concurring in part and dissenting in part.
While I agree that abstention from adjudicating Russell Kelm’s equitable claims is proper under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), my analysis of the abstention principles differs somewhat from that employed by the majority to reach that result. Also, I agree that dismissal of Kelm’s damages claims is not proper in light of Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 108 S.Ct. 523, 98 L.Ed.2d 529 (1988), but I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to address the damages claims on the merits. I therefore write separately.
I.
The district court in this case found Younger abstention applicable to Kelm’s constitutional claims for injunctive relief. An appeals court reviews the decision to abstain de novo. Traughber v. Beauchane, 760 F.2d 673, 676 (6th Cir.1985).
In Younger, the Supreme Court refused to enjoin a state prosecution under the California Criminal Syndicalism Act for the purpose of determining that statute’s federal constitutionality. In so doing, the Court created judicial precedent for a fundamental policy against federal court interference with state court proceedings. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43, 91 S.Ct. at 750. The Court grounded this policy in notions of equity, comity, and federalism. The equity component counsels abstention “when the moving party has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief.” Id. at 43-44, 91 S.Ct. at 750. Comity reflects respect for state judicial institutions. Id. Similarly, federalism requires sensitivity to the states’ prerogative to protect primarily state interests. Id.; see also Zalman v. Armstrong, 802 F.2d 199, 201-02 (6th Cir.1986).
Younger has been extended to some civil contexts. See, e.g., Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, *423Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 107 S.Ct. 1519, 95 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (state suit for tortious interference with contract); Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Schs., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 106 S.Ct. 2718, 91 L.Ed.2d 512 (1986) (state administrative agency proceeding); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 95 S.Ct. 1200, 43 L.Ed.2d 482 (1975) (civil suit involving state nuisance statute). In Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982), the Supreme Court defined the analysis for determining when to abstain. First, is there a pending state proceeding? Second, does the proceeding implicate important state interests? Third, is there an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional challenges in the state proceeding? If the answer to each of these questions is yes, the federal court must abstain. Id. at 432, 102 S.Ct. at 2521.1
A.'
At the time Kelm filed this federal action, the state divorce proceeding was pending. This satisfies the first prong of the Middle-sex inquiry. See, e.g., Kenner v. Morris, 600 F.2d 22, 24 (6th Cir.1979) (finding abstention appropriate where alimony proceeding pending). Whether the state divorce proceeding is, pending now is irrelevant for purposes of the abstention analysis. See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 17 n. 16, 107 S.Ct. 1519, 1529 n. 16, 95 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (finding state proceeding to satisfy Middlesex test even though state court denied rehearing due to procedural default); Zalman, 802 F.2d at 202-05.
B.
The state divorce proceeding fulfills the second prong of the Middlesex inquiry. It is well-recognized that the area of domestic relations is primarily a state interest. See Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 435, 99 S.Ct. 2371, 2383, 60 L.Ed.2d 994 (1979) (abstaining in case involving ex parte temporary child custody order); Parker v. Turner, 626 F.2d 1, 4 & n. 7 (6th Cir.1980). Furthermore, a civil protection order is quasi-criminal in nature, making the policy of Younger directly apt. Therefore, the state proceeding involves Ohio’s vital interest in the ordering of divorcing parties’ affairs and the prevention of domestic violence.
While I find the majority’s use of Ankenbrandt v. Richards, — U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2206, 119 L.Ed.2d 468 (1992), misleading, I agree that Ankenbrandt does not hinder the conclusion that Younger abstention is proper as to Kelm’s equitable claims. Ankenbrandt involved a tort suit brought in federal court by a citizen of Missouri against her former husband and his female companion, both citizens of Louisiana. The plaintiff sought monetary damages for the defendants’ alleged abuse of her children, whose father is the plaintiff’s ex-husband. The district court dismissed the case on two grounds, abstention and the domestic relations exception to federal diversity jurisdiction, and the court of appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion. Id. at-, 112 S.Ct. at 2209.
In reversing the lower courts, the Supreme Court confirmed the vitality of the domestic relations exception to federal diversity jurisdiction, but circumscribed the exception’s application. Id. at — -, 112 S.Ct. at 2213-15. While some language in the opinion suggests that the exception is limited to suits requesting the issuance of a divorce, alimony, or child custody decree, the Court’s discussion of abstention, which is a doctrine distinct from the question of jurisdiction, does not,rule out the relevance of abstention principles in cases where the domestic relations exception is inapplicable. Id. at- -, 112 S.Ct. at 2215-16. Therefore, Ank-enbrandt does not speak to the issue of whether the second Younger criterion is satisfied in this case.
