dissenting:
I.
The issue in this case should be a simple one to resolve: Is the fish camp located in navigable waters at the confluence of the Tanaga Creek and Copper River, in the midst of the Wrangell-St. Elias National Park, “public land” for the purposes of the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 3101, et seq.? It is, unfortunately, an incredibly complex issue1 whose resolution will impact all the navigable waters in Alaska. Because I feel that we, as judges, are not empowered to resolve this issue without direction from Cqn-gress, I dissent.
I agree with the majority that ANILCA defines “public land” as “lands, waters, and interests therein, the title to which is in the United States.” Maj. op. at 701-02; 16 U.S.C. § 3102; Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 548 n. 15, 107 S.Ct. 1396, 1406 n. 15, 94 L.Ed.2d 542 (1987).
Given this definition, this appears to be an easy case at first blush. Because the fish camp is in the midst of a National Park, the United States would seem to have title to all land and waters within the Park. 16 U.S.C. § 410hh(9) (creating Wrangell-St. Elias National Park and Preserve); S.Rep. 96-413, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5070 (noting that United States owns 7,990,000 acres of the Park). If so, the Park would be “public land” and ANILCA would apply.
*705One wrinkle in the facts of this case prevents the solution from being so simple, however: The fish camp lies in navigable waters. Under ANILCA, “public land” does not include land “validly ... granted to ... the State under any other provision of Federal Law.” 16 U.S.C. § 3102(3)(A). The Submerged Lands Act of 1953 granted to the states all federal interests in the “lands beneath navigable waters.” 43 U.S.C. § 1311(c) (“The United States hereby releases and relinquishes unto said States ... all right, title and interest of the United States, if any it has,, in and to all lands [beneath navigable waters], improvements, and natural resources.”); State of Alaska v. Ahtna, Inc., 891 F.2d 1401, 1403 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 919, 110 S.Ct. 1949, 109 L.Ed.2d 312 (1990) (“States generally hold title to the lands underlying navigable rivers within their boundaries.”).2 Alaska therefore has title to the water within and land beneath the river containing the fish camp.
Given this analysis, the United States does not have “title” to the “land or water” containing the fish camp. The only way the fish camp can lie on “public land” as § 3102 defines it is if the United States has “title” to any “interest” in those navigable waters.
To me, the crucial issue is one of statutory construction: What did Congress mean by “interest”? Congress left us few bread crumbs to follow because neither the statute itself nor its voluminous legislative history defines “interest.”3 Even the general legal definition of “interest” is unavailing. See Black’s Law Dictionary 729 (5th ed. 1979) (“The word ‘interest’ is used in the Restatement of Property both generally to include varying aggregates of rights, privileges, powers and immunities and distributively to mean any one of them.”).
This problem of lack of definition is compounded when we consider that the definition chosen will have far-reaching implications. If “interest” is defined narrowly, to comport with the traditional property law notion of *706“interest,” then ANILCA would apply only if the United States could show a property interest, such as an easement, over these waters. If, on the other hand, “interest” is defined broadly, ANILCA may apply if the United States points to any sovereign power it may have over the waters at issue. Under the first definition, few if any of Aaska’s navigable waters would fall under ANILCA; under the second, nearly all would. There is far more at stake here than one fishing camp.
I agree with the majority that Congress, in order to achieve its stated purpose, must have intended some navigable waters to fall under ANILCA so that defining “interest” narrowly to exclude all navigable waters is probably incorrect. Maj. op. at 701-02. I also concede that ambiguities in statutes should be construed in favor of the native Aaskans. People of Village of Gambell v. Clark, 746 F.2d 572, 581 (9th Cir.1984) (“Ambiguities in Title VIII [of ANILCA] must be resolved in favor of the Aaska Native people.”). However, I do not think it is for us to decide, on the basis of these two factors, that Congress intended “interest” to be defined so broadly so as to bring all of Aaska’s navigable waters under ANILCA. Such a drastic change in the amount of control exercised by the federal government over all navigable waters in Aaska can only come from Congress. See Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 266-67, 99 S.Ct. 2753, 2759-60, 61 L.Ed.2d 521 (1979) (requiring clear evidence of congressional intent to change the status quo).
II.
Even if I believed it was for us to make this choice, I do not believe that we could give effect to Congress’ intent if we wanted to. None of the property doctrines currently available to us — regardless of how broadly we define “interest” — could bring Aaska’s navigable waters under ANILCA.
The majority embraces the doctrine of reserved water rights when it holds that the federal government impliedly reserved rights to the navigable waters within the Wrangell-St. Elias National Park when it withdrew that Park from the public domain. Maj. op. at 703-04; 16 U.S.C. § 410hh(9) (reserving Park but not expressly reserving navigable waters within the Park). The reserved water rights doctrine, which derives from the Commerce and Property Clauses, permits the United States impliedly to reserve the specific quantity of water necessary to fulfill the purpose of a federal reservation. See Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138, 96 S.Ct. 2062, 2069, 48 L.Ed.2d 523 (1976); United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 700, 98 S.Ct. 3012, 3014, 57 L.Ed.2d 1052 (1978).
