concurring specially.
I concur in the result reached by the court. It is consistent with my dissent in the origi*1165nal panel opinion. 20 F.3d 348, 353 (8th Cir.1994). I write separately to express my continuing disagreement with the court’s conclusion that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred at any time during this stop and search.
First, the officer’s contraband inquiry was permissible as part of the legitimate traffic stop. The officer’s questions did not expand the detention beyond the limits of United States v. Cummins and United States v. Barahona. I reject the court’s hypertechnical parsing of the subject matter of the questions to reach a contrary result.
Second, the officer’s discussion of guns and drugs was permissible as a prelude to the officer’s request for permission to search the vehicle. A request to search need not consist of a single, isolated statement. The officer’s interest in contraband was a part of this request, a request which the court now recognizes as valid.
Third, even assuming that the officer’s queries regarding contraband exceeded the scope of the traffic stop, the inquiry was permissible under Terry v. Ohio. I agree with the district court’s conclusion that on the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing, the officer had a sufficient, objective basis to question Salvador Ramos about matters beyond the scope of the traffic stop.
The court makes much of the point that each act and each answer of the Ramoses, when viewed in isolation, could be deemed “consistent with innocent behavior.” Supra at 1163. This court pointed out, however, in our recent en banc opinion in United States v. Bloomfield, 40 F.3d 910, 918 (8th Cir.1994), that “[w]e assess the factors on which an officer base[s] his claim of reasonable suspicion as a totality and in light of the officer’s experience.” As we said, “ ‘[A] series of acts that appear innocent, when viewed separately, may warrant further investigation when viewed together.’ ” Id. at 918 (quoting United States v. Weaver, 966 F.2d 391, 394 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 113 S.Ct. 829, 121 L.Ed.2d 699 (1992)). That was clearly the situation here.
Thus, there was no Fourth Amendment violation. I would affirm on that basis,