concurring in part and concurring in the judgment:
I agree with the majority’s result, but cannot join all of its opinion. Specifically, I don’t agree with its reasons why a six-year and not a three-year statute of limitations applies to Count 7. Nor can I join its rationale for concluding that the best evidence rule didn’t preclude the government from introducing a transcript instead of a tape of defendant’s deposition.
I
Count 7 charged Workinger with violating 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a). That statute makes it a felony to:
corruptly or by force or threats of force ... endeavor[ ] to intimidate or impede any officer or employee of the United States acting in an official capacity under this title, or in any other way corruptly or by force or threats of force ... obstruct! ] or impede! ], or endeavor! ] to obstruct or impede, the due administration of this title.
Workinger violated section 7212(a), according to the indictment (and the jury’s verdict), by submitting false documents to the IRS. Count 7 therefore did not charge that he had intimidated United States officials, but only that he “did corruptly obstruct and impede, *1417and endeavor to obstruct and impede” the administration of the tax laws. -Indictment, ER at 4.
The indictment was filed much more than three years after he submitted the last of the false documents. Workinger thus points to 26 U.S.C. § 6531, which provides a three-year statute of limitations for criminal tax offenses, except those listed in its eight subsections. Subsection six provides a six-year statute of limitations “for the offense described in section 7212(a) (relating to intimidation of officers and employees of the United States).”1 In Workinger’s view, the subsection’s parenthetical reference to intimidation of United States officials restricts the subsection’s coverage, and thus applies only to section 7212(a) offenses involving intimidation, not those involving otherwise obstructing or impeding. Because he was charged only with obstructing and impeding, not intimidating, Workinger argues, the indictment was barred by the statute of limitations.
The majority rejects this argument on the ground that the other subsections of section 6531 don’t suggest Congress sought to distinguish, for statute of limitations purposes, between tax offenses involving force or violence and other tax offenses; there’s therefore no reason to think Congress tried to draw such a distinction in section 6531(6). See maj. op. at 1414. True enough, but this doesn’t tell us much about whether section 6531(6) refers to section 7212(a) in its entirety, or only to that portion criminalizing “intimidation” of United States officials. The reason is that none of the other subsections of section 6531 refers to substantive offenses like section 7212(a), which, by its terms, criminalizes the use or threat of force, in addition to other conduct. Because section 6531(6) specifically mentions “intimidation” but omits “obstructing” or “impeding,” Workinger’s argument is not defeated by the majority’s analysis.
I would begin by examining the language of section 6531(6), see N.Y. Conference of Blue Cross v. Travelers Ins., — U.S. -, -, 115 S.Ct. 1671, 1677, 131 L.Ed.2d 695 (1995), something the majority never does. Consistent with ordinary usage, section 6531(6)’s parenthetical is more naturally understood as descriptive rather than restrictive. See Norman J. Singer, 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 45.13, at 78 (5th ed. 1992) (“[Ljegislators can be presumed to rely on conventional language usage.”). Thus, section 6531(6) reads most easily if “the offense described in section 7212(a)” is taken to refer to section 7212(a) in its entirety, and the parenthetical language is understood as further identifying, by way of a general description of its content, the section intended. This does not violate the canon of statutory construction that says courts should strive not to render language in a statute superfluous. Parenthetical language is commonly used for descriptive purposes and, to the extent Congress so used it in section 6531(6), it remains fully functional under a descriptive interpretation. If Congress intended to establish a six-year statute of limitations for “intimidating” and a three-year statute for otherwise obstructing or impeding, it chose a particularly awkward way to achieve this. It would have been much more straightforward to outlaw intimidating United States officials in one subsection, to outlaw any other form of obstructing or impeding them in another, and to refer only to the first in section 6531(6).
Other courts have interpreted identical parenthetical language as descriptive. In United States v. Herring, 602 F.2d 1220 (5th Cir.1979), for example; defendant was charged with “racketeering activity” as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1961. Section 1961’s definition incorporated by reference other federal offenses, identifying them by their United States Code section and a brief parenthetical description. See Herring, 602 F.2d at 1223 n. 3. One of the statutes so *1418incorporated was 18 U.S.C. § 2314, which made it a crime to transport securities in interstate commerce, knowing them to have been “stolen, converted or taken by fraud.” Herring, 602 F.2d at 1222 n. 2. Section 1961, however, described section 2314 as only “(relating to interstate transportation of stolen property).” Id. at 1223 & n. 3 (quoting' 18 U.S.C. § 1961) (emphasis added). Defendant moved to dismiss the section 1961 charge, claiming that, while the securities in Herring might have been “converted”- or “taken by fraud,” it was clear they had not been “stolen”; he therefore hadn’t violated the part of section 2314 that had been incorporated into section 1961. See id. at 1223. The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument, explaining that “the parenthetical [language] ... was intended merely to aid the identification of section 2314 rather than to limit the proscriptions of that section.” Id.; accord United States v. Garner, 837 F.2d 1404, 1418-19 (7th Cir.1987) (section 1961’s reference to “title 18, United States Code: Section 201 (relating to bribery)” reached any conduct amounting to a section 201 violation, not only conduct within “the common definition of bribery”); Fidelity & Deposit v. Stromberg Sheet Metal, 532 A.2d 676, 678-79 (D.C.App.1987) (statutory reference to “title 40 ... sections 270a-270e (known as the Miller Act, relating to performance bonds)” meant the entire Miller Act, not “only that portion dealing with performance bonds”).
