dissenting.
I believe that the district court correctly held that no reasonable person could find, on the basis of this record, that Mr. Davis was fired because of his participation in an activity protected by federal law. The evidence of a causal connection between Mr. Davis’s reporting the alleged sexual harassment incident and his termination is, to my mind, simply too thin to support a verdict in his favor. The court has correctly summarized the evidence and stated the applicable legal principles, but I believe that it has erred in applying those principles to that evidence. There is nothing particularly suspicious about the timing of Mr. Davis’s termination, nor is there any substantial evidence that his lower work ratings were related to any retaliatory motive. A jury verdict against Fleming in this case would be based on mere speculation and not reasonable inference.
In short, as the district court correctly pointed out, this is a case in which “the record as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party,” Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986), and thus there is no genuine issue .of fact in the case.
I therefore respectfully dissent.