dissenting.
This appeal stems from an arbitration proceeding held in response to a specific submission by the parties. The submission simply asked the arbitrator to decide a procedural question relating to the admissibility of notations of prior informal disciplinary actions .(“talk to’s”) taken against a discharged employee at a hearing before a joint mediation panel considering the discharge of that employee. The submission by the Joint Panel asked “whether the Company may enter into the record [before the Panel] ‘talk-withs,’ ‘talk-to’s’ or ‘write-ups’ which [sic] the Union had no prior knowledge.” (Emphasis added).
The arbitrator decided that “[i]n the present particular case ... and limited to the present submission to arbitration, the disputed material may be admitted.” The arbitrator concluded that the Union had had prior knowledge of the talk-to’s and that therefore, they were admissible. The Union’s prior knowledge was critical to the arbitrator’s decision because it was an integral part of the issue submitted for arbitration.1 The parties do not dispute the disposition of the specific submission.
The arbitrator, however, captiously decided another question that was neither submitted nor authorized, paragraph one of his award. That paragraph provided:
1. On the general question of admissibility of talk-to’s and the like before the Joint Panel where the Union members object, the ruling is that such material may not be admitted over the objection of the Union members.
This conflicts with paragraph two,1 exceeds the scope of the submission and does not draw its essence from the parties collective bargaining agreement. Thus, I believe that paragraph one of the arbitrator’s award must be vacated, the judgment of the district court reversed, and the case remanded to the district court with directions to enter, summary judgment on behalf of the appellant. I therefore respectfully dissent.
I.
In paragraph one, the arbitrator plainly states that talk-to’s are never admissible over the Union member’s objection. The district court,2 UPS and the Union all read para*143graph one to apply to all talk-to’s, regardless of Union knowledge, and so do I. The majority states that a broad “interpretation of paragraph one of the award is not suggested by the language of the award.itself.” (Maj. Op. at 141). However, paragraph one’s clear statement that “[talk-to’s] may not be admitted over the objection of the Union members” supports this interpretation. Paragraph one makes no reference to Union knowledge or lack thereof; it directs a broad prohibition.
The arbitrator’s opinion eliminates any doubt that paragraph one may be limited to eases of Union ignorance when it states: “The Union panel members could in a specific future case simply object to the introduction of ‘talk-to’s’ as such, without regard to the prior processing or handling of such material, and ... this would be sufficient tó bar the introduction of such material.” App. at 61. The majority quotes this language, states that it is ambiguous and concludes that “when an award does not apparently exceed the scope of the parties’ submission, it will be affirmed, regardless of inferences that may be drawn from the accompanying opinion.” Maj. Op. at 141 (citing United Steelworkers of Am., 363 U.S. at 598, 80 S.Ct. at 1361). However, paragraph one, as read by the district court, the parties, and me, facially exceeds the scope of the parties’ submission. Thus, the majority cannot simply dismiss the language in the arbitrator’s opinion which supports a broad reading of paragraph one as being ambiguous.
The district court upheld paragraph one, despite concluding that paragraph one en: compassed all talk-to’s, regardless of Union knowledge. It concluded that the submission was not limited to situations where the Union was ignorant of the talk-to’s and that therefore, paragraph one did not exceed the scope of the submission. The majority turns the district court’s reasoning on its head. It rejects the district court’s broad reading of the submission, as I believe it must. However, it upholds the award because it baldly assumes that paragraph one only applies to situations where the Union is ignorant of talk-to’s prior to the hearing.
The majority supports its holding by assuming that the arbitrator’s award addresses “only those talk-to’s of which the Union did not have prior knowledge ...” because that was the only issue submitted for arbitration. Maj. Op. at 141. It seems to me that this reasoning is circular. The majority states that the award cannot exceed the submission because the submission is narrow and therefore that this court must assume that the award is narrow. The majority justifies ignoring paragraph one’s language and the arbitrator’s opinion by making an unwarranted assumption. The majority offers no authority for assuming that paragraph one is narrow, nor does it explain why the district court’s, the Union’s and UPS’s broad reading of paragraph one is incorrect. The majority concludes that:
the arbitrator’s award, on its face, does not contain any language indicating that it extends beyond the scope of the question presented. Rather paragraph one is logically read as a direct response to the parties’ submission, pertaining only to talk-to’s about which the Union had no prior knowledge.