*424The majority also responds to Kelm’s broad argument that Younger abstention does not apply to civil rights cases. The majority writes, “Younger was a civil rights action and we have consistently extended its principles to actions filed pursuant to § 1983.” See op. at 419. I think it is important to clarify this statement. The phrase “civil rights action” has come to mean an action filed under one of the civil rights statutes. Younger involved a facial challenge to a state statute on First Amendment grounds, not a suit against a government official under' a civil rights statute. Therefore, Younger was a civil rights action in the sense that the First Amendment creates and protects civil rights. That said, I agree with the majority that Younger properly extends to federal suits under the civil rights statutes. See, e.g., Pennzoil, 481 U.S. 1, 107 S.Ct. 1519 (action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Mann v. Conlin, 22 F.3d 100 (6th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 193, 130 L.Ed.2d 126 (1994).
C.
The third prong of the abstention analysis focuses on the adequacy of the state court proceeding to entertain the constitutional challenges. Kelm has twice attempted to challenge the constitutionality of Ohio Revised Code § 3313.31 in state court. First, although the CPO had been granted in a separate domestic violence case, Kelm filed a notice of appeal in the pending divorce action, seeking to contest the granting of the CPO. The state court of appeals dismissed the appeal, finding that the order granting the CPO had been filed in the divorce action as well as the domestic violence action but was not a final, appealable order. See In re Kelm, No. 90AP-623 (Franklin Cty.Ct.App. Mar. 26, 1991). Then Kelm obtained the dismissal of Amy Kelm’s domestic violence ease, which, had inadvertently remained pending despite the parties’ settlement. Kelm filed an appeal of that dismissal, again seeking an opportunity to dispute the constitutionality of the Ohio CPO statute. In Kelm v. Kelm, No. 92AP-1683, 1993 WL 220881 (Franklin Cty.Ct.App. June 10, 1993), dismissed, 67 Ohio St.3d 1510, 622 N.E.2d 658 (1993), the state court of appeals refused to reach the merits of the claim, not due to unwillingness or lack of authority, but due to the mootness of Kelm’s claims. The court reasoned that a party may not appeal a judgment that was granted at his request. Id.
Kelm has not attempted to challenge the constitutionality of Ohio Rule 75(H) in state court. Under such circumstances, the state court proceedings are presumed adequate:
[Wjhen a litigant has not attempted to present his federal claims in related state-court proceedings, a federal court should assume that state procedures will afford an adequate remedy, in the absence of unambiguous authority to the contrary.
Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 15, 107 S.Ct. 1519, 1528, 95 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987). Kelm contends, however, that filing an appeal prior to the resolution of the divorce case would be fruitless because the TROs are, like the CPO, merely interlocutory in nature. Kelm therefore insists the state courts are inadequate because, as proven by his two attempts at appeal, the state courts afford no opportunity for review of the constitutionality of CPOs and TROs until the resolution of the divorce case.
Kelm’s argument is not persuasive. Kelm raised this issue at oral argument only, and he has not offered “unambiguous authority” for the proposition that the delay entailed in applying the finality doctrine denies him an adequate opportunity for review and redress. Indeed, case law suggests that, notwithstanding the delay inherent in the finality doctrine, an opportunity to raise constitutional claims is adequate even though such opportunity arises only upon appellate review. In Watts v. Burkhart, 854 F.2d 839 (6th Cir.1988), a case later heard en banc on other grounds, the plaintiff contended that the opportunity to raise constitutional claims was inadequate because the administrative Board of Medical Examiners had concluded his claims were not within the Board’s scope of review. This Court found that the opportunity for judicial review of the administrative proceeding was not inadequate for purposes of abstention analysis: “[W]e are unpersuaded that Watts will not have an adequate opportunity to *425raise Ms constitutional claims at some point in the state proceedings.” Id. at 848. This Court’s decision was well-grounded in Supreme Court authority involving analogous situations. See Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Schs., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 629, 106 S.Ct. 2718, 2723-24, 91 L.Ed.2d 512 (1986); Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 436 & n. 15, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 2523-24 & n. 15, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982) (noting that judicial review of the admimstrative proceeding was available and adequate even where interlocutory review had been denied).
Moreover, there is no indication in the record that delay will harm Kelm’s interests. The CPO has been withdrawn; therefore, even if the imposition of the CPO caused Kelm constitutional injury, wMch I do not concede, no further injury can accrue. Under Rule 75(H), Kelm may petition for vacation or modification of the TRO at any time. Presumably, one basis for a motion to vacate is the alleged unconstitutionality of the rule that authorized the TROs. Indeed, Kelm received review of the TROs several times. Thus, the postponement of the hearing.on the constitutional claims until issuance of a final order does not render the state proceedings inadequate for purposes of Younger abstention.2
Accordingly, the district court properly abstained from adjudicating Kelm’s claims for equitable relief. See Mann v. Conlin, 22 F.3d 100, 105-06 (6th Cir.1994) (applying Younger abstention under similar circumstances).
