dissenting:
Lattimore’s comments following his oral consent — “If I say yes, if I say no, it’s still ... ”; “[I]t’s going to happen anyway, right?”; “[I]t don’t really make no difference” — admit of only one interpretation: “You’re going to search my car, one way or the other, aren’t you?” Frock’s threat to “call a drug dog up” translates into an unmistakable “yes.” There simply was no choice from that point forward.1 Accordingly, I would hold that Lattimore’s written consent was involuntary because it evinced nothing-more than “acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority.” Bumper, 391 U.S. at 549, 88 S.Ct. at 1792 (holding that “consent,” given after a policeman falsely asserted that he had a warrant, could not later be used to justify the search); see also United States v. White, 979 F.2d 539, 542 (7th Cir.1992) (noting that “[bjaseless threats to obtain a search warrant may render consent involuntary”). I would also apply the same reasoning to the issue of the continuing validity of the oral consent.
In its discussion of whether Lattimore withdrew his consent, the majority notes that, while consent to search may be withdrawn,2 “a refusal to execute a written consent form subsequent to a voluntary oral consent does not act as an effective withdrawal of the prior oral consent.” Majority op. at 651. The majority then concludes that the search was lawful because Lattimore never withdrew “his previous, voluntarily given, oral consent....” Majority op. at 652.3 Wholly missing from this analysis is any discussion of the drug dog threat.
The district court’s finding that Lattimore understood “what his rights were” is clearly erroneous. He had been told that attempting to withdraw consent or refusing to sign the form were no longer viable options. Although a voluntariness finding does not hinge on a showing that Lattimore knew that he could withdraw his consent (Gordon, 895 F.2d at 938), there is a critical difference between not knowing you have a right and being told that you do not have it. If Lattimore, as soon as he muttered “yes” to the initial request to search, had been informed that such consent was irrevocable and that *654the search was going forward regardless of anything else Lattimore said or did, I believe there would be no question but that the search would be held unlawful. I am unable to see how Lattimore’s case differs from the hypothetical in any material respect.
I would reverse the district court’s order denying the motion to suppress.
MURNAGHAN, ERVIN, HAMILTON, MICHAEL and MOTZ, JJ., join in this dissent.. Trooper Frock's statement that he searches 97% of the cars he stops strongly suggests to me that he rarely takes no for an answer.
. In some limited circumstances, consent may not be withdrawn once given. See, e.g., United States v. DeAngelo, 584 F.2d 46 (4th Cir.1978) (holding that persons voluntarily entering an airport screening process “acquiesce[ ] in its full potential scope,” including physical inspection), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 935, 99 S.Ct. 1278, 59 L.Ed.2d 493 (1979). We are not confronted with such a situation here.
. The majority later acknowledges that the drug dog comment “would raise serious questions concerning the voluntariness of [Lattimore’s written] consent." Majority op. at 651-652. However, in view of its reliance on the oral consent as the basis for the search, the majority never reaches the issue of the voluntariness of the written consent. This does not prevent the majority from using Lattimore’s execution of the consent form as support for the holding that Lattimore never withdrew his oral consent: ”[I]f Lattimore’s refusal to sign the written consent form would not be adequate to affect a withdrawal of his consent, certainly his question concerning the form coupled with his subsequent signature of it cannot have been.” Majority op. at 651. If the written consent was involuntary, as I would find it to be (and as the majority implies it to be), then certainly such consent cannot be used to bolster a finding that the oral consent was never withdrawn.