dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. While I empathize with Air One’s plight, I conclude that (1) this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain Air One’s petition for review, (2) the court lacks authority to rule that the Spanish registration is invalid (and has erred by doing so without applying Spanish law), and (3) the majority’s opinion ordering the FAA to register Air One’s helicopter in the United States directly conflicts with both a statute and a treaty.
I
The appropriate jurisdictional test is that outlined in Air California v. U.S. Dept. of Transportation, 654 F.2d 616 (9th Cir.1981). In that case, this court stated that under 49 U.S.C.App. § 1486(a),1 FAA “[ajdministrative orders are not final and reviewable ‘unless and until they impose an obligation, deny a right, or fix some legal relationship as a consummation of the administrative process.’ ” Id. at 621 (citations omitted).
Air One argues that the FAA letters in this case are final orders because they effec*884tively deny Air One its right to register its helicopter. I disagree. None of the letters denied Air One’s registration application; to the contrary, the letters merely told Air One what it needed to provide in order to get the application approved, namely a certificate from a Spanish authority (either the Spanish National Aircraft Registry or a Spanish court) that the Spanish registration was invalid. Accordingly, the letters do not impose any obligation, deny any right or fix any legal relationship as the consummation of the administrative process.
The majority states that “[wjhether or not the [FAA] letters amount to final agency action,” this court has jurisdiction to review the FAA’s alleged “failure to register the helicopter” because exhaustion of administrative remedies would be futile. In support of its conclusion on this point, it states that “[t]he FAA has admitted that any further attempts by Air One to obtain a different decision will be futile.”
I cannot agree with this latter statement. The FAA has not conceded that exhaustion of administrative remedies would be futile; to the contrary, the FAA has said that it would accept a final judgment or decree from a court of competent jurisdiction in Spain that the registration is invalid. See Appellee’s Brief at 26-27; Jan. 3, 1996 memorandum from Kenneth G. Caplan, Special Attorney to the U.S. Attorney General. The relevant federal regulations state that such a judgment would constitute “satisfactory evidence of termination of the foreign registration.” 14 C.F.R. § 47.37(b)(2). Air One cannot argue that any efforts to obtain a different decision from the FAA would be “futile” when it refuses to pursue the very remedy which the FAA has suggested and which is mandated by the relevant federal regulations.2
Accordingly, Air One has a remedy available to it, and the FAA’s letters do not “impose an obligation, deny a right, or fix some legal relationship as a consummation of the administrative process.” Air California, 654 F.2d at 621. For that reason, they “are not final and reviewable,” id., and this court lacks jurisdiction to hear Air One’s appeal.
II
Even if this court has jurisdiction to consider Air One’s appeal, I do not believe that we have authority to hold that the Spanish registration is invalid.
The majority states that “we can determine when and if a registration in a foreign country remains valid.” Op. at 883 (emphasis added). In doing so, the majority apparently relies on 14 C.F.R. § 47.37(b)(2). However, it has misapplied the provision. That regulation states that
satisfactory evidence of termination of the foreign registration may be—
(2) A final judgment or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction that determines, under the law of the country concerned, that the registration has become invalid.
14 C.F.R. § 47.37(b)(2) (emphasis added). I strongly doubt that this court is one of “competent jurisdiction” to determine that the Spanish registration is invalid; I suspect that only a Spanish court so qualifies.
More important, however, is the fact that the majority does not even purport to apply Spanish law in holding the Spanish registration invalid, as is clearly required by the regulation. Even assuming that we are a “court of competent jurisdiction” to decide the issue, the parties have not provided any briefing on Spanish law, and we should not decide such an issue in a vacuum.
III
Finally, the majority’s opinion also forces the FAA to register Air One’s helicopter even though the FAA can do so only by violating both a statute and a treaty. First, under federal law, “[a]n aircraft [owned by a citizen of the United States] may be registered [in the United States] only when the aircraft is — (1) not registered under the laws of a foreign country____” 49 U.S.C. *885§ 44102(a) (emphasis added). As Air One concedes, its helicopter is in fact “registered under the laws of a foreign country.”3 The majority’s opinion ordering the FAA to register Air One’s helicopter in the United States clearly contravenes this statute.
Second, as the majority notes, Chapter III, Article 18 of the Chicago Convention states that “[a]n aircraft cannot be validly registered in more than one State.... ” The only Spanish authority yet to rule on the subject has stated that the aircraft is in fact “validly registered” in Spain. Accordingly, the majority’s opinion clearly places the United States in violation of this treaty. In addition, the majority’s decision to invalidate the Spanish registration, before the Spanish courts have even been given an opportunity to rule on the subject, contravenes basic principles of international comity. Finally, the majority’s opinion provides a dangerous precedent which may encourage foreign courts to rule, in subsequent cases, that aircraft registered by the FAA in the United States are not in fact “validly” registered here. The practical effect of the majority’s ruling is thus to render the treaty a virtual nullity.
IV
There is no question that Air One has been the victim of a protracted, intercontinental bureaucratic nightmare, and I empathize completely with Air One’s plight and with the majority’s strong desire to remedy it. However, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Because of that fact, we sometimes confront cases, such as the one at bar, where we simply lack authority to act. And even if we do act, we must always do so in a manner consistent with federal laws and regulations. Because I fear that the majority’s opinion may be inconsistent with these principles, I respectfully dissent.
. This provision has since been repealed and recodified, without significant change, at 49 U.S.C. § 46110.
. In addition, in light of Air One’s decision not to pursue such a judgment in the Spanish courts, I respectfully submit that the majority’s statement that "bringing a court challenge will be unsuccessful" is nothing more than pure speculation.
. In spite of the majority’s holding that the Spanish registration is invalid, this conclusion cannot and does not alter the basic fact that the helicopter remains "registered under the laws of a foreign country.”