Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part.
Carjacking is a heinous offense—violent and extremely frightening. Accordingly, I can well understand the anger and frustration that impelled Congress to enact 18 U.S.C. § 2119, making carjacking a federal crime. Nevertheless, I cannot agree with the majority that Congress had the authority *591to enact this statute under its constitutional power “to regulate commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States.” U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
Numerous carjackings occur in this country every year, and I acknowledge the force of the anecdotal evidence reported by the majority that at least some carjacked vehicles end up in “chop shops.” Carjacking may therefore be said to contribute, in some degree, to the operation of the interstate car-theft rings that Congress sought to regulate by the Anti-Car-Theft Act of 1992, of which § 2119 was a part. A careful reading of this Act’s legislative history, however, precludes any misidentifieation of the concerns that motivated Congress’s enactment of this provision. Whatever gossamer justifications the majority may now proffer, it is clear that Congress enacted the carjacking statute as a response to its accurate perception of carjacking as a crime of violence. And in the absence of congressional findings to the contrary — none are in evidence here — the majority’s conclusion that Congress could have rationally believed that prosecuting carjacking was an essential part of dealing with a larger economic burden on interstate commerce (i.e., interstate car-theft rings) and that carjacking itself, therefore, substantially affects interstate commerce, borders on the gossamer.
Six months ago the majority’s opinion would have carried the day. But that was before United States v. Lopez, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995), which, fairly read, reflects a sea change in the Supreme Court’s approach to these types of questions. That view is widely shared by the media in general and the legal press in particular.1 In contrast, the majority views Lopez as either a narrow decision or something of a “sport.” The majority observes, referencing the separate opinions of Justices O’Connor and Kennedy, that “despite protestations to the contrary, the winds have not shifted that much.” This passage is apparently meant to suggest that Justices O’Connor and Kennedy form an intermediate bloc which would view Lopez as case-specific. I remind my colleagues, however, that both Justices O’Connor and Kennedy joined in the Chief Justice’s opinion. Since five is more than four, I view Lopez as a beacon that we must follow, and the direction in which the beacon points compels my vote to invalidate the carjacking statute as beyond the broad reach of Congress’s Commerce Clause power.
In particular, all five justices in the Lopez majority refused to apply the Court’s previous easelaw “upholding regulations of activities that arise out of or are connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce” to “a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic enterprise.” Lopez, — U.S. at - - -, 115 S.Ct. at 1630-31. In so doing the Court required “a determination whether an intrastate activity is commercial or noncommercial.” Id. at-, 115 S.Ct. at 1633. If the intrastate activity is commercial, the “substantial effects” jurisprudence applies, allowing Congress to regulate the activity if it in aggregate substantially affects interstate commerce; otherwise, the doctrine is inapplicable and affords Congress no basis for regulation. In spite of Lopez's limitation on the application of its “substantial effects” jurisprudence to intrastate commercial activity, the majority upholds the constitutionality of § 2119 by concluding that carjacking, a violent criminal activity, is a commercial transaction. See maj. op. at 580-81.
I disagree with this conclusion, for I read the Lopez Court’s reference to a “commercial *592transaction” as referring to a voluntary economic exchange. The majority also runs afoul of the Lopez Court’s admonition that any definition of “commercial” must be one that provides “real limits” on the scope of Commerce Clause authority. Lopez, — U.S. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 1633. Yet, under the majority’s broad definition of commercial transaction, Congress could constitutionally federalize all intrastate car-theft, all intrastate crimes of theft, and perhaps nearly all criminal activity occurring within a state. The majority’s arguments prove far too much.
Moreover, in the wake of Lopez, I believe that a criminal statute such as § 2119, which does not involve a commercial transaction, cannot be upheld as the majority tries to do — by piling inference upon inference to construct from anecdotal data an argument that carjacking is an essential part of the operation of car-theft rings. Rather, noncommercial enactments, such as § 2119, should be upheld only to the extent that adequate data, available either by way of congressional findings or otherwise, establish that the proscribed non-commercial activity has a sufficient relationship to interstate commercial activity.
Importantly, the Supreme Court recognized in Lopez that “[ujnder our federal system the administration of criminal justice rests with the States.... When Congress criminalizes conduct already denounced as criminal by the States, it effects a ‘change in the sensitive relation between federal and state criminal jurisdiction.’ ” Lopez, — U.S. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 1631 (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, — U.S. -, -, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1720, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993)) (citations omitted).2 In this case, state law already directly governs the defendants’ conduct,3 since New Jersey, like many of its sister states,4 has criminalized carjacking.5 In en*593acting this criminal statute, Congress improperly interfered with the primary authority of New Jersey to define and enforce its criminal code. Intrastate crimes of violence, like the carjacking in this case, are properly left to the states, whose law enforcement agencies and courts are well suited to handle such criminal activity.6
In Part III I will explain in still greater detail why the carjacking statute cannot be justified as substantially affecting interstate commerce. But before reaching that issue, I will first take up the points advanced by the government as the two primary bases for upholding the carjacking statute, neither of which, I submit, are sufficient to uphold § 2119 under the Commerce Clause. First, I examine the majority’s reliance on Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 97 S.Ct. 1963, 52 L.Ed.2d 582 (1977), and demonstrate why the fact that the Dodge Shadow carjacked here once travelled in interstate commerce is not a sufficient interstate nexus to render this statute constitutional under the Commerce Clause. Then, in Part II, I explain why § 2119 cannot be justified as a regulation of an instrumentality of interstate commerce. Because I agree with the majority’s discussion of the double jeopardy issue, I join in Part II of the majority’s opinion, and to that extent this is a concurring as well as dissenting opinion.
I. The Scarborough Akgument
In October of 1992, as a part of the Anti-Car-Theft Act, P.L. 102-519, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 2119, which provides:
Whoever, possessing a firearm as defined in section 921 of this title, takes a motor vehicle that has been transported, shipped or received in interstate or foreign commerce from the person or presence of another by force and violence or by intimidation, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned....
