Isaiah Brown is a black man who describes himself as a born-again Christian. After Polk County terminated his employment as director of the County’s Information Services Department (ISD), Brown brought this action against Polk County, the Polk County Board of Supervisors, and his former supervisor, County Administrator Ray Sears (collectively Polk County). Brown alleged Polk County violated Title VII by terminating him because of his race and his religion. Brown also brought 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims alleging Polk County violated his First Amendment rights of freedom of expression and freedom of religion. Following a bench trial, the district court held Brown failed to show Polk County violated Title VII or 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Brown v. Polk County, 832 F.Supp. 1305, 1316 (S.D.Iowa 1993). Brown appeals and we affirm.
The district court explained the facts of this case in detail, see id. at 1308-10, and we will only summarize them here. Brown was promoted to ISD director in 1986. In this capacity, Brown was responsible for planning and organizing Polk County’s data processing operations and supervising about fifty data processing employees. Ray Sears, Brown’s immediate supervisor, reviewed Brown’s performance annually. Brown’s evaluations were mixed and reflected Sears’s concern about scheduling and departmental morale. Under Brown’s command, the ISD was far behind schedule. The mismanagement was so significant that Polk County hired an outside consultant to review the department. The consultant recommended a total departmental restructuring, which involved eliminating eleven positions and laying off twenty-five employees.
There was a rift in the ISD between the employees who were born-again Christians like Brown and the employees who were not. Beginning in 1985, Brown had held Bible study meetings with employees before work in the Polk County Administration building. The Bible study later stopped, but the group still met to pray or talk in Brown’s office. Those who were not born-again Christians believed Brown would terminate them during the restructuring because they did not share his faith. After hearing this rumor, Brown held a departmental meeting and told the employees he would not consider an employee’s religious views when making the termination decisions. After the restructuring, Brown met with the rehired employees in May 1990. Referring to his Bible study, *407Brown told the employees they should work hard as the Bible directed and not be slothful.
The County Personnel Department and County Administrator received complaints in summer 1990 about inappropriate religious activities in the ISD. At Sears’s request, the County Labor Relations Manager investigated the complaints. The manager’s report stated Brown held prayer meetings, performed religious counseling, and had his secretary type Bible study notes. Based on the report, Sears reprimanded Brown in writing in July 1990, ordering Brown to end his use of County resources to support a religious organization.
When Sears later visited Brown’s office for a systems development review committee meeting, Sears saw some religious objects. According to Brown, Sears told him to “take away the things on your wall and on your desk that may be considered offensive to employees.” Brown complied without protest. Brown testified that because he wanted to comply, he removed his Bible from a desk drawer and asked Sears about it. Sears said, “That goes, too.” Because Sears told Brown to keep the entire ISD free of religious materials, another employee also removed personal religious items. Brown’s management problems continued. In December 1990, the ISD was investigated again after sexually explicit material and personal games were discovered on employees’ computers.
Noting Polk County’s duty to ensure its administrators remain neutral about religious matters, the district court balanced Brown’s First Amendment rights against the First Amendment’s prohibition on the establishment of religion and the free exercise rights of Brown’s co-employees. The district court concluded neither the free exercise nor free expression guarantees protected Brown’s religious activity on. County time or with County facilities. 832 F.Supp. at 1315-16. The district court further held the removed items did not constitute the type of symbolic expression protected by the First Amendment, and Brown failed to show the removal of religious items from his office inhibited his ability to exercise his religion freely. Id. at 1316.
In challenging the district court’s decision that Polk County did not violate his First Amendment rights, Brown does not dispute the district court’s factual findings, but attacks the district court’s analysis and legal conclusions. Citing Hall v. Ford, 856 F.2d 255, 262-63 (D.C.Cir.1988), a free speech case, Brown asserts he need only show his employment was conditioned on the compromise of a constitutional right. Brown seems to assert his free speech and free exercise rights are absolute. Later, Brown argues that to overcome his First Amendment rights, the government must show it had a compelling interest and it used the least restrictive means of achieving its compelling interest. Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718, 101 S.Ct. 1425, 1432, 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981) (strict scrutiny standard). Thus, we must decide which legal standards apply to a public employee’s free speech and free exercise claims.
