dissenting in part and concurring in part, in which KRAVITCH and HATCHETT, Circuit Judges, join:
I dissent from part II of the majority opinion. Under the majority’s analysis, defense counsel need have no trial strategy, need not find out how witnesses will testify before putting them on the stand, and need not know about the value of mitigating evidence even in a ease where the facts require acknowledgment to the jury of a client’s guilt. Nor does it matter that counsel unnecessarily puts a client on the stand and has his client describe the gruesome details of the murder of the victims. The promise of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), that death penalties should not be indiscriminately imposed is now lost in this Circuit. Without adequate defense counsel, death without the opportunity for a life sentence becomes a matter of pure chance.
I concur in part I of the majority opinion. Because I would grant Waters relief on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, I would not reach the issues addressed in parts III and IV of the majority opinion. Thus, I discuss below only the issue addressed by the majority in part II of its opinion: whether *1530Waters’ counsel rendered constitutionally effective assistance during the sentencing phase of Waters’ trial.
I. THE APPLICABLE STANDARD
I agree with the majority as to the standard we must apply in reviewing ineffective assistance of counsel claims: “ We ask only whether some reasonable lawyer at the trial could have acted, in the circumstances, as defense counsel acted at trial.... We are not interested in grading lawyers’ performances; we are interested in whether the adversarial process at trial, in fact, worked adequately.’ ” Majority Opinion at 1512 (quoting White v. Singletary, 972 F.2d 1218, 1220-21 (11th Cir.1992)).
I disagree with the majority’s application of the standard in this case. Waters’ counsel failed to develop a strategy for the sentencing phase of the trial, and his strategy for the guilt phase, if he had one, defeated the objective of obtaining a life sentence for Waters. Counsel made repeated and flagrant fundamental trial errors which assured that the jury could not view Waters in a sympathetic or merciful light. It is painfully obvious that the adversarial process at this trial did not work.
II. A REASONABLE TRIAL STRATEGY
A. The Approach of Competent Counsel
“No competent defense attorney would go to trial without first formulating an overall strategy.” Welsh S. White, Effective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Cases: The Evolving Standard of Care, 1993 U.Ill.L.Rev. 323, 356 (1993). Effective trial lawyers typically prepare for the defense of a criminal case by asking questions such as: (1) What is the objective of the defense? (2) What is the trial strategy to reach that objective? and (3) How does one implement that strategy? In the defense of a death penalty case in particular, counsel’s strategy must eneom-pass both the guilt and the sentencing phases of the trial.
In a capital case, ... some attorneys devise a strategy for the guilt stage without considering the penalty phase. Others take the position that they will merely “put the government to its burden of proof’ at the penalty stage. Both approaches are inadequate. Because the penalty trial will be critical if the defendant is convicted of the capital offense, defense attorney must devise a coherent strategy for that proceeding. Moreover, simply putting the government to its burden of proving its case against the defendant is not a viable option because ... the dynamics of a capital trial are such that the defendant must put on an “affirmative case for life.” Furthermore, because the guilt and penalty trials are integrally related, devising one strategy for the guilt phase and a separate one for the penalty phase is also insufficient. In order to be effective, a capital defense attorney must develop a consistent theory to be used at the guilt and penalty phases.
Id. at 356-57 (footnotes omitted).
In Waters’ case, the objective of the defense was to obtain a sentence of life rather than death. No other objective was possible. The defense could not possibly convince the jury that Waters had not committed the crimes; he had confessed, and the evidence against him was overwhelming. As to the insanity defense, the defense did not have a single witness who would testify that Waters met the test for insanity under Georgia law.1 Davis admitted at the state habeas hearing that he did not expect to succeed on the insanity defense:
Q: Is it fair to say that you didn’t expect to succeed on an insanity defense?
A: I expected — as a lawyer, as a realistic lawyer, I hoped that the matter of his competence would result in a verdict of a life sentence and not of a death sentence.
*1531Respondent’s Exh. 3B at 50-51. Thus, Davis recognized that his overall objective was to obtain a life sentence for his client.
To achieve this objective, a competent trial attorney would develop a strategy aimed at convincing the jury that Waters was a mentally ill human being whose unique circumstances and background made him deserving of the jury’s sympathy, compassion, and mercy. To implement this strategy, the competent attorney would prepare mitigating evidence designed to show the jury, for example, that the defendant suffered from schizophrenia, had a troubled background, was not typically violent, and had close family ties. “A capital defense attorney’s central mission is to present the defendant’s ‘case for life’ through the introduction of mitigating evidence at the sentencing stage.” White, at 360-61.
An effective attorney will educate the jurors as to the capital case procedure and the role mitigating evidence should play in their deliberations; specifically, that mitigating circumstances are “[sjuch as do not constitute a justification or excuse for the offense in question, but which, in fairness and mercy, may be considered as extenuating or reducing the degree of moral culpability,” thereby reducing the appropriate sentence from death to life. Black’s Law Dictionary 1002 (6th ed. 1990). This education of the jury should take place at the beginning of the trial. Particularly when an attorney expects a verdict of guilty, he should explain the bifurcated nature of the capital case, explain that the defense expects a verdict of life rather than death, and then explain mitigating evidence and how it will unfold during the trial to support this verdict. Thus, before the first witness takes the stand, effective counsel has given the jury a framework within which to recognize and consider any mitigating evidence during the guilt phase that might support the plea for life.
B. The Approach of Waters’ Counsel
In his defense of Waters, Davis did not act as a competent counsel. Davis’ testimony at the state habeas hearing indicates that he understood that the objective of the defense was to obtain a sentence of life rather than death. Nevertheless, he completely failed to develop or implement a trial strategy framework in which to achieve this objective.
Davis’ complete failure to develop an effective trial strategy may be explained in part (although not excused) by his lack of experience with death penalty cases. Davis admitted at the state habeas hearing that, prior to Waters’ case, his last involvement with a death penalty case was sometime prior to 1961, more than twenty years before Waters’ case commenced. Davis practiced law from 1939 until 1955 and served as a state court trial judge from 1955 until 1961. In 1961, Davis was elected to the United States Congress, where he served for 14 years. He retired to Glynn County in 1976, and became the Public Defender in December 1979, less than six months before he became involved in Waters’ case. His pre-1961 capital case experience was not only remote in time, but was also largely irrelevant given the immense impact of Furman v. Georgia and its progeny upon death penalty jurisprudence. Indeed, Davis tried Waters’ case just as a criminal defense lawyer would have prior to Furman, when death penalty trials consisted of only one phase and the Supreme Court had yet to declare the important role of mitigating evidence in the jury’s decision-making process. Davis did not educate the jury as to the role of mitigating evidence because he was not sufficiently informed as to its significance.