Even assuming that Congress intended to reserve Aaska’s navigable waters, both the case law and this doctrine’s basis in the Property Clause limit this doctrine: The federal government can only reserve waters running over land that it owns. See Hynes v. Grimes Packing Co., 337 U.S. 86, 110-16, 69 S.Ct. 968, 982-86, 93 L.Ed. 1231 (1949) (implying reservation of navigational waters already owned by the United States); Alaska Pacific Fisheries, 248 U.S. at 87, 39 S.Ct. at 41 (same); Cappaert, 426 U.S. 128, 96 S.Ct. 2062 (implying reservation of nonnavigable waters owned by the United States); U.S. Const., Art IV, § 3, el. 2 (“The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respect the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.”) (emphasis added); cf. Ahtna, 891 F.2d at 1401-04 (rejecting claim of implied reservation of navigable waters owned by state). Because Alaska has title to its navigable waters under the Submerged Lands Act, the United States cannot reserve these waters. Moreover, the task of determining the exact quantity of water, from each body of navigable water, necessary to achieve the Congressional goal of subsistence fishing would be an administrative nightmare.
The next doctrine, the Commerce Power, is similarly inadequate. The Commerce Power is the acknowledgment that “Congress has extensive authority over this Nation’s waters under the Commerce Clause.” Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 173, 100 S.Ct. 383, 389, 62 L.Ed.2d 332 (1979) (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 189, 6 L.Ed. 23 (1824)). This authority “is *707as broad as the needs of commerce,” United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 426, 61 S.Ct. 291, 308, 85 L.Ed. 243 (1940).
This Power would seem to apply here. Even when Congress quitclaimed its ownership of navigable waterways in the Submerged Lands Act, it specifically retained this Power. 43 U.S.C. § 1314(a) (“The United States retains all its ... powers of regulation and control of ... navigable waters for the constitutional purposes of commerce [and] navigation.”); Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 282, 97 S.Ct. 1740, 1750-51, 52 L.Ed.2d 304 (1977). Moreover, ANILCA’s partial basis in the Commerce Clause, see 16 U.S.C. § 3111(4), might be construed as an implicit invocation of this Power. If it were, the United States could regulate subsistence uses in these waters as an exercise of the Commerce Power.
Because it is grounded in the Commerce Clause, however, the Commerce Power must satisfy traditional Commerce Clause analysis-. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 174, 100 S.Ct. at 389-90 (holding that this Power is “viewed in terms of more traditional Commerce Clause analysis”). ANILCA’s subsistence provisions fail this analysis. Congress can only regulate activities that have “a substantial relationship to interstate commerce” or which “substantially affect” interstate commerce. United States v. Lopez, — U.S. -, -, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 1629-30, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995). It would be hard to argue that the priority of a handful of Alaskan natives over subsistence fishing in one river in Alaska would “substantially affect” interstate commerce. Although the natives might buy less fish from others, this would not have any noticeable effect on interstate demand for fish. Even if every rural Alaskan subsistence fished and never bought any fish, it is still unlikely that interstate commerce would be “substantially affected.” Cf. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 63 S.Ct. 82, 87 L.Ed. 122 (1942) (finding that home consumption of wheat by every person in the United States would decrease demand for commercial wheat and would thereby defeat the purpose of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 85 S.Ct. 377, 13 L.Ed.2d 290 (1964) (finding that nationwide discrimination against African-Americans harms interstate commerce). Because the impact of ANIL-CA’s subsistence priority in Alaskan navigable waters would not “substantially affect” interstate commerce, this priority cannot be upheld under the Commerce Power.
The final doctrine that might apply, the navigational servitude, is likewise inappropriate. Like the Commerce Power, the navigational servitude is a power derived from the Commerce Clause and is not a species of property. See City of Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016, 1028 n. 6 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 870, 108 S.Ct. 197, 98 L.Ed.2d 148 (1987) (“[T]he United States does not hold title to the navigational servitude.”); United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 628, 81 S.Ct. 784, 788, 5 L.Ed.2d 838 (1961) (“The [navigational] servitude only encompasses the exercise of this federal power.") (emphasis added); United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 225-26, 76 S.Ct. 259, 261-62, 100 L.Ed. 240 (1956) (“The interest of the United States in the flow of a navigable stream originates in the Commerce Clause. That clause speaks in terms of power, not of property.”).
Although both the navigational servitude and the Commerce Power share a common origin in the Commerce Clause, the servitude has a narrower purpose than the Power. Boone v. United States, 944 F.2d 1489, 1493 (9th Cir.1991) (“[T]he navigational servitude is distinct from the power to regulate navigable waters.”). The navigational servitude gives the federal government, for the sole purpose of seeing that the waterways remain navigable, the power to condemn land beneath navigable waterways without compensation. See Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 177, 100 S.Ct. at 391-92 (“The navigational servitude ... gives rise to the authority in the Government to assure that such streams retain their capacity to serve as continuous highways for the purpose of navigation in interstate commerce.”); Boone, 944 F.2d at 1494 (holding that the servitude “generally relieves the government from the obligation *708to pay compensation for acts interfering with the ownership of riparian, littoral, or submerged lands which, if not for the fact that a waterway was involved, would require compensation under the Fifth Amendment.”). Because the subsistence provisions of ANIL-CA do not further any navigational purpose, the servitude cannot be the basis to apply ANILCA.