18 U.S.C.A. § 2119 (West Supp.1995) (emphasis added). The majority correctly recognizes that this provision differs from § 922(q), the statute involved in Lopez, since § 2119 contains a jurisdictional element — the requirement that the accused “take[ ] a motor vehicle that has been transported, shipped or received in interstate or foreign commerce” — which § 922(q) lacked.
The majority goes on to state that
the mere presence of a jurisdictional element, however, does not in and of itself insulate a statute from judicial scrutiny under the Commerce Clause, or render it per se constitutional. To the contrary, courts must inquire further to determine whether the jurisdictional element has the requisite nexus with interstate commerce.
Following on, it reasons that it
must, therefore, determine whether the jurisdictional component in this case limits the statute to items that have an explicit connection with, or effect upon, interstate commerce.
The court concludes that it does.
These judicial missions are laudable, but they stand in sharp contrast to the discussion that follows which does not support them. Rather, the majority’s essential reasoning, like that of the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Oliver, 60 F.3d 547, 550 (9th Cir. 1995), is that the presence of this statutory element itself renders § 2119 constitutional.7 This reasoning supports the government’s contention that Lopez would have been decided differently had § 922(q) (which prohibited the possession of a gun within a 1000 feet of a school) simply contained a requirement that the gun had at some point been transported in interstate commerce.
*594I cannot agree that the force of the Lopez decision is so restricted. That is because, in order for a particular congressional enactment regulating an intrastate activity to pass constitutional muster under the Commerce Clause, the enactment must still fit within one of the three enumerated categories of congressional power. The jurisdictional element in such cases functions only to narrow the class of regulated activity. As the Court in Lopez recognized, in distinguishing prior ease law, § 922(q) “contains no jurisdictional element which would ensure, through ease-by-case inquiry, that the [regulated conduct] affects interstate commerce.” Lopez, — U.S. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 1631 (emphasis added). In other words, a jurisdictional element functions only to limit the regulation to interstate activity or to ensure that the intrastate activity which is regulated satisfies one of the three tests of congressional power. Section 2119 fails in this regard, since this provision regulates intrastate activity8 and the jurisdictional element in no way limits the statute’s application to ensure that it fits within one of the three branches of congressional Commerce Clause authority.
The majority, like the Oliver court, offers no analysis as to how § 2119’s jurisdictional element limits, in any relevant manner, the crime of carjacking so that it fits within one of the three enumerated branches of congressional authority. Rather, both opinions rely on the decision of the Supreme Court in Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 97 S.Ct. 1963, 52 L.Ed.2d 582 (1977), which the majority candidly admits did not engage in any analysis of the authority of Congress to enact laws under the Commerce Clause.9
As the majority recognizes, the Scarborough decision expanded upon the Court’s prior opinion in United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 92 S.Ct. 515, 30 L.Ed.2d 488 (1971), which, like Scarborough, involved what was then § 1202(a) of Title 18. This provision provided that any convicted felon “who receives, possesses, or transports in commerce or affecting commerce ... any firearm shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both.” In Bass, the “Government proceeded on the assumption that § 1202(a)(1) banned all possessions and receipts of firearms by convicted felons, and that no connection with interstate commerce had to be demonstrated in individual cases.” Id. at 338, 92 S.Ct. at 517. In response to this argument, the defendant contended that “the statute did not reach possession of a firearm not shown to have been ‘in commerce or affecting commerce,’ and that, if it did, Congress had overstepped its constitutional powers under the Commerce Clause.” Id. at 338, 92 S.Ct. at 518.
The Court rejected the government’s interpretation of the statute, refusing to adopt the government’s “broad reading in the absence of a clearer direction from Congress,” because the statute’s “sanctions are criminal and because, under the Government’s broader reading, the statute would mark a major inroad into a domain traditionally left to the States.” Id. at 339, 92 S.Ct. at 518. Therefore, the Court concluded that “the commerce requirement in § 1202(a) must be read as part of the ‘possesses’ and ‘receives’ offenses.” Id. at 350, 92 S.Ct. at 524; “Absent a clearer statement of intention from Congress than is present here, we do not interpret § 1202(a) to reach the ‘mere possession’ of firearms.” Id. The Court reasoned that “[ajbsent proof of some interstate commerce nexus in each case, § 1202(a) dramatically intrudes upon traditional state criminal juris*595diction.” Id. Because the government had not proven even the minimal nexus that the Court held the statute to require, the Court overturned the conviction, and thus “d[id] not reach the question whether, upon appropriate findings, Congress can constitutionally punish the ‘mere possession’ of firearms.” Id. at 339 n. 4, 92 S.Ct. at 518 n. 4.
Following Bass, the Court confronted in Scarborough the question of how the government might satisfy its statutory burden under the Bass Court’s reading of the statute, which required that a defendant possess the weapon “in commerce or affecting commerce.”10 Through a careful parsing of § 1202(a)’s legislative history, the Court concluded that in order to be convicted under the statute, the government need only prove that “the firearm possessed by the convicted felon traveled at some time in interstate commerce.” Scarborough, 431 U.S. at 568, 97 S.Ct. at 1966.
