Opinion by Judge BRUNETTI; Dissent by Judge REINHARDT
BRUNETTI, Circuit Judge:Federal prisoner Miguel Angel Gonzalez appeals the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate or modify his 168-month sentence, which was imposed after his guilty pleas to one count of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) and 846, and to two counts of using a telephone to commit a felony in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b). In an unpublished disposition of the direct appeal, this court affirmed Gonzalez’s convictions and sentence. United States v. Forcelledo, Nos. 89-30335, 89-30336, 89-30337, 89-30338, 89-30340, 89-30342, 89-30343, 919 F.2d 146 (9th Cir. filed Nov. 20, 1990).
We review de novo the district court’s denial of Gonzalez’s § 2255 motion, see United States v. Angelone, 894 F.2d 1129, 1130 (9th Cir.1990), and we now affirm.
DISCUSSION
Gonzalez claims that he was denied his right to a qualified court interpreter under the Court Interpreters Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1827 (1988), and that the lack of adequate interpretation more generally deprived him of certain Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights because he did not understand the nature and cause of the charges against him and the potential consequences of his guilty plea. He additionally argues that his attorney’s failure to request a qualified interpreter to assist him in court proceedings, as well as his attorney’s gross miscalculation of his likely sentence under the applicable United States Sentencing Guidelines, constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.
*1049A. Procedural Default
The government correctly points out that Gonzalez failed to raise these contentions during his direct appeal. Ordinarily, he might have to assert cause for this procedural default as well as actual prejudice resulting from the errors of which he complains. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-68, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 1594-95, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982); but see Chambers v. United States, 22 F.3d 939, 945-46 (9th Cir.1994) (noting inter-circuit conflict on whether Frady standard applies to § 2255 attacks on guilty pleas and unclear posture of Ninth Circuit law on the issue, but not resolving the question). At least some of Gonzalez’s claims might not survive such a hurdle.
However, the government failed to assert procedural default in the district court proceedings on Gonzalez’s § 2255 motion, and indeed it argued the merits of these claims. Other circuits have held that such a failure to assert default waives the issue. See, e.g., United States v. Metzger, 3 F.3d 756, 758 (4th Cir.1993), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1374, 128 L.Ed.2d 50 (1994); United States v. Hicks, 945 F.2d 107, 108 (5th Cir.1991); Valladares v. United States, 871 F.2d 1564, 1566 n. 2 (11th Cir.1989) (Powell, J.); United States v. Hall, 843 F.2d 408, 410 (10th Cir.1988).
This situation also differs from the recent case of Woolery v. Arave, 8 F.3d 1325 (9th Cir.1993), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1623, 128 L.Ed.2d 348 (1994), in which this court addressed waiver of the doctrine of Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976). First, in Woolery we noted that Stone represents “a categorical limitation on the scope of the [judicially-created] exclusionary rule.” 8 F.3d at 1326. We held that the State of Idaho could not waive the Stone issue by failing to raise it in the district court’s consideration of Woolery’s § 2254 petition, because Stone eliminates the cognizability in federal habeas of exclusionary rule claims. Id. at 1326-28. By contrast, the Supreme Court’s decision in Frady was not categorical — it simply imposed a cause and prejudice requirement for raising claims defaulted in an earlier federal proceeding. Unlike Stone, Frady did not eliminate the cognizability of an entire class of claims.
Second, Woolery was a collateral attack on a state-court proceeding, for which considerations of comity and federalism have great significance. Such concerns are absent in the context of Gonzalez’s § 2255 motion. See Metzger, 3 F.3d at 758. In addition, although the Frady Court did observe that “the Federal Government, no less than the States, has an interest in the finality of its criminal judgments,” 456 U.S. at 166, 102 S.Ct. at 1593, that interest is surely attenuated when the government itself fails to assert it during the district court’s consideration of a collateral attack. Moreover, permitting the federal government to assert a procedural bar now would represent an unjustifiable double standard, since we would preclude a state from doing so. See, e.g., Panther v. Hames, 991 F.2d 576, 580 (9th Cir.1993). Assuming arguendo that Frady does apply to collateral attacks on guilty pleas, we hold that the government has waived application of Frady's cause and prejudice standard to Gonzalez’s claims.
