dissenting.
A naive assumption about race served as the sole basis for Joseph's "strategic decision" to ignore the wishes of his client *423regarding the newspaper incident. I not only believe that the decision was unreasonable under prevailing professional norms; I also believe that it was based upon an underlying assumption that was explicitly rejected as unreasonable by the Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,90 L. Ed. 2d 69, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986) (rejecting the notion that it is reasonable to assume that black jurors will be partial to black defendants solely on account of their shared race). See Batson, 476 U.S. at 97. Accordingly, I dissent.1
Although the majority acknowledges the "racially charged" nature of this case, I do not believe it adequately pursues the extent to which race influenced Joseph's decision not to inform the court about the juror seen carrying a newspaper into the jury room, which included an inaccurate and unfavorable article about his client's testimony. In my view, in order to assess fairly whether Joseph's strategic choice was reasonable, we must candidly address the assumptions that influenced his decision.
In determining whether Joseph's actions constituted a sound trial strategy, the majority places great emphasis upon the fact that his decision stemmed from a belief that the "jury was the best that could be expected from Weatherwax's point of view." (Maj. Op. at 16). In light of this, the majority concludes, "the [strategic] decision not to inform the court was reasonable 'under prevailing professional norms.'"2 (Maj. Op. at 16). In other words, Joseph thought *424that "he had the best jury possible under the circumstances and he made a judgment that many competent litigators would make under the same circumstances." (Maj. Op. at 16). Respectfully, I believe my colleagues' focus is both legally and logically misplaced.
Arguably, most if not all decisions by counsel before, during and after a trial can be considered strategic. As a result, a finding that a particular decision was strategic, in and of itself, cannot answer the question whether that decision falls within the "wide range of . . . competent assistance." See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674,104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). Put differently, not all strategic decisions are by definition professionally reasonable.3 In order to determine whether a particular strategic decision constituted "competent assistance," we must assess the underlying basis for that decision — an inquiry that, in my view, is not sufficiently pursued by the majority. Moreover, because the majority does not fully confront why Joseph felt that this was the best possible jury from Weatherwax's perspective, its conclusion that Joseph's inaction was "reasonable 'under prevailing professional norms'" strikes me as quite a leap, to say the least.
The following hypothetical, I think, will help to illustrate my point.
Suppose that John Doe, a black man, is charged with first degree murder for shooting a white man, but claims that the killing was in self-defense. Furthermore, suppose that Doe's jury is all white. During the course of the trial Doe's attorney decides not to call to *425the stand a black man, who was a witness to the crime, despite Doe's request that the testimony be heard.
On appeal, Doe brings an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in which he alleges that his lawyer was incompetent based upon his decision not to introduce the eyewitness testimony of the black man, whom Doe felt potentially could have aided in his defense. In response to this charge, Doe's lawyer claims that he chose not to call this individual as a witness because he made a professional judgment and concluded that the witness's testimony would have had no impact upon the jury.
Under the majority's logic, the lawyer's explanation that the witness was not called because the testimony would have been ineffectual would, standing alone, constitute a sufficient basis upon which to conclude that Doe's counsel acted "reasonably 'under prevailing professional norms.'" (See Maj. Op. at 18 (favorably citing United States v. Long, 674 F.2d 848, 855 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding that counsel's failure to call alibi witness was not ineffective assistance and stating: "This Court will not-second guess tactical decisions of counsel in deciding whether to call certain witnesses."))). In other words, the majority would not find it necessary to question why Doe's counsel felt that the eyewitness's testimony was not worth introducing.
Suppose, however, that the answer to the question the majority does not ask was that Doe's attorney made his decision not because he believed that the witness or his story would be incredible, but because he felt strongly that the testimony of a black person would simply carry no weight in the minds of an all-white jury because the victim was white. Surely, the majority would not conclude that Doe's counsel employed a reasonable strategy by allowing this type of outmoded racial stereotyping to influence a decision whether or not to call the witness. To countenance such an approach, under the guise of "strategic decisionmaking," would be to place a judicial imprimatur upon the type of evil that Batson and its progeny sought to bury. I have no doubt that under such circumstances, we would not permit either a criminal defendant or our system of justice to risk being sacrificed to an odious form of racial reasoning disguised as a legitimate strategic judgment.