Astonishingly, the majority relies upon assistant public defender Don Manning’s experience to support its conclusion that defense counsel was aware of and made effective use of the post-Furman capital punishment law. This reliance is ludicrous for a number of reasons. First, Manning did not provide any meaningful assistance to Davis during Waters’ trial. Manning’s name does not even appear in the trial transcript except to note his presence. He did not question a single witness or make a single statement to the judge or jury. Second, Manning had been practicing law for only a very short time. He had been a member of the bar for only a year and a half and had been with the public defender’s office for less than six months when he became involved in Waters’ case. *1532Finally, Manning did not have any meaningful experience. Manning admitted at the state habeas hearing that he had not tried a single felony case prior to the Waters’ case. Although he was appointed co-counsel in a death penalty case tried in February 1979, four months after he was admitted to the bar, his testimony indicates that he did not actually try this case himself. It is preposterous for the majority to suggest that Manning’s presence somehow compensates for Davis’ incompetence.
To the extent Davis did have a strategy for Waters’ case, it was to present the defense of insanity in the guilt phase. Davis developed no strategy for the sentencing phase of the trial. Neither did he develop an effective overall strategy to encompass both the guilt and sentencing phases. Rather, he decided to present the insanity defense during the guilt phase of the trial, and he did nothing more. As Manning testified at the state habeas hearing:
Q: If we could move now to the sentencing phase of the trial, if you could describe to the Court any effort to prepare for the sentencing phase.
A: Well, we really didn’t have any special preparation for that phase. We— knowing the facts of the ease it appeared that Mr. Waters probably would be found guilty based upon his testimony and other evidence. So we considered the totality of the trial. We didn’t think well, let’s talk about the guilt/innocence phase versus let’s talk about the penalty phase. We viewed it as a whole and approached the trial from that standpoint. And we felt that any witnesses that we put up during the guilt/innocence phase, their testimony would be essentially the same in that phase as it would be in the penalty phase. So if we got the testimony in or attempted or tried to in the guilt/innocence, we felt it just be redundant to call those same, very same, witnesses in the penalty case. So we did not call any witnesses in the penalty phase.
Respondent’s Exh. 3B at 74-75. Manning even admitted that the defense strategy was not prepared with sentencing in mind:
Q: In terms of the defense approached [sic] at trial, is it fair to say that the strategy was essentially a strategy that was prepared with sentencing in mind?
A: No, I don’t think that’s fair to say. Certainly, that was a consideration but I don’t believe that that would characterize the strategy that we had.
Id. at 80. Thus, to the extent Davis focused on Waters’ case, his emphasis was entirely upon the insanity defense, a defense that he knew would fail.
Davis’ blind pursuit of the insanity defense to the exclusion of any other strategy obscured the objective of obtaining a life sentence from the very beginning of the trial. Davis’ opening statement at the guilt phase of the trial covers less than three pages in the trial transcript. He told the jury: ‘We do not contend for any other defense available under the law, except one, and that is, that [Waters] was not in his right mind at the time [of the crimes].... You have a delicate and difficult task to perform in this ease; just one, and that is by your verdict to determine the mental condition of the Defendant at the time that these offenses occurred.” Respondent’s Exh. IE at 628-30. This is the substance of the opening statement. Other than noting that Waters had attempted suicide, Davis did not mention, much less summarize, any mitigating evidence; indeed, he did not even recite the evidence that would support the insanity defense! Far from educating the jury as to capital case procedure and the role mitigating evidence should play in their deliberations, Davis did not even mention that the jury was embarking on the first phase of a two-phase trial. Indeed, no one — not Davis, not the judge, not the prosecutor — told the jury of the bifurcated nature of the proceedings until after the trial had moved into the sentencing phase. Thus, Davis provided the jury with absolutely no framework within which to consider the limited helpful mitigating evidence he did manage to introduce during the guilt phase of the trial.
By pursuing the insanity defense, Davis sought exoneration for his client. During the initial guilt phase of the trial, the jury learned that Waters sought a verdict of not *1533guilty, notwithstanding that he admitted committing two heinous murders. Thus, the jury saw a man who sought to escape responsibility for his crimes, rather than a man who was truly sorry for his crimes and sought only mercy on his life. This frustrated any objective of securing a life sentence for Waters.
Davis compounded this problem by failing to educate the jury on the difference between the guilt phase deliberations and the sentencing phase deliberations. Davis failed to explain to the jury that the standard applicable to the insanity defense was very different from the standard applicable to the sentencing decision. Indeed, the jury was never informed that mitigating evidence could justify a sentence of life even if the same evidence failed to establish insanity. A review of Davis’ testimony during the state habeas hearing indicates that Davis did not -understand the distinction between the guilt phase and sentencing phase deliberations:
Q: During this time period, during this insanity phase of the trial, you were still hoping for one Juror who would decide that the death penalty was inappropriate, is that right?
A: I would hope for twelve Jurors.
Q: What were you hoping at the time?
A: As far as hoping, I was hoping for twelve Jurors to decide that he was insane at the time of the commission of the offense.
Q: And you decided that the penalty phase of the trial would be more or less the same thing, is that right?
A: Well, it wasn’t so much a decision on my part. Yes, it was the same, pretty much the same.
Q: And you felt the same evidence would have to be used in the second part of the trial than the first?
A: Yes.
Q: And the same legal standard applied in the second part of the trial as in the first.
A: No, not the same legal standard but the testimony would be virtually the same.
Q: Well, you felt that the instruction in the first half of the trial would be used in the second half of the trial, didn’t you?
A: The instructions?
Q: The instructions from the Court concerning insanity?
A: Yes, concerning insanity. Yes.
Q: And so, when the Court instructed the Jurors about the legal definition of insanity, you felt that would be used in both the guilt phase and the penalty phase of the trial, is that right?
A: I suppose so.
Respondent’s Exh. 3B at 62-63 (emphasis added). It is hard to know what Davis was thinking. He may have operated under the mistaken impression that the jury’s rejection of the insanity defense imposed some legal constraint upon its sentencing deliberations. To be sure, Davis did nothing to keep the jury from operating under such a misinterpretation.
Davis’ pursuit of the insanity defense and neglect of the sentencing phase caused him to ignore, and thereby to fail to elicit and present to the jury, available mitigating evidence that may have convinced the jury to spare Waters’ life. Affidavits introduced during the state habeas proceeding indicate that several of the expert witnesses who testified on Waters’ behalf would have offered additional evidence in mitigation of Waters’ crimes, had Davis elicited this evidence. For example, Ms. Jerry Bowman Stewart, a psychologist, would have testified that Waters “suffered from schizophrenia, a major psychiatric disorder”; that this illness would have affected Waters’ conduct on the day of the murders; and that it would have been consistent for Waters to have been hallucinating on that day. Respondent’s Exh. 3B at 115-16. Dr. Miguel Bosch would have testified that “Waters was suffering from a serious mental disorder that is called schizophrenic disorder”; that Waters did not have a “criminal type personality”; and that he was surprised that Waters was facing murder charges. Id. at 111-12. These affidavits indicate that Davis prepared the expert witnesses only for the insanity defense and did not prepare them to testify as to mitigating circumstances. As Ms. Stewart said in her *1534affidavit: “[Davis] never discussed with me, as I recall, any use of my testimony during the penalty phase of Mr. Waters’ trial.” Id. at 116. This is further proof that Davis did not understand the bifurcated nature of a death penalty case.