That decision, as the majority concedes, was exclusively one of statutory construction, explicating the intent of Congress in enacting § 1202(a). The Court’s entire analysis focused on this issue of congressional intent— what Congress required by the phrase “in commerce or affecting commerce.” Noticeably absent from the opinion, as the majority recognizes, is any analysis of whether the activity regulated by the statute constitutes a constitutional exercise of congressional power under the Commerce Clause. Given this fact, the relevance of the Scarborough decision to Commerce Clause jurisprudence is dubious.11 I agree that the Commerce Clause issue was implicit in the result reached by the Scarborough Court, which upheld the conviction.12 However, the majority errs in relying on a putative holding of Scarborough (perhaps “phantom holding” might be more apt) to conclude that the interstate jurisdiction element renders the statute constitutional under the Commerce Clause.13
Even if it were proper to rely on Scarborough as Commerce Clause precedent, the *596majority errs in defining the scope of Scarborough’s putative Commerce Clause holding as broadly as it does because § 1202(a) is distinguishable from § 2119. Section § 1202(a)’s jurisdictional requirement could, more properly, be viewed as a rational restriction on the illegal interstate trade in guns pursuant to the first branch of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority; the well established “authority of Congress to keep the channels of interstate commerce free from immoral and injurious uses.” Lopez, — U.S. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 1629 (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 256, 85 S.Ct. 348, 357, 13 L.Ed.2d 258 (1964)). At the time of § 1202(a)’s enactment federal law prohibited the sale of guns to felons. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(d) (1976) (providing that it shall be unlawful for a licensed gun distributor to sell or give a firearm to a person under indictment for or convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year). A fortiori, felons who had purchased their weapons after their felony conviction would have done so through illegal channels. Accordingly, § 1202(a), which prohibited felons from possessing a gun that traveled in interstate commerce, could have constituted a rational means for Congress to deal with illegal interstate trafficking in guns.
Section 2119, in contrast, cannot be justified in this fashion. Its jurisdictional element limits the reach of the carjacking statute to automobiles that have legitimately traveled in interstate commerce. But, we cannot rationally conclude that Congress seeks to regulate legitimate interstate trade in automobiles from manufacturer to dealer or from dealer to victim. Rather, § 2119 extends solely to intrastate criminal activity, which bears no rational nexus to the fact that the automobile in question was at some point legitimately shipped interstate. Hence, the jurisdictional element does not in any way rationally limit the class of activity Congress seeks to regulate. The concerns motivating Congress to enact § 2119 are the same whether the automobile was manufactured within the state where the crime occurred or elsewhere.14
The reasoning of the majority and the Oliver court, which would essentially permit Congress to regulate any activity so long as the statute contains some interstate jurisdictional element (no matter how tenuous its relation to the regulated activity), is simply too broad. The majority’s holding effectively renders the Supreme Court’s three-part Commerce Clause analysis superfluous, and permits Congress, through the inclusion of a meaningless interstate commerce provision, to “convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States.” Lopez, — U.S. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 1634. For instance, the majority’s logic would permit a federal law outlawing the theft of a Hershey kiss from a corner store in Youngstown, Ohio, by a neighborhood juvenile on the basis that the candy once traveled in interstate commerce to the store from Hershey, Pennsylvania. Similarly, the majority’s broad reading would vest Congress with power under the Commerce Clause to enact a federal law requiring students in private schools to read their homework assignments, so long as the government establishes that the textbooks were published in another state.15 The majority’s reasoning destroys any “distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local.” laL16
*597Accordingly, I conclude that § 2119 would constitute a constitutional exercise of congressional authority only if the intrastate activity regulated fit within one of the “three broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its commerce power.” Id. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 1629. In upholding this conviction, the majority relies on two of these three categories, concluding that § 2119 is constitutional under Congress’s power (1) to “regulate and protect the instru-mentalities of interstate commerce,” and (2) to regulate those activities with a “substantial effect on interstate commerce.” Id. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 1629-30. I take both of these rationales up in turn.
II. Instrumentalities of Interstate Commerce
Despite the fact that § 2119 does not govern the use of automobiles as instrumentalities of interstate commerce, the majority, again joining the Ninth Circuit in Oliver, 60 F.3d at 550, upholds the constitutionality of the statute on the theory that automobiles often are used as instrumentalities of interstate commerce. In so doing, the majority dramatically expands the scope of Congress’s power under this branch of Commerce Clause authority.
The majority correctly recognizes that “Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities.” Lopez, — U.S. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 1629. However, in crafting the scope of this category of congressional authority, courts have, to date, appropriately limited its application to congressional regulation of instrumentalities actually engaged in interstate commerce, or objects such as railcars or railway bridges, which are integrally related to an interstate commerce network. While automobiles can indeed be used to engage in interstate commerce (and an automobile need not be travel-ling interstate to be used in interstate corn-merce), the federal carjacking statute, unlike those statutes upheld in prior cases, in no way regulates instrumentalities in any way engaged in interstate commerce. Rather, § 2119 is a criminal statute of general application, which, by its terms, lacks any nexus to the use of automobiles in interstate commerce.
In my view, congressional authority under this branch of its Commerce Clause power has been shaped by two cases cited by the Supreme Court in Lopez—Southern Railroad Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20, 32 S.Ct. 2, 56 L.Ed. 72 (1911), and Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342, 34 S.Ct. 833, 58 L.Ed. 1341 (1914)—and by a statement in dicta in Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150, 91 S.Ct. 1357, 1359, 28 L.Ed.2d 686 (1971) (Perez was a “substantial effects” decision, see discussion infra).
The first of these cases, Southern R.R., involved the application of the Safety Appliance Act to a non-conforming railroad car used solely for hauling within one state, on “ ‘a part of a through highway’ over which traffic was continually being moved from one State to another.” 222 U.S. at 23, 32 S.Ct. at 3. The Court upheld the application of the regulation to the intrastate railcars, since such a close relationship existed between the intra- and inter-state traffic that congressional power could be “exerted to secure the safety of the persons and property transported” in interstate commerce, even though the “dangers intended to be avoided arise, in whole or in part, out of matters connected with intrastate commerce.” Id. at 27, 32 S.Ct. at 4.
Similarly, in the Shreveport Rate Cases, the Court upheld the Interstate Commerce Commission’s (ICC) ability to regulate the “relation” between inter- and intra-state rail rates by requiring an increase in the price of the intra-state rate. In both these cases the Court was concerned with the regulation of “intrastate transactions of interstate carriers .” Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. at *598353, 34 S.Ct. at 837 (emphasis supplied). Given this caselaw, the majority’s conclusion that § 2119 constitutes a regulation of an instrumentality of interstate commerce because cars can be used as instrumentalities of interstate commerce dramatically extends congressional power under this category of authority.
