Gregory B. Bloomfield (a.k.a. Earl Mar-cum Johnson) appeals the district court’s1 denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized during a search of his rental truck following a traffic stop. Bloomfield entered a conditional plea of guilty to possession with intent to distribute marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
At about 7 p.m. on March 6,1993, Missouri State Highway Patrolman Scott Jefferson Roberts was parked on the shoulder of 1-44 in Pulaski County when he saw a Hertz-Penske rental truck abruptly change lanes without signaling. Roberts followed the truck for about two miles to the 150-mile marker, where he pulled the truck over. He asked for the driver’s license, which bore the name Earl Marcum Johnson, and for the truck rental agreement. When Bloomfield handed the license and agreement to Roberts, Roberts noticed that he appeared to be very nervous: his hand was shaking, he was breathing heavily, his eyes were red, he only rolled the window part of the way down, and he did not look at Roberts. Roberts saw what appeared to be two radar detectors on the center of the truck’s dashboard.
Roberts asked Bloomfield to sit in the patrol car while he ran a radio check on the license. Bloomfield opened the truck door only slightly, squeezing himself out through a narrow opening. As the truck door was opened, Roberts noticed a “masking odor” of deodorant, and he saw a pager attached to Bloomfield’s waistband as they walked toward the patrol car.
In the patrol car, Roberts asked Bloomfield where he was coming from and where he was going. Bloomfield said that he had been working in Arizona, and was going to his home in North Carolina after stopping in Pennsylvania to visit his fiancee. Roberts then asked the name of the company Bloom*913field worked for in Arizona, but Bloomfield evaded the question. Roberts also asked the name of the town in Pennsylvania Bloomfield planned to visit, and Bloomfield refused to give the name. Roberts observed that Bloomfield still seemed to be very nervous, was perspiring, swallowing and breathing heavily, and constantly moving his feet or fingers. Roberts finally asked Bloomfield if he was carrying anything illegal in the truck. Bloomfield, after hesitating, said no. Roberts then asked if he could search the truck, and Bloomfield again said no.
Roberts decided to call for a drug dog to check the truck and told Bloomfield of these plans. Roberts requested that the dog be sent as quickly as possible from Phelps County, the closest county with a drug dog, and, if the Phelps County dog was unavailable, from any State Highway Patrol troop that had a dog immediately available. Sergeant John S. Betts arrived, called by Roberts for assistance, and got into the back seat of the patrol car. Bloomfield asked if he were under arrest; Roberts and Betts told him that he was not.
While they were waiting for the dog to arrive, Bloomfield told Betts that he needed to use the bathroom, but that he did not want to go to a police station where there would be other police officers. Roberts and Betts then escorted Bloomfield, who drove his own truck, to the nearest zone office, about a ten-minute drive away. There were no other police officers at the zone office. While there, Bloomfield asked Roberts how long he would have to wait, and Roberts responded that he would hold Bloomfield until the dog arrived, unless he felt that the waiting period was becoming unreasonably long. Bloomfield waited outside the office, where he smoked several cigarettes; the officers waited inside.
About one hour after Roberts originally stopped Bloomfield, the dog arrived at the zone office and “alerted” to the cargo compartment of the rental truck, indicating the presence of drugs. Roberts placed Bloomfield under arrest and searched the truck, finding a range of deodorant products, including “Stick-Ups,” “Renuzit,” dog repellent, pet deodorizer and ammonia, and 797 pounds of marijuana.
Bloomfield moved to suppress the evidence found during the search of his rental truck. Following a hearing, the district court denied the motion and admitted the evidence. Before trial, Bloomfield entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress, and was sentenced to sixty months imprisonment, a $50 special assessment, and five years of supervised release by the district court. Bloomfield appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress, and the district court was reversed by a majority of the circuit court panel. This rehearing en bane followed.