B. Lack of a Qualified Interpreter
Gonzalez traces his right to a qualified interpreter to the Court Interpreters Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1827 (1988), which states in relevant part:
The presiding judicial officer ... shall utilize the services of the most available certified interpreter, or when no certified interpreter is reasonably available, as determined by the presiding judicial officer, the services of an otherwise qualified interpreter, ... if the presiding judicial officer determines on such officer’s own motion or on the motion of a party that such party (including the defendant in a criminal case)
(A) speaks only or primarily a language other than the English language ...
so as to inhibit such party’s comprehension of the proceedings or communication with counsel or the presiding judicial officer ...
*105028 U.S.C. § 1827(d)(1) (emphasis added). Both the magistrate judge and the district court judge did quickly perceive that Gonzalez, whose primary language is Spanish, had some difficulties with English.
However, the statutory predicate for appointment of an interpreter is a finding by the presiding judicial officer, upon inquiry, that a non-primary English speaker’s skills are so deficient as to “inhibit” comprehension of the proceedings. See United States v. Lim, 794 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 937, 107 S.Ct. 416, 93 L.Ed.2d 367 (1986); see also United States v. Sanchez, 928 F.2d 1450, 1455 (6th Cir.1991) (“Our inquiry as to a district court’s decision concerning the appropriate use of interpreters in the courtroom focuses upon whether the purposes of the Act were adequately met.”); Valladares, 871 F.2d at 1565; United States v. Tapia, 631 F.2d 1207, 1209 (5th Cir.1980). In accepting Gonzalez’s guilty plea, the district court judge here specifically determined that Gonzalez’s language difficulties did not constitute a “major” problem. This was a factual finding, and we review the cold record for clear error only. United States v. Mayans, 17 F.3d 1174, 1179 (9th Cir.1994); Lim, 794 F.2d at 471.
While the subsequently-filed presentence report contained the information that Gonzalez was a naturalized U.S. citizen, had lived in the United States for twenty years, and had been a principal in and worked for a variety of businesses, at the time of its inquiry the district court certainly knew that Gonzalez had lived in Oregon for ten years, was buying his own home, and worked in the auto and truck sales business. At Gonzalez’s arraignment, where the defendant was represented by appointed counsel Norman Linstedt, the magistrate judge had also conducted the following colloquy:
Court: Do you understand?
Gonzalez: Yeah, little bit.
Court: What is your problem, language problem?
Gonzalez: Well, no. I don’t know how to read that much. I understand. I understand.
At Gonzalez’s change of plea hearing, where Linstedt continued as his attorney, the district court judge examined Gonzalez with a string of questions about the rudiments of his offenses. For example:
Court: What did you do? Did you work with other people to buy drugs and sell them?
Gonzalez: I used the telephone.
Court: In addition to using the phone, what did you do?
Gonzalez: I worked with Forcelledo. Court: Did you sell drugs to people? Gonzalez: Yes.
Court: Did you deliver drugs to people? Gonzalez: Yes.
Court: Was that drug cocaine?
Gonzalez: Yes.
Court: Where did you get the drugs you sold?
Linstedt: You worked for Forcelledo? Gonzalez: Right.
Court: Did you ever sell cocaine to somebody?
Gonzalez: Yes.
Court: Where did you get that cocaine? Gonzalez: Get it from Forcelledo.
The court continued briefly, then Linstedt interjected:
I spent from about 7:00 o’clock this morning and any deficiency that he has in language, his wife is here and we fully discussed this and read all of these documents; and we have been doing the same thing for the last couple of months. As his lawyer, I am satisfied that his plea is an understanding plea and in his best interest if he did what he just told Your Honor he did.