Workinger doesn’t point to any cases that have interpreted similar parenthetical language as restrictive. He cites 26 U.S.C. § 1(a)(1), which refers to “every married individual (as defined in section 7703),” and 26 U.S.C. § 9722, which states: “If a principal purpose of any transaction is to evade or avoid liability under this chapter, this chapter shall be applied (and such liability shall be imposed) without regard to such transaction.” These sections don’t help Workinger. Unlike the language of section 7212(a), language of the section 1(a)(1) is more naturally understood as restrictive because it uses the restrictive phrase “as defined.” And it’s not clear what comfort Workinger gets from section 9722’s parenthetical language, which is clearly not restrictive but descriptive.
Nor is Workinger’s explanation of why Congress would have provided a six-year statute of limitations for “intimidating” but a three-year statute for otherwise “obstructing or impeding” persuasive. .He claims that intimidation offenses are somehow less “dangerous” than other section 7212(a) violations, Appellant’s Reply Br. at 4, but this doesn’t take into account the language of section 7212(a). The statute makes it illegal not only to “intimidate or impede” United States officials, but to “in any other way corruptly or by force or threats of force ... obstruct[ ] or impede[ ], or endeavor[ ] to obstruct or impede, the due administration of this title.” 18 U.S.C. § 7212(a). In other words, section 7212(a), by its terms, anticipates “obstructing” or “impeding” offenses that involve the use of force or threats, and can therefore be quite “dangerous.” Suppose, for example, that Workinger had broken into the home of the IRS agent who was investigating him and slit the agent’s throat while he slept. Work-inger wouldn’t have intimidated the agent, but he would surely have endeavored to obstruct or impede the administration of the tax laws in a particularly “dangerous” manner.
The legislative history, though not conclusive, favors the view that section 6531(6) refers to section 7212(a) in its entirety.2 According to the House Report, section 7212(a) was intended to reach any type of “interference” with the administration of the tax laws, and Congress viewed all such interference as equally serious:
A [current] provision of the ... Code makes it an offense punishable by a $5,000 fine or 3 years’ imprisonment or both to forcibly assault, resist, oppose, etc., any officer or employee acting under the internal revenue laws. A similar, but amplified, provision of this bill covers all cases where the officer is intimidated or injured; that is, where corruptly, by force or threat of force, directly or by communication, an attempt is made to impede the administra*1419tion of the internal-revenue laws. The penalty in the case of all such attempts to interfere with the administration of the internal-revenue laws is to be a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than 5 years or both.
H.R.Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 107 (1954), reprinted, in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4025, 4135-36. The House Report further describes section 6531 as providing a six-year limitations period “for intimidating United States officers.” Id. at 4134. Given the Report’s evident view that section 7212(a) sets forth a single offense, its reference to “intimidating United States officers” is, in context, a reference to the entire prohibition established by section 7212(a), denoted by the first act (or, more precisely, result) it proscribes.
Workinger also points to Waters v. United States, 328. F.2d 739 (10th Cir.1964), where the Tenth Circuit reasoned that “[sjince the six-year limitation [under section 6531] is an exception to the [three-year] general rule, it must be strictly construed to apply to those offenses specifically enumerated.” Id. at 743. Workinger takes this language out of context. The Tenth Circuit was there referring to offenses listed in sections of the tax code that were not enumerated in section 6531. Section 7212(a), by contrast, is listed by number and therefore is “specifically enumerated” as the Tenth Circuit used those words. Workinger also points to Waters’ statement that section 6531 “is to be liberally interpreted in favor of the accused.” Id. at 742. The Supreme Court has since explained, however, that the so-called “rule of lenity” applies only where the language of a criminal statute is “grievously ambiguous.” Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, n. 17, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 1804 n. 17, 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994) (brackets omitted); Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 463, 111 S.Ct. 1919, 1926, 114 L.Ed.2d 524 (1991). That test isn’t met here. Although Workinger’s interpretation can’t be rejected out of hand, it’s not as persuasive as the alternative.