The legal standard controlling Brown’s free speech claim is clear. Although government employees do not relinquish their free speech rights as a condition of public employment, the First Amendment is not a license for interference with the proper functioning of the workplace. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 140, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 1686, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983); see Grantham v. Trickey, 21 F.3d 289, 292 (8th Cir.1994). The government’s legitimate interest in regulating speech is greater for public employees than for general citizens. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 140, 103 S.Ct. at 1686. The government has a strong interest in avoiding the interference of employee speech with work, personnel relationships, and the employee’s job performance. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388, 107 S.Ct. 2891, 2899, 97 L.Ed.2d 315 (1987). To decide what regulation of a public employee’s speech is constitutionally permissible, a court balances on a case-by-case basis the employee’s interest as a citizen in commenting on matters of public concern and the government’s interest as an employer in promoting efficient public services. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 1734-35, 20 L.Ed.2d *408811 (1968); Shands v. City of Kennett, 998 F.2d 1337, 1344-46 (8th Cir.1993), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 880, — L.Ed.2d-(1994). This balancing accommodates the public employer’s dual role as a public service provider and a government entity operating under the First Amendment’s constraints.
Brown’s reliance on Hall for an absolute free speech right is misplaced. Brown selectively quotes general language stating the government cannot condition employment on the compromise of a constitutional right. Hall, 866 F.2d at 262. In the very next sentence, however, the court in Hall explained this principle is limited by the government’s legitimate interest in efficient operations. Id. at 263. Brown’s failure to acknowledge this legitimate limitation is the basic flaw pervading his First Amendment arguments.
Having identified the controlling standard, we turn to the merits of Brown’s free speech claim. Brown asserts Polk County violated his right to free speech by directing him to refrain from prayer and stating his Christian beliefs. We think Brown reads Polk County’s directive too broadly. The written reprimand directed Brown to stop using Polk County resources to support and promote a religious organization, and to ensure the work environment was free of religious proselytizing, witnessing, and counseling. This language does not encompass Brown’s private prayers, or Brown’s activities off County time or property.
*Brown asserts his speech is a matter of public concern, but we need not decide this preliminary issue. Because the district court balanced the interests of Brown and Polk County, the court presumed Brown’s speech was a matter of public concern. See Con-nick, 461 U.S. at 149, 103 S.Ct. at 1691. After weighing the interests of Polk County and Brown, the district court concluded Polk County did not violate Brown’s free speech rights. We agree. Under Brown’s leadership, the ISD was having significant problems with inefficiency, employee morale, and general mismanagement, and these problems were related to Brown’s religious speech. In this case, Polk County’s interest in efficient operations outweighs Brown’s interest in expressing his religious beliefs to his subordinates at work. Finally, even if the religious items removed from Brown’s office were protected symbolic expression, the same balancing analysis applies and defeats Brown.
We now consider the legal standard applicable to Brown’s free exercise claim. The Supreme Court has long recognized a distinction between the freedom of individual religious belief and the freedom of individual religious conduct. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699, 106 S.Ct. 2147, 2151-52, 90 L.Ed.2d 735 (1986). Under the Free Exercise Clause, an individual’s freedom of belief is absolute, but an individual’s freedom of conduct is not. Id. In other words, individuals do not have an absolute right to practice their chosen religion as they please. Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 844 F.2d 562, 564 (8th Cir.1988). Beyond this point, .however, the law is less clear. The Supreme Court has never identified a legal analysis governing whether an adverse employment action infringes a public employee’s right to free exercise of religion. Although we apply a Pickering balancing analysis in the context of public employees and free speech, it is unclear what analysis applies in the context of public employees and free exercise of religion. Brown believes the district court should have used a general strict scrutiny analysis.
The right to free exercise of religion is a fundamental constitutional right. Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 375 n. 14, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 1169 n. 14, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974). As a general rule, a governmental action or regulation that burdens fundamental constitutional rights is strictly scrutinized. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 666, 110 S.Ct. 1391, 1400-01, 108 L.Ed.2d 652 (1990). To pass constitutional muster, the action or regulation must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. Id. Courts of Appeals have applied the general strict scrutiny test to public employees’ claims that their public employers’ actions have infringed their fundamental constitutional rights to expres*409sive association and intimate association. See McCabe v. Sharrett, 12 F.3d 1558, 1566 (11th Cir.1994) (discussing cases). Despite the general rule, however, the Supreme Court does not strictly scrutinize public employers’ restrictions on certain fundamental constitutional rights of public employees. As we have already explained, the Supreme Court uses a special analysis when examining restrictions on public employee expression. See supra at 407-408. The Supreme Court has also devised a special analysis for reviewing adverse public employment decisions made for political patronage reasons. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980).