The majority makes several attempts to justify Davis’ failure to elicit available mitigating evidence from his expert witnesses. First, the majority opines that the favorable testimony that Ms. Stewart could have offered “was contradicted by the opinion of Dr. Bosch, a psychiatrist, who testified that he found no connection between the killings and Waters’ mental condition....” Majority Opinion at 1514. The majority fails to point out that Dr. Bosch’s highly prejudicial opinion about Waters was elicited by Davis on redirect examination. As is discussed more fully in part III.B. below, Davis made fundamental and egregious errors in his redirect examination of Dr. Bosch by repeatedly eliciting testimony that was harmful to his client. Thus, the majority justifies Davis’ failure to elicit favorable testimony from Ms. Stewart by relying on the highly prejudicial testimony that Davis foolishly elicited from Dr. Bosch, evidence that an effective defense attorney would have never presented. This justification by the majority is ludicrous.
Second, the majority excuses Davis’ failure to elicit Ms. Stewart’s opinion that Waters may have been hallucinating by noting that this testimony would have been inconsistent with Waters’ testimony: ‘Waters’ testimony belies the equivocal suggestion in Mrs. Stewart’s post-trial affidavit that Waters might have been suffering from hallucinations when he committed the murders.” Majority Opinion at 1515. As is discussed in part III.B. below, Davis made a fundamental mistake in putting Waters on the stand; Waters’ testimony, at least as elicited by Davis, was devastating to his plea for life. Thus, again, the majority seeks to explain one ineffective act on the part of Davis with the consequence of another ineffective act.
Third, the majority justifies Davis’ failure to elicit Dr. Bosch’s opinion that Waters did not have a “criminal type personality” by noting: “[N]o one suggested that Waters ... was a ‘criminal type personality.’ It was undisputed that Waters is a law-abiding citizen except, of course, for the fact that he kidnapped, abused, and murdered two women.” Majority Opinion at 1515-16. This justification has the ring of a tasteless joke. It also defies both logic and sound capital trial strategy. In presenting mitigating evidence, a capital defense attorney has several objectives, one of which is “to convince the sen-tencer that the defendant will not be a future danger if his life is spared.” White, at 361. Certainly, presenting evidence that the defendant is not a “criminal type personality” furthers this objective. There is no excuse for Davis’ failure to elicit and present to the jury this type of evidence.
Finally, the majority reaches the astonishing conclusion that “the evidence indicates that counsel discussed mitigating circumstances with each of the medical experts.” Majority opinion at 1516. The majority is mistaken. At the state habeas hearing, Manning testified:
Q: During the preparation of the trial, did you ever specifically direct any medical people’s attention to the legal idea of mitigating circumstances?
A: Yes, I think with everyone we talked to.
Respondent’s Exh. 3B at 82. Manning did not testify, however, that either defense attorney talked with all of the medical experts who testified at trial. Indeed, neither Manning nor Davis indicated that they talked with Dr. Hosea DeLatorre prior to trial. As is discussed in part III.B. below, it is obvious from Dr. DeLatorre’s trial testimony that Davis had no idea what Dr. DeLatorre would say on the stand. Similarly, Dr. Bosch’s trial testimony indicates that Davis did not know what Dr. Bosch would say.2 If Davis did discuss mitigating circumstances with any of *1535the medical experts, he did not do so effee-tively, as he left an abundance of mitigating evidence unrevealed.
Davis also failed to elicit available mitigating evidence from Waters’ family members. During the guilt phase of the trial, Davis called to the stand Waters’ three sisters, the only blood relatives that testified on his behalf. Davis asked one sister only about her endeavors to have certified certain medical documents. He asked the other two sisters only about the events leading up to Waters’ arrest. Davis never elicited from any of the sisters testimony touching upon Waters’ character, his troubled childhood, his history of mental illness, or his histoiy of attempted suicides. As is evident from the evidence offered at Waters’ state habeas proceeding, the sisters were ready and willing to offer testimony on each of these subjects.
Davis also called Waters’ wife as a witness during the guilt phase of the trial. Like Waters’ sisters, she testified only to the events leading up to Waters’ arrest; she offered no insight into his character or his history of mental illness.
In its effort to excuse Davis’ failure to elicit favorable mitigating evidence from Waters’ family members, the majority contends that Davis did elicit testimony from non-expert witnesses that Waters “was a nice, quiet, religious, and trustworthy man.” Majority Opinion at 1517. The majority fails to mention that none of this favorable testimony came from either Waters’ sisters or his wife. By putting Waters family members on the stand and failing to elicit such testimony, Davis undoubtedly misled the jury into believing that the family had nothing favorable to say about Waters.3
Davis not only harmed his client’s case by failing to elicit favorable mitigating evidence; he also harmed the case by eliciting evidence that was devastating to Waters’ plea for life. Under Davis’ persistent questioning, Dr. Bosch portrayed Waters as a drunken sex maniac who killed to satisfy a sexual impulse, Dr. Hosea DeLatorre testified that Waters was “in good contact with reality,” and Waters conveyed to the jury in his own words the graphic details of his grisly crimes. None of this evidence is consistent with the objective of portraying Waters as a mentally ill man deserving of sympathy and mercy. Whether Davis elicited this evidence in an attempt to support the doomed insanity defense or because he utterly failed to prepare for trial, he acted incompetently.
Not surprisingly, research shows that “a defendant’s unsuccessful attempt to raise an insanity defense positively correlates with a death penalty verdict.” Michael L. Perlin, The Sanist Lives of Jurors in Death Penalty Cases: The Puzzling Role of “Mitigating” Mental Disability Evidence, 8 Notre Dame J.L.Ethics & Pub.Pol’y 239 (1994). I do not suggest that pursuing an insanity defense during the guilt phase of a capital trial is always unreasonable; the manner in which Davis pursued the defense in this case, however, was senseless. A lay person would have known better. Davis made a decision to present the insanity defense, which he knew could not succeed, and there his strategic planning, if it can be called that, came to a tragic halt. He failed to develop any strategy that encompassed the sentencing phase of the trial; as a consequence, his presentation of mitigating evidence, its purpose and role, was woefully inadequate. He may have even failed to understand, and he certainly failed to explain to the jury, the difference between the insanity defense and the sentencing decision. Thus, Davis neither formulated nor implemented a reasonable trial strategy. This incompetency compounded his failure to adhere to fundamental rules of trial advocacy, discussed below.
III. THE FUNDAMENTAL RULES
A. The Rules Followed By Competent Counsel
An effective defense attorney follows very basic rules during the course of a criminal trial. Among these rules are the following:
*15361. Never put a witness on the stand without first discussing his or her testimony.
2. Never ask a witness a question without knowing the answer.
3. To the extent possible, insure that evidence that is gruesome or inflammatory is excluded.
4. Never put the defendant on the stand unless there is an essential element of proof that can only be established through the defendant.
