OPINION OF THE COURT
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge:Petitioner James Enrique Scheidemann, a permanent resident alien, seeks review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s deportation order. Petitioner, who faces deportation on account of a 1987 drug trafficking conviction for which he has served over five years in prison, does not contest his deportability. Rather, arguing that he is eligible to apply for discretionary waiver of deportation under § 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the “Act”), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c), he urges us to reverse the BIA’s finding that he is statutorily barred under that section from seeking discretionary relief because of his prior drug offense conviction.
Petitioner acknowledges, as he must, that § 212(c) plainly bars discretionary relief to aliens who have served at least five years’ imprisonment for one or more “aggravated felonies,” and that the Act’s definition of “aggravated felony” includes drug trafficking offenses such as his. Because both the statutory bar and the underlying definition of “aggravated felony” were added to the Act by amendments enacted after petitioner’s conviction, however, he argues that the BIA violated the presumption against retroactivity by applying the bar to his antecedent conviction. We find that the statutory bar does not have a retroactive effect as applied to petitioner’s conviction, and we hold that the BIA correctly applied the statute in accordance with clear congressional intent. We will therefore deny the petition for review.
I.
Petitioner, a 49 year-old native and citizen of Colombia, has been a lawful permanent resident in the United States since 1959. His wife, children, parents and siblings are all United States citizens. In June 1987, petitioner was convicted in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey of (1) racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), (2) conspiracy to commit racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), (3) conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance (cocaine) in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, (4) possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance (cocaine) in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and (5) use of a telephone to facilitate a drug conspiracy in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b). Petitioner was sentenced to four concurrent ten-year terms for the racketeering and drug conspiracy and possession offenses, and to a four-year term, also to run concurrently, for the telephone offense. Petitioner actually served five years and ten months in prison.
In March 1992, while petitioner was still in prison, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) instituted deportation proceedings against him, charging him with de-portability pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(B)(i) as an alien convicted of a controlled substance violation. At a deportation hearing held in November 1994, the immigration judge found petitioner deporta-ble as charged. Petitioner then applied with the immigration judge for discretionary relief from deportation under § 212(c) of the Act. The INS opposed the application, arguing *1519that discretionary relief is unavailable under the plain language of § 212(c) to an alien who has served a sentence of at least five years for one or more “aggravated felonies,” and that petitioner’s drug trafficking offenses are “aggravated felonies” within the Act’s definition thereof. In December 1994, the immigration judge denied petitioner’s application for relief and ordered petitioner deported to his native country of Colombia.
Petitioner appealed to the BIA The BIA affirmed, holding that the § 212(c) statutory bar applies to all convictions within the original definition of “aggravated felony,” regardless of the date of conviction, if the petitioner filed the application for relief after the statutory bar became effective on November 29, 1990. This timely petition for review followed.
II.
We have jurisdiction over this petition to review the BIA’s dismissal of an appeal from a deportation order pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) because the petitioner’s residence (as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(33)) is in New Jersey and he timely filed this petition. The deportation order became final upon the BIA’s dismissal of petitioner’s appeal therefrom, 8 C.F.R. § 243.1, and petitioner has exhausted his administrative remedies as of right.
The framework for judicial review of an agency’s construction of the statute it administers is well settled. “The starting point in interpreting a statute is its language, for if the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter.” Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 409, 113 S.Ct. 2151, 2157, 124 L.Ed.2d 368 (1993) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). But “if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2782, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). “In sum, the courts must respect the interpretation of the agency to which Congress has delegated the responsibility for administering the statutory program ... unless that interpretation is arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” Katsis v. INS, 997 F.2d 1067, 1070 (3d Cir.1993) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 902, 127 L.Ed.2d 93 (1994).
III.
Section 212(c) grants the Attorney General discretion to waive the exclusion of otherwise excludable resident aliens seeking to reenter the United States from abroad:
Aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence who temporarily proceeded abroad voluntarily and not under an order of deportation, and who are returning to a lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven consecutive years, may be admitted in the discretion of the Attorney General [despite being otherwise excludable].... The first sentence of this subsection shall not apply to an alien who has been convicted of one or more aggravated felonies and has served for such felony or felonies a term of imprisonment of at least 5 years.
