dissenting.
The court’s opinion is thorough and workmanlike and deserves respect. I regret, however, that I am unable to agree on three points: (1) that the evidence was insufficient to entitle defendants to a self-defense instruction; (2) that it was not prejudicial error to exclude the portion of Castillo’s statement which explained and qualified the portion received into evidence; and (3) that the evidence sufficed to establish the predicate offense of conspiracy to murder federal officers.
I. THE FAILURE TO INSTRUCT ON SELF-DEFENSE
A The Governing Standard
Considerable confusion exists in this circuit over the precise formulation of the standard for determining whether a defendant is entitled to an instruction on a theory of defense. This court recently held that “where the district court ‘refuse[s] a charge on a defense theory for which there is an evidentiary foundation and which, if believed by the jury, would be legally sufficient to render the accused innocent,’ this court presumes that the lower court has abused his discretion.” United States v. Correa-Ventura, 6 F.3d 1070, 1076 (5th Cir.1993) (quoting United States v. Rubio, 834 F.2d 442, 446 (5th Cir.1987)). But this court has applied three different standards for what constitutes “an evidentiary foundation” requiring a self-defense instruction: (1) “any evidence” regardless of how insubstantial; (2) “substantial evidence” defined as “more than a scintilla”; and (3) “evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in [the defendant’s] favor” (the formulation adopted from Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 108 S.Ct. 883, 99 L.Ed.2d 54 (1988)).
The “any evidence” standard has been applied in this circuit since the seminal cases Perez v. United States, 297 F.2d 12 (5th Cir.1961), and Strauss v. United States, 376 F.2d 416 (5th Cir.1967). Courts have continued to apply the “any evidence” standard both before and after the Supreme Court’s decision in Mathews, on which the opinion relies.1 Other courts within the circuit have *746applied a slightly more demanding “more than a scintilla” test. See Pierce v. United States, 414 F.2d 163, 166-68 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 960, 90 S.Ct. 435, 24 L.Ed.2d 425 (1969); United States v. Groessel, 440 F.2d 602, 606 (5th Cir.1971). But those courts that have recognized the existence of the two different standards — “any evidence” and “more than a scintilla” — have found no outcome-determining difference between them. See United States v. Andrew, 666 F.2d 915, 922-24 nn. 10-11 (5th Cir.1982); United States v. Fischel, 686 F.2d 1082, 1086 n. 2 (5th Cir.1982); United States v. Leon, 679 F.2d 534, 539 n. 5 (5th Cir.1982). See also United States v. Hill, 626 F.2d 1301, 1303-04 n. 3 (5th Cir.1980) (noting that the semantic discrepancies between these two formulations have not produced disparate results in cases). Finally, there is United States v. Stowell, 953 F.2d 188, 189 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 908, 112 S.Ct. 1269, 117 L.Ed.2d 497 and cert. denied, 506 U.S. 902, 113 S.Ct. 292, 121 L.Ed.2d 217 (1992), which the court reads as explaining away the “any evidence” test based on a statement in Mathews, that “a defendant is entitled to an instruction as to any recognized defense for which there exists sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find in. his favor.” But Mathews seems to me a thin reed on which to lean that proposition.2
Whatever formulation of the standard applies here, however, defendants are entitled to an instruction on self-defense. Even under the Mathews/Stowell standard, which is arguably the most demanding of the three, there need only be sufficient evidence in the record to permit a jury to have a reasonable doubt that defendants were not acting in self-defense, this is so because, while the defendant bears the burden of production on self-defense, the government retains the burden of persuasion to prove the absence of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. See *747United States v. Alvarez, 755 F.2d 830, 842-43 & n. 12 (11th Cir.) (setting out the burden of proof for self-defense under federal criminal law), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 905, 106 S.Ct. 274, 88 L.Ed.2d 235 (1985); United States v. Johnson, 542 F.2d 230, 233-34 n. 4 (5th Cir.1976). See also Fifth Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal Cases), No. 2.51 at 137-38 (1990 ed.). As the following discussion shows, I believe, there was ample evidence to permit a jury to have had a reasonable doubt that the defendants were not acting in self-defense.
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
At the outset it is necessary to recognize that this case is about the culpability of individual defendants. The crime of which each defendant was convicted — aiding and abetting the manslaughter of federal agents — was allegedly committed by each defendant individually; it was not a group crime. Contrary to the opinion’s general approach, each defendant is entitled to individual consideration of the charges against him and his defenses. Specifically, each is entitled to individual determination of his right to a self-defense instruction. The court acknowledges as much when it holds that Castillo is not entitled to an instruction because of the evidence reflecting his conduct on the day of the gun battle,3 but the court otherwise forsakes this approach.
