dissenting.
The court’s opinion repeals, insofar as the United States is concerned, the $500,000 malpractice general damages cap that-the South Dakota Supreme Court has just told us “remains in full force and effect.” Knowles v. United States, 544 N.W.2d 183, 204 (S.D. 1996) (Gilbertson, J., writing for the majority on revival of the earlier statute). From this result, I dissent.
The issue in this appeal is whether the liability for any alleged negligence of an Air Force medical services specialist (under civilian parlance, a “nurse’s aide”) is capped under that revived statute. The South Dakota statute mentions neither the position of med-' ieal services specialist nor nurse’s aide.. A hospital, as noted by the court, is, however, a beneficiary of the limits established by the South Dakota Act. This includes a military hospital. See Lozada v. United States, 974 F.2d 986, 987 (8th Cir.1992) (applying Nebraska damages cap statute to a military hospital).
The court, quoting our earlier opinion in this same case, Knowles v. United States, 29 F.3d 1261, 1265 (8th Cir.1994), states that the United States “is ‘standing in the shoes’ ” of the medical 'services specialists, the government employees purportedly guilty of culpable conduct in the treatment of Kris Knowles. Supra at 1150. While the “standing in the shoes” metaphor may be a handy illustration for some purposes, it is only an *1152illustration and is not an accurate statement of the law under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680. The FTCA allows the United States to assume liability for the negligence of its employees under a theory of respondeat superior, much as a private employer would under ordinary-tort law. Accordingly, it may only “step into the shoes” of the hospital as the employer of allegedly negligent staff.1 It may not step into the shoes of the negligent employee.
Analysis of this case must begin with a rudimentary examination of the Federal Tort Claims Act, under which this suit is brought. The FTCA provides for a limited waiver of the United States’ absolute immunity from suit. Under the FTCA, the United States, subject to specific exceptions not applicable here, has statutorily waived its sovereign immunity and voluntarily assumed liability for the wrongful act of an “employee” while “within the scope of his office or employment.” 28 U.S.C. § 2672. Similarly, the jurisdictional counterpart to the FTCA limits liability to “claims ... for money damages ... for injury ... caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (emphasis added). The FTCA explicitly excludes-liability of the government for the negligent actions of independent contractors. 28 U.S.C. § 2671. It also excludes liability of the government under any theory involving managerial agents or officers empowered to act on behalf of the United States in a policy-making capacity. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).2 Thus, by its very terms, FTCA liability is limited to responsibility under the theory of respondeat superi- or.
Phrases such as “scope of employment” and “employees acting within the scope of their employment” are conspicuous in the statute. This is the language of respondeat superior. Indeed, the Knowles’s complaint is replete with this terminology.3 These terms of art are borrowed from the common law of torts and agency. To that effect, for purposes of the FTCA the common law of torts .and agency defines the distinction between an independent contractor (for whose torts the government is not responsible), a policy-making agent (for whose torts the govern*1153ment is not responsible) and a servant (for whose torts the government is responsible). B & A Marine Co. v. American Foreign Shipping Co., 23 F.3d 709, 713 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 421, 130 L.Ed.2d 336 (1994); see also Toole v. United States, 588 F.2d 403, 407 n. 4 (3d Cir.1978). “Employee” in the statute is to be read as having the same general meaning as “servant” in the body of law relating to respondeat superior. United States v. Becker, 378 F.2d 319, 321 (9th Cir.1967). Thus, courts consult a state’s applicable law of respondeat superi- or to determine “scope of employment” under the FTCA. See, e.g., Heuton v. Anderson, 75 F.3d 357, 360 (8th Cir.1996); Walsh v. United States, 31 F.3d 696, 699 (8th Cir.1994) (both applying Iowa respondeat superior law). And, it is hornbook law that liability under respondeat superior theory is vicarious, and not direct, liability. W. Page Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 69, at 499 (5th ed. 1984). See also Sterling v. United States, 85 F.3d 1225, 1229 (7th Cir.1996) (the FTCA creates vicarious liability).
The FTCA also provides that the United States is liable “in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances,” 28 U.S.C. § 2674, or “under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). “Private person or individual” includes such entities as corporations, municipal corporations, and hospitals. See, e.g., Lozada, 974 F.2d at 989 (military hospital). Moreover, there need not be an actual “private party” under like circumstances as the United States; the statute merely requires us to analogize to a hypothetical private party under “like circumstances.” Bush v. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 927 F.2d 445, 452 (9th Cir.1991). In this context, the “hypothetical private party” is analogous to a private employer. See, e.g., Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, — U.S. -,-, 115 S.Ct. 2227, 2229, 132 L.Ed.2d 375 (1995) (people injured in automobile accident suing driver and driver’s employer/government agency); United States v. Smith, 499 U.S. 160, 162, 111 S.Ct. 1180, 1183, 113 L.Ed.2d 134 (1991) (injured patient suing doctor and doctor’s employer/Army hospital).
