dissenting.
The appellant in this case, Prizevoits, failed to file a notice of appeal within the requisite 30-day period. As the court notes, however, district courts have power to grant a brief extension of time for filing a notice of appeal “upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause.” Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(5). In her motion for extension of time to file notice of appeal, Prizevoits argued that the facts established excusable neglect. The district court granted the motion, finding “good cause to invoke the grace period provision of Appellate Rule 4(a)(5).... ” We generally give deference to that finding. Varhol v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 909 F.2d 1557, 1563 (7th Cir.1990). Neither party challenges the district court’s finding. Having satisfied the statutory prerequisites to its exercise of discretion, the district court was within its power to grant an extension of time for filing a notice of appeal. This court, therefore, has jurisdiction and may turn to the merits of the appeal. In re Marchiando, 13 F.3d 1111, 1115 (7th Cir.) (Posner, C.J.), cert. denied, Illinois Dept. of the Lottery v. Marchiando, — U.S. —-, 114 S.Ct. 2675, 129 L.Ed.2d 810 (1994). As we have previously stated, “[t]he danger of collusive conferral of appellate jurisdiction is slight; for why should the party that won below give his opponent a shot at reversal?” Id., 13 F.3d at 1114 (emphasis in original).
We second-guess the district court’s finding only when “the party’s excuse is so far afield (for example, counsel simply forgetting on day thirty to file the notice) that granting the extension would be a patent abuse of discretion.” Varhol, 909 F.2d at 1564. The majority posits that it would have been an abuse of discretion for the district court to have found excusable neglect in this case because the decisions of this court interpreting the term “excusable neglect” foreclose any possibility of such a finding. There are two problems with the majority’s position. First, the district court’s finding was not an abuse of discretion in the light of the facts of *136this case. Second, although we do not have the benefit of briefing by the parties on this or any of the other issues addressed in the majority’s opinion, it is probable that this court’s decisions interpreting the term “excusable neglect” have been superseded by the Supreme Court’s decision in Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates Limited Partnership, 507 U.S. 380, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993), which makes clear that the determination of whether there is excusable neglect is an equitable determination.
The majority supports its position that the district court abused its discretion by declaring that “[a] footnote to the order reveals that the ‘good cause’ consisted in the filing of an unauthorized motion, the motion to extend the time for filing a Rule 59(e) motion.” The majority’s statement is incorrect. The footnote to which the majority refers more likely indicates that the district court rejected Pri-zevoits’s simple “filing of an unauthorized motion” as grounds for excusable neglect. In footnote one of its order granting Prizev-oits’s motion, the district court stated: “The third paragraph of the plaintiffs motion is troubling because in it the plaintiff still does not seem to recognize that the motion for an extension of time to file a Rule 59 motion was a nullity from the outset.” A review of Pri-zevoits’s motion indicates that there were several reasons that she “neglected” to file a timely notice of appeal: Prizevoits had retained new counsel between the time the parties briefed and argued her motion for summary judgment and the time the court issued its judgment; Prizevoits’s new attorney did not receive all of the materials pertaining to her case until after the time for filing a Rule 59 motion had passed; Defendant Indiana Bell had consented to the extension of time for filing a Rule 59 motion; and Prizevoits’s motions were lost or delayed in the mails. In addition, it is clear that the defendant was on notice of Prizevoits’s intention to pursue the case. The district court was aware of these facts and all of the other circumstances surrounding Prizevoits’s failure to file a timely notice of appeal.
In the light of these facts we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion, even under our old decisions. Moreover, the Supreme Court’s decision in Pioneer makes it even less likely that the district court abused its discretion. In Pioneer, the Court held that attorney negligence may, in certain circumstances, constitute “excusable neglect,” considerably liberalizing its meaning and prescribing a new analytical test. The Court held that the plain meaning of the word “neglect” indicates that Congress contemplated that courts could “accept late filings caused by inadvertence, mistake or care-lessness_” Id. at 388, 113 S.Ct. at 1495. The majority, however, chooses not to address the impact of Pioneer on our past decisions. Given the difference in tone between Pioneer and our past decisions, this choice is a dubious one.
The Supreme Court went on to add that whether such “neglect” is “excusable” is an equitable determination, “taking account of all relevant circumstances surrounding the party’s omission_” Id. at 395, 113 S.Ct. at 1498. These circumstances include the risk of prejudice to the moving party, the extent of the delay, and its potential effect on judicial proceedings, the reason for the delay and whether the moving party acted in good faith. Id. This determination should be made in the first instance by the district court, the court which is aware of all of the circumstances in any particular case. The facts of this ease negate the majority’s position that the district court abused its discretion. Cf. City of Chanute, Kansas v. Williams Nat. Gas Co., 31 F.3d 1041, 1044-47 (10th Cir.1994) (finding of “excusable neglect” not abuse of discretion even though tardiness of notice of appeal due to appellants’ failure to comprehend plain language of Fed.R.App.P. 3(c)), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 1254, 131 L.Ed.2d 135 (1995); Lackey v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 990 F.2d 202, 206 (5th Cir.1993) (same). If the majority still wishes to second-guess the district court, it should do so by remanding the case for a more detailed opinion. I respectfully dissent.