We have applied the strict scrutiny analysis to free exercise challenges to governmental action outside the public employment context. E.g., Murphy v. State of Arkansas, 852 F.2d 1039, 1041 (8th Cir.1988) (reviewing free exercise challenge to Arkansas Home School Act). In the absence of any challenge to the strict scrutiny standard, we once applied the standard to decide whether public employees should receive an exemption from a drug-testing program on religious grounds. Rushton, 844 F.2d at 563-64. On the other hand, we have recognized that regulations limiting fundamental rights are reviewed more deferentially when applied to public employees than when applied to ordinary citizens. Crain v. Board of Police Comm’rs, 920 F.2d 1402, 1408 (8th Cir.1990).
In the context of state employees claiming infringement of their right to free exercise of religion, courts have applied a modified Pickering analysis to account for the state’s duty under the Establishment Clause to ensure its employees do not encourage or promote one religion over other religions or any religion over nonreligion. See County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 593-94, 109 S.Ct. 3086, 3100-02, 106 L.Ed.2d 472 (1989) (explaining state’s duty). These courts balance the public employee’s free exercise rights against the state’s duties to avoid Establishment Clause violations and to protect the religious beliefs of other public employees. See, e.g., Langlotz v. Picciano, 683 F.Supp. 1041, 1048 (E.D.Va.1988), aff'd, 905 F.2d 1530 (4th Cir.1990) (unpublished opinion); Spratt v. County of Kent, 621 F.Supp. 594, 600-01 (W.D.Mich.1985), aff'd, 810 F.2d 203 (6th Cir.1986) (unpublished opinion), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 934, 107 S.Ct. 1574, 94 L.Ed.2d 766 (1987). This is the test that the district court applied in Brown’s ease. See 832 F.Supp. at 1315-16.
In our view, the modified Pickering analysis is more appropriate than a general strict scrutiny analysis in this ease. To the extent that the Pickering analysis is viewed as more deferential to the public employer than a general strict scrutiny analysis, we see no reason to defer when fundamental speech or political affiliation rights are involved but not when free exercise rights are at stake. See McCabe, 12 F.3d at 1567. Pickering’s, rationale—that the government as an employer has a special interest in regulating its employees’ behavior to avoid the disruption of public functions—applies to free exercise rights as well as free speech rights. See id. at 1568. Courts have applied a Pickering analysis outside the speech context in cases involving expressive association rights, liberty rights, and free exercise rights. See id. at 1568-69 (discussing eases); Langlotz, 683 F.Supp. at 1048. Application of the modified Pickering analysis in this case takes into account the disruptive potential of Brown’s open free exercise conduct in the workplace, see McCabe, 12 F.3d at 1567, and best considers the tension Polk County faced between not establishing or promoting religion and not inhibiting its practice. We thus conclude the district court applied the proper legal analysis to Brown’s free exercise claim.
Brown contends Polk County violated the Free Exercise Clause by restricting his right to believe and profess. Again, Brown misreads Polk County’s directive. In reprimanding Brown, Polk County sought to limit only Brown’s conduct, not his belief. The district court weighed the competing interests of Brown and Polk County and concluded Polk County did not violate Brown’s free exercise right by restricting his religious conduct on County time and property. 832 F.Supp. at 1315-16. Given Polk *410County’s duties to avoid an Establishment Clause violation and protect the free exercise rights of employees other than Brown, Brown’s status as a supervisor of fifty employees, and the adverse effects of Brown’s religious conduct in the workplace, we agree with the district court that the balance of interests tips in Polk County’s favor under the circumstances presented in this case.
Even if a strict scrutiny analysis applies as Brown contends, Polk County had an overriding compelling interest in restricting religious practices in the workplace: avoidance of an Establishment Clause violation. Goodall by Goodall v. Stafford County Sch. Bd., 930 F.2d 363, 370 (4th Cir.1991). Because Brown administered many employees as the ISD’s director, Polk County needed him to be neutral towards religion in the workplace to maintain'the County’s neutrality. See Spratt, 621 F.Supp. at 600-01. We reject Brown’s assertion that Polk County did not use the least restrictive means of accomplishing this legitimate goal. Brown’s assertion is largely based on his mischarac-terization of Polk County’s policy.
