Judge, dissenting:
Chief Judge Tjoflat cites to and quotes from Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 112 S.Ct. 1061, 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992). In Collins, Justice Stevens, after noting the difference between “(1) whether plaintiffs harm was caused by a constitutional violation, and (2) if so, whether the City is responsible for that violation”, 503 U.S. at 120, 112 S.Ct. at 1065-66, analyzed the first issue in terms of substantive due process and quoted from DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 196, 109 S.Ct. 998, 1003, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989), (quoting Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348, 106 S.Ct. 668, 670-71, 88 L.Ed.2d 677 (1986)), that substantive due process is only violated when government involves itself in “abusing [its] power, or employing it as an instrument of oppression” or when “an omission can ... properly be characterized as ... arbitrary or conscience-shocking, in a constitutional sense”, rather than in the context of “a fairly typical state law tort claim.” 503 U.S. at 126-28, 112 S.Ct. at 1069-70. That approach by Justice Stevens would appear fully in line with the standard in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct. 205, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952), adopted in cases such as McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1556, n. 7 (11th Cir.1994), and Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1500 (11th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1115, 106 S.Ct. 1970, 90 L.Ed.2d 654 (1986).1 In Gilmere at 1500-01, Judge Vance quoted Judge Friendly’s observations in Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033, 94 S.Ct. 462, 38 L.Ed.2d 324 (1973):
Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers, violates a prisoner’s constitutional rights. In determining whether the constitutional line has been crossed, a court must look to such factors as the need for the application of force, the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used, the extent of injury inflicted, and whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.
Johnson v. Glick took place in a prison setting. In the majority opinion, Judge Tjoflat distinguishes prison cases on the grounds that matters which arise in a custodial setting are hardly fully applicable in an employment, non-eustodial setting of the type set forth in the within case. I fully agree. However, that does not mean that substantive due process provides no protection for persons in the position of Skinner in a state employment situation. Rather, the test set forth in Collins, which itself involved an employment relationship and not a custodial setting, still remains fully applicable in a case such as this case.
An examination of the record in this case discloses that Skinner presented considerable evidence showing a long standing custom and practice of unfettered hazing by fellow employees, on a number of occasions, including group attacks upon a single fire fighter who had been recently promoted or married, or the like. Such evidence includes incidents during which four or five fire fighters held a fire fighter selected as their victim, while one or more other fire fighters painted the genitals of the victim and other fire fighters looked on, having, in one or more instances, been alerted by announcement over the loudspeaker system within the firehouse that the event was about to take place. There was, in addition, evidence that such occurrences had become sufficiently traditional, to have caused special vocabulary to be developed. The so called “three man lift” were words used with regard to the type of occurrence described supra. The words “red assing” were employed generally to describe a certain form of hazing. The evidence also was rather specific concerning the knowledge of such practices held by the Chief of the Fire Department and by other responsible officials of that department and that such officials had, at most, ineffectually attempted to stop the practices. Such evidence falls with*350in the standards adopted by the Supreme Court in Collins, 503 U.S. at 126, 112 S.Ct. at 1069, of abuse of power, and actions which constitute oppressive behavior by superiors in permitting fellow employees to engage in the same, and also adds up to “conscience shocking” behavior exceeding the typical state law tort claim on behalf of one employee against one or more other employees of the State. Further, such practices were permitted to continue over a long period of time and fell beyond the single type of “push or shove” occurrence referred to by Judge Friendly in Johnson v. Glick, at 1033.2 Nor do such practices constitute the kind of behavior which governmental officials may ignore without liability. See, by way of contrast, Lovins v. Lee, 53 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir.1995), in which governmental officials were held non-liable for rape by a violent criminal allegedly, wrongfully released on a temporary pass from prison.
