dissenting:
“A fundamental canon of statutory construction is that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.” Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42, 100 S.Ct. 311, 314, 62 L.Ed.2d 199 (1979), quoted in United States v. Wilson, 796 F.2d 55, 58 (4th Cir.1986). Because teeth, however much they can be or are employed to visit violence upon others, are not “dangerous weapons” as that term is commonly understood, I would reverse the assault convictions of defendant and remand for further proceedings.
The result reached by the majority and the court in Moore, ante at 787, is by no means an absurd or even an unreasonable one. Practically any object could qualify as a weapon under the types of statutes before us, see, e.g., State v. Frey, 178 Wis.2d 729, 505 N.W.2d 786 (Ct.App.1993) (pillow can be a weapon when used to cover victim’s face so she could not breathe). Moreover, it would offend neither equity nor the English language for the legislature to specifically include teeth (or fists or feet, for that matter) as weapons whose use constitutes an aggravation of the crime of assault. ‘Weapon,” however, connotes an object or instrument, and it strains the boundaries of ordinary usage to call body parts “objects.” Punch, kick or bite another, and you are guilty of assault; strike or stab another with an object, and you are guilty of assault with a weapon. This common sense understanding is buttressed by the structure of the statutes of conviction.
The federal statute of conviction, 18 U.S.C. § 113(c), which proscribes “[ajssault with a dangerous weapon, with intent to do bodily harm,” carries a maximum sentence of imprisonment of five years. The next subsection, 113(d), proscribes “[ajssault by striking, beating, or wounding ...” and carries a six-month maximum sentence.1 Despite the tenfold difference in allowable sentences under the two sections, a striking with a fist could be as easily classified as one or the other under the majority’s reasoning. This would *790render any distinction between the two sections almost imperceptible. See People v. Van Diver, 80 Mich.App. 352, 263 N.W.2d 370 (1977) (holding that bare hand was not a weapon under assault statute because to hold otherwise would result in practically every assault qualifying’ as an aggravated assault); see also Frey, 505 N.W.2d at 791 (“To allow juries to consider a defendant’s body parts as dangerous weapons would result in penalty enhancement ... for virtually every battery-offense, thus blurring the legislatively-drawn line between simple and aggravated battery[, and] would be directly contrary to the legislative intent evinced by this statutory scheme”). While it would perhaps have been preferable to distinguish assaults on the basis of the seriousness of the injuries inflicted, Congress has chosen instead to use “weapon” as the distinguishing concept, and we are obliged to give this term some meaning. Once body parts are deemed weapons, the term ceases to be of any use as a distinguishing factor.
Sturgis was also-convicted under D.C.Code § 22-505(b), which proscribes assaults upon correctional officers with the use of a “dangerous or deadly weapon.” Although the terms “weapon” or “dangerous weapon” are not defined in the code, reference to related legislation is instructive. See Edwards v. United States, 583 A.2d 661, 664 (D.C. Ct. App.1990) (‘When the meaning of a word in a statute is doubtful, it is appropriate to refer to related legislation to determine the sense in which the word was employed in the particular statute”) (citation omitted). Section 22-3202 establishes a hierarchy of sentence ranges (based on the defendant’s criminal record) for crimes of violence committed “when armed with ... any pistol or other firearm ... or other dangerous or deadly weapon (including a sawed off shotgun, shotgun, machine gun, rifle, dirk, bowie knife, butcher knife, switchblade knife, razor, blackjack, billy, or metallic or other false knuckles.... ” As the majority notes, this list is not an exclusive one (ante at 787 n. 1), but the nature of the items in the list surely suggests that the universe of “dangerous or deadly weapons” should be limited to external objects commonly associated with the term. See id. (“Where general words follow specific words in a statutory enumeration, the general words are construed to embrace only those objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words”) (footnote omitted) (quoting 2A N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.17, at 166 (4th ed.1984)). The same rationale that would include teeth within the ambit of “weapons” would certainly include fists and feet, yet would render superfluous the concept of simple assault. See Commonwealth v. Davis, 10 Mass.App.Ct. 190, 406 N.E.2d 417 (1980) (holding that teeth could not, as a matter of law, be considered “dangerous weapons”).2
The District of Columbia recognizes some limits on what can be deemed a weapon. In Edwards, the Court of Appeals held that a stationary bathroom fixture, against which the defendant had repeatedly slammed his wife’s head, could not be deemed a weapon within D.C.Code § 22-3202. The court recognized that, had Edwards detached the fixture and bludgeoned his wife with it, he would surely have been guilty of using a dangerous weapon. The distinction is a common sense one — a weapon is something with which one can “be armed,” something one can pick up and use. Beer bottles, chairs, telephone receivers swung on a cord — all these clearly come within the ordinary mean*791ing of weapons; teeth, however, do not.3
I respectfully dissent.
. Similarly, D.C.Code § 22-505(a) provides a five-year maximum sentence for anyone who "assaults ... [any correctional officer],” while subsection (b), the other statute of conviction, increases the maximum sentence to ten years for an assault in which the defendant "uses a deadly or dangerous weapon.”
. In Davis, the court advanced four reasons for rejecting the State’s argument that teeth should be considered "dangerous weapons” under the assault statute: (1) No reported decision in Massachusetts had ever held that "human hands, feet or teeth alone can constitute a dangerous weapon.” The court stated that this consideration "call[ed] ... for the exercise of judicial restraint in expanding the concept [of dangerous weapons] beyond its traditiorial scope." Id. 406 N.E.2d at 420; (2) “[T]he notion that parts of the body may be used as dangerous weapons has not been generally accepted elsewhere.... This is so, irrespective of the degree of harm inflicted.” Id.; (3) Other offenses, such as assault with intent to maim, are sufficient to cover attacks using parts of the body to inflict harm; and (4) The increase in punishment for the use of weapons is partly premised on the fear such weapons induce in victims and on the propensity for the use of a weapon to result in "resistance, conflict and violence. ..." Id. at 422 (citation omitted). '
. In Arthur v. United States, 602 A.2d 174 (D.C.App.1992), a decision cited by the majority {ante at 788), the court held that -tennis shoes used to stomp victim’s head could be "dangerous weapons” under D.C.Code § 22-3202(a), the statute proscribing assault "while armed with or [had] readily available any ... dangerous or deadly weapon.” The court rejected Arthur's argument that the government had to prove that the use of the tennis shoes "caused an injury greater than that which could have been inflicted by a bare hand (or an unshod foot)." Id. at 179. The implication is that an unshod foot would not qualify as a weapon.