dissenting:
Because the district court failed to properly exercise its discretion by dismissing for forum non conveniens a claim brought pursuant to United States copyright law, I dissent. A district court may dismiss an action on grounds of forum non conveniens upon a showing that 1) an adequate alternative forum exists, and 2) the balance of relevant public and private interest factors weighs in favor of dismissal. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257, 102 S.Ct. 252, 266, 70 L.Ed.2d 419 (1981). In this case, the *705district court erred by ignoring the unique nature and complexity of American copyright law in its analysis of both parts of the forum non conveniens test.
I must admit that I am astounded when I read that it is not convenient to try an American copyright case in an American court for copyright infringement that takes place solely in America. I am also astounded by a decision that the convenient place to hold the trial is in Singapore, particularly when the majority have not the slightest idea that a court in that nation would even recognize an American copyright.
Background
Plaintiff, Creative Technology Ltd., and Defendant, Aztech Systems Pts. Ltd., are both Singapore companies. Defendant, Az-tech Labs, Inc. is a wholly owned United States-based subsidiary of Defendant Aztech Systems. Both Creative and Aztech Systems designed and manufactured the computer software at issue in Singapore. Both companies have wholly owned subsidiaries in the United States that distribute their software in the United States. Creative owns twelve United States copyrights for the “text of computer software” which it seeks to protect in this action. All twelve of Creative’s copyrighted works were first published in the United States. Creative’s entire complaint is based on the defendants’ infringement in the United States only of Creative’s twelve United States copyrights through their design, manufacture, importation, and distribution in the United States of similar software. Each of these acts constitutes a separate and independent violation of the United States Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 107-120, and 501. Moreover, the remedies that Creative seeks, namely a permanent injunction against further production of the infringing computer software, an order recalling all infringing copies, and profits obtained from sales of the infringing products, are those provided by the United States Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 502-504.
Creative’s complaint alleges that Creative was damaged by the distribution of the defendants’ infringing software in the United States in violation of 17 U.S.C. §§ 501 and 106, respectively. In its opposition to the defendants’ motion to dismiss this action on grounds of forum non conveniens, Creative has submitted evidence that Aztech Labs was distributing $500,000 worth of allegedly infringing software per month in the United States. According to the complaint, all of Aztech Labs’ allegedly infringing conduct occurred in the United States. Even though the district court justified its dismissal for forum non conveniens by the fact that the design and manufacture of both Creative’s and Aztech Systems’ software occurred in Singapore, the district court acknowledged that “Creative’s complaint focuses on Az-tech’s distribution of Sound Galaxy cards in the United States.”
Discussion
I.
In determining that it is not convenient to try this case in its court, the district court and the majority have failed to take into account one of the abiding principles of American copyright law, particularly as it has developed pursuant to the Berne Convention: the principle of “national treatment.” According to this principle, authors should enjoy in other countries the same protection for their works as those countries accord their own authors. See UCC Art. II; Berne Conv. Art. V. See generally 3 Nimmer on Copyright § 17.01[B], at 17-8; H.Rep. (BCIA) at 14. Foreign authors who are granted American copyrights must be treated the same as American authors. Moreover, “it is commonly acknowledged that the national treatment principle implicates a rule of territoriality.” Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 94 C.D.O.S. 3381, 3385 (9th Cir.1994). See also 3 Nimmer, supra, § 17.05, at 17-39 (“The applicable law is the copyright law of the state in which the infringement occurred, not that of the state of which the author is a national ...”). For purposes of a forum non conveniens analysis, the principle of national treatment sets copyright cases apart from other kinds of cases. The national treatment principle requires that, where a copyright has been infringed in a particular country, *706the author has the right to pursue a remedy in that country.
The majority have failed to consider the adequacy of Singapore as an alternative forum in light of the principle of national treatment. They do not address the impact of the Berne Convention, which requires United States courts to treat foreign owners of American copyrights the same as American owners. Instead, the majority use the doctrine of forum non conveniens to hold that when foreign persons own American copyrights, it is not convenient for an American court to adjudicate their claims. Contrary to the majority’s assertion, I simply advocate that we follow the Berne Convention by allowing foreign copyright owners the same opportunity that we give to American copyright owners to litigate their case in the United States when the alleged infringement takes place in the United States.