In his majority opinion, the Chief Judge has written3: “The record does not support the dissent’s implication that the City committed any deliberate acts to injure Skinner. At most, the evidence suggests that certain fire department officials knew that hazing incidents had occurred at some points in the past. This, however, falls short of demonstrating that the City violated a substantive constitutional right”. I respectfully disagree. A deliberate act to injure on the part of the City of Miami is not necessary to establish liability pursuant to § 1983. Rather, a municipality may be subject to § 1983 liability if plaintiff establishes “a widespread practice that, ‘although not authorized by written law or express municipal policy, is ‘so permanent and well settled as to constitute a ‘custom or usage’ with the force of law,’ (citations omitted). In other words, a longstanding and widespread practice is deemed authorized by the policymaking officials because they must have known about it but failed to stop it.” Brown v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 923 F.2d 1474, 1481 (11th Cir.1991).4 In the within case, there is quite'a bit of evidence of just such a failure to stop a known, widespread practice, and also of the fact that there were scattered ineffectual attempts to curtail that practice. Those ineffectual attempts support the verdict of the jury in favor of the plaintiff — they do not undermine it.
In his majority opinion, Judge Tjoflat writes “[mjinimal attention was paid to the issue of a constitutional violation in the district court”, and refers to the fact that the district court simply instructed the jury that Skinner had claimed denial of his “constitutionally guaranteed right to be free from unreasonable seizures or physical abuse.” See n. 2 in the majority opinion, along with parts of the record setting forth the jury instructions relating to the roles played by responsible officials of the City of Miami. Certainly it would have been better for the trial judge to have utilized the standards enunciated by Justice Stevens in Collins and by Judge Friendly in Johnson v. Glick. But the record does not disclose that defendants-appellants specifically requested such instructions, or even, in general, requested the inclusion of the same in the jury instructions. Under the circumstances, it would appear *351that the jury instructions were not so lacking in compliance with applicable legal standards so as to require a new trial in order to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
That is particularly true in this case in which, from my point of view, there is more than ample evidence to sustain the jury’s verdict and to support affirmative answers by the jury to the two discrete questions posed by Collins, namely that (1) “plaintiffs harm was caused by federal constitutional violation”, and (2) “The City is responsible for that violation.” Collins, 503 U.S. at 120, 112 S.Ct. at 1066.
For the reasons set forth in this separate opinion, I respectfully dissent and would affirm the judgment of the district court.
. But see the reservations as expressed by Judge Tjoflat's separate opinion, joined in by Judges Roney and Fay, in Gilmere at 1511, n. 21; see also McKinney at 1556, n. 7.
. MacDowell v. Manchester Fire Dep’t., 769 F.Supp. 40 (D.N.H.1990), relied on by Skinner and discussed by Judge Tjoflat, see n. 3 of the majority opinion, may well have only involved such a single type of event; accordingly its authority may be questionable.
. See n. 2 of the majority opinion.
. See also Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1345-1347 (11th Cir.1994); Brooks v. Scheib, 813 F.2d 1191, 1193 (11th Cir.1987) (“(a) municipality’s failure to correct the constitutionally offensive actions of its police department may rise to the level of a 'custom or policy' if the municipality tacitly authorizes these actions or displays deliberate indifference towards the police misconduct (citations omitted))”; Depew v. City of St. Mary's, 787 F.2d 1496, 1499 (11th Cir.1986). Authority to the same effect also emanates from other Circuits; see, e.g., McNabola v. Chicago Transit Authority, 10 F.3d 501, 511 (7th Cir.1993) (quoting from the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Brown); Bordanaro v. McLeod, 871 F.2d 1151, 1157 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 820, 110 S.Ct. 75, 107 L.Ed.2d 42 (1989); Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1386-87 (4th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1027, 108 S.Ct. 752, 98 L.Ed.2d 765 (1988). Individual liability, as contrasted with liability pursuant to Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), can also stem from such omissions. See Swint v. City of Wadley, 51 F.3d 988, 999 (11th Cir.1995), involving an arrest, not an employment setting. But that distinction, as discussed supra in the body of this dissent, does not, in my view, adversely affect the application herein of a combination of the standards of Collins and Monell so as to require anything other than affirmance of the judgment below.