II. THE DISTRICT COURT’S FINDINGS
The district court’s explicit factual findings are unfortunately limited to finding that the stop was not pretextual, that Roberts smelled a “masking odor” from the truck when Bloomfield exited, and that the dog was summoned promptly and arrived within a reasonable time; the court made no other factual findings regarding the circumstances leading up to the arrival of the dog. Hearing Tr. at 94. Rule 12(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that “[wjhere factual issues are involved in determining a motion, the [trial] court shall state its essential findings on the record.” Three circuit courts have held, however, that the failure of a district court to state the factual findings underlying its decision on a motion to suppress does not necessitate a remand. See, e.g., United States v. Yeagin, 927 F.2d 798, 800 (5th Cir.1991); United States v. Griffin, 7 F.3d 1512, 1516 (10th Cir.1993); United States v. Harley, 990 F.2d 1340, 1341 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 236, 126 L.Ed.2d 190 (1993). These circuits will uphold a district court’s decision on a motion to suppress despite lack of factual findings if, on review of the record, they find that “any reasonable view of the evidence supports [the district court’s decision].” Harley, 990 F.2d at 1340; see also Yeagin, 927 F.2d at 800; Griffin, 7 F.3d at 1516. In United States v. Williams, the D.C. *914Circuit explained the rationale behind this approach:
The stated rationale is that Rule 12(e) confers on the litigants a personal “right” to have factual findings made, and that “failure to object” to a lack of findings “results in waiver.” This has the effect of denying defendants (and the government if it should appeal the granting of a suppression motion) a windfall when the trial court omits a finding apparent on the face of the record, or when, under any possible view of the record, the district court could have reached but one result.
... The idea ... is that the district court, in reaching its legal conclusion, presumably made whatever factual findings were needed to support the conclusion. Denying a remand because of “waiver,” then, means we review facts we infer were actually, albeit silently, found.
951 F.2d 1287, 1290-91 (D.C.Cir.1991) (citations omitted).2
This approach to inadequate Rule 12(e) findings of fact is consistent with this circuit’s longstanding approach to Rule 12(e)’s analogue in civil procedure, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), which requires trial courts to make findings of fact specially. We have held that if the record “sufficiently informs th[is] court of the basis for the trial court’s decision on the material issue” presented, a remand for further findings is not required. Maxwell v. Mason, 668 F.2d 361, 362 (8th Cir.1981) (quoting Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Corrections, 505 F.2d 194, 213 n. 16 (8th Cir.1974)); see Charles v. Allstate Ins. Co., 932 F.2d 1265, 1269 (8th Cir.1991). “If there can be no genuine dispute about how the trial court actually resolved the facts missing from its express findings,” an appellate court may affirm a decision based on incomplete findings.3 Charles, 932 F.2d at 1269 (quoting Ferguson v. Hill, 846 F.2d 20, 21 (5th Cir.1988)); see also Steven Alan Childress, A Standards of Review Primer, 125 F.R.D. 319, 325 (1989). Two circuits have held that if the district court’s findings of fact are not in strict compliance with Rule 12(e), remand for further findings is required. See United States v. Moore, 936 F.2d 287, 288 (6th Cir.1991); United States v. Prieto-Villa, 910 F.2d 601, 610 (9th Cir.1990). Under the reasoning above, we decline to join these circuits, and apply the “any reasonable view of the evidence” test to the district court’s *915decision to deny Bloomfield’s motion to suppress.
Although, on the issue of reasonable suspicion, the district court specially found only that Roberts did smell a “masking odor” from the truck, its finding that this gave rise to reasonable suspicion that Bloomfield was carrying drugs indicates that the court treated Roberts’ testimony at the suppression hearing as credible.4 In addition, the Presentence Investigation Report prepared for the district court and accepted by that court in its entirety lists the facts of the encounter between Roberts and Bloomfield as recounted by Roberts at the suppression hearing.5 Sentencing Addendum, July 30, 1993; Presentence Investigation Report at 3-1. Because the district court’s legal basis for denying Bloomfield’s motion to suppress^ reasonable suspicion, is stated on the record, and because a reasonable view of the evidence can support this decision, we find a remand unnecessary.
III. DISCUSSION
A. The Traffic Stop
Bloomfield argues that the initial traffic stop was pretextual, and thus violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unlawful searches and seizures.
We review the district court’s finding that the initial stop was not pretextual for clear error. See United States v. Richards, 967 F.2d 1189, 1192 (8th Cir.1992). Any traffic violation, however minor, provides probable cause for a traffic stop. United States v. Barahona, 990 F.2d 412, 416 (8th Cir.1993). If the officer is legally authorized to stop the driver, any additional “underlying intent or motivation” does not invalidate the stop. United States v. Cummins, 920 F.2d 498, 501 (8th Cir.1990), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 428, 116 L.Ed.2d 448 and 449 (1991). The district court credited Roberts’ testimony that he saw Bloomfield change lanes abruptly and without signaling. This constitutes a legitimate reason for a traffic stop, see United States v. Johnson, 28 F.3d 1487, 1495 (8th Cir.1994), and we hold that the district court did not err when it found that the stop was not pretextual.