The Supreme Court’s discussion in Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. at 150, 91 S.Ct. at 1359, is not to the contrary. In Perez, the Court recognized that Congress could protect the “instrumentalities of interstate commerce, as for example, the destruction of an aircraft (18 U.S.C. § 32).” Id. at 150, 91 S.Ct. at 1359. At the time of Perez, § 32 provided a criminal penalty for “[w]hoever willfully sets fire to [or] damages ... any civil aircraft used, operated, or employed in interstate, overseas, or foreign air commerce." While the majority correctly recognizes that motor vehicles are often used as instrumentalities of interstate commerce (e.g., commercial trucking, interstate bus services, travelling salespeople, and even, perhaps, commuters), § 2119, unlike 18 U.S.C. § 32, does not involve the protection of an item used as an instrumentality of interstate commerce.17 If § 2119 were limited, like § 32, to the carjacking of automobiles “engaged in interstate commerce,” this statute would indeed proscribe interference with an item being used as an instrumentality of interstate commerce, which Congress could properly regulate under this branch of Commerce Clause authority. However, § 2119’s scope is dramatically broader, given that it governs all automobiles (regardless of their connection to interstate commerce) including those, like the one involved in this case, which are clearly not being used as instru-mentalities of interstate commerce.
It is enough for the majority that intrastate carjacking threatens both in-state and out-of-state motorists. But to reiterate, this is not the proper focus under this prong of Commerce Clause analysis. In regulating under this branch of authority, Congress can protect instrumentalities of interstate commerce. The fact that a motorist from Cherry Hill, New Jersey, is subject to a risk of carjacking in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, does not convert this motorist’s automobile into an instrumentality of interstate commerce equivalent to a commercial train or airplane transporting passengers and goods both inter- and intra-state.18
The regulation of air and rail travel is simply not a valid analogy. Such federal regulation is proper since both airplanes and trains are, nearly exclusively, used as instru-mentalities of interstate commerce — that is, air and rail travel involves, overwhelmingly, the sale of both inter- and intra-state transportation services for persons and/or cargo.19 We do not deal here with the ability of Congress to regulate or protect intra- and inter-state bus or commercial truck travel. Such regulation is clearly proper, since it, in contrast to § 2119, would involve the regulation of actual instrumentalities of interstate commerce. Rather, we deal here with a regulation governing all automobiles in all instances.
In reaching its conclusion, the majority misreads the scope of existing Supreme Court precedent. Foremost, its reliance on *599Alstate Const. Co. v. Durkin, 345 U.S. 13, 73 S.Ct. 565, 97 L.Ed. 745 (1953), and Overstreet v. North Shore Corp., 318 U.S. 125, 63 S.Ct. 494, 87 L.Ed. 656 (1943), is simply misplaced. These cases address the question whether, pursuant to a statute regulating an entity “engaged in interstate commerce,” the regulated entity in fact fell within this statutory requirement. As the Court explained, Over-street was
another ease in which we must define the scope of the Fair Labor Standards Act. The precise question is whether petitioners, who are engaged in maintaining or operating a toll road and a drawbridge over a navigable waterway which together constitute a medium for the interstate movement of goods and persons, are “engaged in commerce” within the meaning of §§ 6 and 7 of the Act, ... [where] “commerce” [is defined as] “commerce ... among the several States.”
318 U.S. at 126 & n. 2, 63 S.Ct. at 495-96 & n. 2 (footnote and citations omitted). The Court concluded that they were.
Alstate was a similar case. Alstate, a road contractor, also manufactured a road surfacing material. Installing the material on railroads and interstate roads made up the lions share of its work. The Court observed that
he who serves interstate highways and railroads serves commerce. By the same token he who produces goods for these indispensable and inseparable parts of commerce produces goods for commerce. We therefore conclude that Alstate’s off-the-road employees were covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act because engaged in “production of goods for commerce.”
As the Supreme Court once again clarified in United States v. Robertson, — U.S. -, ---, 115 S.Ct. 1732, 1732-33, 131 L.Ed.2d 714 (1995) (per curiam), the question whether an entity is “engaged in interstate commerce” under an applicable statute is a question quite different from whether a statute, lacking any such requirement, otherwise falls within Congress’s Commerce Clause authority. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 197 n. 12, 95 S.Ct. 392, 399 n. 12, 42 L.Ed.2d 378 (1974) (“The jurisdictional inquiry under [a statute], turning as it does on the circumstances presented in each case and requiring a particularized judicial determination, differs significantly from that required when Congress itself has defined the specific persons and activities that affect commerce and therefore require federal regulation.”) (emphasis added).
The Court in Overstreet did bolster its •conclusion that the bridge operator was engaged in interstate commerce by the fact .that it operated a bridge which “eonstitute[d] a medium for the interstate movement of goods and persons.” Overstreet, 318 U.S. at 127, 63 S.Ct. at 496. However, the application of the statute to the entities in both Overstreet and Alstate rested first and foremost on the Court’s statutory conclusion that the business was “engaged in interstate commerce.” Id.; Alstate, 345 U.S. at 15-16, 73 S.Ct. at 567.
In sum, the majority and the Oliver court reason that because cars are sometimes used as instrumentalities of interstate commerce, Congress can regulate any aspect of automobiles (and automobile traffic) under this branch of congressional authority. Federal power under the Commerce Clause, in my view, is not this broad. The fact that automobiles can be used as instrumentalities of interstate commerce does not grant to Congress plenary authority to regulate the use and operation of every individual’s automobile. Such an approach would constitute a dramatic encroachment on the regulation of automobiles, a traditional area of state concern, and would permit Congress to pass federal laws requiring individuals to wear seatbelts (as opposed to requiring that cars be manufactured with seatbelts) or banning motorists from making a right turn at a red fight.20 Previous Commerce Clause jurispru*600dence has never before viewed congressional power to regulate the instrumentalities of interstate commerce this broadly. With its decision, the majority dramatically and improperly enhances the scope of federal power under this branch of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.
