with whom HEANEY and McMILLIAN join, dissenting.
The district court’s grant of the writ should be affirmed. There is no question that the prosecution’s statements were improper and pervaded both opening argument and closing summation. Defense counsels’ failure to object in any way fell well below the standard of reasonable representation “demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Such deficient performance resulted in prejudice to Seehan, in that the jury probably considered improper factors when reaching its result. Given the strong evidence on both sides as to Seehan’s turbulent state of mind at the time of the crime, the centrality of that question, and the horror of the underlying and uncontested act, the prosecution’s improper arguments injected wild cards into the jury’s deliberations and rendered the result of Seehan’s trial unreliable.1 Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. Had the jury not been asked to consider improper factors, there is at the very least a reasonable probability that the result would have been different.2 Seehan has thus established that he was provided with ineffective assistance of counsel at his trial, and, under Strickland, should be granted a writ of habeas corpus.
Contrary to the state’s assertion, which the majority apparently also rejects, the state court’s finding of no prosecutorial misconduct does not amount to a finding that the statements were proper. The state sets up the false tautology that improper statements equal prosecutorial misconduct, and therefore no misconduct equals no improper statements. Through this device, the state argues that there is a state court finding that the statements were not improper, a finding to which we must defer. This is disingenuous and just plain wrong. All of the state*613ments of which Seehan complains are of the sort which have been universally condemned, and are clearly objectionable. That the state court did not feel that their utterance singly or in combination amounted to prosecutorial misconduct, a question of state law, in no way gives the statements the imprimatur of propriety and in no way relieves Seehan’s counsel of their duty to object to such statements.3
Granting the writ, therefore, does no violence to the state reviewing court’s findings of fact. Whether or not the pregnant prosecutor rubbed her abdomen (and the state court, contrary to the state’s assertion, made no finding as to that issue), the recorded statements made to the jury were myriad and not subtle in nature.4 While it might be arguable that a reasonably competent attorney may not have immediately objected to the first, or even the second, improper statement, no reasonably competent attorney would have permitted the prosecution to amass such a wealth of impermissible argument without at least some objection. Such passivity falls well outside the range of competence required of criminal attorneys. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2064-65 (on federal habeas, the first prong of ineffective assistance is established when petitioner shows that his or her attorney’s performance falls below a standard of reasonableness as measured by prevailing professional standards).
In considering the prejudice prong of ineffective assistance, the state makes the novel and alarming argument that whether or not deficient performance operated to a defendant’s detriment to the extent that relief is in order, is a question of fact. Ergo, according to the state, when the state court considered the prosecutorial misconduct claim and determined that the prosecutors’ improper statements did not so bias the jury as to change the outcome of the trial, it made a finding of fact binding upon us. Alternatively, the state argues that the state court’s resolution of the state law prosecutorial misconduct claim is determinative of our resolution of the question of federal law arising *614under the Strickland claim. I note that the majority rightly rejects the vein of these, and parallel, arguments in arriving at its decision.
These arguments are fundamentally misguided and ignore the rulings of both this court and the United States Supreme Court. Ruling on deficient performance and prejudice require courts to make a legal determination by applying legal standards to the underlying facts. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698, 104 S.Ct. at 2070. What happened, what normally happens, who said or failed to say what, what was the state of the evidence, etcetera, are the questions of fact which must be answered in order to make that legal determination. That facts must be found in order to apply the law in no way transforms the ultimate legal question into a finding of fact. See, e.g., id.; Drew v. United States, 46 F.3d 823, 825 (8th Cir.1995); Grooms v. Solem, 923 F.2d 88, 90 (8th Cir.1991); Couch v. Trickey, 892 F.2d 1338, 1341 (8th Cir.1989). The determination of whether prejudice resulted from facts A, B, and C, is an application of the law to the facts, and thus is afforded little or no deference. Argument to the contrary reflects a misconception of legal principles.
The state’s parallel assertion that the state court determination of no prejudice arising from the prosecutorial misconduct binds us on the federal legal question of Strickland prejudice must also fail. The Supreme Court has specifically and wisely held that a state court finding on ineffective assistance is not binding on federal habeas courts.5 See, e.g., Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698, 104 S.Ct. at 2070; Grooms, 923 F.2d at 90. Such holding necessarily applies to the prongs of the Strickland test, or review of ineffective assistance claims would be an exercise in futility. A contrary rule would, in fact, render federal habeas meaningless for any claim which the state courts have addressed and rejected.
Of course, absent cause and prejudice or actual innocence, procedural default rules already operate so that federal habeas is available only for those claims which the state courts have addressed and found meritless. In other words, states could insulate themselves from any federal vindication of federal constitutional rights by simply deciding the merits on parallel state law grounds. While comity and federalism are important and weighty principles, they are not the only values underlying the Constitution and our federal jurisprudence. The Constitution also demands vindication of the federal constitutional rights of individual citizens, especially against governmental overreaching. The analytical framework proposed by the State of Iowa would have us abdicate that fundamental, albeit frequently unpopular, duty.
The writ of habeas corpus is intended to protect citizens from lawless incarceration, obtained through the disregard of constitutional rights. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 477-79, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 1461-62, 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991). Under the Fourteenth Amendment, the federal Constitution guarantees all citizens effective representation of counsel in serious criminal cases, state or federal. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685-86, 104 S.Ct. at 2063-64. A conviction obtained through provision of ineffective assistance of counsel is void. Id. Citizens incarcerated under such unfair convictions cannot be deprived of federal relief through the device of rejecting parallel state law claims. See id. at 698.