II.
The district court also abstained from adjudicating Kelm’s claims for monetary relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Citing Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 108 S.Ct. 523, 98 L.Ed.2d 529 (1988), and Litteral v. Bach, 869 F.2d 297 (6th Cir.1989), the majority independently addresses Kelm’s claim for monetary damages under § 1983, because abstention is improper “where [pending] state proceedings can not address a party’s claim for monetary relief_” See op. at 421. The majority then affords qualified immunity to the Columbus police officers and finds the state action requirement lacking with respect to Amy Kelm.3 For these reasons, the majority dismisses the § 1983 damages claims for failure to state a claim.
I agree with the majority that Deakins and Litteral bar dismissal of Kelm’s monetary claims on abstention grounds. OMo courts of common pleas may entertain actions against state actors based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Schwarz v. Board of Trustees, 31 Ohio St.3d 267, 510 N.E.2d 808 (1987); Jackson v. Kurtz, 65 Ohio App.2d 152, 416 N.E.2d 1064 (1979). Russell Kelm filed the divorce action in the domestic relations division of the court of common pleas for Franklin County. I acknowledge that Ohio law gives domestic relations judges the same capacity to receive jurisdiction as the common pleas judges, see Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2301.03(A) (Anderson *426Supp.1992); however, the parties have cited to this Court no Ohio statute, and I am aware of none, actually granting Ohio domestic relations courts jurisdiction over § 1983 claims for monetary damages. Similarly, the parties have not identified any Ohio case in which a domestic relations court in fact exercised such jurisdiction.
While the majority’s application of Dea-kins and Litteral is proper, I find the remainder of the majority’s analysis inadvisable. At the time the district court ordered dismissal on abstention grounds, the defendants’ motions for summary judgment were pending. Because the district court abstained from adjudicating Kelm’s damages claims, the district court never issued a ruling on the claims’ merits. Upon review of the record, I cannot say with conviction that Kelm is unable to allege any set of facts which will state a claim against the police officers. Similarly, under Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982), it is conceivable that Kelm states a claim against Amy Kelm based on her invocation of state procedures for securing a CPO and the involvement of the officers in executing that order. Also, the question arises whether the defendants are entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity or an analogous good faith defense. See id. at 942 n. 23, 102 S.Ct. at 2756 n. 23. Under the facts of this case, the district court, not this Court, should determine in the first instance whether Kelm’s damages claims fail on the pleadings or on motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, I would remand Kelm’s damages claims to the district court for consideration.
. Citing Federal Express Corp. v. Tennessee Public Service Comm’n, 925 F.2d 962 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 812, 112 S.Ct. 59, 116 L.Ed.2d 35 (1991), and Nilsson v. Ruppert, Bronson & Chicarelli Co., 888 F.2d 452 (6th Cir.1989), the majority credits the Sixth Circuit with the derivation of this test. But this three-pronged test is not merely Sixth Circuit authority. Rather, it is explicitly laid out by the Supreme Court in Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432, 102 S.Ct. at 2521. In Nilsson and Federal Express, the Sixth Circuit merely followed Supreme Court precedent, as we are bound to do.
. In assessing the adequacy of the state proceedings, the majority observes, "The facts in Pennzoil resemble those before us.” See op. at 420. I think this statement is misleading. Pennzoil did not involve a civil protection or temporary restraining order in the context of a divorce action. Far from it, Pennzoil involved a state suit Pennzoil brought against Texaco for tortious interference with Pennzoil's agreement to purchase stock from Getty Oil Co. Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 4, 107 S.Ct. at 1522. After the jury verdict against Texaco, but before entry of judgment, Texaco filed a federal suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the Texas procedures for enforcement of a judgment violated Texaco’s constitutional rights. Id. at 6-7, 107 S.Ct. at 1523-24.
The relevant similarity is not between the "facts,” but between Texaco’s and Kelm’s procedural failure to present constitutional claims to the state court rather than filing a § 1983 action in federal court. Even this similarity is imperfect, however, because Texaco failed to raise any of its constitutional claims in state court, see id. at 6, 17, 107 S.Ct. at 1523, 1529, while Kelm raised some (those respecting the CPO) and not others (those respecting the TROs).
. The majority does not address the § 1983 liability of defendants Parkhurst and Weber because "Kelm specifically dismissed defendants Parkhurst and Weber from his damages claim....” Op. at 421. This characterization of Kelm's actions with respect to Parkhurst and Weber is not quite accurate. Rather, Kelm stated in a memorandum to the district court that "there was no intention in the Complaint to include [Parkhurst and Weber] within the scope of" the damages claim.