And yet, a close examination of the record in this case reveals that the logic underlying why Joseph decided not to bring the *426newspaper incident to the court's attention is very similar to that of Doe's attorney.
For example, in arguing to the district court that Joseph's decision was reasonable and did not require a new trial, the attorney for the government stated that:
As unlikable as it may be, we all have prejudices and prejudices may play at trials and Attorney Joseph, based upon his education and training but more his experience, told you that, typically speaking, I don't like Continentals on my juries
In this case I can say I guess fairly that Michael Joseph cut against the grain. He didn't do the same old thing this time. He was insightful. He said I have a different defendant with a different profile. . . . Three Continentals on this jury? I don't want to disturb this jury. I want to leave it the way it is. It was a tactical decision. Fie tried to get that jury. He accomplished the fact of getting that jury and once it was empaneled, he didn't want to disturb it.
He said ... I wanted to keep this jury because I knew with three Continentals on there that he had a better chance.
(JA 84). Moreover, the "Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law," submitted by the government to the trial court, stated:
Because the petitioner is Caucasian, and because he had been charged with killing a black man, Joseph decided that it was important to empanel as many Caucasians people on the jury as possible because he believed that Caucasians would identify with the petitioner. Given the nature of the charge, first degree murder, the Court finds that Joseph's strategy, in that regard, was eminently reasonable.
(JA 98) (emphasis added).
Simply put, Joseph disregarded his client's request that he "do something" about the newspaper incident because he felt that the three white jurors, solely because they were white, would sympathize with Weatherwax. In fact, Joseph's judgment was entirely motivated by race. For example, he stated that "Continentals [i.e. *427white people] are often retirees who are viewed as conservative and anti-crime." (See Appellant's Br. at 8 n.4.) This admission reveals that there was no reason whatsoever for Joseph to conclude that the three white jurors would identify with Weatherwax. other than their shared race. Why else would persons who are "conservative and anti-crime" identify with an individual charged with first degree murder and illegal possession of a firearm?
Joseph's troubling assumptions about the racial partisanship of the white jurors were so deep-seated that he was willing to risk allowing a white juror, who could have been prejudiced by an unfavorable article written about his client's testimony, to remain on the jury.4 In Joseph's testimony before the district court, he went so far as to say "even if I was [sic] told that the jury was reading the paper, it would not have made much difference to me." See Judge Brotman's Memorandum Opinion at 4. In my opinion> to the extent such unfortunate assumptions might ever be considered reasonable, they simply cannot form the basis of a professionally reasonable strategic decision in light of the interests that weighed in favor of bringing the matter to the court7 s attention.
On one side of the scale was Joseph's assumption that the white jurors would sympathize with Weatherwax based only on their shared race, an approach which, predictably, backfired and which the Supreme Court explicitly rejected as unreasonable in Batson. On the merits, this assumption is undeserving of any weight, but if one were to pretend that it should carry any, one might conclude that it weighed in favor of not informing the court about the newspaper incident.5 But on the other side of the scale were two legitimate and important considerations: (1) Weatherwax's explicit *428request that Joseph "do something" about the newspaper incident; and (2) the potential that a failure to do so could jeopardize Weatherwax's constitutional right to an impartial jury. When balanced against one another the only professionally responsible and reasonable choice for Joseph was to inform the trial court of what had occurred.6
Because Joseph's decision was motivated by improper, illegitimate, indefensible, outmoded stereotypical assumptions about the proclivities of whites and blacks when they are called upon to sit in judgment of their fellow citizens, and because his decision fell far outside "the wide range of professionally competent assistance," to which Weatherwax was entitled, I would affirm the district court's order. Accordingly, I dissent.
This case does not require us to decide the broader and admittedly more difficult question of the reasonableness or legitimacy of trial strategies that are designed to appeal to the particular racial make-up of a jury. Rather, the views I express relate specifically to the issue of whether a strategic decision, grounded exclusively upon a lawyer's assumptions about the proclivities of jurors based solely upon their race, can be considered professionally reasonable when that decision runs counter to the express wishes of his or her client and increases the likelihood that that client's constitutional right to an impartial jury will be violated.
