dissenting.
In my judgment, the majority opinion fails to identify the correct issue in this case, omits facts essential to a correct resolution of the real issue, and announces a rule of law wholly foreign, until today, to established Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. I respectfully dissent.
I.
The issue we are required to decide is whether the defendant’s consent to search his vehicle was freely and voluntarily given. The majority opinion never addresses this issue. Instead, it holds, without supporting authority, that once the circumstances justifying an initial Terry stop are resolved, the suspect must be released. Indeed, the authority cited in support of this novel view contradicts it. Had the majority opinion taken into account all of the facts relevant to the real issue in the case — whether the defendant voluntarily consented to the search of his vehicle — it may well have avoided the erroneous conclusion it reaches.
II.
The facts are all important.
Deputy Sheriff Jeffrey Wagner of the Livingston County, Michigan, Sheriffs Department initially approached the defendant, James Erwin, Jr., because Erwin was standing in a truck stop, near a pay telephone, and next to a vehicle which matched the description of one identified in a police radio dispatch as possibly being operated by a drunk and/or reckless driver.
Deputy Wagner testified that as he approached Erwin, the defendant seemed to be attempting to get back into his vehicle as if to leave. Wagner asked Erwin to remain where he was and explained that he was investigating a drunk and/or reckless driving report involving someone driving a vehicle whose description matched Erwin’s. During this brief exchange, Wagner noted that Erwin seemed extremely nervous, he was sweating, rubbing his hands together, taking his hat off and putting it back on again several times, and wiping his brows. He also noticed a cellular phone on the front seat and observed that the back seat cushion was “slightly ajar.”
The deputy asked Erwin for his driver’s license, which the defendant produced. However, the defendant did not have a registration for the vehicle or proof of insurance because, he claimed, he had borrowed the vehicle from someone else and, in all events, the vehicle had been rented. A radio lien check on Erwin’s license revealed that Erwin had “several” prior convictions for weapons and drug offenses, and had recently been released from a parole status. While Wagner was running the check on Erwin’s license, Deputy Sheriff Michael Lawry arrived on the scene. Lawry noticed that Erwin was “sweating profusely,” his eyes were “darting around,” and he was continually “reaching into his pocket.”
Lawry approached Erwin, patted him down for weapons, and discovered that Erwin was carrying a pager, between $800 and $900 in cash, and $135 in food stamps. Initial questioning revealed that Erwin was not intoxicated, and it did not appear that he was under the influence of drugs. However, the deputies suspected that Erwin might be a drug distributor. They reached that conclusion, the deputies said, because of the combination of the cellular phone, the pager, the nearby public phone, the large amount of cash, the out-of-place back seat cushion, a small mirror and an open cloth case on the front seat of the vehicle which the deputies suspected, mistakenly it turned out, was a “coke spoon,” the defendant’s criminal background, the suspicious absence of the vehicle registration and proof of insurance, and the defendant’s “extremely nervous” demeanor; all articulable facts pointing to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
At this point the deputies decided to question Erwin further and asked him whether he had anything in the vehicle he shouldn’t have, like weapons or drugs, to which the defendant responded that he did not. Deputy Lawry then said: “Well, then, you don’t mind if I look around in the car then, do you, or would you?” Erwin responded that he would not mind. Deputy Lawry testified that the back seat cushion came forward with *224“minimal” effort. Behind the cushion, he found the package of cocaine at issue in this case.
At the suppression hearing, the district court credited the deputy’s testimony and found that Erwin’s consent to search the vehicle was freely and voluntarily given.
III.
A threshold issue is whether the police had a reasonable basis for detaining Erwin at all. The record contains ample evidence to justify the deputies in detaining and questioning Erwin, based upon the reasonable, articula-ble suspicion of drunk or reckless driving derived from the police radio dispatch information. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-19, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1877-79, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Police are generally justified in stopping an individual and asking for identification when relying on information transmitted by a valid police bulletin. See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 232, 105 S.Ct. 675, 682, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985).
Although the majority opinion does not dispute the lawfulness of the initial detention of Erwin for questioning, it concludes, under the authority of Terry, that the deputies were not permitted to continue questioning Erwin once the initial reasonable suspicions that justified the stop were dispelled. The majority places great weight on the fact that Erwin was not in fact intoxicated. However, under Terry, officers are justified in posing questions to a person they lawfully stop and in detaining him briefly while attempting to obtain further information. Id. Simply put, there is no constitutional rule of law that proscribes detention for further questioning once the justification for the initial Terry stop is satisfied. That, of course, is particularly so where there is a reasonable, articula-ble basis to suspect criminal activity other than that for which the original stop was made. As in all Fourth Amendment inquiries, the test is one of reasonableness. The question to be asked is whether “ ‘the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure ... “warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’ that the action taken was appropriate?’ ” Id. at 233, 105 S.Ct. at 682. The concept of “reasonable suspicion” is not “ ‘readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.’ ” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (citation omitted). Rather, the validity and scope of the stop depend upon the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 8, 109 S.Ct. at 1585-86.