Thus, we are unable to resolve this issue in this case, even if it were our place to do so.4
III.
It would be much more expedient if we could write on the slate Congress has left blank. It seems fairly clear that ANILCA’s objectives would be best achieved by bringing all Alaskan navigable waters under AN-ILCA’s reach, subject to the limitation of reasonable and noncommercial subsistence use.5
However, Congress has not so provided. We, as judges, have been asked to decide whether Alaska or the United States has control over all of Alaska’s navigable waters. This is a decision we are neither qualified to, nor in this case capable of, deciding or implementing.
I am thus compelled to conclude that the United States has had no “interest” in Alaska’s navigable waters since it gave them away in 1959. Those waters, including the fishing pond at issue here, are therefore not “public land” subject to ANILCA’s subsistence priorities. For this reason, I would reverse the decision of the district court and wait for Congress to make its intentions clear.
. In Native Village of Quinhagak v. United States, 35 F.3d 388, 392 (9th Cir.1994), one panel of this Circuit held that this issue — whether "public lands” includes navigable waters — presented a "serious question" for preliminary injunction purposes. That panel has a gift for understatement.
. None of the exceptions to the Submerged Lands Act apply. Section 1301(f) carves out the first exception: The definition of "lands beneath navigable waters" excludes land grants from the United States to third persons. 43 U.S.C. § 1301(f). Neither party contends that the United States deeded Alaska’s navigable waters to a third party.
Section 1313 includes two more exceptions. Under the first, the United States retains ownership over "all tracts or parcels of land together with all accretions thereto” which it had reserved at the time of statehood, or which it later acquires by condemnation. 43 U.S.C. § 1313(a). Since only dry land can have accretions, Black's Law Dictionary 19 (5th ed. 1979) (the term acere- ' tion is "usually applied to the graduate and imperceptible accumulation of land by' natural causes”), this section does not apply to the land beneath navigable waters.
The second part of § 1313 excepts lands beneath navigable waters "held by the United States for the benefit of any tribe, band, or group of Indians or for individual Indians.” 43 U.S.C. § 1313(b). Title to Alaska’s navigable waters passed to Alaská at the time of its statehood, in 1959. Alaska Statehood Act, § 6(m), 72 Stat. 339, 343 (1959) (“The Submerged Lands Act of 1953 ... shall be applicable to the State of Alaska ...”). To prevent the automatic transfer of title, the United States would have to show that it was holding land for the benefit of Native Alaskans in 1959; a later reservation would not reclaim land already given away. While it is clear that the native Alaskans are considered Indians, Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89, 39 S.Ct. 40, 41-42, 63 L.Ed. 138 (1918) (applying presumption in favor of Indians to Alaskan natives), and it is probable that the Wrangell-St. Elias National Park was created in 1980 for the benefit of the Native Alaskans under ANILCA, see 16 U.S.C. § 410hh(9) (establishing Wrangell-St. Elias Park and referring to subsistence priorities of ANILCA), it is doubtful that the United States was holding that land for the benefit of the native Alaskans in 1959, 21 years before Congress expressed any intent to use the Park land to benefit Alaskan natives. The Ninth Circuit requires greater proof of intent. See Ahtna, 891 F.2d at 1405-06 (refusing to conclude, under similar language in § 4 of the Alaska Statehood Act, that the United States held land for the Alaskan natives absent express showing of an intent to do so).
. ANILCA’s legislative history and its subsequent interpretation do contain conflicting conclusions about ANILCA’s application to navigable waters. Compare 126 Cong.Rec. 29260, 29280 (1980) (statement of Rep. Udall) ("[I]t has always been our intent to apply the subsistence preference to all fish stocks in the waters of Alaska.”) with 57 Fed.Reg. 22,940, 22,942 (1992) (Sec. of Interior) ("Because the United States does not generally own title to the submerged lands beneath navigable waters in Alaska, the public lands definition in ANILCA and these regulations generally excludes navigable waters.”). Since these conclusions shed no light on how Congress intended "interest” to be defined and since they conflict in any event, they are of little use to my analysis.
. Thus, Congress will probably have to condemn these waters or take some other action sufficient to make these doctrines applicable.
. A major objection to granting a subsistence priority to rural Alaskans is the fear that the rural Alaskans will abuse this priority and commercially exploit the fisheries to the detriment of non-rural Alaskans. This fear is misplaced, however, if ANILCA's provisions regarding the scope of the priority are strictly followed. ANILCA forbids "subsistence uses” that are “wasteful,” 16 U.S.C. § 3112, and excludes from "subsistence uses” fish caught for commercial sale, 16 U.S.C. § 3113(2)(B). Thus, ANILCA already possesses safeguards against this type of abuse.