concurring and dissenting:
I dissent from Part II of the majority opinion but concur in Part III.
Mejia’s argument proceeds from the premise that an ideal procedure would have been for Judge Real to grant a continuance and hear live testimony from the officers. No doubt that would have been ideal, and I am somewhat at a loss to understand why the ideal did not become the reality. Nevertheless, I do not agree that reversal is required.
Mejia’s argument comes parlously close to suggesting that district courts simply cannot make proper decisions in suppression cases without seeing the witnesses. That, of course, is not true. See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 677-81, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 2413-15, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980); Campbell v. United States District Court, 501 F.2d 196 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 879, 95 S.Ct. 143, 42 L.Ed.2d 119 (1974). I do not overlook the Supreme Court’s footnote 7 in Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 681, 100 S.Ct. at 2415. However, I do not think that one should put very much weight on the dicta in that footnote. The agency proceedings alluded to by the Court do not, as far as I know, preclude the boards, which are making the ultimate decisions, from making credibility determinations different from those of the hearing officers. Indeed, we know that agency boards do just that. See, e.g., Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 767 F.2d 1448, 1455 (9th Cir.1985), aff'd, 480 U.S. 421, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987); McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir.1981). Moreover, the idea that a district court must actually review a magistrate judge’s determinations de novo, but may not upset the magistrate judge’s credibility decisions is troublesome to say the least. Much of what passes as factfinding in our system does in fact require resolving conflicts in the evidence and therefore believing one party or the other. If a district judge could not read a hearing transcript and come to a conclusion that differs from that of *321the magistrate judge, the utility of magistrate judges in our system would be greatly undermined. That cannot be: mutatis mu-tandis a district judge should generally be able to read a hearing transcript and make his own assessment in the first place.
That being said, I do not think that Mejia should carry the day. It seems to me that he has utterly failed to show that he was prejudiced. True, he keeps uttering the generality that the district court could have made a much more just decision had it only seen the officers in person. But Judge Real had the officers’ declarations before him and had the transcript of their cross-examination in front of Judge Gadbois. As Judge Real pointed out, that cross-examination did not appear to develop any relevant inconsistencies or to bring out any even remotely interesting contradictory testimony. There was no particular reason to think that a second cross-examination would have been more efficacious.
Also, if the officers did exhibit any unusual body language, facial expressions, vocal hesitations, or the like on the first cross-examination, we may assume that Mejia would have been quick to tell Judge Real about those incidents. Demeanor problems would surely underscore the need for seeing the officers in person. Again, Mejia contented himself with generalities.
Finally, when the fact that the district court found Mejia and his wife to be unbelievable is added to the mix, the whole becomes less, not more, redolent of prejudice. In short, while I do not entirely fathom the district court’s reluctance to hear the officers’ testimony on a later day, I also do not think that Mejia has adequately explained how he was actually prejudiced. See United States v. Robertson, 15 F.3d 862, 873 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 362, 130 L.Ed.2d 315 (1994).
Thus, I respectfully dissent from Part II of the opinion.