Once Roberts stopped Bloomfield, he was entitled to conduct an investigation “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place.” Cummins, 920 F.2d at 502. This reasonable investigation includes asking for the driver’s license and registration, requesting that the driver sit in the patrol car, and asking the driver about his destination and purpose. See Barahona, 990 F.2d at 416 (questioning a driver stopped for “drifting” and changing lanes without signaling about destination and purpose within scope of stop); Richards, 967 F.2d at 1193 (asking driver stopped for “swerving” lane change to sit in patrol car within scope of stop).6 Rob*916erts asked for Bloomfield’s license and rental agreement, requested that Bloomfield accompany him to the patrol car while he radio-checked the license, and, while waiting for the check to be completed, asked Bloomfield about his purpose and destination. Our cases sanction all of these actions as within the scope of a traffic stop. The reasonable scope of the initial traffic stop, therefore, extends up to' .the moment when Roberts asked Bloomfield if he could search the rental truck.
B. The Seizure
Bloomfield next argues that his detention while waiting for the drug dog to arrive was a de facto arrest. We review the question of whether the seizure and detention of Bloomfield and his truck amounted to an arrest de novo. United States v. Miller, 974 F.2d 953, 956 (8th Cir.1992).
Stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3148-49, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983). “[A] person has been seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.” United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980). The subjective intent of the seizing officer is irrelevant if not communicated to the suspect. Id. n. 6. “[B]oth investigative stops and arrests are ‘seizures,’ but an investigative stop must be supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot, whereas an arrest must be supported by probable cause.” Miller, 974 F.2d at 956 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25-30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1882-85, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)).
Bloomfield and his truck were seized at the time of the initial stop, and that seizure extended throughout the waiting period until the dog “alerted” to the truck. Roberts testified that, after he radioed for the dog, Bloomfield expressed a desire to leave the site of the stop:
Q: What did you inform him when he requested to leave at the scene of the initial stop?
A [Roberts]: Again he asked to go on and use the rest room. We said no he wasn’t. He asked me how long he was going to have to wait, and I told him I did not know how long it would be. And he asked if he could go, and we told him there was nowhere to go at the 150 marker, his vehicle was staying there.
Hearing Tr. at 33. Roberts testified that Bloomfield again asked if he could leave at the zone office:
Q: At the zone office, then, he did request to leave; is that correct?
A [Roberts]: Again he said [sic] asked if I was going to hold him all night, and I said I didn’t intend to hold him there all night, but I would just hold him as long as I felt was reasonable.
Hearing Tr. at 34.
The initial seizure of Bloomfield and the truck was thus extended throughout the waiting period; Roberts testified that he said that he was holding the truck, and that he told Bloomfield that, without the truck, there was nowhere to go. Under these circumstances, a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave.
We consider both the length of the detention and the efforts of police to conduct their investigation quickly and unintrusively in' determining whether a detention is reasonable in the context of an investigative stop: “[A]n investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Similarly, the investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer’s suspicion in a short period of time.” United States v. Willis, 967 F.2d 1220, 1224 (8th Cir.1992) (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1325-26, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983)).
Although “[t]here is no bright line of demarcation between investigative stops and arrests,” Miller, 974 F.2d at 957, a de facto arrest occurs when “ ‘the officers’ conduct is more intrusive than necessary for *917an investigative stop,”’ United States v. Jones, 759 F.2d 633, 643 (8th Cir.) (quoting United States v. Rose, 731 F.2d 1337, 1342 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 931, 105 S.Ct. 326, 83 L.Ed.2d 263 (1984)), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 837, 106 S.Ct. 113, 88 L.Ed.2d 92 (1985). Time is an important factor in distinguishing between an investigative stop and a defacto arrest: There is “no rigid time limitation on Terry stops,” United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1575, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985), but a stop may be too long if it involves “delay unnecessary to the legitimate investigation of the law enforcement officers,” id. at 687, 105 S.Ct. at 1576. Another factor is “the degree of fear and humiliation that the police conduct engenders.” United States v. Lego, 855 F.2d 542, 544-45 (8th Cir.1988) (citation omitted). The courts have also held that transporting a suspect to another location or isolating him from others can create an arrest. See Rose, 731 F.2d at 1342. Additional factors that may weigh in favor of an arrest are subjecting a suspect to unnecessary delays, handcuffing him, or confining him in a police car. See Willis, 967 F.2d at 1224.