In this case, Creative alleges independent violations of the United States Copyright Act by acts of distribution which occurred in the United States. Our decision in this case should be obvious when put in the context of this court’s analysis in cases such as Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 749 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir.1984) and Subafilms. In Timberlane, 749 F.2d at 1386, this court affirmed a dismissal on grounds of forum non conveniens, because the “witnesses, the parties, and dastardly deeds were all Honduran; these suits would clearly require us to apply Honduran law ...” Similarly, in Subafilms, 94 C.D.O.S. at 3385, this court attempted to prevent “international discord” by holding that a claim of infringement based only on the authorization in the United States of infringing acts which occurred entirely outside the United States was not cognizable under the United States Copyright Act. In Timberlane and Subafilms, the territorial nature of copyright law precluded application of the United States Copyright Act to conduct that did not occur at all in the United States. By contrast, in this case, the principle of national treatment requires that United States copyright law be applied in order to remedy infringing conduct that occurred in the United States. Those works of Creative that are protected by United States copyrights and that were infringed by conduct which occurred in the United States must receive the benefit and the protection of the national treatment principle. Creative is entitled to protection under the United States Copyright Act.
Thus, the first part of the forum non conveniens test requires us to retain this action because the principle of national treatment precludes Singapore from being an adequate alternative forum. See Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 257, 102 S.Ct. at 266. The national treatment principle requires that infringement occurring in the United States be adjudicated in the United States.
However, the majority conclude that the “High Court of Singapore is capable of granting Creative the relief it seeks.” They conclude that the High Court can provide both a permanent injunction and sufficient damages to remedy the independent violations of importation and distribution under the United States Copyright Act. The majority have reached these conclusions without resort to any High Court case or other Singapore authority. Nor do the majority have any basis on which to conclude that the Singapore High Court will even “desire” to follow this course of remedy. Indeed, the only thing we really know about Singapore copyright law is that it is not even bound by the principles of the Berne Convention, because Singapore was not a signatory to that treaty. The record before us contains not a single Singapore statute or opinion authorizing the type of legal approach that the majority assumes the High Court will follow. In fact, the record does not tell us anything about Singapore law, its procedures, composition, or rules.
Thus, Singapore law is inadequate and inapplicable for the purposes of protecting Creative’s United States copyrights. In this case, the “subject matter” of the dispute consists of twelve United States copyrights which are entitled to protection by American courts against infringement occurring in the United States. This is precisely the type of case in which “dismissal [is] not ... appropriate where the alternative forum does not permit litigation of the subject matter of the *707dispute.” Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 254, n. 22, 102 S.Ct. at 265, n. 22.
II.
In addition to determining whether an adequate alternative forum exists, a district court must judge the applicability of forum non conveniens by weighing the relevant public and private interest factors. Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 257, 102 S.Ct. at 266. In Gates Learjet Corp. v. Jensen, 743 F.2d 1325, 1334 (9th Cir.1984), this court stated:
If a district court properly analyzes and considers all relevant factors and its balancing of these factors is reasonable, its forum non conveniens dismissal “may be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of discretion.” A district court, therefore, abuses its discretion when it fails to balance the relevant factors.
(Citations omitted.)
It is clear enough from the complaint, which is based entirely upon American copyright law, that the district court abused its discretion by dismissing this action. The district court utterly ignored the public interest in having the federal courts of this country apply American copyright law to resolve this controversy. See Contact Lumber Co. v. P.T. Moges Shipping Co. Ltd., 918 F.2d 1446, 1452 (9th Cir.1990). In Gates Learjet, 743 F.2d at 1336, this court held that the district court abused its discretion by failing to properly weigh the same public interest factors in the analogous area of trademark litigation:
... the district court failed to weigh Arizona’s interest in having the controversy “resolved at home.” Arizona has a significant interest in interpreting its own laws.... Arizona also has an interest in protecting its companies from trademark infringement abroad to preserve the state’s economic vitality. Although the si-tus of the alleged trademark and trade-name infringement was the Philippines, it appears that Philippine law is not applicable.... A proper understanding of the applicable law and the relative interest, in fact, suggests that Arizona has the more substantial interest in this litigation.
(Citations omitted.) Here, the applicable law is the United States Copyright Act and the situs of the alleged infringement is the United States. The district court erred in finding that any copyright law other than the United States Copyright Act would need to be applied in this case. Thus there is a strong public interest in avoiding conflict of law problems by having American courts resolve this controversy. See Zipfel v. Halliburton Co., 832 F.2d 1477, 1485 (9th Cir.1987); Subafilms, 94 C.D.O.S. at 3385. In addition, as in Gates Learjet, there is a strong public interest in having American courts resolve this localized controversy. The district court abused its discretion by failing to consider these factors.