Although the waiver of sovereign immunity extends to torts committed by government employees, the FTCA grants total immunity to employees for torts committed in the course of their employment. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1), (d)(2) (also called the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 or the Westfall Act).4 The FTCA further provides that the United States “shall be- entitled to assert any defense based upon judicial or legislative immunity which otherwise would have been available to the employee of the United States whose act or omission gave rise to the claim.” 28 U.S.C. § 2674. One of these sources of legislative immunity is the West-fall Act. Another is the Gonzalez Act, 10 U.S.C. § 1089 (also called the Medical Malpractice Immunity Act).5 These statutes *1154confer absolute immunity on Government employees for liability for acts committed in the course of employment. Both grants of immunity are available to the medical services specialist in this case.6
Discussing the Westfall Act, the court asserts that the United States has “removed liability from its employees and placed it on itself’ and thus is “liable to the same extent the employee would have been absent immunity from suit.” Supra at 1150. This is not a correct statement of the law. The government has waived its immunity with respect to acts of its employees acting within the “scope of [their] office or employment,” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), so as to be liable to the same extent that private employers are held liable under state law for the acts and omissions of their employees. Fair v. United States, 234 F.2d 288, 294 (5th Cir.1956) (emphasis added). Thus, as defendant, the United States is liable only under a statutorily-imposed re-spondeat superior theory. See Gutierrez de Martinez, — U.S. at-, 115 S.Ct. at 2229 (“[generally, such eases unfold much as. cases do against other employers who concede respondeat superior liability”). Congress intended this statutory scheme to immunize employees from a particular type of claim — the sort of wrongdoing for which employers, typically, are vicariously liable under principles of respondeat superior. Wood v. United States, 995 F.2d 1122, 1125 (1st Cir. 1993) (en banc).7
Thus, the crucial question in most Federal Tort Claims Act cases becomes whether an individual is acting within the scope of his or her employment.8 Scope of employment sets the line: if an employee is inside the line, he is not subject to suit; if he is outside the line, he may be personally liable. Gutierrez de Martinez, —- U.S. at-, 115 S.Ct. at 2231. For negligence committed by those inside the line, the United States is the only available defendant, and then only to the extent permitted by the FTCA Id. The Supreme Court has made it clear under these statutes that federal employees are immune from liability even if substitution of the United States as defendant leaves the plaintiff without a remedy. Smith, 499 U.S. at 166, 111 S.Ct. at 1185 (“Congress recognized that the required substitution of the United States as defendant in tort suits filed against Government employees would sometimes foreclose a tort plaintiff’s recovery altogether.”).9
The effect of the statutory scheme in the present case is that the United States steps into the shoes of the hospital, as employer, under respondeat superior theory. The government cannot stand in the shoes of a negligent federal employee, individually, because the employee is immune from suit.10 Here, *1155because of the malpractice damages cap, the amount that Kris Knowles.can recover under imputed liability may be less than he might have been able to recover under the medical services specialist’s direct liability, if any. The trade-off for that, however, is his ability to sue the United States which is ordinarily immune from suit.
The court’s approach ignores “course of employment” language in the FTCA and Westfall and Gonzalez Acts. The court effectively writes the “course of employment” language right out of these statutes. This language can mean nothing else but that the United States is vicariously liable.
In conclusion, contrary to the court’s holding, the United States cannot step into the shoes of the medical services specialist individually — he or she is immune from suit. Instead, the plaintiff has an action, under a federal statutory grant of authority, against the medical services specialist’s employer, the United States. Because that employer, the sole source of liability, is a hospital, the damages cap applies. I would remand this case for entry of judgment against the United States in the amount of $500,000 in general damages and for a determination of other damages not subject to the statutory limitation.
. Concededly, if a private employer were involved, the liability of the employee, here the medical services specialist, would not be extinguished just because the employer is also liable. See generally W. Page Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 69, at 499 (5th ed. 1984) ("all that the law [of respondeat superior] has done is to broaden the liability for that [employee’s] fault by imposing it upon an additional, albeit innocent, defendant.”).
. An employer’s liability for the acts of an employee can come in two distinct forms that are sometimes confused: master/servant (employer) liability and principal/agent (principal) liability. When an employee negligently drives a vehicle on company business and injures another, the doctrine of respondeat superior is applicable even though negligent driving is not company policy. The employee negligence is imputed to the employer. On the other hand, principal/agent liability involves managerial acts by an individual (such as a corporate president) empowered by the employer (such as - through a corporate board of directors) to create and implement the employer's policy decisions. These are considered direct acts of the employer. See generally Restatement (Second) of Agency § 217 C (1958) and Restatement (Second) of Torts § 909 (1979) (regarding imposition of punitive damages for managerial acts). The discretionary act exemption of the FTCA, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a), shields the United States from liability in these situations. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 36, 73 S.Ct. 956, 968, 97 L.Ed. 1427 (1953) (discussing discretionary function exemption: "where there is room for policy judgment and decision there is discretion”). In any event, medical service specialists, are not, under any stretch of the imagination, policy-making officers or employees with discretionary authority, whatever theory of employer/employee liability you may wish to apply.