III. SubstaNtial Effect on
INTERSTATE COMMERCE
The majority’s principal justification in upholding the constitutionality of § 2119 is that Congress could have rationally concluded that carjacking has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. In its discussion, the majority does an excellent job of recounting the congressional findings with regard to the entire Anti-Car-Theft Act. See maj. op. at 577-79. However, by recounting this legislative history, the majority conflates the relevant issues. We do not deal here with the constitutionality of this entire Act or with the effect of car-theft rings, in the whole, on the economy. Rather, our concern is whether Congress could have rationally concluded that carjacking substantially affects interstate commerce through its role in interstate car-theft operations.
Section 2119’s legislative history is devoid of any findings in this regard, which should come as no surprise. In enacting this provision, Congress was concerned not with the economic effects of carjacking or with the relationship between carjacking and interstate car-theft operations, but rather with curtailing this well-publicized crime of violence. This intent is abundantly clear from the legislative history cited by the majority: “In addition to economic costs, car owners are increasingly subject to violent crime. The most recent developments in car-theft is ‘armed carjacking.’ ” H.R.Rep. No. 851,102d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 15 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2829, 2831 (emphasis added); see also id., pt. 3, at 2, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2895 (“Perhaps relating to the opportunity for profit, criminals are increasingly committing violent crime in the form of ‘armed carjacking.’ ”); 138 Cong.Reo. Hll,819 (1992) (statement of Rep. Ramstad) (“People are outraged and terrified by the heinous carjacking epidemic currently upon us. How can any civilized nation tolerate the brutal killing of a mother dragged 2 miles to her death ... ? How can any civilized people tolerate such despicable, outrageous criminal acts? They cannot and they will not.”); id. at Hll,820 (statement of Rep. Collins) (“The most shocking case, involv[ing] a young mother who was dragged two miles to her death ... has absolutely galvanized public opinion and outcry that this Congress act now to address this awesome despicable crime.”).
Given this legislative history, it is clear that § 2119 was enacted to deal with carjacking as a crime of violence, not, as the majority now contends, to confront the effects of carjacking on the interstate economy. Congress has not made any findings to support the conclusion that carjacking has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Congress made no such findings since, as the majority surmises, maj. op. at 587, Congress viewed § 2119’s jurisdictional requirement, discussed supra at 593-96, as constitutionally sufficient.
I recognize that “Congress need [not] make particularized findings in order to legislate.” Perez, 402 U.S. at 156, 91 S.Ct. at 1362 (cited in Lopez, — U.S. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 1631 (“Congress is normally not required to make formal findings as to the substantial burdens that an activity has on interstate commerce.”)). Accordingly, I point to the lack of congressional findings only to demonstrate, that like the statute in Lopez, no such findings are available to support the government’s contention that the intrastate activity has a substantial effect on commerce. See Lopez, — U.S. at ---, 115 S.Ct. at 1630-32 (“[T]o the extent that congressional findings would enable us to evaluate thelegislative judgment that the activity in question substantially affected interstate commerce, even though no such substantial effect was visible to the naked eye, they are lacking here.”).”
*601Given the lack of congressional findings, the majority constructs for Congress an argument that carjacking has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The majority’s argument is essentially two-fold; it contends: (1) that carjacking, itself, is a commercial transaction which, in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce; or (2) that Congress could have rationally concluded that § 2119 was a necessary element in thwarting the operation of car-theft rings, which Congress found to substantially affect interstate commerce.
In the first instance, the majority submits that carjacking can be upheld as a regulation of an intrastate commercial transaction which, through repetition, has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Maj. op. at 579-80 & n. 20 (citing Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 325 (1981)). In so doing, the majority runs afoul of Lopez.
Importantly, the Court in Lopez concluded that the regulation of non-economic intrastate activity could not be upheld under its eases dealing with the “regulations of activities that arise out of or are connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce.” Lopez, — U.S. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 1631. In limiting the application of its “substantial effects” jurisprudence to intrastate economic or commercial activity, the Court recognized that its prior caselaw in this area satisfied this limitation:
[W]e have upheld a wide variety of congressional Acts regulating intrastate economic activity where we have concluded that the activity substantially affected interstate commerce. Examples include the regulation of intrastate coal mining; Ho-del, supra, intrastate extortionate credit transactions, Perez, supra, restaurants utilizing substantial interstate supplies, McClung, supra, inns and hotels catering to interstate guests, Heart of Atlanta Motel, supra, and production and consumption of home-grown wheat, Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 63 S.Ct. 82, 87 L.Ed. 122 (1942). These examples are by no means exhaustive, but the pattern is clear. Where economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained.
Lopez, — U.S. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 1630.
In articulating this important limitation on its Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the Lopez court “admitted! ] [that] a determination whether an intrastate activity is commercial or noncommercial may in some cases result in legal uncertainty.” Id. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 1633. But the Court recognized that “so long as Congress’ authority is limited to those powers enumerated in the Constitution, and so long as those enumerated powers are interpreted as having judicially enforceable outer limits, congressional legislation under the Commerce Clause always will engender ‘legal uncertainty.’” Id. Following Lopez, the Court in United States v. Robertson reiterated this new important limitation on its substantial effects jurisprudence: “The ‘affecting commerce’ test was developed in our jurisprudence to define the extent of Congress’s power over purely intrastate commercial activities that nonetheless have substantial interstate effects.” — U.S. -,-, 115 S.Ct. 1732, 1733 (1995) (emphasis added).
The majority concludes that the Court’s limitation of its substantial effects jurisprudence to intrastate commercial or economic activity does not preclude application of the doctrine to § 2119 because, in the majority’s view, carjacking is a commercial transaction. In reaching this conclusion, the majority’s analysis evidences none of “legal uncertainty” that concerned the Court in Lopez, — U.S. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 1633, since it is sufficient for the majority that “[w]hen a criminal points a gun at a victim and takes his or her car, the criminal has made an economic gain and the victim has suffered an undeniable and substantial loss.” Maj. op. at 581. The majority then attempts to measure the “economic effect” of carjacking by concluding that it is equivalent to the sum of the value of all caijacked automobiles. See maj. op. at 582 n. 20. In my view, the majority’s definition of commercial transaction is too broad and thereby runs afoul of the Lopez Court’s requirement that the definition of “commercial” provide “real limits” on the scope of Commerce Clause authority. — U.S. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 1633 (rejecting the *602primary dissent’s contention that “Congress could rationally conclude that schools fall on the commercial side of the line,” on the grounds that such a “rationale lacks any real limits because, depending on the level of generality, any activity can be looked upon as commercial”).