8 U.S.C. § 1182(c). Though the statutory language expressly authorizes only a waiver of exclusion, courts have applied § 212(c) as also authorizing discretionary relief to de-portable aliens who have not exited the United States. E.g., Katsis, 997 F.2d at 1070. The first quoted sentence is the waiver provision for which petitioner would be eligible but for the second quoted sentence, which is the' statutory bar at issue.
When petitioner was convicted in 1987 and a fortiori at the time of his criminal conduct, there was no aggravated felony bar in § 212(c). All deportable aliens, even those convicted of a felony, were thus eligible to apply for a discretionary waiver. Congress added the statutory bar to § 212(c) by amendment in 1990 to restrict the availability of the discretionary waiver. See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub.L. No. 101-649, § 511(a), 104 Stat. 4978, 5052 (1990) (the “1990 amendment”).1 The 1990 amendment *1520expressly applies to all “admissions [and, by implication, deportations] occurring alter the date of the enactment” of the amendment on November 29, 1990. § 511(b), 104 Stat. 'at 5052. The Attorney General has reasonably interpreted this to mean that the amendment applies to all applications for discretionary waiver submitted after November 29, 1990. 56 Fed.Reg. 50,033 (Oct. 3,1991).
In 1987, the Act also lacked a definition of “aggravated felony.” One was added to the definition section of the Act when Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (“ADAA”). Pub.L. No. 100-690, § 7342, 102 Stat. 4181, 4469-70 (1988). At that time, the significance of the definition was primarily in the context of statutory provisions setting forth the grounds for deportation and enhanced penalties for illegal entry of aliens convicted of such felonies. Prior to 1990, it had no significance in the context of discretionary waivers of deportation.
The 1988 definition of “aggravated felony” included “any drug trafficking crime as defined in section 924(c)(2) of title 18.”2 § 7342, 102 Stat. at 4469. This definition, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43), did not include a specific effective date. Petitioner does not dispute that this definition encompasses his drug trafficking offenses (as 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) defines “drug trafficking crime” to include “any felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.)”), but he argues that the definition cannot retroactively define his 1987 offenses of conviction as “aggravated felonies” for purposes of § 212(c).
The issue before us is whether the BIA properly interpreted the § 212(c) statutory bar to apply to aliens convicted of “aggravated felonies” as originally defined in 1988 even where the conviction antedates the enactment of both the statutory bar and the underlying definition of “aggravated felony.” 3 Petitioner asserts that the BIA’s interpretation is impermissible because it violates the presumption against retroactivity as articulated by the Supreme Court in Landgraf v. USI Film Prod., — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994), and Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1510, 128 L.Ed.2d 274 (1994).4 We *1521disagree.5
IV.
The Supreme Court in Landgraf prescribed the analysis for determining whether Congress intended a statute to apply retroactively.
When a case implicates a federal statute enacted after the events in suit, the court’s first task is to determine whether Congress has expressly prescribed the statute’s proper reach. If Congress has done so, of course, there is no need to resort to judicial default rules. When, however, the statute contains no such express command, the court must determine whether the new statute would have retroactive effect, i.e., whether it would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party’s liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed. If the statute would operate retroactively, our traditional presumption teaches that it does not govern absent clear congressional intent favoring such a result.
— U.S. at-, 114 S.Ct. at 1505. As the Court in Landgraf demonstrated, a court may determine congressional intent from the statutory text, by necessary implication from the statute taken as a whole, or from the statute’s legislative history. See id. at - -, 114 S.Ct. at 1491-96.
Here, neither the “aggravated felony” definition nor the § 212(c) statutory bar contains an “express command” that the aggravated felon bar applies to pre-enactment convictions. But, following the Landgraf analysis, there are two independent reasons why the BIA’s interpretation of the statute does not violate the presumption against retroactivity. The first reason is that the statute does not have a retroactive effect. . The second and more important reason is that, whether or not the statute would have a retroactive effect here, the text of the statute and- its amendments clearly shows that Congress intended § 212(c) to apply to offenses within the original 1988 definition of “aggravated felony” regardless of the date of conviction. Thus, the BIA’s interpretation of the statute is not only permissible, it is obligatory given Congress’ clear intent as expressed in the statutory scheme as a whole.
A.
