dissenting.
While I believe both questions are close ones, it appears that the district court correctly concluded that the federal issue was presented adequately to the state courts and that there is sufficient evidence in the record to require that a voluntary manslaughter instruction be given. Because I believe that the evidence supported an instruction on voluntary manslaughter, I cannot join my colleagues in reversing the judgment of the *263district court. In my view, the majority’s .conclusion that the error is harmless is based on an impermissible substitution of its judgment on a matter of credibility for that of the state court jury. As the majority quite frankly admits, reliance on the harmless error doctrine in this case requires the judges of this court to perform a task that the jury may never have addressed because of the refused jury instruction. It requires that the panel resolve matters of credibility and weigh the evidence on the primary issue of guilt or innocence. Mr. Everette has a right to have that issue determined by a jury, not by federal appellate judges. I do not believe that it is the proper role for a federal habeas court to intrude so drastically into the prerogative of the jury. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.