.In the complaint, the Knowleses allege that the United States is liable for the wrongful acts of its employees, i.e., hospital personnel. Specifically, they allege that the United States, "through its agents and employees, all acting within the scope of their agency and employment," allowed the temperature of Kris Knowles room to fall to such a level as to cause hypothermia; that its "agents and employees ... should have known that the temperature posed a hazard to newborn infants;" that the United States, "through its hospital staff,” was told of the intolerable cold temperatures. Plaintiffs further allege that the United States, “by and through its hospital staff and employees," failed to monitor or to report the newborn's low body temperature and that the “hospital staff and employees, including its physicians, nurses and other attendants,” knew or should have known the infant was becoming hypothermic.
. The Westfall Act was enacted in response to the holding in Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292, 297, 108 S.Ct. 580, 584, 98 L.Ed.2d 619 (1988), that government employees were absolutely immune only from state-law tort liability for acts that were both within the scope of their employment and discretionary in nature. The Westfall decision effectively denied most federal employees immunity from lawsuits against them personally for torts committed in the scope of employment. It narrowed the respondeat superior liability of the United States while shifting the liability to the employees individually.
Through the Westfall Act, Congress legislatively overruled the Westfall decision. Nasuti v. Scannell, 906 F.2d 802, 804 (1st Cir.1990). The Act provides a federal employee with absolute immunity from an ordinary tort suit if the suit arises out of acts performed within the scope of employment. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1). Thus, an action against the United States is the only remedy for injuries caused by federal employees acting within the scope of their employment. Anthony v. Runyon, 76 F.3d 210, 212-13 (8th Cir. 1996).
. Like the Westfall Act, the Gonzalez Act was passed in response to a decision, Henderson v. Bluemink, 511 F.2d 399 (D.C.Cir.1974), that expanded the tort liability of military physicians. Smith, 499 U.S. at 170 n. 11, 111 S.Ct. at 1187 n. 11. The Gonzalez Act provides protection against malpractice liability to any military "physician, dentist, nurse, pharmacist, or paramedical or other supporting personnel” for any negligent or wrongful acts committed while acting within the scope of duties.or employment. 10 U.S.C. § 1089(a). The meaning of the act is *1154clear: a suit against the United States is the only remedy for malpractice of military medical personnel. Jones v. Newton, 775 F.2d 1316, 1318 & n. 1 (5th Cir.1985) (per curiam).
. The more generous immunity'available under the Westfall Act is available to those federal employees previously covered by other immunity statutes such as the Gonzalez Act. See United States v. Smith, 499 U.S. 160, 173, 111 S.Ct. 1180, 1188, 113 L.Ed.2d 134 (1991).
. The Wood case has been criticized on grounds not relevant to this discussion. Heuton v. Anderson, 75 F.3d 357, 360 (8th Cir.1996).
. The FTCA includes a certification procedure to determine whether the employee is in the scope of employment. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d). Under this procedure, the Attorney General certifies that a government employee was in the scope of employment at the time of the actionable act or omission. Id. Once certified, the employee is absolutely immune from suit for actions in the course and scope of employment. As far as- the record shows, such certification in this case apparently took place at the administrative claim level.
. The court argues that the availability of supplanted liability is a crucial factor in conferring Westfall Act immunity. Supra at 1150. As the Smith case makes clear, the availability of another remedy is of no concern. Smith, 499 U.S. at 166, 111 S.Ct. at 1185. The plaintiffs in Smith were left completely without a remedy because the United States had not waived its immunity for the negligence of military doctors on foreign soil and the doctors themselves were immune from suit under the Westfall Act. Id.
. A case that-illustrates the exclusivity of this statutorily-imposed respondeat superior action is Ezekiel v. Michel, 66 F.3d 894 (7th Cir.1995). In that case, a Veterans Administration (VA) nurse sued a VA resident physician for a needle prick that resulted in hepatitis. Because the doctor was found to be a federal employee under the FTCA, substitution of the United States as defendant was required. Id. at 901, 904. The case was subject to dismissal after substitution. Id. at *1155901. Contrary to the court’s assertion, supra at 1150, the case against the doctor, individually, was not dismissed because FECA provided the exclusive remedy, but because he was immune from suit under the Westfall Act, leaving the United States (the nurse’s employer) as the only defendant. Ezekiel, 66 F.3d at 897 (if Dr. Michel was a federal employee, then the Westfall Act would nullify Ezekiel's claim against Dr. Michel). The fact that federal worker's compensation (FECA — the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101 et seq.) provided a remedy was not dispositive. Indeed, absence of another means of recovery does not affect Westfall Act immunity. Supra at 1154 n. 9. Just as direct recovery against Dr. Michel was barred in Ezekiel, Kris Knowles’s recovery is limited in this case.