The first issue is whether, treating each defendant individually, there is evidence in the record showing that he was the aggressor in the gun battle. The defense of self-defense is available only to one who is “not the aggressor.” See Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law § 53 (1972). If there were evidence that any of these defendants had provoked the shooting, that evidence might disqualify that defendant from claiming a self-defense instruction. But a defendant is not required to take the stand to deny his role as an aggressor.
Here, there is no evidence thát any of the individual defendants provoked the shooting. While there is conflicting evidence as to whether the first shot came from within the compound or outside the compound, no evidence identifies any of the individual defendants as firing the first shot. In the absence of such evidence, the defendants were entitled to a self-defense instruction so long as there was enough evidence to permit a reasonable jury to have a reasonable doubt about whether the agents did not use excessive force.
The “first shot” evidence is, therefore, of limited significance. To the extent that evidence is relevant to whether any defendant was an aggressor, the court’s treatment of it goes beyond the determination of its sufficiency and engages in impermissible weighing and evaluation of its credibility.4 The opinion rejects Ballesteros’ testimony because it was contradicted at trial and Castillo’s post-arrest statement as a “self-serving, post-arrest” statement contradicted by “overwhelming” testimony of agents and media representatives and by physical facts. The evidence the opinion describes, however, portrays a scene of great complexity and confusion. Deciding who shot first based on that evidence requires a difficult factual determination that should not be made by a court of appeals, but should have been left to a jury.
The heart of the matter is whether there was sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the agents used exces*748sive force. The defendants contend that the evidence shows that agents fired indiscriminately through the windows and walls of rooms from which no gunfire originated. This contention was amply supported by the testimony of Kathryn Schroeder and Marjorie Thomas (summarized in the margin),5 who were present in the compound during the gun battle and were called at trial as government witnesses. The court rejects this evidence because it does not show that any of the defendants came under indiscriminate, unprovoked fire or knew that such fire was taking place. See supra p. 719-20. That Schroeder and Thomas might have been entitled to a self-defense instruction had they been defendants, the opinion argues, does not vicariously entitle these defendants to such an instruction.
It is difficult to accept the opinion’s contention that the testimony of Schroeder and Thomas provides no basis upon which a jury could infer that defendants knew of and were responding to excessive force. The opinion suggests that, before defendants could claim to be entitled to a self-defense instruction, Thomas or Schroeder had to tell them about the gun fire they witnessed. See supra p. 721-22. However, there is substantial evidence, recited elsewhere in the opinion, that during the gun battle the defendants were present in the same area in which Schroeder *749and Thomas were located and that the latter were close enough to observe the defendants’ activities and hear their exclamations. See supra pp. 733-35. If the evidence showed that the defendants were in the same general vicinity as Sehroeder and Thomas while a battle involving helicopters and some 76 well-armed ATF agents raged in the compound, ultimately resulting in over 30 casualties, surely that evidence was sufficient to raise an issue for the jury as to whether the defendants knew of and were responding to the random firing through walls and into windows observed by Sehroeder and Thomas.
Finally, while we can all agree, as the opinion states, that a citizen may not initiate a firefight solely on the ground that the police sent too many well-armed officers to arrest him, it is too late in the day to argue that there are no limits on the amount of force the police may use in executing warrants. The Fourth Amendment protects individuals against “the use of excessive force by a law enforcement officer even when that officer is making a lawful arrest.” United States v. Span, 970 F.2d 573, 577 n. 3 (9th Cir.1992) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394-96, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 1870-72, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989)). “[Djetermining whether force used to effect a particular seizure is ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of ‘the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests’ against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. at 1871. The opinion declares that a “dynamic entry” by 76 agents armed with 9 millimeter pistols and AR-15 semiautomatic rifles and accompanied by helicopters will not support an inference of unreasonable force. But under the court’s sweeping rationale, it would have made no difference if the agents had been supported by armored personnel carriers, or by tanks, or by suppression fire from aircraft.
In conclusion, this appeal presents no mere “lawyer’s sporting search for error” or for a “device for defendant to invoke the mercy-dispensing prerogative of the jury.” See supra p. 741. The trial judge gave a self-defense instruction in connection with the principal offense; while obviously not determinative, that shows that the person in the best position to evaluate the evidence regarded it as sufficient to warrant such an instruction. These defendants had a serious claim that the ATF used excessive force. Therefore, they were entitled to a self-defense instruction in relation to the manslaughter charge, and the trial court’s failure to give one was reversible error.