5. Never say or do anything during the trial to disparage or diminish the defendant in front of the jury.
6. Identify with the defendant and help the jury identify with the defendant.
These rules are fundamental to good advocacy and are not to be lightly disregarded.
B. Davis’ Disregard of the Rules
During the course of Waters’ trial, Davis violated each and every one of the six rules listed above, some of them repeatedly. I offer here a few of the most egregious examples.
The first example is Davis’ redirect examination of Dr. Bosch. Throughout this examination, Davis asked the witness questions about information the two obviously had not discussed and to which Davis could not have known the answers, thereby violating rules 1 and 2 above. As a result, Davis elicited testimony that was inflammatory and highly prejudicial to Waters (rather than insuring that such testimony was excluded, in accordance with rule 3 above). Specifically, Davis elicited Dr. Bosch’s opinion that there was no connection between Waters’ mental illness and the crime and his opinion that the “key” to the crime was Waters’ sex drive. I reproduce here the bulk of Dr. Bosch’s testimony on redirect examination:
A [by Dr. Bosch]: ... As far as the question of his condition at the time of the alleged offense, I dealt with that many times in trying to figure out what was wrong, and I could not put it together, the crime and the mental illness. You know, you’re talking about insanity. You’re talking about right from wrong and from delusional compulsions, but when we do this kind of work, when we see these people and talk to them and see the crime that they committed, the question that we ask in ourselves, is this connected with this illness, is this a result of this illness.
Q: Well, what’s your answer to that?
A: And my — And I couldn’t find any connection. That’s the reason that I stated to the District Attorney that it is my opinion that at the time of the offense, at the time of the alleged murder that he knew what he was doing.
Q: Well, let me ask you this: How do you reconstruct the feeling of the emotion that Kelly Waters felt at the time the crime was committed? How do you, in your mind, reconstruct that?
A: I would like to answer the question, but not with the jury present.
■ Q: Well, we — You will have to ... defer to our "wishes in the matter. I asked you to answer it.
A: ... To answer the question, I would have to get into the, what I consider as, I don’t know, it’s confidential between me and your client, and the Defendant. And I would have to say something that, what he said to me and I don’t know if I should say that in front of the ladies and gentlemen or not. I have some doubt about it.
A: Well, You Honor, do I have to answer the question? Do I have the right to refuse to answer his questions? ... Your Honor, this is my point: I do have — I can answer his question. I do have the answer. There’s no question about it. I can answer his question and hope that he’d be satisfied, but based on my confidential relationship between me and Mr. Waters, I prefer not to answer that question. But I do have the answer. If you ask me to give it to him, I will do it.
THE COURT: Well,
MR. DAVIS: Your Honor, we ask that he give it.
*1537THE COURT: All right. All right. He has waived his privilege, Dr. Bosch.
A: Well, Mr. Davis, this is the answer to your question, and I wrote it down.
Q: All right.
A: It’s not something that I’m saying to you today. Now, this is related to the alleged offense. He related to me that he went from Waycross to Brunswick, that he saw two women fishing in that area over there. That he saw the women were getting ready to leave, that he had a gun in his car, that he pulled the gun on those women. And he has stated to me that the reason that he did it was because he wanted to have sex with them, but he could not have sex with them. And he said that he had oral sex with one of the women.
Q: You’re saying oral?
A: Oral, yes.
Q: All right.
A: He said that he put the handcuffs on both of them, and I believe on the left and right side of the other one, and then he said that after that — He said that he put the handcuffs on the ladies because they were trying to over power him. And then he shot the older lady, and then he shot the second one, the other one. And then he left, went back to Waycross. He said that he was stopped by a deputy or a state patrol on the road, who checked on him to see if he was drinking, and they let him go. And then later on he got back home. That’s what he said to me about the alleged offense.
Q: Yes. Well, I don’t object to your reading that. I’m quite happy to have it in the record, but my question didn’t quite address that point. My question is: How do you reconstruct the emotional processes that lead to that act that you’ve just read about?
A: I mean, you — I believe that I got an idea what you’re trying to, what you’re looking for. You’re trying to, asking me how I was able to give an opinion about that he was not ...
Q: No, I’m not trying to work my way back to anything. I’m just saying,— Awhile ago, for example, you were deserib-ing the emotional processes that led to his attempted suicide.
A: Yeah.
Q: Now, I’m trying to ask you to give us your opinion of the emotional processes that led to the event you just read about.
A: Well, most likely, he was in a kind of stage, or emotional condition, more or less, like I saw him in the Liberty County Jail. Maybe he was a little bit tense or a little bit depressed. He had a few drinks on that date. And that he was, maybe like he was going to, when I talked to him, that he was able to relate, able to talk, that he understood my questions and ...
Q: I’m talking about on April the 25th.
A: Yeah, that’s what I said. And I’m sure that his emotional state, whatever he worries about, being maybe a little bit apprehensive, a little bit nervous, a little bit depressed on that date, and because of all of this background that he had, maybe after the first lady, the oldest lady got shot, between that one and the second one, maybe he got a little more apprehensive or a little more fears about what was going on and more, you might say, tight, emotional state, between the shooting between the two ladies, and plus, I’m sure that after the whole incident that, the whole incident, maybe he got a little more tight, a little more upset. And I don’t know if that takes care of your question.
Q: No, it doesn’t. What I’m driving at is, what — Do you think that the whole episode was trying to do something for his own ego or some other- reason?
A: My feeling is like I wrote, and I believe that, like I said before, he seemed to be honest with me when he answered my questions. And one of the — I believe the key to the whole thing is that he wanted to have sex. You know, when you drink — Alcohol, like I said, is a sedative. But, you know, alcohol relieves the sexual desire, but take away the performance. When people are drunk — When people drink, they want to have sex, but alcohol takes away the performance from them, and that was the case in this one, was a little bit of sexual impulse was released, but couldn’t perform. And this is related *1538to alcohol. But I believe the main reason, when he saw those two women, that he had some kind of sexual stimulus that he wanted to have sex with. And to me, that’s what the key of the whole thing. And again, the episode when one of the women was trying to overpower him and — That’s what he said. And again, I believe what he said.
Mr. Davis: I have no further questions.
Respondent’s Exh. IF at 1002-11 (emphasis added). As this testimony indicates, Dr. Bosch attempted to protect Waters by withholding his most damning opinions. At Davis’ insistence, Dr. Bosch was forced to reveal these opinions to the jury. Thus, Davis succeeded, in a manner akin to a prosecutor, in portraying his client not as a mentally ill man deserving of sympathy, but as a drunken sex maniac who killed to satisfy a sexual impulse.
Davis’ conduct in questioning Dr. Bosch in this manner is inexplicable. The issue being tried was whether Waters was insane or not. Either (1) Davis had talked with Dr. Bosch about his testimony, knew what he would say, and intentionally sabotaged Waters’ ease by eliciting Dr. Bosch’s harmful testimony, or (2) Davis had failed to talk with Dr. Bosch regarding his testimony, was woefully ill-prepared for the examination, and blindly stumbled into the devastating line of questioning on redirect. The majority opts for the latter scenario, speculating that Dr. Bosch’s devastating testimony “resulted from trial counsel’s attempt to extract favorable testimony from the witness.” Majority Opinion at 1520. If Davis thought his questioning would elicit favorable testimony from Dr. Bosch, it is because he had absolutely no idea what Dr. Bosch would say. With even minimal preparation, Davis could have avoided his egregious blunder. That this blunder was due to lack of preparation, rather than to intentional sabotage, does not render Davis’ conduct reasonable, as the majority concludes.