We will first consider whether applying § 212(c) to pre-enactment convictions would have a “retroactive effect” within the meaning of Landgraf. The Supreme Court in Landgraf endeavored to resolve the “apparent tension” between two canons of statutory construction. “The first is the rule that a court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision,” and the second “is the axiom that retroactivity is not favored in the law, and its interpretive corollary that congressional enactments and administrative rules will not be construed to have retroactive effect unless their language requires this result.” — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1496 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). The Landgraf three-part analysis, quoted above, is the Court’s resolution to this “apparent tension.”
The Court explained that application of a statute to pre-enactment conduct does not necessarily give the statute a “retroactive” or *1522“retrospective”6 effect.
A statute does not operate “retrospectively” merely because it is applied in a case arising from conduct antedating the statute’s enactment, or upsets expectations based in prior law. Rather, the court must ask whether the new provision attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment. The conclusion that a particular rule operates “retroactively” comes at the end of a process of judgment concerning the nature and extent of the change in the law and the degree of connection between the operation of the new rule and a relevant past event.... [Fjamiliar considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations offer sound guidance.
— U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1499 (citation and footnote omitted).
The Court observed that “[t]he largest category of cases in which [it has] applied the presumption against statutory retroactivity has involved new provisions affecting contractual or property rights, matters in which predictability and stability are of prime importance.” Id. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1500. Although the Court quickly added that the presumption has not been limited to such cases, they represent perhaps the model context for application of the anti-retroactivity presumption. “Elementary considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should have an opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly; settled expectations should not be lightly disrupted.” Id. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1497.
The provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 at issue in Landgraf were held to be “retroactive in effect” because one provision allowed recovery of punitive damages (which increased deterrent and retributive aspects of the statute, and retroactive imposition of which “would raise a serious constitutional question”) and the other, allowing recovery of compensatory damages, was “the type of legal change that would have an impact on private parties’ planning” and would “attach an important new legal burden to [the defendant’s] conduct.” Id. at-, 114 S.Ct. at 1505-06. The Court thus found that retroactive application of these provisions, where prior law afforded no relief, “c[ould] be seen as creating a new cause of action” and would have an “especially pronounced” impact on parties’ rights. Id. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1506.
The Landgraf Court distinguished from statutes altering the legal consequences of prior conduct three categories of cases that have a great deal in common with the case before us. First, the Court observed, “[w]hen the intervening statute authorizes or affects the propriety of prospective relief, application of the new provision [in a case involving pre-enactment conduct] is not retroactive.” Id. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1501. As an example, the Court cited a provision of the Clayton Act which altered the standard for evaluating the propriety of injunctive relief against labor picketing.
The second class of cases noted by the Court as involving no true retroactivity is that involving “statutes conferring or ousting jurisdiction.” Id. The law existing at the time jurisdiction is invoked governs such cases, according to the Court, “because jurisdictional statutes ‘speak to the power of the court rather than to the rights or obligations of the parties.’ ” Id. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1502 (quoting Republic Nat. Bank of Miami v. United States, 506 U.S. 80, 100, 113 S.Ct. 554, 565, 121 L.Ed.2d 474 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring)).
Finally, the Court in Landgraf observed that “[c]hanges in procedural rules may often be applied in suits arising before their enactment without raising concerns about retroac-tivity.” Id. It noted “the diminished reliance interests in matters of procedure,” and observed:
Because rules of procedure regulate secondary rather than primary conduct, the fact that a new procedural rule was instituted after the conduct giving rise to the suit does not make application of the rule at trial retroactive.
*1523Id. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1502.7
In this case, the consequences of petitioner’s criminal conduct were clear at the time of that conduct and they remain unchanged today. He was subject to possible criminal sanctions and deportation. The only relevant change in the law relates to the permissible scope of the Attorney General’s discretion to grant relief from one of those consequences. Like statutes altering the standards for in-junctive relief, this change has only a prospective impact. It is not designed to remedy the past but only to affect petitioner’s future status with respect to the legality of his presence in: the United States. Like statutes constricting the jurisdiction of a judicial body, these changes speak only to the power of a public agency. Finally, like legislation altering procedural rights, the relevant amendments in this case regulate secondary rather than primary conduct and infringe on no significant reliance interest. Given the facts that petitioner’s pre-1987 conduct clearly subjected him to deportation as well as criminal sanctions, and that § 212(c), as it then existed, offered relief from the former only at the unfettered discretion of the Attorney General, petitioner does not, and could not, contend that his conduct was undertaken in reliance on the then current version of § 212(e).