Brown also contends Polk County violated the Free Exercise Clause by asking him to remove the religious items from his office. The removal of the religious items from Brown’s office does not implicate the Free Exercise Clause, however. To show a free exercise violation, a religious adherent must initially prove the challenged governmental action substantially burdens the adherent’s religious practice. Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 699, 109 S.Ct. 2136, 2148-49, 104 L.Ed.2d 766 (1989); see Murphy, 852 F.2d at 1041 (governmental action must interfere with sincerely held religious beliefs). The burden must be more than an inconvenience; the burden must rise to the level of pressuring the adherent to commit an act the religion forbids, or 'preventing the adherent from engaging in conduct that the faith requires. Graham v. Commissioner, 822 F.2d 844, 850-51 (9th Cir.1987), aff'd sub nom. Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 699, 109 S.Ct. 2136, 2148-49, 104 L.Ed.2d 766 (1989). Here, the district court found Brown did not prove the removal of the religious items from his office inhibited his ability to exercise his religion freely. 832 F.Supp. at 1816. This key finding is not clearly erroneous. Indeed, Brown did not protest Sears’s instruction or otherwise indicate his born-again Christianity required him to keep a Bible in his desk and the objects on his desk and walls. Although the instruction to remove Brown’s Bible in particular may have been overzealous and offensive, the district court’s supported finding simply ends the free exercise inquiry. Having failed to show the removal substantially burdened his religious practice, Brown did not establish the threshold requirement for a free exercise violation.
As for his equal protection claim, Brown attacks the district court’s finding that he was not subjected to disparate treatment in exercising his religious beliefs. See id. This attack is meritless. The County’s policy applied to all County employees, not just Brown. We thus conclude the district court properly rejected Brown’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims.
We now turn to Brown’s Title VII arguments. Finding no direct evidence of racial or antireligious animus, 832 F.Supp. at 1311, 1313 & n. 16, the district court applied the three-step analysis of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), to Brown’s racial and religious discrimination claims. Brown contends the district court should have applied the mixed motives test of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989), because there was direct evidence of antireligious and racial animus on Polk County’s part. In Brown’s view, the written reprimand and Sears’s instruction to remove the objects from Brown’s office show improper motive. Brown’s contention fails for two reasons.
First, Brown misunderstands his ev-identiary burden. The Price Waterhouse test applies only if the plaintiff produces “evidence that directly reflects the use of an illegitimate criterion in the challenged decision.” Stacks v. Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages, Inc., 996 F.2d 200, 202 (8th Cir.1993) (per curiam); see id. at 201 n. 1 (the term “direct evidence” means only that the plain*411tiff must present evidence showing a specific link between discriminatory animus and the challenged decision); Parton v. GTE North, Inc., 971 F.2d 150, 153 (8th Cir.1992) (plaintiff must show employer “actually relied” on improper ground in making adverse employment decision). We agree with the district court that Brown did not produce evidence that directly shows Polk County based Brown’s termination on his religion or his race.
Second, because this case was tried on the merits, we need not concern ourself with whether the McDonnell Douglas or Price Waterhouse test applies. Kientzy v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 990 F.2d 1051, 1060 (8th Cir.1993). Instead, we need only review the ultimate factual issue of whether Polk County intentionally discriminated against Brown on the basis of his race or religion. See id.; Finley v. Empiregas, Inc., 975 F.2d 467, 473 (8th Cir.1992). After the bench trial, the district court found Brown’s inadequate performance was the reason for his termination. 832 F.Supp. at 1312, 1314. We conclude the district court’s ultimate finding that Polk County did not discriminate against Brown based on his race or religion is not clearly erroneous. See Tuttle v. Henry J. Kaiser Co., 921 F.2d 183, 186 (8th Cir.1990) (standard of review). Having reviewed the ultimate issue, we need not consider Brown’s attack on the district court’s finding that Polk County could not have accommo--dated Brown’s religious activities and expression without undue hardship. See 832 F.Supp. at 1314.
We have considered all of Brown’s arguments and rejected them. Accordingly, we affirm the district court.