The majority also opines that the testimony of Dr. Bosch on redirect examination was not harmful to Waters: “That testimony did not help the defense, but we are not convinced that it was harmful.” Majority Opinion at 1520. This conclusion is preposterous. The majority contends that the jury had already heard during cross-examination Dr. Bosch’s conclusion that there was no connection between Waters’ mental illness and the crime. During cross-examination, Dr. Bosch did testify that Waters knew right from wrong, that he was not psychotic, and that it was “quite possible” that he knew what he was doing when he committed the crimes; Dr. Bosch never even implied, however, that there was no connection between Waters’ mental illness and the crimes. Thus, during Davis’ redirect examination of Dr. Bosch, the jury heard for the first and only time that there was no connection between Waters’ mental illness and his crimes, and that the crimes were the result of Waters’ drunken impulse to fulfill a sexual desire. It is nonsense to suggest that this redirect examination was not harmful to Waters’ plea for mercy.
A second example of Davis’ flagrant violation of the fundamental rules of trial advocacy is Davis’ direct examination of Dr. Hosea DeLatorre. Davis called Dr. DeLatorre as a witness without knowing what his testimony would be. Thus, Davis again violated rules 1 and 2 listed in part III.A. above. As a result, he elicited nothing but evidence that was prejudicial to Waters. I reproduce here Davis’ entire direct examination of Dr. DeLa-torre, with the exception of his professional background:
Q: All right. I’ll ask you if you had occasion to examine the Defendant in this case, Kelly Waters, in the past?
A: That’s correct.
Q: Can you state what date you examined him?
A: I saw him the first time the date that he was admitted to the Forensic Services Division in August the 21st, 1980.
Q: And then did you see him more than that one time?
A: I saw him on rounds, mostly once a week, and also, I saw him when he was at Stafford for competent, to decide he was competent to stand trial when he was released from the Binion building.
*1539Q: And over what period of time did you see him once a week?
A: For about a month.
Q: So you saw him approximately four times?
A: Four times in one round, and I got two or three interviews with him.
Q: During the course of those interviews, were you able to form a medical opinion as to his mental condition?
A: Uh ...
Q: Just answer it if you were able ...
A: I got an opinion.
Q: Did you consult his records to find that he had been diagnosed as a paranoid type schizophrenic?
A: I got some information that he was diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic.
Q: Did you concur in that diagnosis?
A: No, sir.
Q: You did not?
A: No, sir.
Q: What was your diagnosis?
A: My diagnosis was anxiety neurosis.
Q: What kind of neurosis?
A: It’s a neurosis characterized by the feelings of anxiety and ...
Q: I’m not understanding that word.
A: Feelings of anxiety.
Q: Would you ...
A: ... all the time, nervous, tense.
Q: One of your words was anxiety?
A: Anxiety.
Q: And what’s the first part of that?
A: Anxious, neurosis, anxiety neurosis.
Q: Anxiety neurosis?
A: Neurosis.
Q: And that was your diagnosis?
A: That was my diagnosis. No, it was not my diagnosis. I was agree with the diagnosis, but the diagnosis was done by a psychiatrist the Binion Building, that he was assigned to a psychiatrist for mental evaluation. He made the diagnosis. And I, as the medical director of the Forensic Division, I need to check, I review all the diagnoses in the Forensic Service Division to see if they are correct. So we make another type of evaluation to see if we are agreed with the diagnoses offered by the psychiatrist before sending the people to the court.
Q: And you disagreed?
A: I was agreed with the diagnosis of anxiety neurosis done in the Binion Building.
Q: You are agreeing with anxiety neurosis?
A: That’s correct.
Q: Would you explain to the jury how an anxiety neurosis differs from a schizophrenic condition?
A: The anxiety neurosis, the people in anxiety, when the person feels anxious, there’s not too much difference with the schizophrenia.
Q: There’s not much difference.
A: Not much' difference because the people that feel anxious react different than normal people, exaggerate his actions, become violent at times. At times he feels depressed. It’s mixed symptoms of different types of mental illnesses, but the person always is in good contact with reality.
Q: All right.
Mr. Davis: I have no further questions.
Respondent’s Exh. 1G at 1013-1016.
In essence, Dr. DeLatorre testified that Waters did not suffer from paranoid schizophrenia, but only from anxiety neurosis, and that he was in good contact with reality. Thus, Dr. DeLatorre’s entire testimony was harmful to Waters’ case. Not surprisingly, the prosecutor’s cross-examination of Dr. De-Latorre was extremely short; the prosecutor merely clarified that Waters “was in good contact with reality” and knew the difference between right and wrong. Id. at 1016. The majority concludes that a reasonable attorney would have offered Dr. DeLatorre’s testimony in support of a plea for mercy or in support of the insanity defense. As with the redirect testimony of Dr. Bosch, Davis’ conduct may be explained in one of two ways: either he intentionally sabotaged his client’s case by calling Dr. DeLatorre to the stand, or he was not prepared and had no idea what Dr. DeLatorre would say on the stand. (As noted in part II.B. above, neither Davis nor *1540Manning identified Dr. DeLatorre as one of the expert witnesses with whom they talked prior to the trial.) Either way, Davis acted incompetently.
The majority contends that Dr. DeLa-torre’s testimony “was not harmful to counsel’s efforts to obtain a sentence less than death for Waters” because it “was part of the evidence counsel presented from mental health experts with different perspectives and diagnoses....” Majority Opinion at 1519. The majority suggests that counsel cannot be faulted for offering testimony that paints a fuller and more accurate picture of the defendant, even if the testimony is ultimately harmful to the defendant’s case. This approach is totally inconsistent with the adversarial process, the integrity of which the ineffective assistance of counsel standard is designed to protect.
A third example of Davis’ violation of the fundamental rules of trial advocacy is Davis’ unbelievable decision to put Waters on the stand. Davis put his client on the stand even though Waters’ testimony could add absolutely nothing to the case for the defense. Davis then elicited from Waters gruesome and inflammatory evidence regarding the details of the crimes. I reproduce here Davis’ entire direct examination of Waters:
Q: Your name is Eurus Kelly Waters?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Mr. Waters, until the time of your arrest, you lived with your wife in Way-cross?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Was that at 708 Homer Street in Waycross?
A: That’s correct.
Q: And you’ve now been in jail since early in May of 1980?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: I’ll ask you, Mr. Waters, if during the course of your lifetime you have ever attempted to kill yourself?
A: Yes sir, on two occasions.
Q: All right, sir. Tell us about that.