In Sharpe, the Court found that a twenty-minute detention was reasonable when the police acted diligently and defendant contributed to the delay. 470 U.S. at 686-88, 105 S.Ct. at 1575-77. In United States v. Place, the Court found that a ninety-minute detention of defendant’s luggage was unreasonable when agents did not act diligently to minimize the delay. 462 U.S. 696, 709-10, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 2645-46, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983). Only one hour passed between approximately 7 p.m., when Roberts pulled Bloomfield over, and 8 p.m., when Roberts arrested Bloomfield after the dog indicated that there were drugs in the rental truck. During this time, Roberts acted diligently to verify his suspicions as quickly as possible. He radioed for the drug dog only about six minutes after stopping Bloomfield, and specifically requested that a dog be sent as soon as possible from the closest possible location. Hearing Tr. at 12, 15. When police need the assistance of a drug dog in roadside Terry stops, it will in general take time to obtain one; local government police forces and the state highway patrol cannot be expected to have drug dogs immediately available to all officers in the field at all times. Courts must “consider the law enforcement purposes to be served by the stop as well as the time reasonably needed to effectuate those purposes”7 Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 685, 105 S.Ct. at 1575 (citations omitted). The one-hour period between the time Roberts pulled Bloomfield over and the time Roberts arrested Bloomfield was not an unreasonable period to wait for a drug dog to verify Roberts’ suspicion. Cf. United States v. Frost, 999 F.2d 737, 741-42 (3d Cir.) (finding that a wait of almost one hour for a drug dog was reasonable), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 573, 126 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993). The length of the detention was reasonable, and Roberts acted diligently to minimize the detention period.
The other circumstances surrounding the seizure also did not transform it into an arrest requiring a showing of probable cause. Roberts did not subject Bloomfield to any intrusion or restraint beyond that necessary for his investigation. He told Bloomfield that he was not under arrest. Hearing Tr. at 9. See United States v. Zukas, 843 F.2d 179, 183 (5th Cir.1988) (that officers told suspect that he was not under arrest contributed to finding that seizure was not a de facto arrest), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1019, 109 S.Ct. 1742, 104 L.Ed.2d 179 (1989). Bloomfield himself asked to leave the site of the initial stop, and Roberts accommodated Bloomfield’s request. Bloomfield was not physically restrained in any way. The officers did not impound the truck, nor did they remove it from the two locations where they and Bloomfield waited for the dog. They did not search the truck until after the dog had provided probable cause to do so. This detention does not rise to the level of a de facto arrest; Roberts and Betts accommodated Bloomfield’s requests and respected his free*918dom of movement and privacy, employing the least intrusive means of detention reasonably necessary to achieve their investigative purpose. Therefore, if Roberts had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot, his seizure of Bloomfield and the truck did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
C. The Terry Standard
Bloomfield also argues that his detention pending arrival of the drug dog was a seizure made without reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity. If, during a traffic stop, an officer develops a reasonable, articulable suspicion that a vehicle is carrying contraband, he has “justification for a greater intrusion unrelated to the traffic offense.”8 Cummins, 920 F.2d at 502. We assess the factors on which an officer based his claim of reasonable suspicion as a totality and in light of the officer’s experience. Barahona, 990 F.2d at 416.
We review the factual findings of the district court as to what the parties said or did for clear error; we review the district court’s finding that the Fourth Amendment has not been violated de novo. See United States v. Garcia, 23 F.3d 1331, 1334 (8th Cir.1994); cf. United States v. McKines, 933 F.2d 1412, 1426 (8th Cir.) (en banc) (whether a Fourth Amendment seizure occurred rests on a reasonable person’s belief about the surrounding circumstances, and is a legal characterization that must be reviewed de novo), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 593, 116 L.Ed.2d 617 (1991).