II. EXCLUSION OF A PORTION OF CASTILLO’S STATEMENT
Texas Ranger De Los Santos testified that Castillo made the following statement about the day of the battle:
That in the morning he heard someone saying that something was going to happen, so he got out of bed, put on his black clothing and an ammunition vest which held eight magazines, and picked up his AR-15. He then looked out the window and saw two cattle trailers approaching the compound. When he saw them he exited his room and went to the foyer where he saw Vernon Howell, Perry Jones, and others. Vernon Howell opened the front door and stated “Wait a minute, there’s women and children in here.” Then gunfire erupted through the door. "When the gunfire erupted, he tried to chamber a round in his AR-15, but it jammed. He then ran down the hallway, back to his room, where he got his own personal 9-millimeter Baretta pistol. He exited his room and went down the hallway toward the other end of the compound to the second to the last room, facing the front of the compound. He entered that room, where there were three other Davidians.
Following this testimony, the prosecutor asked De Los Santos questions to clarify that the room Castillo entered faced the front of the compound. The clear inference to be drawn from this testimony is that, upon entering that room, Castillo participated in the gun battle, thereby aiding and abetting the manslaughter of federal agents.
The court barred Castillo from eliciting testimony from De Los Santos about the following portion of Castillo’s statement:
*750Castillo went into the room identified as McBean, Summers, and Hipsman’s room. Castillo stated he took cover during the shooting, never firing a shot. Castillo also stated no one in his room fired a round. Castillo claims that he doesn’t know who fired a weapon inside.
See supra p. 728 (emphasis added). This excluded portion of Castillo’s statement reveals the potentially misleading nature of the admitted portions of his statement.
Under the rule of completeness embodied in Fed.R.Evid. 106, additional portions of a defendant’s statement must be admitted if they are “relevant to the issues [in the case]” and “qualify or explain the subject matter of the portion offered by the opponent....” United States v. Crosby, 713 F.2d 1066, 1074 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1001, 104 S.Ct. 506, 78 L.Ed.2d 696 (1983) (emphasis added).
Citing United States v. Smith, 794 F.2d 1333, 1335 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 938, 107 S.Ct. 419, 93 L.Ed.2d 370 (1986), the court upholds the exclusion of this portion of the testimony because it leaves Castillo’s “pick[ing] up his handgun ... unqualified and unexplained.” See supra p. 728. Smith, however, is not analogous to this case but, in fact, reveals the weakness of the court’s reasoning here.
In Smith, a police officer testified about a small portion of a defendant’s post-arrest statement that he “was present on Hamilton Street at the time of [his co-defendant’s] arrest and observed the arrest ... [and] that he owned a red or maroon bicycle.” See Smithy 794 F.2d at 1335. That statement served as a partial admission supporting the testimony of two government witnesses who placed the defendant in the vicinity of Hamilton Street at the time of his co-defendant’s arrest. Id. Additional statements the defendant sought to have admitted were: “(1) that [the defendant] had met [his co-defendant] two months earlier; (2) that five weeks before [the defendant’s] arrest [his co-defendant] asked [the defendant] if he could dispose of Anheuser-Busch stock certificates; (3) that [the defendant] never dealt in stocks; (4) that stocks were a “white boy’s game’; and (5) that he was not involved in attempting to sell the stocks and had no idea what to do with stock certificates.” None of these statements are related to the defendant’s presence on Hamilton Street at the time of his co-defendant’s arrest and, therefore, could not be said to qualify or explain the admitted portion of the statement. The only thing that could be said about the additional statements was that they were exculpatory. Thus, while Smith stands for the fact that the exculpatory nature of a statement does not alone require its admission under the Rule 106 fairness analysis, Smith does not speak to why Castillo’s statement that he took cover in the room and did not fire his gun does not qualify the statement that he picked up a gun and went into the room facing the front of the compound (the side from which much of the Davidian gunfire came) and, therefore, should have been admitted.