A: The first time I attempted to take my life was a gunshot wound. The — I shot myself in the stomach with a .22 caliber rifle. On the second ■ occasion, I taken some poisonous medicine which consisted of a bottle of rubbing alcohol and white linament.
Q: How long ago was the second occasion?
A: Something like 1966.
Q: How long ago was the first occasion?
A: I believe that happened in ’64.
Q: Now, your marriage to the present Mrs. Waters, Helen Waters, is your second marriage, is it not?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And your first marriage, did it end in divorce?
A: Yes, it did.
Q: Was there a child ...
A: Yes, sir.
Q: ... from your first marriage?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And what age is that child now?
A: Sixteen.
Q: Where does she live?
A: In Lake City, Florida.
Q: Mr. Waters, you were formerly, were you not, a cab driver in Waycross?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: I’ll ask you if you can tell us something about the events on and around the date of April the 25th, 1980, involving visits by you to Jekyll Island? For example, now, April the 25th, 1980, was on a Friday. Can you recall the Wednesday before that Friday going to Jekyll Island?
A: Yes, sir, I believe I went to Jekyll Island fishing that day.
Q: On that particular day, can you remember anything that happened?
A: Only I got real bad sunburned.
Q: And how did you get it, were you fishing or lying on the beach, or just ...
A: Both.
Q: ... how?
A: Both.
Q: And can you remember what happened after you left Jekyll that day?
*1541A: The only thing that I remember, you know, that would be considered — I stopped by my sister’s house and drank some tea.
Q: All right.
A: Which the sister I’m talking about in question is Georgia Rainey.
Q: All right. Now, then, about the next day, which would have been a Thursday, was there anything unusual about that day that caused you to remember that day?
A: Nothing unusual happened, no.
Q: Then on Friday, you remember, of course, that day, Friday?
A: Vaguely.
Q: Yes. Would you state to the Court what happened? Start out at the beginning of the day and state what happened on that Friday.
A: Mr. Davis, the best of my recollection is that the first thing that I remember as to happening on Friday was taking my wife to work.
Q: All right. And when you took her to work, what did you do?
A: I don’t have any idea.
Q: Do you remember being on Jekyll that day?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Can you tell us what time of day it was when you got to Jekyll that day?
A: Well, I can’t be sure, but I would say sometime in the late morning.
Q: Now, you’ve, of course, sat through this trial, as you’re entitled to do under the law. You heard a lady take the stand by the name of Mrs. Googe from Darien.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Do you remember seeing her that day?
A: Yes, I believe I did talk to her on the beach that day.
Q: You heard what she had to say about the conversation that was had between you and her. Was that ...
A: Yes, sir.
Q: ... in accordance with the way you remember it?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And then following that, can you tell us what happened next?
A: The only thing that — The next thing that comes to my mind, Mr. Davis, is that I was drinking, that I was drinking some alcohol, some whiskey. And in regard to the rest of the day, the only thing that I remember is just what is in the statement that I made to Mr. Curley.
Q: Well, now, we’re going to have to go through that. But first I’ll ask you a question or two. What were you drinking on that occasion?
A: Calvert’s, I believe.
Q: And where had you gotten it?
A: I can’t say for sure because I don’t know.
Q: Well, what — All right. You don’t know. Well, what size bottle was it in?
A: That particular one was a half-pint bottle.
Q: Did you wear it in your pocket when you weren’t drinking out of it, that bottle?
A: No sir, I believe that it was in the car.
Q: In your car. Can you remember before the occasion where you encountered the two women who were killed, before that? Can you remember — Did you buy a chaser or go to a store or anything along that line at all?
A: Yes, sir, I believe that I bought some Gatorade, and some coffee, and also cigarettes, at the little Zippy Market, or whatever the name of it is, on Jekyll Island.
Q: Now, where is that Zippy Market located?
A: In the shopping plaza as you go into Jekyll, go onto the island.
Q: Do you know the area that people call the New Marina over there?
A: Yes, I do.
Q: Have you ever fished in it?
A: Many times.
Q: Did you go later after you’d been to this Zippy Mart, or Zippy Market, did you go over to the area of the New Marina?
A: Yes, sir.
*1542Q: And when you got to that — What were you driving?
A: My ’74 white Chevrolet.
Q: When you got over there, what did you see, if anything?
A: Nothing stands out in particularly. Now, there was a sailboat there in the river. This marina consists of a large lagoon that makes off from the river. There was a sailboat there and there were some people — I believe it was one black man and one black woman fishing.
Q: At the new marina?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: All right. Then after you observed that, what next happened?
A: The next thing that stands out to me that I have been able to recall, been able to recollect, was I went around to the far side of the New Marina, which it consists of a dirt, a narrow, dirt road, and there I saw this red car. Now, as to the make of the ear, I have no idea.
Q: All right.
A: But there were two ladies coming up the — There is a steep incline there going down to the water. And I observed two ladies coming up that incline.
Q: Now, when you say coming up, would that have been from the water to their car, is that what you’re ...
A: That’s correct.
Q: ... telling us?
A: Yes, sir, that’s what I’m trying to say.
Q: All right. And what occurred?
A: I pulled my car up beside of their’s.
Q: So you were still driving when you saw them coming up?
A: Yes, sir, I was.
Q: All right.
A: And I got out of the car, my car, and pulled my gun on them.
Q: Now, you say you pulled your gun.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where had your gun been?
A: My gun was in my hip pocket, my right hip pocket.
Q: Was it there while you were driving?
A: Yes, it was.
Q: Did you have handcuffs?
A: Yes, sir, I think so.
Q: Where were they?
A: Probably in my pocket.
Q: Would that be the normal place for them to be?
A: No, sir, generally they were on the signal light reflector knob is where they generally were.
Q: Hanging, dangling?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: All right. You say — Now, you’ve already said that you pulled your gun on the ladies. Now, ...
A: Yes, sir.
Q: ... at that time, were you in your car or out of the car?
A: I was out of their car, out of my car and at the rear of their car.
Q: Where was your gun at that time?
A: In my hand.
Q: And where were the handcuffs at that time?
A: At that time, I guess the cuffs were in my pocket.
Q: All right. And what, if anything, was said when you got there and that happened? After that happened, what, if anything, was said?
A: I just — I told them that they were going to go with me. And I marched them across some, something like a hundred yards, to a wooded area where it’s real brushy. And I guess my intentions was sex; I don’t know. But anyway, Mrs. Culpepper, I believe her name was, put the cuffs on her wrist and Miss Paseur’s wrist.
Q: Did you tell her to do that?
A: Yes, I believe I did.
Q: Were they fastened tight or loose?
A: No, sir, they were very loosely.
Q: Then what occurred?
A: I had — I made Mrs. Culpepper undress from the waist down, and I attempted to have oral sex with her.
*1543Q: At that particular time, were they standing, sitting or lying down?
A: Lying down.
Q: Were they lying on their stomach or their back?
A: On their back.
Q: Were they side by side or in some other position?
A: Side by side, yes, sir.
Q: At any time during that time when you, as you stated you attempted to have oral sex, did you ever unzip your trousers?