We agree with the observation of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit when it was confronted with the issue that we here face. “In general, the concern regarding retroactive application of statutes is the deprivation of rights without notice and fair warning; such concerns are not present in this case.... In this case, Congress did not attach additional consequences [to past criminal activity] but merely withdrew a previously available form of discretionary relief.” De Osorio v. INS, 10 F.3d 1034, 1042 (4th Cir.1993).
We hold, then, that the statutory provisions at issue here do not have a “retroactive effect” under the second part of the Land-graf analysis. Therefore, the presumption against retroactivity is irrelevant and the law in effect at the time of the decision must control.
B.
Because we hold that the BIA’s interpretation of the statute does not violate the presumption against retroactivity, it is at least a permissible interpretation to which we would ordinarily defer. Katsis, 997 F.2d at 1070; De Osorio, 10 F.3d at 1042. Such deference is not necessary in this case, however, because the text of the relevant statutory provisions clearly shows that Congress intended the § 212(c) statutory bar to apply to pre-enactment convictions such as petitioner’s.8 And where “the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter.” Good Samaritan, 508 U.S. at 409, 113 S.Ct. at 2157 (internal quotation marks omitted).
1.
First, we will consider whether Congress clearly intended the definition of “aggravated felony” itself to apply to convictions entered before enactment of the definition. As we have noted, this definition was added to the Act in 1988 with the passage of the ADAA when its significance was in contexts other than § 212(c). Nowhere does the ADAA expressly command that the term “aggravated felony” shall apply to convictions entered prior to the ADAA’s enactment date. Nevertheless, despite the absence of any express command, it is clear from the relevant provisions of the ADAA that Congress intended the definition to apply to pre-enactment convictions.
The portion of the ADAA that is relevant here contains both the definition of “aggra*1524vated felony5’ and six substantive provisions that attach specific adverse immigration consequences to aggravated felonies. Three of these provisions, by necessary implication, show that Congress clearly intended the definition of “aggravated felony” to apply to pre-enactment as well as post-enactment convictions. For example, § 7345 of the ADAA enhanced the criminal penalties for the illegal reentry of an alien “whose deportation was subsequent to a conviction for commission of an aggravated felony.” § 7345(a)(2), 102 Stat. at 4471. Congress expressly provided that these enhanced penalties “shall apply to any alien who enters, attempts to enter, or is found in, the United States on or after the date of the enactment” of the ADAA. § 7345(b), 102 Stat. at 4471. This section necessarily contemplates enhanced penalties for aliens convicted of aggravated felonies before the date of enactment in 1988, because the enhanced penalties apply on the date of enactment to aliens who attempt reentry following their deportation, which was in turn subsequent to conviction of an aggravated felony. We must construe the definition of “aggravated felony” to apply to pre-enactment convictions because it would be impossible otherwise to give effect to Congress’ express command regarding the effective date of this substantive provision employing the term, and it is elementary that we must construe a statute so as to give effect to every word. E.g., Sekula v. FDIC, 39 F.3d 448, 454 & n. 16 (3d Cir.1994). By necessary implication, then, Congress clearly intended the definition of “aggravated felony” to apply to convictions entered prior to 1988.9 If we were to construe the definition of “aggravated felony” to be prospective only, we would improperly render these express statutory provisions absurd.
The other three substantive provisions of the ADAA employing the “aggravated felony” term, each of which concerns deportation of aggravated felons, explicitly limit their application prospectively to aliens convicted of aggravated felonies “on or after the date of the enactment” of the ADAA See §§ 7343(e) (“Deportation of Aliens Committing Aggravated Felonies”), 7344(b) (“Grounds of Deportation”), and 7347(c) (“Expedited Deportation Proceedings for Aliens Convicted of Aggravated Felonies”). Such expressly prospective language would be redundant if the definition of “aggravated felony” were construed to apply only to convictions entered on or after the effective date of the ADAA. Moreover, these provisions demonstrate that Congress knew well how to limit expressly the reach of a provision where it desired to do so, but Congress did not do so with respect to the definition section. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 1213, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987) (noting that, where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it from another section of the same act, it is generally presumed that Congress acted intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion).