Thus whether or not the facts support a finding of Strickland prejudice is a question of federal law which we address de novo. Drew, 46 F.3d at 825; see generally, Foster v. Delo, 11 F.3d 1451, 1454-59 (8th Cir.1993). This is necessarily a question on which reasonable minds can and often do disagree. As I stated initially, I believe that Seehan’s counsels’ failure to object to the stream of improper statements shown in the record render the results of the trial unreliable and create a reasonable probability that had counsel acted, the outcome would have been different. I emphasize that the outcome would have been different, not that Seehan would have been completely exonerated. Much has been made of the “overwhelming evidence” of guilt however, Seehan has never contested his act, only his state of mind. With such a close question about such an *615appalling act, a barrage of inflammatory argument and insinuation of special knowledge prejudices the admitted perpetrator.
In an attempt to minimize the impropriety of the prosecutors’ remarks, the state argues that both sides made emotional appeals; this is beside the point. First, a defendant, unlike the state, is permitted to throw himself on the mercy of the jury. Second, impropriety on the part of a defendant (such as presenting perjured testimony) does not permit the state to engage in parallel impropriety. Finally, the question is not whether the prosecutors were acting in bad faith, or even in ignorance, but whether defendant’s counsel should have intervened with objections, and whether such failure prejudiced the defendant. The answer, on both accounts, is yes.
The majority’s contention that the prosecution’s prefacing this mass of improper argument with disclaimers as to' the nonevidentia-ry nature of the words somehow prevented any prejudice to Seehan, even admitting deficient performance, is more than problematic. Thus, a prosecutor is freed to make inflammatory arguments and inferences of special knowledge, so long as he or she remembers to disclaim their validity. With this I must disagree.
Accordingly, I dissent.
. The facts illustrate the closeness of the question of Seehan's state of mind. He was a devoted and loving father, who had been deeply involved in his son's care and who became the primary care taker when his wife abandoned the family. When Tommy’s custody became' a bargaining chip in the separation, Seehan attempted to commit suicide. During this suicidal episode, he impulsively killed his son and continued with botched suicide attempts. The trial centered on opposing expert testimony as to Seehan's state of mind at the time of his tragic act.
. Persuading the jury on Seehan’s tortured state of mind was crucial to a determination of whether first or second degree murder was the appropriate verdict. If first degree, the sentence was life imprisonment without possibility of parole. If second degree, the sentence would have been, at most, 50 years. Seehan has now served 20 years in prison. He is presently an honor lifer at the medium security prison at Clarinda, Iowa. Had he had effective assistance of counsel in the face of the egregious conduct of prosecutor Har-kin, it is very likely that he would be out of prison today rather than being indefinitely warehoused at taxpayers' expense for his solitary aberrant act.
. The state’s reliance, in its brief, on Pickens v. Lockhart, 4 F.3d 1446, 1453 (8th Cir.1993) for its argument to the contrary, apart from the question of whether Pickens is rightly or wrongly decided, is based on a misunderstanding of the issue in that case. In Pickens the question presented was whether a prosecutor's comments were so egregious that they resulted in a deprivation of due process. Here the question is whether Seehan’s counsel should have objected to the prosecutors' improper argument. Effective assistance of counsel requires more than that counsel object to conduct which amounts to a deprivation of due process. Likewise, the Strickland prejudice test does not require that deficient performance result in a trial that is so unfair that it would amount to a deprivation of due process even had counsel performed adequately. Rather, it requires that there be a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the outcome would have been different. In a word, Pickens does not apply to the issues before the court.
. The district court divided the objectionable argument into three categories: improper suggestion of personal knowledge of guilt; improperly placing the burden of solving societal problems on the jury; and improperly inflaming the jury’s passions. Some examples from the first category are: that the state "spent ... long and serious hours going over the facts of this case,” “six months of anguish," "they are not giving me enough money to try and convict an innocent person,” the prosecution’s "duty ... has been to present the evidence as we developed it to you. We have a different type of duty than you would anticipate. It's different from that of a civil case in which lawyers represent one client or another. We represent the people of Iowa and Story County. In short, we represent you [the jury]. We also represent the defendant because he is part of our society[,] ... our duty is to ensure that we have a just result."'
Examples from the second category are: "you [the jury] today and throughout the course of this trial will be representing society,” "society demands justice for this kind of act. That is the oldest rule. It’s been in existence ever since mankind developed. Thou shalt not kill." “[J]u-rors are part of that law enforcement chain” which is "only as strong as its weakest link.” "Tommy Seehan [the victim] demands that verdict" of "guilty of the highest degree."
Examples from the third category are: the victim "was the kind of little boy that I would like to have. He was the kind of little boy that you would like to have.” “He is cold, he is dead, he is buried, and he will laugh no more.” As noted in the district court’s well reasoned opinion, the trial was "littered” with “perva[sive]” improper comments by the prosecution to which defense counsel made not one objection. Seehan v. Iowa, No. 4:91-CV-50363, slip op. at 19, 22 (S.D.Iowa July 12, 1993). The statements set out above are merely illustrative and are by no means exhaustive.
. Notably, Strickland itself was a habeas case dealing with alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. In considering that claim, the Supreme Court gave no deference to previous state court determinations that there had been no ineffective assistance.