A: No, sir, I did not.
Q: Did you ever take your trousers down?
A: No, sir.
Q: You did not undress at all?
A: No, sir.
Q: Now, when you say you attempted to have oral sex, it’s necessary to, for this jury to understand exactly what you mean. Now, when you say that, do you, are you telling the jury that it was your mouth?
A: That’s correct.
Q: Are you saying that it was her private, female part ...
A: That’s correct.
Q: ... that was involved?
A: That’s correct.
Q: And nothing else?
A: That’s all.
Q: Now, how long did this attempt at oral sex last?
A: Not over three or four minutes.
Q: And during that time, what was Miss Paseur, the younger of the two ladies doing?
A: Well, she was laying side of Mrs. Culpepper, but she was very hysterical and she was screaming at Mrs. Culpepper.
Q: Screaming?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: All during that time?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Do you remember the words she said?
A: The only thing that stands out „ is she accused Mrs. Culpepper of enjoying what I was doing to her.
Q: Is that a fact?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Anyway, what next occurred?
A: Then after it was over with, they both got up and attempted to dress, Mrs. Culpepper did, as she had on, I believe it was a pair of shorts. I can’t be sure, but I think that’s what it was. And as she pulled her shorts up and got them buckled, or got them zipped, or however she fastened them, after she did this, her and Miss Paseur both at the same time made a lunge, and I don’t know, I just — I had the gun on them and I pulled the trigger. And I believe that I struck Mrs. Culpep-per, and then as she fell back, I shot Miss Paseur.
Q: Well, what length of time was there between the first shot and the second shot?
A: It was very close together.
Q: Did you fire two shots only?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Not three?
A: No, sir.
Q: At the time that you fired the first shot, had Mrs. Culpepper gotten her clothes back on or not?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And then what did you do?
A: I then left them both in the, on the ground and went back to my ear.
Q: You did what?
A: I left them there and went back to my car.
Q: Did you do anything, one way or the other, with respect to the clothing of Miss Paseur?
A: Yes, I did, I ripped them.
Q: Did you do anything else?
A: No sir.
Q: Did you then go back to your car?
A: Yes, sir, I returned to my car and I passed by their car, or her ear, whichever one it belonged to, and I take her pocketbook off the front seat of the car.
*1544Q: And then what did you do?
A: I immediately left the island.
Q: And where did you head?
A: Home.
Q: To Waycross?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And what happened on the way to Waycross?
A: I threw the pocketbook out somewhere around the Satilla River Bridge.
Q: Now, describe how you went at that. Did you throw it out over the passenger’s seat, or on the same side you were, out of the window on your side?
A: I pulled over to the wrong side of the road from which I should have been traveling and tossed it out the window.
Q: The window you tossed it out of, was it the driver’s side window?
A: That’s correct, yes, sir.
Q: And did it go over the bannister of the bridge there?
A: Yes, sir, I think so.
Q: And then what did you do?
A: I proceeded on towards Nahunta, which just a few seconds, just a few minutes after this, I was stopped by a Brant-ley County Deputy Sheriff.
Q: You heard him testify. Was that the same man who stopped you?
A: Yes, sir, it was.
Q: Mr. Rowell?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Meanwhile, had you looked in the pocketbook to see whether there was money in it or not?
A: Mr. Davis, I don’t know whether I did or not.
Q: You do not know?
A: I do not know.
Q: Now, you’ve heard the testimony about what happened following that, and has that testimony been in accordance with your memory of the things that happened after that?
A: Yes, it has.
Q: And your memory doesn’t tell you any different from what has been testified about, all of these things that happened following that?
A: No, sir, the best that I can remember, I would go in accordance with them.
Q: You what?
A: I would go in accordance with them.
Q: I didn’t understand.
A: They would be in accordance.
Q: In accordance. All right.
Mr. Davis: You may examine the witness.
Respondent’s Exh. 1G at 1147-61.
The majority seeks to portray Davis’ decision to put Waters on the stand as a reasonable strategic decision calculated to help “humanize” Waters in the eyes of the jury. This portrayal is erroneous for two reasons. First, Waters’ testimony did anything but “humanize” him in the eyes of the jury. Waters’ description of the killings is chilling. At Davis’ prompting, Waters described not only the grisly details of his crimes, but also the victims’ reactions. Waters’ testimony, as orchestrated by Davis, paints the picture of a man who killed without emotion.
Second, evidence offered at the state habe-as hearing indicates that Davis did not prepare Waters to testify. Manning testified that the decision to put Waters on the stand was made “in the courtroom itself or possibly with Mr. Waters in the holding cell adjacent to the courtroom.” Respondent’s Exh. 3B at 86. Davis testified:
Q: The Defendant’s testimony was intended to accomplish what? Do you remember?
A: It was intended to allow the Jury to form a clear idea of what Kelly Waters was like as a person.
Q: Do you remember a moment in Mr. Waters’ testimony and he’s discussing the facts of the crime and he recounts the statement made by the younger of the two victims?
A: Yes, I remember that.
Q: Do you remember that that statement had to do with the older victim enjoying the sex act that Mr. Waters was committing at the time
A: Yes, I remember that.
*1545Q: Do you recall the effect of that testimony on the courtroom?
A: Well, of course, that would involve a little speculation but it stands to reason that it was highly adverse effect.
Q: As a matter of fact, do you recall a couple leaving the courtroom, sobbing?
A: No, I don’t recall that.
Q: Was that a piece of testimony that you felt you wanted the jury to have?
A: No, it was not.
Q: Was that piece of testimony discussed with Mr. Waters before the trial?
A: It was not.
Q: Did you tell [Waters] before the trial that you were going to ask him, for example, the question that drew the response that we discussed earlier?
A: No, I don’t — as a matter of fact I don’t recall asking him a question that drew that particular response. The testimony was given by him but I do not recall its having been in response to a specific question by me.
Respondent’s Exh. 3B at 60-61 (emphasis added). Contrary to Davis’ recollection, Waters’ damning testimony was in response to very pointed and specific questions by Davis. Again, Davis either intentionally sabotaged his client’s case, or he had no idea what his client would say on the stand.