The court concluded:
[Tjhere is some language difficulty but not a major one. The record should reflect that he has been in court when other defendants have entered a plea of guilty and that he has been assisted by competent counsel who has fully advised him of his rights and that he has also been assisted also by his wife who is able to assist the *1051attorney in explaining these matters to him.
Reviewing the record of the district court’s sua sponte inquiry, we hold the district court did not clearly err in concluding that Gonzalez’s comprehension was not sufficiently inhibited as to require an interpreter.1 The defendant’s answers were consistently responsive, if brief and somewhat inarticulate, and he only occasionally consulted his attorney. In addition, although his lack of objection is not dispositive, Gonzalez never indicated to the court.that he was experiencing major difficulty, despite the opportunities afforded him. We therefore conclude that Gonzalez was not entitled to an interpreter under the provisions of the Court Interpreters Act. Cf. Valladares, 871 F.2d at 1566 (“To allow a defendant to remain silent throughout the trial and then ... assert a claim of inadequate translation would be an open invitation to abuse.”).
As a result, use of interpreters was a matter for the district court’s discretion, see, e.g., Mayans, 17 F.3d at 1179, and especially in light of Gonzalez’s failure to object we cannot say that the court abused its discretion here. See United States v. Yee Soon Shin, 953 F.2d 559, 561 (9th Cir.1992); Lim, 794 F.2d at 471. Gonzalez’s statutory and Fifth and Sixth Amendment claims based on lack of an interpreter fail as a result of these conclusions.
C. Ineffective Assistance
Gonzalez claims here that Linstedt’s failure to object to the lack of a court-appointed interpreter, as well as counsel’s alleged gross miscalculation of the sentence he would likely receive upon pleading guilty, constituted ineffective assistance of counsel because he would not have pleaded guilty if he had had better information. This claim lacks merit.
1. Ineffective Assistance in Failing to Request a Courh-Appointed Interpreter.
Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), Gonzalez must show that Linstedt’s failure to request an interpreter constituted ineffective assistance and that he, Gonzalez, was prejudiced thereby. The Strickland standard extends to assistance with guilty pleas. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58, 106 S.Ct. 366, 370, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985). “In any case presenting an ineffectiveness claim, the performance inquiry must be whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances_ Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89, 104 S.Ct. at 2065.
However, Gonzalez has failed to demonstrate that Linstedt was ineffective with respect to recognizing Gonzalez’s language difficulties. The record here reflects Linstedt’s belief (bolstered by the finding of the district court that Gonzalez was competent) that, with the assistance of Gonzalez’s wife, he had succeeded in conveying to Gonzalez the essence of the charges against him and the nature of the plea agreement. The only misunderstanding Gonzalez has actually claimed relates to the length of his sentence under the Guidelines, not the nature of the charges nor the maximum possible sentence. Moreover, he concedes that the mere fact that English was not his primary language did not mandate appointment of a qualified interpreter, which makes it far less likely that the alleged right should have been obvious to competent counsel in this situation. Given the totality of the circumstances, Linstedt’s assistance with respect to Gonzalez’s language difficulty was reasonable.
2. Ineffective Assistance as to the Likely Sentence.
The district court informed Gonzalez of the maximum possible sentences and fines *1052for the offenses to which he pleaded guilty. He responded affirmatively when asked if he was satisfied with Linstedt’s representation of him. As a result, Gonzalez cannot claim he was prejudiced by Linstedt’s alleged gross error in calculating the sentencing guidelines range and likely sentence. See United States v. Rubalcaba, 811 F.2d 491, 494 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 832, 108 S.Ct. 107, 98 L.Ed.2d 66 (1987).
AFFIRMED.
. Gonzalez would have us conclude that, because he consulted his wife during the plea process, the district court "substituted” his wife’s interpretive services for those of a qualified interpreter. However, the record does not indicate whether those consultations were for interpretation or, as might also have been expected, for discussions of the advisability and implications of pleading guilty. In any event, Gonzalez's contention does not render the district court's determination clearly erroneous.