The majority sweeps within its definition of commercial activity all criminal acts which involve a coercive (nonconsensual) transfer of economic benefit from victim to perpetrator. A definition of this breadth would include not only carjacking, but also all crimes of theft. Indeed, if Chief Judge Posner is correct, perhaps it includes all criminal activity. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF Law 217-18 (4th ed. 1992) (contending that “[mjurder, robbery, burglary, larceny, rape, assault and battery, mayhem, false pretenses, and most other common law crimes (i.e., crimes punishable under the English common law)” all “represent a pure coercive transfer either of wealth or utility from victim to wrongdoer”). While it is far from clear what Lopez meant by a “commercial transaction,” the preferable definition of commercial transaction requires an activity involving a voluntary economic exchange.21 To define a commercial transaction as broadly as the majority does — any activity involving a transfer of wealth from victim to wrongdoer — is to embrace a Commerce Clause jurisprudence that includes within its scope a broad array of criminal activity, which “[ujnder our federal system, the States possess primary authority for defining and enforcing_” Lopez, — U.S. at ---, 115 S.Ct. at 1680-31 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The majority’s second “substantial effects” argument is somewhat distinct from its first. It contends that Congress could have rationally concluded that carjacking was “an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated.” Id. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 1631. In the majority’s view, Congress could have concluded that criminalizing carjacking was an essential part of the regulation of car-theft rings, which are interstate commercial enterprises that Congress found to have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
Given the lack of congressional findings on the nexus between carjacking and car-theft rings, the majority constructs its argument from anecdotal evidence drawn from newspaper reports suggesting that some carjackers have sold automobiles into car-theft rings. In addition, the majority relies on police reports and some statements by members of Congress suggesting that modem anti-theft devices have made it easier to carjack many vehicles than to steal them when they are parked. The majority also relies on a Department of Justice Report on carjacking. See An Analysis of Carjacking in the United States (Oct. 14, 1992). Such reliance is misplaced, given that the thrust of this report directly undercuts the majority’s contention that carjacking forms a part of the operation of car theft rings.
After discussing car theft rings (i.e., chop shops, salvage switching of vehicle identification numbers, exportation, and insurance fraud), the report states:
In each of the above instances, there was relatively little danger to the American public as the sole motive was to obtain the vehicle for its value. In contrast, the new carjacking problem is more akin to the violent street crimes associated with street gangs and the drug subculture....
The primary motives appear to be transportation for a getaway after robbing the driver, a source of transportation to commit another crime, joyriding, and to a lesser degree, to derive a profit from the resale of the vehicle or its parts.
Department of Justice, An Analysis of Carjacking in the United States (Oct. 14, 1992) *603at 2-3 (emphasis added) (“The San Juan Division notes that only eight percent of the vehicles carjacked in their division are recovered suggesting that they are either chopped, replated, or exported.”).
From these several sources, the majority reasons that carjacking is becoming a more effective way for car-theft rings to steal ears. Maj. op. at 582. The majority has constructed a fine argument in its attempt to preserve the constitutionality of § 2119, but I cannot agree that Congress could have rationally concluded that carjacking contributes significantly to the operation of car-theft operations; reported carjackings at the time of the enactment of the Anti-Cartheft Act of 1992 constituted less than 2% of the autos stolen in this country on an annual basis.22
The majority draws the legal support for its argument from the Court’s opinion in Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 91 S.Ct. 1357, 28 L.Ed.2d 686 (1971). In Perez, the Court upheld a criminal loan sharking provision because, as the majority recognizes, Congress concluded that intrastate loan sharking constituted a significant aspect of the operation of organized crime, which had an adverse effect on interstate commerce. While the legal framework of the majority’s argument is similar to Perez, this case is clearly distinguishable. In Perez, the Court relied on extensive congressional findings that “grew out of a ‘profound study of organized crime, its ramifications and its implications’ undertaken by some 22 Congressmen”. Id. at 155, 91 S.Ct. at 1362 (quoting 114 Cong.Rec. at 14391). These findings in turn relied on an executive branch report stating “that loan sharking was ‘the second largest source of revenue for organized crime,’ and is one way by which the underworld obtains control of legitimate businesses.” Id. (quoting The Challenge of Cmme in a FREE SOCIETY, A REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justioe 190 (February 1967)).
The Perez Court recognized that these findings “supplied Congress with the knowledge that the loan shark racket provides organized crime with its second most lucrative course of revenue, exacts millions from the pockets of people, coerces its victims into the commission of crimes against property, and causes the takeover by racketeers of legitimate businesses.” 402 U.S. at 156, 91 S.Ct. at 1362 (emphasis added). Given these findings, the majority cannot assert that the role of carjacking in the operation of interstate car-theft rings approaches anywhere near the essential role of loan sharking in the operation of organized crime. Indeed, in constructing its argument, the majority can point to little more than random newspaper clippings to suggest that carjacking has any relationship to interstate car-theft rings, let alone a relationship comparable to that of loan sharking to organized crime. Accordingly, I cannot agree that the majority’s analysis establishes a relationship between carjacking and ear-theft rings of a degree that satisfies existing constitutional requirements.