The design of the ADAA thus clearly demonstrates that Congress intended the temporally-unrestricted definition of “aggravated felony” to apply to pre-enactment convictions. It is only certain substantive provisions that Congress has expressly limited to apply prospectively to those aggravated felony convictions entered on or after the ADAA’s enactment date. The definition of “aggravated felony” lacks an effective date not by oversight, but by design: a crime described in the original 1988 definition is an aggravated felony regardless of the date of conviction, but its immigration consequences will vary according to the effective date of the substantive provision employing the term. We must construe the definition to *1525include pre-enactment convictions in order to give meaningful effect to all the express provisions of the ADAA, both those that are expressly prospective and those that necessarily apply to pre-enactment convictions.
Subsequent amendments to the aggravated felony definition are consistent with the statutory scheme described above. As part of the Immigration Act of 1990 — the statute that created the § 212(c) statutory bar— Congress amended the definition of “aggravated felony” to include certain additional offenses (including money laundering, crimes of violence, and foreign law violations). See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub.L. No. 101-649, § 501(a), 104 Stat. 4978, 5048 (1990). Congress specifically directed that these additional offenses are aggravated felonies only if “committed on or after the date of the enactment” of the 1990 amendment. § 501(b), 104 Stat. at 5048. This same section of the 1990 amendments also expanded the drug offenses qualifying as “aggravated felonies” to include “any illicit trafficking in any controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act).” § 501(a)(2), 104 Stat. at 5048. In contrast to the explicitly prospective application for the other, additional offenses, however, Congress expressly stated that the drug offense amendment “shall be effective as if included in the enactment of [the original definition in] section 7342 of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.” § 501(b), 104 Stat. at 5048. Thus, Congress limited the temporal scope of the aggravated felony definition only with respect to the new crimes added in 1990, but left intact the temporally unlimited language of the original, 1988 definition (under which petitioner’s crimes fall).
Congress enacted similar amendments in 1994 to expand further the definition of “aggravated felony,” and these amendments again left the 1988 definition intact in its temporal scope. See Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, Pub.L. No. 103-416, § 222(b), 108 Stat. 4305, 4322 (1994) (“The amendments made by this section shall apply to convictions entered on or after the date of enactment of this Act”). The 1994 amendments were enacted on October 25,1994, well after the 1992 opinion in which the BIA first announced the interpretation it advances here,10 and after five courts of appeals had published opinions affirming the BIA’s interpretation.11 In light of this case law, it is significant that Congress in 1994 did not also amend the original “aggravated felony” definition to make it absolutely prospective, for we must presume that Congress is aware of existing judicial interpretations of statutes. E.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 696-97, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 1958-59, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); James v. O’Bannon, 715 F.2d 794, 804 (3d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1050, 105 S.Ct. 1746, 84 L.Ed.2d 812 (1985). Congress in 1990 and 1994 thus left intact the scheme it originally created in 1988.
Petitioner’s crimes, because they come within the original 1988 definition, are thus “aggravated felonies” even though they antedate the enactment of the statutory provision, and any temporal restriction must come from the relevant substantive provision employing the term — in this case, § 212(c).
2.
The plain language of the § 212(c) statutory bar itself and of its effective date provision demonstrate.that Congress intended the bar to become effective immediately upon enactment. Section 212(c) provides that any alien “who has been convicted of one or more aggravated felonies and has served for such felony or felonies a term of imprisonment of at least 5 years” is ineligible to apply for a discretionary waiver of deportation. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (emphasis added). As noted above, this provision was added to § 212(e) by § 511(a) of the Immigration Act of 1990, 104 Stat. at 5052. The emphasized verb tenses indicate that the bar applies to aliens convicted at least five years prior to the provision’s effective date. Moreover, this intent is confirmed by Congress’ express command that the statutory bar would apply to all “admissions occurring after the date of *1526the enactment” of the 1990 amendment (November 29, 1990).12 § 511(b), 104 Stat. at 5052.