Maj. Op. at 141.
But where is the logic? The majority offers no support for its “logical” conclusion. To the majority, it is logical only because of its unwarranted assumptions. I believe that, contrary to the majority’s “logical” reading, paragraph one of the arbitrator’s award broadly rules against the admission of talk-to’s. It therefore exceeds the scope of the issue submitted for arbitration, serves no useful purpose, and is wholly unnecessary to the unchallenged disposition of the issue submitted for arbitration.
II.
The majority correctly notes that an arbitrator’s award will be upheld so long as it draws its essence from' the collective bargaining agreement unless the award is tainted by fraud or bias or addresses matters outside the arbitrator’s authority. The majority concludes that paragraph one of the award draws its essence from the parties’ collective bargaining agreement and therefore, upholds it. I respectfully disagree.
*144The arbitrator does not satisfactorily explain why he needed to make paragraph one’s broad ruling. The specific limits of the submission and the conflict between paragraphs one and two of his award belie his claim that it was necessary to resolve paragraph one before he could resolve paragraph two.
Under paragraph one of the award, a single Union member would have the right to bar evidence submitted at a hearing. This is contrary to the rules of procedure established under the basie collective bargaining agreement between the, parties. The 1990-93 National Master United Parcel Services Agreement and the Central Pennsylvania Supplement provides that a hearing panel will be composed of four members, two appointed by the Union, and two appointed by UPS and that the panel’s majority decision will bind the parties. The members -of this joint Union and company panel sit as neutrals and attempt to equitably resolve disputes. In creating the panel, the parties struck an even balance of power with management and the Union having equal representation. Under this system, decisions are made upon majority vote, or if deadlocked are sent to an outside arbitrator for resolution. The essence of the panel, structure under the agreement is that panel decisions are by majority vote.
Article 48 of .the parties’ collective bargaining agreement specifically prohibits an arbitrator from modifying that agreement.3 By allowing a single Union member to bar evidence from a proceeding, the arbitrator has overturned the majority concept of the panel structure and fundamentally altered the parties’ agreement. The parties bargained for equal power on the panel. Paragraph one of the arbitrator’s award shifts the balance of power towards the Union and upsets the parties’ bargained-for equality. In so doing, the arbitrator’s decision has the potential to undermine the parties’ entire grievance and arbitration procedure.
Paragraph one of the arbitrator’s award violates the essence of the parties’ collective bargaining agreement by depriving the parties- of their contractual right to have an arbitrator resolve deadlocks on evidentiary disputes over the admissibility of “talk-to’s.” Accordingly, this court should reverse the district court’s decision and remand with directions to enter summary judgment on UPS’s behalf.
III.
Instead of putting to rest a simple procedural issue, the arbitrator has unilatérally raised questions that have the potential to generate labor unrest between the parties. Paragraph one of the arbitrator’s award exceeds the scope of the submission, violates the essences of the parties’ collective bargaining agreement and should be vacated.4 I therefore respectfully dissent.
. Paragraph two’s finding that the talk-to’s are admissible makes no sense in light of paragraph one’s conclusion that talk-to’s are never admissible if the Union objects. Judge Roth cites this inconsistency as support for her conclusion that paragraph one refers only to talk-to's which the Union does not know about prior to the hearing.
I believe that the plain language of these two paragraphs reveals an inherent inconsistency and that the only way to eliminate that inconsistency is to vacate paragraph one.
. Specifically, the district court characterized paragraph one as saying, "that 'talk-to’s' are never admissible if the Union objects.” Opinion at 142.
. Article 48, § 2 of the basic collective bargaining agreement provides in pertinent part that an arbitrator "shall not have the authority to amend or modify this Agreement or establish new terms ... under the Agreement.”
. The appellant on appeal also contends that paragraph one of the arbitrator’s award should be vacated because it violates "a .well-defined dominant public policy.” I see no need to reach that issue and I therefore do not discuss it.