IV. Conolusion
In sum, I believe that non-commercial intrastate crimes, even ones receiving publicity in the national media, are a matter of state and not federal concern. Pre-Lopez courts were correct to conclude that although § 2119 “may stretch the outer limits of the Commerce Clause, under current doctrine it is not unconstitutional.” United States v. Overstreet, 40 F.3d 1090, 1093 (10th Cir.1994) (emphasis added). However, after Lopez I believe that the outer boundary has shifted, since, as I have demonstrated, Lopez is not just another Supreme Court case, but a watershed. For all of the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
. See, e.g., Bennett L. Gershman, Judicial “Conservatism," N.Y.L.J. 2 (June 21, 1995) ("In Lope?., the Court may have uprooted nearly 60 years of Commerce Clause jurisprudence.”); Herman Schwartz, Court Abandons Rational-Basis Test, Legal Times 25-26 (May 8, 1995) ("The imposition of judicial limits on Congress’ commerce clause regulation of private activities thus marks a major shift in judicial attitude.”) (emphasis added); Dean James L. Huffman, Lopez Pops Feds Ballooning Powers, Natl L.J. A21 (May 22, 1995) (“The Lopez holding, even as cautiously explained by Chief Justice Rehnquist ... is, as Justice John P. Stevens says in dissent, ‘radical.’ There is no other way to reverse nearly 60 years of total deference to Congress on the meaning of the commerce clause.”) (emphasis added); Stuart Taylor, Jr., Judging with Pinpoint Accuracy, The Recorder 10 (May 8, 1995) (rescribing the comment of Yale Law Professor Bruce Ackerman describing Lopez as "one of the opening cannonades in the coming constitutional revolution”).
. Similar sentiments are echoed in the recently submitted "Proposed Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts”:
Congress should commit itself to conserving the federal courts as a distinctive judicial forum of limited jurisdiction in our system of federalism. Civil and criminal jurisdiction should be assigned to the federal courts only to further clearly defined and justified national interests, leaving to the state courts responsibility for adjudicating all other matters.... In principle, criminal activity should be prosecuted in a federal court only in those instances in which state court prosecution is not appropriate or where federal interests are paramount.
Committee on Long Range Planning — Judicial Conference of the United States, Proposed Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts 23 (March 1995); see also Thomas M. Mengler, "The Sad Refrain of Tough on Crime: Some Thoughts on Saving the Federal Judiciary from the Federalization of State Crime,” 43 U. Kansas L.Rev. 503 (1995).
. In fact, as the government concedes, the New Jersey criminal penalty exceeds the penalty provided by the federal carjacking statute in this case.
. See, e.g., Cal.Pen.Code § 215 (1995); 11 Del.C. § 222 (1994); D.C.Code § 22-2903 (1994); Fla. Stat. § 812.133 (1994); Burns Ind.Code Ann. § 35-42-5-2 (1994); La.Rev.Stat. § 14:64.2 (1995); Md.Ann.Code art. 27, § 348A (1994); Mass.Ann.Laws ch. 265, § 21A (1995); Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-117 (1993); South CarCode Ann. § 16-3-1075 (1993); Va.Code Ann. § 18.2-58.1 (1995).
. The defendants could be prosecuted under NJ § 2C:15-2, which provides:
A. CARJACKING DEFINED. A person is guilty of carjacking if in the course of committing an unlawful taking of a motor vehicle, as defined in N.J.S. 39:1-1, or in an attempt to commit an unlawful taking of a motor vehicle he:
(1) inflicts bodily injury or uses force upon an occupant or person in possession or control of a motor vehicle;
(2) threatens an occupant or person in control with, or purposely or knowingly puts an occupant or person in control of the motor vehicle in fear of, immediate bodily injury;
(3) commits or threatens immediately to commit any crime of the first or second degree; or
(4) operates or causes said vehicle to be operated with the person who was in possession or control or was an occupant of the motor vehicle at the time of the taking remaining in the vehicle. An act shall be deemed to be "in the course of committing an unlawful taking of a motor vehicle" if it occurs during an attempt to commit the unlawful taking of a motor vehicle or during an immediate flight after the attempt or commission.
B. GRADING. Carjacking is a crime of the first degree and upon conviction thereof a person may, notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1) of subsection a. of N.J.S. 2C:43-6, be sentenced to an ordinary term of imprisonment between 10 and 30 years. A person convicted of carjacking shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment and that term of imprisonment shall include the imposition of a mini*593mum term of at least five years during which the defendant shall be ineligible for parole.
N.J.Stat. § 2C:15-2 (1994).
. Not surprisingly, local, as opposed to federal, law enforcement officials made the arrests in this case.
. While the majority does not address the subject, I will assume that this jurisdictional element requires the government to establish that "a fully assembled 'motor vehicle’ has been transported in interstate commerce rather than ... [merely requiring a showing that] either the 'motor vehicle’ or the motor vehicle's parts, prior to assembly, moved in interstate commerce.” United States v. Johnson, 56 F.3d 947, 956-57 (8th Cir. 1995).
. In this regard, § 2119’s jurisdictional requirement is distinguishable from a requirement that the regulated entity actually be "engaged in interstate commerce.” See United States v. Robertson, - U.S. -, ---, 115 S.Ct. 1732, 1732-33, 131 L.Ed.2d 714 (1995) (per curiam) (examining the question whether a regulated entity was "engaged in interstate commerce"). If § 2119 contained such a requirement, the government would need to establish that the defendants were in fact working as a part of a car-theft ring engaged in interstate commerce. While such a requirement would render § 2119 constitutional, the statute, as enacted, simply lacks any requirement that the regulated person(s) be engaged in interstate commerce.
. Indeed the majority summarily concludes:
Because section 2119 is limited to cars that have traveled in interstate or foreign commerce, the Supreme Court's decisions in Bass and Scarborough compel the conclusion that the jurisdictional element in section 2119 provides a nexus sufficient to protect the statute from constitutional infirmity.
. In Bass, the Court noted, by way of example, that the government could satisfy this burden under the statute, “if at the time of the offense the gun was moving interstate or ¡on an interstate facility, or if the possession affebts commerce.” Bass, 404 U.S. at 350, 92 S.Ct. at 524.
