’s reliance on an uncorroborated tip did not provide reasonable suspicion necessary to authorize a strip search. We, therefore, GRANT Plaintiffs motion for judgment as a matter of law and REMAND for a determination on the issue of damages.
.While not determinative of the issues in this case, it is interesting to note Starbuck stated he could not recall giving Campbell information concerning Daugherty and drug smuggling activ: ities.
. A strip search is an inspection of a naked individual without scrutinizing the subject's body cavities.
. A visual body cavity search is a visual inspection of a naked individuál that includes the anal and genital areas.