If we were to interpret § 212(c) as applying only to post-enactment convictions, by its terms the statutory bar would not have restricted the Attorney General’s action for at least five years from the date of the bar’s enactment. But § 212(c) is aimed at restricting the Attorney General’s action, and Congress expressly commanded that the statutory bar was to take effect “after the date of [its] enactment” on November 29,1990. “We believe the only sensible interpretation is that Congress intended its directions to go into effect promptly ‘after the date of the enactment.’” Buitrago-Cuesta v. INS, 7 F.3d 291, 294 (2d Cir.1993).13 A contrary interpretation would make § 212(c) “a super-prospectivity statute, and, thus, would render absurd Congress’s provision that [§ 212(c) ] would apply ‘after’ the date of enactment.” Id. at 295.14
By its own terms, then, § 212(c) contemplates barring discretionary relief to aliens convicted of aggravated felonies in 1985 and before. If an alien has served at least five years’ imprisonment for a felony conviction, as petitioner here has, the only limitations on the applicability of the § 212(c) bar are two: (1) that the application for relief must have been submitted after the date of the bar’s enactment, and (2) that the conviction must have been for an “aggravated felony” as defined in the Act. Because petitioner applied for § 212(c) relief after November 29, 1990, and because his crimes eoncededly come within the 1988 definition of “aggravated felony,” he is properly subject to the statutory bar.
We hold, therefore, that Congress intended § 212(c) to restrict the Attorney General’s power to exercise discretionary relief immediately after enactment of the bar on November 29, 1990, with respect to aliens who have served at least five years’ imprisonment for crimes defined as “aggravated felonies” under the original 1988 definition thereof, regardless of the conviction date.
V.
We thus conclude that § 212(c)’s bar applies to all convictions under the original 1988 definition of “aggravated felony,” regardless of the conviction date, where the alien applied for discretionary relief after the effective date of the 1990 amendment. Accordingly, the petition for review will be denied.
. The statutory bar as first enacted in § 511(a) denied discretionary relief to any alien who has *1520been convicted of “an aggravated felony and has served a term of imprisonment of at least 5 years.” The language just quoted was subsequently clarified to read, as it presently does, "one or more aggravated felonies and has served for such felony or felonies a term of imprisonment of at least 5 years." See Miscellaneous and Technical Immigration and Naturalization Amendments of 1991, Pub.L. No. 102-232, § 306(a)(10)„ 105 Stat. 1733, 1751 (1991). This technical change is of no significance to the issues presented here either in its text or its effective date — Congress directed that this technical amendment "shall take effect as if included in the enactment of the Immigration Act of 1990." § 310, 105 Stat. at 1759.
. As will be discussed in more detail, the original 1988 definition of "aggravated felony” has twice been expanded by amendment to include additional crimes, but the definition has continuously included drug trafficking crimes such as those of which petitioner has been convicted. Petitioner does not contest this fact.
. In its decision here, the BIA relied in part on its prior decisions in Matter of A-A-, Int. Dec. 3176 (BIA 1992) (holding that § 212(c) applies to all applications for relief filed after November 29, 1990, regardless of when conviction occurred, for offenses within the original definition of "aggravated felony”), and Matter of Gomez-Giraldo, Int. Dec. 3242 (BIA 1995) (reaffirming Matter of A-A- and holding that its interpretation does not violate the presumption against retroac-tivity as articulated by the Supreme Court in Landgraf v. USI Film Prod., - U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994), and Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., - U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1510, 128 L.Ed.2d 274 (1994)).
.We reject petitioner's other two claims of error. First, petitioner asserts a violation of the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution. As the BIA correctly noted, however, the prohibition against ex post facto laws does not apply to . deportation proceedings, which are "purely civil action[s] to determine eligibility to remain in this country, not to punish.... The deportation hearing looks prospectively to the respondent's right to remain in this country in the future. Past conduct is relevant only insofar as it may shed light on the respondent’s right to remain.” INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038, 104 S.Ct. 3479, 3483, 82 L.Ed.2d 778 (1984). While credible and forceful arguments have often been brought before the Supreme Court that the ex post facto clause should be applied to deportation proceedings, the clause “has been unswervingly held as inapplicable to matters of deportation.” United States v. Bodre, 948 F.2d 28, 31-33 (1st Cir.1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 941, 112 S.Ct. 1487, 117 L.Ed.2d 628 (1992). We accordingly reject petitioner’s argument that the ex post facto clause applies here. *1521Second, petitioner creatively argues that, even if § 212(c) is fully applicable, his 70 months served should be prorated among the several offenses of conviction so that the time served for the three "aggravated felonies” works out to less than five years (it is undisputed that petitioner’s two racketeering convictions are not "aggravated felonies” under the Act). This argument fails because petitioner was sentenced to concurrent sentences on all counts, and therefore he has served over five years on two of his aggravated felony counts. Petitioner thus meets the terms of the § 212(c) statutory bar.