According to the majority, "bringing the newspaper incident to the court's attention would have created a likelihood that the court would either declare a mistrial or excuse a juror whom Joseph felt favored the defense." (Maj. Op. at 16). A mistrial or the dismissal of a juror, however, would necessarily have required a finding that: (1) the newspaper article was read by one or more jurors; (2) that its contents were prejudicial to Weatherwax; and (3) that a juror who read the article was actually influenced by its prejudicial nature. See Government of the Virgin Islands v. Weatherwax, 20 F.3d 572 (3d Cir. 1994) (discussing Government of the Virgin Islands v. Dowling, 814 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1987)). *424If the court were to have found that a particular juror — presumably the white member of the jury seen carrying the newspaper — should be dismissed (i.e., that he was actually prejudiced by reading the article), then it is totally illogical to argue that Weatherwax would still have benefitted from the presence of that juror simply because the juror was white.
In Government of Virgin Islands v. Weatherwax, 20 F.3d 572, 579 (3d Cir. 1994), our first review of this case, we observed that "trial counsel's actions here would indicate that representation was deficient unless the district court determines he [Joseph] decided to forego voir dire because he thought the jury was favorable to his client." I was a member of the panel which decided that case, and I adhere to this statement insofar as it is premised upon the notion that strategic decisions by counsel, including those based upon a lawyer's belief that a jury is favorable to his client, are presumptively reasonable. In this case, however, the record developed on remand clearly demonstrates that Joseph's reliance upon the favorable make-up of the jury as an explanation for his inaction was unreasonable because it was motivated solely by an illegitimate race-based stereotype.
During the hearing before the district court, Mrs. Lay testified that Joseph "said that the jury [sic] with the newspaper is a white man." (J.A. at 68).
As stated earlier, the unreasonableness of Joseph's assumption is demonstrated by the fact that he was willing to risk allowing white jurors, who may have been prejudiced against his client by reading an unfavorable article about his client's testimony, to remain on the jury simply based upon their race. In my opinion, such a judgment is professionally indefensible.
In the majority's view, however, the underlying basis for Joseph's decision finds support in a variety of social science research, which tends to show that jurors are in fact partial to defendants of the same race. I do not dispute the legitimacy or accuracy of these studies or theories. Rather, I simply believe that it is unreasonable to assume that these "affinities" are so deep-seated that they would justify the risk of allowing a potentially biased or prejudiced juror to remain on the jury solely due to his or her race. For example, if Joseph had *428discovered that one of the white jurors was married to a relative of the crime victim, I am confident that the majority would not consider it reasonable for Joseph to want to keep that white juror on the case simply because of his or her race. Thus, it seems clear to me that concerns over juror prejudice — particularly when raised by a client — must trump assumptions about the racial partisanship of jurors.
Even if I could conceive of a convincing argument that Joseph's decision constituted a reasonable strategy, which I cannot, I would still conclude that his actions fell below professional norms. Rather than completely ignore his client's wishes, the more appropriate action for Joseph would have been to bring the matter to the attention of the court, and then to ask the court not to poll the jury because of its "favorable" make-up.
The majority contends that "had Joseph brought the newspaper incident to the trial court's attention, the court would have had an affirmative obligation to conduct voir dire . . . ." See Government of the Virgin Islands v. Dowling, 814 F.2d 134, 139 (3d Cir. 1987) ("In every case where the trial court learns that a member or members of the jury may have received extra-record information with a potential for substantial prejudice, the trial court must determine whether the members of the jury have been prejudiced.") (emphasis added) (Maj. Op. at 16-17 n.3). I disagree. As the majority itself notes, "the [newspaper] article . . . included no extra-record information about Weatherwax or the crime." (Maj. Op. at 3 n.l) (emphasis added). Accordingly, I believe that by bringing the matter to the court's attention, Joseph would have accommodated the request of his client, while simultaneously protecting his trial strategy. Moreover, although less desirable, once Weatherwax was found guilty of second-degree murder, this course of action would have enabled Joseph to file a motion for a new trial based on the newspaper incident. See Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 33.