Officer Roberts had a reasonable suspicion that Bloomfield was transporting drugs when Bloomfield exited his rental truck to accompany Roberts to the patrol car. While there is a possible innocent explanation for each of the factors cited by Roberts if examined separately, as a totality they were sufficient to create a reasonable suspicion that Bloomfield was transporting drugs.9 “[A] series of acts that appear innocent, when viewed separately, may warrant further investigation when viewed together.” United States v. Weaver, 966 F.2d 391, 394 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 829, 121 L.Ed.2d 699 (1992).
Although it is customary for people to be “somewhat nervous” when Roberts pulls them over, it is unusual for people to “fidget” as Bloomfield did when the stop is a “normal *919Hearing Tr. at 16; routine” traffic stop.10 see, e.g., Weaver, 966 F.2d at 396 (defendant’s extreme nervousness, exceeding people’s ordinary nervousness when stopped by police, contributed to reasonable suspicion). Roberts was also able to attach significance to the strong “masking odor” based on his experience and training in drug interdiction. Cf. United States v. Ojeda, 23 F.3d 1473, 1476 (8th Cir.1994) (strong masking odor in car contributed to holding that jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knew there were drugs in car). Similarly, the significance of a pager is familiar to law enforcement officers. See United States v. Barth, 990 F.2d 422, 425 (8th Cir.1993) (a pager is a “tool of the drug trade”). We hold that the sum of Roberts’ observations examined in light of his training and experience constitute a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Bloomfield’s rental truck contained drugs, justifying the seizure and detention of Bloomfield and the truck.
D. The Search
Bloomfield’s final argument that the warrantless search of the truck after the drug dog “alerted” was invalid requires only brief discussion. A dog’s identification of drugs in luggage or in a car provides probable cause that drugs are present. Place, 462 U.S. at 706, 103 S.Ct. at 2644; United States v. Stone, 866 F.2d 359, 363 (10th Cir.1989). Once probable cause is established, a car can be searched without a warrant under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 1981-82, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1969). After the drug dog “alerted,” Roberts and Betts had probable cause to search the truck, and, under the automobile exception,- did not need to obtain a warrant to make a valid search.
IY. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, we affirm the decision of the district court.
. The Honorable Russell G. Clark, Senior Judge, United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri.
. The court found that Williams required remand because the district court had not stated the legal basis for its denial of Williams' motion to suppress: "If we knew the district court's legal reasoning in this case, we might have little difficulty in ascertaining the pertinent but unstated findings underlying it.” Williams, 951 F.2d at 1291.
In Williams, although the court remanded for both factual findings and conclusions of law, the reason for the remand was not the lack of factual findings, but the fact that the appellate court could not discover from the record on what legal basis the district court’s decision rested: the circuit court stated that "[t]he record suggests three possible grounds on which the district court could have ruled,” consent, search incident to arrest, or reasonable suspicion. Id. at 1289-90. The passage from Williams cited by the dissent itself supports this reading of Williams, stating that remand is needed when the district court "not only” fails to make findings of fact, "but also” does not state its legal reasoning. Id. at 1288. This suggests that the district court’s failure to state legal reasoning, not its failure to find facts, was the dispositive ground for remand. In United States v. Taylor, the D.C. Circuit again discussed remand in the context, not of inadequate findings of fact, but of failure to state a legal conclusion: "We are somewhat troubled because the District Court ... never expressed a conclusion that the officers had probable cause to arrest Taylor.” 997 F.2d 1551, 1554 (D.C.Cir.1993). Again, the passage cited by the dissent supports this reading, stating that remand is not necessary absent "findings of fact and conclusions of law" if the evidence is uncontested or found credible by the district court. Id. at 1554-55 (emphasis added). The dissent neglects to acknowledge that its quoted passages from both Williams and Taylor apply to situations where the district court failed to state its conclusions of law, not merely its findings of fact; in the instant case, the court, specifically found that Roberts had reasonable suspicion to detain Bloomfield.
. In Charles, plaintiff claimed disparate treat- . ment, alleging that she was discharged, rather than demoted, because of her race. There was directly conflicting testimony on the question of whether Allstate Insurance had a practice of demoting, rather than discharging, managers who had performance difficulties, and the district court made no findings of fact on this issue. 932 F.2d at 1269. We held that “[a]n examination of the whole record shows that the trial court gave appropriate weight to the testimony,” id., even though the district court had made no credibility determination. Id. at 1269-70.