. The Lopez Court observed that “[u]nlike the statute in Bass, § 922(q) has no express jurisdictional element which might limit its reach to a discrete set of firearm possessions that additionally have an explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce.” - U.S. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 1631 (emphasis added). This statement is consistent with the requirement that the jurisdictional element limit the regulation to interstate activity or ensure that the regulated intrastate activity fall within one of three categories of congressional power under the Commerce Clause.
. I do note that though the Commerce Clause issue easily could have been mentioned, it was not.
. Even though the Court’s decision in Scarborough was devoid of any Commerce Clause analysis, the majority supports its unflinching application in this case by relying on language in Rodriguez De Quijos v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 109 S.Ct. 1917, 104 L.Ed.2d 526 (1989), where the Court cautioned: "If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions." 490 U.S. at 484, 109 S.Ct. at 1921-22 (emphasis added). In Rodriguez, the Court of Appeals concluded that "a predispute agreement to arbitrate claims under the Securities Act of 1933” was enforceable, and did not “requir[e] resolution of the claims ... in a judicial forum,” despite that fact that previously in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 74 S.Ct. 182, 98 L.Ed. 168 (1953), the Supreme Court had held that "an agreement to arbitrate future controversies” under the Securities Act of 1933 was "void" under § 14 of that Act. Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at 479, 109 S.Ct. at 1919. The Court of Appeals reasoned that while subsequent Supreme Court decisions had not directly addressed the holding of Wilko, which was directly applicable, subsequent decisions had reduced Wilko to "obsolescence.” Rodriguez De Quijos v. Shearson/Lehman Bros., Inc., 845 F.2d 1296, 1299 (5th Cir.1988).
I acknowledge the binding nature of this decision, but it is clearly distinguishable. Scarborough, a decision analyzing the legislative intent behind § 1202(a) (a statute since repealed by Congress) and devoid of any Commerce Clause analysis, simply cannot have "direct application” in a case concerning the power of Congress to enact a federal carjacking statute under its Commerce Clause power. Moreover, while the broad application of the statute in Scarborough is probably undermined by Lopez, my contention that Scarborough is inapplicable to this action does not arise from the Court’s decision in Lopez.
. Congress, in enacting § 2119, expressed concern that "[i]n a single week last year in Detroit, 74 cars were stolen in armed carjackings.” H.R. No. 851, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 15, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2829, 2831. It defies logic to assert that Congress rationally sought to criminalize only those carjackings occurring in Detroit which involved these relatively few cars in Michigan manufactured outside of the state.
. See Paul D. Kamenar, The Feds Lose a Piece of Their Rock; Commerce Clause Should Not Be Infinite, Legal Times 25 (May 3, 1995) (recounting the criticism of commentator George Will that under the Lopez dissent's broad reading of Commerce Clause authority, Congress could "pass a federal law requiring students to do their homework").
. In overturning § 2119 as beyond the scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority in United States v. Cortner, 834 F.Supp. 242 (M.D.Tenn.1993), rev’d 30 F.3d 135 (6th Cir.1994), Judge Wiseman had a similar view of this argument:
To say ... that because something once traveled in interstate commerce it remains in inter*597state commerce after coming to rest in a given state is sheer sophistry.... [I]f it is sufficient to invoke the powers of the Commerce Clause that something has been manufactured outside of the state of Tennessee and previously transported here, 90% of the merchandise on every merchant's shelf will qualify and any robbery of any store can be federalized by the Congress under this rationale.
Id. at 243.
. The majority recognizes this important distinction between the carjacking statute and 18 U.S.C. § 32 in dismissing Stokes' reliance on United States v. Heightland, 865 F.2d 94 (6th Cir.1989). See maj. op. at 589-90.
. In Cortner, Judge Wiseman recognized that
[i]f anything that will take you across a state line is an "instrumentality of commerce,” then there is justification for Congress to regulate anything done on a bicycle or, for that matter, on foot. The Framers traveled to Philadelphia on horseback or by horse and carriage. Can it be imagined that in constructing the Commerce Clause they intended to regulate and punish horse stealing?
834 F.Supp. at 243.
.Although federal aviation regulation governs non-commercial aircraft, the regulation of automobiles remains different. Safe interstate commercial air travel depends on the regulation of all planes using our nation's air space in a manner not present in the regulation of automobiles. See Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 303, 64 S.Ct. 950, 956, 88 L.Ed. 1283 (1944) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("Air as an element in which to navigate is even more inevitably federalized by the commerce clause than is navigable water.... Congress has recognized the national responsibility for regulating air commerce. Federal control is intensive and exclusive.”).
. Existing federal automobile regulation of this genre (i.e., the federal speed limit) has been exerted under the Spending Clause, not the Commerce Clause. See 23 U.S.C. § 154 (Supp.1995) (conditioning receipt of federal highway funds on a state's enforcement of federally-imposed speed limits). It has long been recognized that “ 'the power of Congress to authorize expenditure of public moneys for public purposes is not limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in *600the Constitution.' " South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207, 107 S.Ct. 2793, 2796, 97 L.Ed.2d 171 (1987) (quoting United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66, 56 S.Ct. 312, 319, 80 L.Ed. 477 (1936)).
. The Court’s decision in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 63 S.Ct. 82, 87 L.Ed. 122 (1942), "perhaps the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity,” Lopez, - U.S. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 1630, is not to the contrary. Wickard dealt with the production and consumption of home grown wheat, an activity that undeniably bears a connection with a voluntary economic exchange — the need vel non of the regulated entity (the farmer) to purchase wheat in the market place. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 114-116, 126-130, 63 S.Ct. at 84, 90-91.
. See Department of Justice, An Analysis of Carjacking in the United States at 33 (Oct. 14, 1992); Nancy Gibbs, Hell on wheels; Car Crime is no longer a matter of stealing parts but of taking lives — and an American icon becomes less and less of a sanctuary, Time 44 (August 16, 1993) (“The FBI estimates that there were 25,000 carjackings last year ... [which] is still only a tiny fraction of the 1.6 million annual car thefts.”).