Although any one of the factors taken into account by the deputies, considered separately, might well be consistent with innocent behavior, taken together, they justify, at the very least, a reasonable suspicion that Erwin was engaged in criminal activity. See id. at 9, 109 S.Ct. at 1586. But even assuming that all the factors with which the deputies were faced did not amount to articulable facts pointing to a reasonable suspicion, there were, nonetheless, ample grounds to ask Erwin if he would consent to a search of his vehicle. A law enforcement officer does not violate the Fourth Amendment merely by approaching an individual, even when there is no reasonable suspicion that crime is afoot, and asking him whether he is willing to answer some questions. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1323-24, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983). The Constitution does not prohibit a law enforcement officer from engaging an individual in conversation; and that is not less so when the conversation includes a request for consent to conduct a search of the individual or his vehicle. United States v. Dunson, 940 F.2d 989, 993-94 (6th Cir.1991) (citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 435-42, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3147-52, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984)), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 941, 112 S.Ct. 1488, 117 L.Ed.2d 629 (1992). “The Fourth Amendment proscribes unreasonable searches and seizures; it does not proscribe voluntary cooperation.” Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 2389, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991).
IV.
Because the search of defendant’s ear was not preceded by an impermissible seizure under the Fourth Amendment, Erwin’s consent, if freely and voluntarily given, would have entirely justified the search of the vehicle. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 558, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1879, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980). The question of voluntary consent is *225one of fact to be determined by the totality of the circumstances and will not be reversed unless clearly erroneous. United States v. Winfrey, 915 F.2d 212, 218 (6th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1039, 111 S.Ct. 709, 112 L.Ed.2d 698 (1991); United States v. Rose, 889 F.2d 1490, 1494 (6th Cir.1989).
The majority opinion does not consider whether consent was freely and voluntarily given because it concludes that once the eir: eumstanees justifying the initial stop were resolved, Erwin had to be released. Majority op. at 221 (citing United States v. Obasa, 15 F.3d 603, 607 (6th Cir.1994)). There is simply no authority to support such'a narrow black-letter rule. Obasa, the case cited in the majority opinion, does not support the majority’s new rule. To the contrary, Obasa specifically holds that:
When police actions go beyond cheeking out the suspicious circumstances that led to the original stop, the detention becomes an arrest that must be supported by probable cause_ Nevertheless, ... there is no “litmus-paper test ... for determining when a seizure exceeds the bounds of an investigative stop.” ... The “endless variations in the facts and circumstances” of cases raising the issue make a bright-line test impracticable. ... [T]here can be no rigid time limit for a permissible Terry stop.
Obasa, 15 F.3d at 607 (emphasis added) (quoting Royer, 460 U.S. at 506, 103 S.Ct. at 1329). Thus, the per se rule announced in the majority opinion is directly contradicted by the case cited as authority. As additional support for the novel rule it establishes today, the majority opinion cites a footnote statement in a West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals case1 decided under the West Virginia Constitution, and a decision of the Ohio Supreme Court2 which establishes a new warning police officers must give to persons stopped for traffic violations in Ohio before “an officer attempts to engage in a consensual interrogation.” I agree with the statement in the majority opinion that both decisions are “interesting[ ],” but manifestly, neither is Fourth Amendment authority in this circuit.
There is simply no rigid time or scope against which to measure a valid Terry stop. See, e.g., Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 685, 105 S.Ct. at 1575; Obasa, 15 F.3d at 607, and, under the Fourth Amendment, no arbitrary point beyond which an officer may not request permission to conduct a vehicle search. The voluntariness of Erwin’s consent is the real issue in this case — the one framed in the parties’ briefs and argued at oral argument— and it should have been resolved in the majority opinion.
Erwin argues that he was not asked whether he would consent to a search of his vehicle, but rather that he “acquiesced” to the deputy’s “statement” about whether he could search his vehicle. The trial court’s finding of fact was otherwise.
A consent search is a standard law enforcement investigatory technique. Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 231-32, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2049-50, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). The voluntariness of a consent to search is not affected by the consenter’s knowledge that he has a right to refuse to consent. Id. at 234, 93 S.Ct. at 2051. Although, whether the suspect was informed of his right to refuse consent is one of the many factors to consider in determining the voluntariness of the consent, the police are under no legal obligation to inform a suspect of his right to refuse consent. “[I]t would be thoroughly impractical to impose on the normal consent search the detailed requirements of an effective warning.” Id. at 231, 93 S.Ct. at 2050.
Here, the district court conducted an exhaustive examination of the evidence, carefully assessed the credibility of the witnesses, and found that Erwin “took a chance, gave a knowing consent, but lost the gamble.” On issues of voluntariness, the trial court’s finding “represents the last word unless it is clearly erroneous.” Dunson, 940 F.2d at 994. A finding by the district court is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court, upon examination of the record, is left with a definite *226and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. United States v. Tillman, 963 F.2d 137, 143 (6th Cir.1992).
There is no evidence that the deputy threatened Erwin or coerced him in any way, and Erwin does not claim that he misunderstood the deputy’s question. As the district court found, Erwin’s consent was unequivocal and specific: “No,” he didn’t mind. There is no basis in the record to conclude that the district court clearly erred in finding that Erwin freely and voluntarily consented to the search of his vehicle.
Y.
The rule announced in the majority opinion effectively alters, and is wholly inconsistent with, Terry and its progeny. The logical application of the majority’s novel new rule means that from now on law enforcement officers may not even detain a driver long enough to run a lien check on a suspect’s driver’s license after making a valid Terry stop, if the original purpose for which the driver was stopped is satisfied.
I respectfully dissent.
. State v. Jones, 193 W.Va. 378, 456 S.E.2d 459, 466-67 n.17 (1995).
. State v. Robinette, 73 Ohio St.3d 650, 653 N.E.2d 695, 699 (1995).