. Although Bloomfield denied that he was excessively nervous when giving Roberts his license and while sitting in the patrol car, the question of whether Roberts had reasonable suspicion centers on Roberts' perception of the facts, not on how Bloomfield actually felt. See United States v. Weaver, 966 F.2d 391, 396 (8th Cir.1992) (drug courier's nervousness, manifested by unsteady, rapid speech, tremulous hand, and swaying body, "struck the officers as exceeding that exhibited by non-drug-carrying passengers”) (emphasis added).
. These facts include that: Roberts observed that Bloomfield was breathing heavily, his hands were shaking, and his eyes were red; Roberts saw a radar and a laser detector on the truck's dashboard; Bloomfield “squeezed” out of the truck's door; Roberts noticed the smell of deodorizers; Bloomfield carried a pager; Bloomfield's answers to questions were evasive, and he failed to give his employer's name or the name of the Pennsylvania town he said he was going to visit; and Bloomfield initially acted as if he did not hear Roberts ask him if he could search the truck. Presentence Investigation Report at 3-4.
."[Qluestions [about purpose and destination] were reasonably related to ascertaining the reasons for Barahona's erratic driving and whether he posed a danger to others on the road.” Barahona, 990 F.2d at 416. In Barahona, the police officer asked Barahona to sit in the patrol car and asked him where he was going and why before discovering that his license did not check out and that there were irregularities in the rental contract for his car. Id. at 414. Roberts testified that he wanted to see if Bloomfield had been drinking or falling asleep at the wheel. Hearing Tr. at 6. Under the reasoning of Bara-hona, therefore, Roberts’ asking Bloomfield to sit in the patrol car and where he was going and why were within the scope of the initial traffic stop.
. In both- Place and Royer, the Supreme Court has suggested that the use of drug dogs in examining suspect luggage is- valuable as often the fastest and least intrusive method of resolving suspicions during an investigative stop. 462 U.S. at 709 n. 9, 103 S.Ct. at 2646 n. 9; 460 U.S. at 505-06, 103 S.Ct. at 1328-29.
. In Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court held that when the police are dealing with "necessarily swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat — which historically has not been, and as a practical matter could not be, subjected to the warrant procedure,” a limited search and seizure does not require probable cause, but "specific and articu-lable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant th[e] intrusion.” 392 U.S. at 20-21, 88 S.Ct. at 1880. Our recent decision in United States v. Hogan, 25 F.3d 690 (8th Cir.1994), is inapposite to the instant case, and application of our Hogan ruling to this case would be directly contrary to the Supreme Court's decision that probable cause is not required for reasonable on-the-spot investigations.
Hogan held that, when police had prepared information about and surveillance of a suspect ahead of time, knew his address and workplace, were observing his residence, and had obtained search warrants for his residence and truck, they could not seize his automobile and his person, for which they did not have a warrant, without probable cause. 25 F.3d at 691-93. This was not necessarily swift action predicated upon on-the-spot observations, but a carefully planned search and arrest that went awry. Officer Roberts, unlike the officers in Hogan, was handling a classic Terry situation: he made on-the-spot observations that led him to believe that criminal activity was afoot at that moment, and had to make an immediate decision whether to investigate further or to send Bloomfield on his way to tm unknown destination. Under Terry, we do not apply the probable cause standard to these circumstances.
. If an officer can cite only one or two factors such as nervousness or out-of-state license plates or identification, he may not have a reasonable suspicion to seize a person pending investigation. See, e.g., Garcia, 23 F.3d at 1335-36 (holding that a driver with a Texas license and a passenger with Mexican identification driving a truck full of furniture boxes westwsird through Nebraska did not provide police with a reasonable suspicion); United States v. White, 890 F.2d 1413, 1417 (8th Cir.1989) (holding that an airline passenger fitting drug courier profile who appeared to be nervous did not provide police with a reasonable suspicion), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 825, 111 S.Ct. 77, 112 L.Ed.2d 50 (1990). Roberts cited at least six factors that, taken together, excited his suspicion.
. The dissent attempts to narrow the concept of reasonable suspicion by discounting “subjective perceptions” of law enforcement officers as factors supporting reasonable suspicion. This would constitute a dramatic departure from our previous case law: we have often held that nervousness and other "subjective perceptions” are valid factors supporting reasonable suspicion. See, e.g., Richards, 967 F.2d at 1193; Weaver, 966 F.2d at 396; Cummins, 920 F.2d at 500.