Instead, Smith highlights the error in not admitting Castillo’s additional statements. In Smith, the lower court affirmed the defendant’s conviction, recognizing that the trial court had allowed “Sutton to cross-examine the government agent with respect to the portion of the statement testified to, [even though] it refused to allow Sutton to cross-examine ... with respect to other portions [of his statement]_” Id. at 1335-36 (emphasis added). When de los Santos placed Castillo armed in a room facing the front of the compound where the battle was taking place, Castillo surely was entitled to cross-examine him about that portion of the statement by asking what else he said about his presence in that room.
The opinion also cites United States v. Haddad, 10 F.3d 1252 (7th Cir.1993), which is analogous to this case and supports the conclusion that the additional portion of Castillo’s statement should have been admitted. In Haddad, a police officer testified that the defendant admitted that he knew there was marijuana under the bed. The trial court, however, excluded testimony that the defendant, at the same time, had denied knowledge of a gun that was found under the bed some six inches from the marijuana. The court held the ruling to be error, saying:
*751The admission of the inculpatory portion only (i.e. that he knew of the location of the marijuana) might suggest, absent more, that the defendant also knew of the gun. The whole statement should be admitted in the interest of completeness and context, to avoid misleading inferences, and to help insure a fair and impartial understanding of the evidence.
10 F.3d at 1259 (ultimately holding that the error was not prejudicial because the same evidence was received through another witness).
Here, too, the receipt of the inculpatory portion of the statement (that Castillo went armed into a room facing the battle) required receipt of the other related portion of the statement (that he took cover and never fired a shot) to avoid misleading inferences. See, e.g., supra p. 731 (this court’s statement that “Castillo admitted that he was in a room at the front, armed with a gun, during the gun battle.”).
Castillo stood charged with murder. When de los Santos’ testimony placed Castillo where he might have fired a fatal shot, it was an abuse of discretion to preclude cross-examination to show that he had taken cover and never fired a shot.
III. SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE OF CONSPIRACY UNDER § 924(c)(1)
Defendants Branch, Whitecliff, Castillo, Avraam and Craddock were convicted under section 924(c)(1) and each was sentenced to 30 years. The predicate “crime of violence” on which this conviction was based was a conspiracy to murder federal officers. Because the jury acquitted the defendants on the conspiracy count, this court must determine whether there was sufficient evidence that each of the defendants joined the conspiracy with the requisite intent. See United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 67, 105 S.Ct. 471, 478, 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984); United States v. Ruiz, 986 F.2d 905, 911 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 848, 114 S.Ct. 145, 126 L.Ed.2d 107 (1993).
Murder is “the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought.” 18 U.S.C. § 1111. As this court said in United States v. Harrelson, 754 F.2d 1153, 1173 (5th Cir.), reh’g denied, 766 F.2d 186, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 908, 106 S.Ct. 277, 88 L.Ed.2d 241, and cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1034, 106 S.Ct. 599, 88 L.Ed.2d 578 (1985), reversing a conviction:
[Defendant] was charged ... with conspiracy to commit first degree murder; first degree murder requires the criminal intent of premeditation and malice aforethought. It was therefore incumbent upon the government to prove [defendant] had that criminal intent....
See also Ingram v. United States, 360 U.S. 672, 678, 79 S.Ct. 1314, 1319, 3 L.Ed.2d 1503 (“conspiracy to commit a particular substantive offense cannot exist without at least the degree of criminal intent necessary for the substantive offense itself.”), reh’g denied, 361 U.S. 856, 80 S.Ct. 42, 4 L.Ed.2d 96 (1959); United States v. Beil, 577 F.2d 1313, 1314-15 (5th Cir.), reh’g denied, 585 F.2d 521 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 946, 99 S.Ct. 1422, 59 L.Ed.2d 634 (1979). A leading text elaborates the point:
At the outset, it is useful to note that there are really two intents required for the crime of conspiracy. Every conspiracy involves an agreement, so it must be established that the several parties intended to agree. But such an intent is “without moral content,” and thus it is also necessary to determine what objective the parties intended to achieve by their agreement. Only if there is a common purpose to attain an objective covered by the law of conspiracy is there liability.
2 Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law § 6.4(e) (1986).
The court states that “[t]he record is replete with evidence of a conspiracy to murder federal agents and each individual defendant’s membership in that conspiracy.” But the evidence as to these defendants relating to the events of February 28 reflects at most that each, as a member of the Branch Davidi-an sect, participated in some fashion in the gun battle. There is no evidence that any of them entered into an agreement to kill federal officers, much less that any did so with premeditation and malice aforethought. That these defendants were members of the sect led by David Koresh, whose teachings *752may well have been inflammatory, and that they were present in the compound during the battle and in various ways participants in it, does not support a finding that each of them conspired to murder federal officers.