I see no reason to apply the rule of lenity in any event. The Supreme Court has articulated two rationales for the rule, neither of which is implicated here. The first is that defendants are entitled to notice of what’s illegal so they can conform their conduct. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348, 92 S.Ct. 515, 522, 30 L.Ed.2d 488 (1971). But it is unlikely in the extreme that a defendant would elect to commit a crime because he believed the statute of limitations for the offense was only three years instead of six; there is no plausible rebanee interest at stake here. The second rationale is that only legislatures, not courts, should make conduct criminal; the rule of lenity prevents a court from resolving an ambiguity in a criminal statute so as to expand the scope of a criminal statute beyond what the legislature clearly intended. See id. But there’s no concern here that a court will render criminal what the legislature meant to remain legal. Work-inger’s conduct clearly was criminal under section 7212(a); the only doubt is whether the government waited too long to prosecute. There’s no reason to apply the rule of lenity on that point.
II
Workinger’s best evidence rule argument commands considerably less force than his interpretation of section 6531(6). He claims the government should not have been allowed to introduce a transcript of his deposition because the deposition had also been recorded on tape. The majority properly rejects this argument, but for the wrong reason. According to the majority, the transcripts were admissible because the deposition tapes were destroyed by their owner before trial “in the ordinary course of his business and not at the behest of the government.” Maj. op. at 1415.
I cannot join this analysis because it presupposes that the best evidence rule appbes here. It does not. The best evidence rule cabs for the introduction of “the original writing, recording, or photograph” only where the proponent seeks “[t]o prove the content of a writing, recording, or photograph.” Fed.R.Evid. 1002. Here, the government did not seek, by introducing the transcript, to prove the content of the tapes but to prove what was said at the deposition itself; Workinger admits as much. See Br. for Appellant at 17 (“The prosecution in this *1420case sought to introduce the transcript as evidence of admissions by Dr. Workinger”) (emphasis added) (citing ER 137 (the government offered testimony “to authenticate the transcript as substantive evidence of what occurred”))-3 It is true that the reporter prepared the transcript by listening to the tapes. The transcript, nevertheless, purports to reflect what was said at the deposition, not what was on the tapes.4 The best evidence rule has no application.
The majority attributes some independent significance to the tape transcript by arguing that “[a] different rule would lead to transcripts being submitted with the admonition ‘Trust me, the transcript does reflect what was taped.’ ... [This] is precisely what the best evidence rule was designed to avoid.” Maj. op. at 1415. But this hopelessly confuses the policies of the best evidence rule with those of the hearsay rule. The transcript here was admissible not because it accurately reflected the tape, but because Donald Johnson, the attorney for the defendant’s ex-wife, testified that it accurately reflected the deposition. ER at 90-92. Without this testimony from someone who was present, I’m not at all sure the transcript would have been admissible since, as the majority notes, the transcriber was not present when the testimony was given and thus could not authenticate the transcript as an accurate reflection of what was said at the deposition. See maj. op. at 1415.
And here is what I find curious about the majority opinion. In the name of ensuring the integrity of transcripts, my colleagues permit the introduction of a transcript where the intervening tape has been destroyed. Since we have no evidence of what the tape said other than the transcript itself, we really do have a situation where the secretary who transcribed the tape can tell us only “I have listened to the tape, and here is what it says.” Maj. op. at 1415.5 At the same time, the majority seems to say that, were the tape available, the best evidence rule would require its introduction in lieu of the transcript. One can only imagine the upheaval this will cause in the trial courts of the Ninth Circuit. Since virtually all transcripts are prepared from an intervening medium (an audio tape, stenograph paper, a computer tape), the clear implication of today’s opinion is that the best evidence rule precludes introduction of the transcript if the intervening medium is available. All told, I think this is a strange result and entirely unnecessary.
I join the remaining portions of the majority opinion.
. The district court found Count 7 timely based not only on section 6531(6), but also on section 6531(1). The latter provides a six-year statute of limitations "for offenses involving the defrauding or attempting to defraud the United States or any agency thereof." 26 U.S.C. § 6531(1). The government doesn’t defend this reasoning on appeal and, in fact,, with commendable candor, acknowledges the authority that shows it to be error. Br. of Appellee at 15 n. 5 (citing United States v. Grainger, 346 U.S. 235, 244, 73 S.Ct. 1069, 1074, 97 L.Ed. 1575 (1953)). The majority's discussion of the issue, maj. op. at 1413-14, is therefore superfluous.
. Because I do not believe the section is clear, it is appropriate to consult legislative history for a general understanding of what the drafters had in mind.
. The majority's statement to the contrary, maj. op. at 1414-15, isn’t accurate.
. In this case the distinction doesn't matter much, but it well could. In a case, for example, where the defendant was charged with fraudulently altering a tape, the best evidence rule might well bar the admission of the transcript to prove what was on the tape.
.Fortunately, as noted, what the tape says really doesn't matter. See note 4, supra.