A fourth and final example of Davis’ violation of the fundamental rules of trial practice is his closing argument at the conclusion of the sentencing phase. With this closing argument, Davis violated the last two rules listed in part IIIA.. above: he disparaged and diminished Waters before the jury, and, rather than identifying with Waters and helping the jury identify with him, he distanced himself from Waters. At the beginning of the closing argument, Davis said: “It strikes me that Kelly Waters is a miserable wreck of a human being....” Respondent’s Exh. 1H at 1344. Davis then concluded the closing argument by referring to Waters as “a nut” and “a living subject that can be studied,” and he asked the jury to make “a study” of Waters rather than killing him:
... Can any . good come out of this case? I’ll say it can. I’ll say the good that can come out of it would be this. We know what happens to a case similar to Kelly Waters when he refrains from taking drugs. We’ve found out to our sorrow, to the utter shame of the County, to that event which brought so much sadness to the wife, to the families of the victims in this case, to that occasion which brought so much sadness to the family of the Defendant in this case. We found out what would happen. I say if he is allowed to serve a life, a sentence of life imprisonment, he is a living subject that can be studied, that upon whom the effects of drugs can be determine with more certainty than it can be now. He is a prime case of what can happen if he doesn’t take drugs and what steps may be needed by society to ensure that a man in his boots needs to take drugs and needs to be put under such circumstances as you either know he’s on drugs or else he’s in a condition where, where nothing, no harm can come from him if he refrains from taking them. You going to make him responsible for taking them? Well, he’s a nut to start with. It happens every day in our lives. You cannot depend on that. But in his case, you can. In his case, he’s an ideal subject for the medical profession to say, all right, here is a man, called to God one day, called to a pistol and handcuffs the next day. He’s got that kind of split personality. He doesn’t know whether to serve the Lord or serve the Devil. He doesn’t even know whether he wants to be a person or not. We’ll take him. We’ll experiment with him. We’ll find out more about what can, the limits of activity in his ease. We’ll use him for the good of society, so that an offense of this nature will not be repeated. That’s the human thing to do in this case. It’s a socially advisable thing to do. I agree this sort of thing excites the basest emotions I suppose that can be excited in the human breast; revenge, lack of mercy, all of those kinds of emotions are excited in the mind of any normal person that heard this evidence. Of course, it is. But what is the socially acceptable, merciful, biblical, Christian *1546thing to do here? I say don’t kill him. Don’t rub him out. Don’t put him out of existence. Keep him. Study him. Learn about him. Keep him so he can’t do anybody else any harm. Maybe from the result of his continued life, the results ... of continued examination of him and a study of him will make it possible that the lives of more innocent people will not be sacrificed. I ask you to consider that. And I ask you in reaching your verdict to let this man continue to live in the interest of serving, doing your duty as an enlightened citizen facing up to the tremendous responsibility that the law vest upon you in this case.
Id. at 1353-33 (emphasis added). Thus, Davis concluded the case for his client — not with a plea for mercy for a human being, but with a dehumanizing request to allow a specimen to be studied.
Not surprisingly, the majority spends much time in its attempt to justify Davis’ closing argument. In so doing, the majority endorses a cynical and utterly depressing view of mankind, and of jurors in particular. The majority concludes that Davis’ closing argument was reasonable notwithstanding that it runs counter to basic moral sensibilities; as the majority says: “counsel’s strategic decision was within the wide range of reasonableness — reasonableness to the task at hand, not reasonableness as a matter of moral values or philosophy.” Majority Opinion at 1522. The majority suggests that jurors are more likely to be motivated by an appeal to base human emotions — such as a desire to turn a human being into a laboratory specimen — than by an appeal for mercy. I cannot concur in such a degrading view of my fellow man.
IV. CONCLUSION
Where a defendant has confessed to murder and the State seeks the death penalty, defense counsel’s only purpose is to seek a life sentence. Obviously, that is no light assignment. Success turns on whether counsel can portray his client as a human being. If jurors conclude that the defendant is practically a violent animal, a vote for the death penalty is not unexpected. In this 20th Century of advanced civilization, we have witnessed the horrors of an Adolph Hitler (with his millions of followers) and the peaceful overthrow of the British yoke by a nonviolent Ghandi.
Effective defense attorneys know the ambivalence with which jurors’ feelings can be influenced by words, behavior, and nuances in the courtroom. Waters had as his appointed defender a lawyer who either did not understand this drama or who himself thought Waters was not a human being and deserved to die. I do not attribute to Davis this latter callousness. I think Davis’ age, years in Congress, and retirement had so far removed him from the fray of the courtroom, that he was incapable of rising to the considerable challenge presented by his assignment to defend Waters. Constitutionally, Davis’ defense of Waters was neither effective nor purposeful, despite anything the majority says to the contrary. Life is dear and holy. Humanness is a sacred state. I believe a defendant whose life is in the balance deserves legal representation that is effective, purposeful, and to which we can point with confidence when we affirm a death penalty. That scenario does not exist here.
Davis’ ineffectiveness as Waters’ defense attorney cries out from every page in the transcript as well as from the testimony of Davis and Manning at the habeas hearing. By his own admission, Davis was aware that the only issue for the jury was whether Waters lived or died. Yet he had no strategy for the sentencing phase of the trial; his presentation of evidence was directed toward whether Waters was insane at the time of the killings, when he did not have a shred of evidence that would show Waters did not know the difference between right and wrong; his elicitation of evidence from witnesses he called in Waters’ behalf sealed Waters’ fate; he failed completely to exploit the promise of Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), that defendants found guilty of murder may nevertheless escape the harsh penalty of death by establishing mitigating evidence that explains the behavior of the defendant leading to the murder.
*1547The trial record is entirely devoid of Davis’ presentation or discussion of mitigating evidence and the remedy established by Lockett. The instructions of the trial court contained one sentence advising the jury about mitigating evidence: “Members of the Jury, you should, you should consider all evidence submitted in the trial of this case in arriving at your verdict as to the sentences imposed. This would include any evidence of mitigating circumstances received by you in this case.” Respondent’s Exh. 1H at 1362 (emphasis added).
There was ample available evidence of Waters’ schizophrenia, its delusional and hallucinatory components, the effect of the disease on a person’s ability to control his or her behavior, and how it specifically affected Waters. Whether such evidence, the exclusion of the inflammatory evidence placed in evidence by Davis against his own client, and the education of the jury about Lockett would have resulted in a sentence for life verdict, we shall never know. The case was a difficult one. But that was no reason for Davis to surrender before trial commenced and tell the jury in closing that his client “was a nut.” The Sixth Amendment and the promise of Gideon v. Wainwright, 872 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), was not fulfilled in Waters’ trial. Davis was ineffective. The district court’s denial of Waters’ petition for the writ was error and should be reversed.
. Under Georgia law, ‘‘[a] person shall not be found guilty of a crime if, at the time of the act, omission, or negligence constituting the crime, the person did not have mental capacity to distinguish between right and wrong in relation to such act, omission, or negligence.” Ga.Code Ann. § 16-3-2 (Michie 1992).
. Davis testified at the state habeas hearing that he talked with Dr. Bosch prior to trial; in response to a leading question, he even testified that he asked Dr. Bosch "to specifically address himself to the question of mitigating circumstances.” Respondent’s Exh. 3B at 63. Dr. Bosch, however, attested unequivocally that Davis "did not directly discuss my testimony with me before I testified.” Id. at 111.
. See Stephens v. Kemp, 846 F.2d 642, 653-54 (11th Cir.) ("The only testimony the jury heard at sentencing concerning appellant’s mental histoiy and condition, including bizarre behavior he occasionally exhibited, was that which was presented by his mother. As her testimony makes clear, many others could have testified concerning his behavior; the fact that others did not do so undoubtedly diminished the impact on the jury of the facts she described. [Footnotes omitted.]”), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 872, 109 S.Ct. 189, 102 L.Ed.2d 158 (1988).