Each defendant is entitled to individual justice by means of a review of the evidence to determine whether the requisite elements of such a conspiracy have been established as to him. Failing that, their conviction of the predicate offense rests on nothing more than guilt by association.
Accordingly, I would reverse the convictions and remand for a new trial.
. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 452 F.2d 419, 422-23 (5th Cir.1971), ("The test is whether there is some evidence to support the defense theory.”); United States v. Young, 464 F.2d 160, 164 (5th Cir.1972) (defendant was "effectively deprived ... of his right 'to have presented instructions relating to a theory of defense for which there is any foundation in the evidence.' "); United States v. Taglione, 546 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1977) (citing Strauss, court stated, "Where the evidence presents a theory of defense for which there is foundation in the evidence, refusal to charge on that defense is reversible error.”); United States v. Parker, 566 F.2d 1304 (5th Cir.) ("In deciding this case we must look at the facts in the light most favorable to defendant, since defendant is entitled to jury instructions relating to a theory of defense for which there is any foundation in the evidence.”), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 956, 98 S.Ct. 1589, 55 L.Ed.2d 808 (1978); United States v. Goss, 650 F.2d 1336, 1343 (5th Cir.1981) ("We have often held that, if there is any evidentiary support whatsoever for a legal defense, and the trial court’s attention is specifically directed to that defense, the trial judge commits reversible error by refusing thus *746to charge the jury.... Because [the proposed defense] was an available defense, we must determine whether, construing the evidence most favorably to the defense, there was an underlying evidentiary foundation to support the [defendant's claim], regardless of how weak, inconsistent or dubious the evidence of [the defense] may have been.”); United States v. Washington, 688 F.2d 953 (5th Cir.1982) ("Indeed, an instruction specifically embracing the theory of the defense must be given even though the evidence underlying the defense be 'weak,' ‘insufficient,’ or ‘dubious.’ ”); United States v. Rubio, 834 F.2d 442, 446 (5th Cir.1987) (" '[I]f there is any evidentiary support whatsoever for a legal defense, and the trial court's attention is specifically directed to that defense, the trial judge commits reversible error by refusing to charge the jury.’ ”) (quoting United States v. Goss, 650 F.2d 1336, 1344 (5th Cir.1981)); United States v. Kim, 884 F.2d 189, 193 (5th Cir.1989) ("A criminal defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on a theory of the defense for which there is any foundation in the evidence.”); United States v. Cordova-Larios, 907 F.2d 40, 42 (5th Cir. 1990) ("A defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on a theory of the defense for which there is any foundation in the evidence.”).
. Mathews did not directly address the evidentia-ry standard under which a jury instruction must be given. The quoted statement was only a link in the Court's chain of reasoning, leading to a holding that a defendant is entitled to raise inconsistent defenses. See Mathews, 485 U.S. at 63, 108 S.Ct. at 886-87. But the case Mathews cites in support of the quoted statement, Stevenson v. United States, 162 U.S. 313, 16 S.Ct. 839, 40 L.Ed. 980 (1896), is instructive. See Mathews, 485 U.S. at 63, 108 S.Ct. at 886-87.
Stevenson involved a defendant who was charged with murder. The trial court refused tp give a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of manslaughter and the defendant appealed this refusal. In deciding whether the trial court erred by failing to give the instruction, the Court stated:
The evidence might appear to the court to be simply overwhelming to show that the killing was in fact murder, and not manslaughter or an act performed in self defense, and yet, so long as there was some evidence relevant to the issue of manslaughter, the credibility and force of such evidence must be for the jury, and cannot be matter of law for the decision of the court.
... A judge may be entirely satisfied from the whole evidence in the case that the person doing the killing was actuated by malice; that he was not in any such passion as to lower the grade of the crime from murder to manslaughter by reason of any absence of malice; and yet if there be any evidence fairly tending to bear upon the issue of manslaughter, it is the province of the juiy to determine from all the evidence what the condition of mind was, and to say whether the crime was murder or manslaughter.
Stevenson, 162 U.S. at 314—15, 323, 16 S.Ct. at 839, 843 (emphasis added). Stevenson illuminates the meaning of Mathews, making clear that a defendant is entitled to a defense instruction so long as it is supported by any evidence.
. The factual basis for the court's conclusion omits the undisputed evidence, erroneously excluded by the district court, that Castillo took cover during the gun battle and never fired a shot. See supra pp. 717-19.