Moreover, the district court’s error was compounded by its failure to account both for the unique significance of copyright law in American society and federal court jurisprudence and for the enormous complexity of American copyright law, particularly as it pertains to the protection of computer software. As the Supreme Court has stated:
The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an “author’s” creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good. “The sole interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring the [copyright] monopoly,” this Court has said, “lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.... ” When technological change has rendered its literal terms ambiguous, the Copyright Act must be construed in light of this basic purpose.
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156, 95 S.Ct. 2040, 2044, 45 L.Ed.2d 84 (1975) (citations omitted). Stated simply, the United States courts are the most well-suited forum for adjudicating the rights bestowed by United States copyrights. 133 Cong.Rec. H1293-05 (daily ed. March 16, 1987) (“While a relatively obscure discipline, copyright touches every American in their homes, schools, libraries, and workplaces. Determining the scope of a law which deeply affects how all of us may enjoy books, films, television programming, computer software, information products and services, music, *708and the visual arts requires great caution, particularly in a rapidly changing society such as ours that seeks both the free flow of information and the free marketplace”); Peter L. Felcher, Subject Matter of Copyright and Jurisdiction, 249 Practising Law Institute/Patent 7, *11 (1988) (“Federal judicial as well as Congressional control over copyrights is essential to promoting our system of intellectual and creative freedom and protection”).
By dismissing this action on grounds of forum non conveniens, the district court also failed to understand the importance of the copyrightability of computer software in American jurisprudence. American copyright law has yet to resolve fully the extent of protection that is due computer software, firmware, and other computer products. See, e.g., 2 International Copyright Law and Practice, USA, § 2, at 37 (Paul E. Geller & Melville B. Nimmer eds., 1993) (“Computer software stands at the vortex of a hotly contested storm in United States copyright law at present”). We must not leave the resolution of this issue to a Singapore court. The enormous importance of both computers and computer-related copyrights to American society precludes such a simplistic and shortsighted solution.
A copyright may not be as important as the Congressional Medal of Honor, but the district court and the majority have completely disregarded the fact that an American copyright is a valued benefit granted by the United States government for the primary purpose of benefiting the general public good; therefore, a copyright infringement claim must not be treated as a mere private cause of action like a tort or breach of contract. The majority confuse the importance of copyright law to the public good with the importance of copyright law to the American consumer. Nowhere have I stated that the district court should have accounted for the importance of this case to American consumers. Rather, I maintain that the district court failed to consider the enormous impact on the general public good resulting from its decision to leave to a Singapore court unsettled issues relating to the intellectual freedom to create American copyrights to computer software in a rapidly expanding market.
The district court and the majority cite Lockman Foundation v. Evangelical Alliance Mission, 930 F.2d 764 (9th Cir.1991), for authority to dismiss this case. They fail to understand the difference between this case and Lockman. In Lockman, the plaintiff owned an American copyright of its English translation of the Bible. The alleged infringement was the translation in Asia of the Bible into several Asian languages for distribution almost exclusively in Asia. In addition, the plaintiff alleged a violation of Japanese copyright law plus several non-copyright counts. The district court dismissed all the counts on the ground that it was not convenient to try them in America. The plaintiff did not appeal the dismissal of the American copyright claim. This Court held that, because the American copyright claim was so intertwined with the non-copyright claims, a grant of leave to amend in order to eliminate the copyright claim would have been futile. That is not this case. It is readily apparent that the American public interest is non-existent for Asian language Bibles distributed in Asia. There was no finding that even one Asian Bible was distributed in the United States. No infringement took place in the United States. In Lockman, there simply was not, as the Supreme Court found in Aiken, the stimulation of artistic creativity for the general public good in America.
Finally, contrary to the majority’s view, given the enormous importance to American society of copyright protection of computer products that are imported and distributed in this country, the interest of the United States in resolving this matter and the relation of the jury community to this task strongly favor retaining this case in the United States courts. There is no evidence presented in this case to demonstrate that Singapore courts are qualified to balance the creativity protected by American copyright law. A United States copyright is a privilege bestowed by our government upon the author in order to reward creativity. American copyright law involves a significant public interest.
*709Because there is no basis in claiming that it is not convenient to try this case in a United States District Court and because the public and private interest factors weigh in favor of retaining this action, I dissent. The district court erred in dismissing this action on grounds of forum non conveniens.