. We note that, in affirming the BIA’s interpretation of the statute, we join all six of our sister courts of appeals that have previously evaluated and upheld the BIA’s interpretation. See Samaniego-Meraz v. INS, 53 F.3d 254, 257 (9th Cir.1995); Asencio v. INS, 37 F.3d 614, 617 (11th Cir.1994); Campos v. INS, 16 F.3d 118, 121 (6th Cir.1994); De Osorio v. INS, 10 F.3d 1034, 1039-41 (4th Cir.1993); Buitrago-Cuesta v. INS, 7 F.3d 291, 294 (2d Cir.1993); Barreiro v. INS, 989 F.2d 62, 64 (1st Cir.1993); see also Cortes-Castillo v. INS, 997 F.2d 1199, 1202 n. 1 (7th Cir.1993) (dictum).
. The Court used the terms ‘‘retroactive’’ and "retrospective” synonymously.
. Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion, joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas, agreed that the Court had found no retroactivity in cases falling within the three categories referenced in the Court's opinion. His explanation for the result in those cases differs somewhat from that of the Court, but that explanation, like that of the Court, counsels in favor of a finding of no retro-activity in this case.
. Petitioner does not contest that Congress has the power to declare past criminal activity a new grounds for denial of discretionary relief from deportation, or even a new grounds for deportation. See, e.g., Campos v. INS, 16 F.3d 118, 122 (6th Cir.1994) (citing cases). The issue presented is instead one of congressional intent.
. Sections 7346 and 7349 are the two other provisions of the ADAA that similarly demonstrate Congress' clear intent that the definition of "aggravated felony" should apply to pre-enactment convictions. Section 7346 provides criminal penalties for aiding or assisting aliens who have previously been convicted of an "aggravated felony” to enter the United States, and Congress expressly commanded that that provision "shall apply to any aid or assistance which occurs on or after the date of the enactment of this Act." § 7346(b), 102 Stat. at 4471. Likewise, § 7349 provides a ten-year bar on reentry into the United States of aliens convicted of an aggravated felony, and Congress expressly stated that the bar "shall apply to any alien convicted of an aggravated felony who seeks admission to the United States on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.” § 7349(b), 102 Stat. at 4473.
. See note 3, supra.
. See cases cited in note 5, supra.
. As noted above, the literal text of § 212(c) applies to legal resident aliens seeking re-admission after going abroad, but we have held that § 212(c) applies equally to deportation proceedings. Katsis, 997 F.2d at 1070. The Attorney General has interpreted the § 212(c) statutory bar as applying to all applications for discretionary waiver submitted after November 29, 1990, the date of enactment of the 1990 Act. 56 Fed. Reg. 50,033 (Oct. 3, 1991).
. On this same point, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reasoned as follows: "If Congress believed seven years’ residence insufficient to entitle aliens to waivers if they had served five or more years imprisonment for committing an aggravated felony, it makes small sense that so substantial a stricture should not go into effect for five years from enactment.” Barreiro v. INS, 989 F.2d 62, 64 (1st Cir.1993).
.In reaching our conclusion, we are mindful of the fact that § 212(c) necessarily applies super-prospectively with respect to those specific offenses added to the definition of "aggravated felony” by the 1990 and 1994 amendments. But the super-prospective effect of some offenses is not due to the terms of § 212(c), which is simply to take effect "after” its enactment, but rather is due to the underlying definition of what constitutes an "aggravated felony.” Section 212(c) has no such necessary prospectivity with respect to aggravated felonies such as petitioner's because, as discussed above, offenses described in the original 1988 definition are "aggravated felonies” regardless of the date of conviction.