. While the court must determine whether the requisite amount of evidence has been produced to support the instruction sought, the court may not weigh the evidence and pass on its credibility. See Pierce, 414 F.2d at 166 (“[O]nce there is [sufficient evidence to raise the defense and justify its consideration], it is the function of the jury to weigh it, and the judge cannot refuse to submit the issue merely because he thinks that the defense has little merit.”). See also Stevenson, 162 U.S. at 316, 16 S.Ct. at 840 ("If there were some appreciable evidence [to support the instruction sought], its proper weight and credibility were for the juiy,”); Strauss, 376 F.2d at 419 ("If the trial judge evaluates or screens the evidence supporting a proposed defense, and upon such evaluation declines to charge on that defense, he dilutes the defendant’s jury trial by removing the issue from the jury's consideration.”).
. Kathryn Schroeder, a government witness, testified that on the morning of February 28, 1993, she was in her room with her children watching out the window. She testified that there were no firearms in her room at that time. (R. 4455.) While watching out the window, she saw uniformed men jump out of two cattle trucks and start running up the walk with rifles pointed and held about mid-way, meaning not all the way at their shoulders. (R. 4460-63.) She testified, "Then almost immediately, I heard shots.” (R. 4462.) When she heard the shots, she got down on the floor.. (R. 4463.) "Within another five or ten seconds,” (R. 4463), or (another estimate) "about 15-20 seconds” after the initial shot, (R. 4603), shots began coming into her room. According to Schroeder's testimony, bullets came through her window and walls, (R. 4602, 4663, 4665-66), from the top of the window to the bottom as well as through the comer of the window and wall, (R. 4603, 4464); about a half dozen shots came through the window, (R. 4464); and dogs were shot in front of her room, (R. 4602, 4665-66). She testified that after the onset of the gunfire she and her children got down on the floor and she had her children lie under the beds. (R. 4464.) According to her testimony, Schroeder never fired a shot during this time, (R. 4665-66), and no one else fired from her room either, (R. 4602-03). Schroeder testified that after she was on the floor she heard the gunfire going on and on. (R. 4465.) As the gunfire continued, she was able to tell which bullets were coming from outside and which were coming from inside. (R. 4465.) She feared for her life so she stayed on the floor. (R. 4602.) Eventually, Brad Branch came in and asked if they had a man and/or a gun in the room. When they said no, he said they had to get out because it was not safe there. (R. 4466.)
Similarly, Marjorie Thomas, also a government witness, testified (by video deposition) that, on the morning of the 28th, she went into her room and saw her friends looking out the window. (Transcript of redacted video deposition at pp. 28-29.) Thomas joined them at the window and saw three helicopters approaching. As the helicopters drew nearer, she heard a sound. Then bullets began coming through the window, shattering the blinds. (Tr. 30-31.) Thomas explained in her testimony that she saw the helicopter first and then heard a shot, (Tr. 181), but she did not know if the shot came from the helicopter. (Tr. 197.) She saw a man hanging from the helicopter, but could not tell if he was armed. (Tr. 200.) She just knew that the first shot she heard came from outside. (Tr. 181.) Thomas testified that the gunfire coming into the room shattered the window and left a bullet hole above the window near the ceiling. (Tr. 145.) She testified that when she saw the helicopter and heard the shots, she thought they were all in danger of being killed. (Tr. 87-88.) She and the other women dived to the floor to avoid the bullets flying overhead. (Tr. 30-31.) After they were on the floor, someone called up from the second floor to hand over their guns; three of the women in the room had guns present. (Tr. 32.) Thomas testified, however, that when the women were looking out the window before the gunfire started, they were not firing weapons or sticking anything out of the window. (Tr. 197.) When the person called up from the second floor asking for the guns, the women retrieved the guns from the floor, the bed, and beside the bed. They then passed the guns, along with ammunition vests, down to the lower floor. Thomas testified that she did not see who received the guns. (Tr. 33-34.) After passing the guns and ammunition to the lower floor, the women remained in the loft. Thereafter, someone called for them to come down to the second floor because it was not safe for them to be in the loft. At that time they all went to the second floor where Thomas saw many women and children on the floor close together, almost on top of each other. (Tr. 35.) Thomas testified that they remained on the ground during the shooting. Bullets were flying everywhere and they feared for their lives. Thomas testified that, during this time, she did not see anyone on the floor near her shooting out at the agents. (Tr. 116-19.)