concurring:
I agree with the result reached by the majority, and therefore join in the judgment, but I must disagree with my colleagues’ conclusion that the district court erred in overturning the state trial judge’s finding that a factual basis was established before the entry of petitioner’s guilty plea. Although the state court’s factual determination is presumed to be correct, that presumption is clearly rebutted here.1 The state court’s conclusion that the factual basis for petitioner’s plea had been established during the guilty plea colloquy is refuted by the transcript of the sentencing hearing as well as other circumstances in this record. However, for the reasons set forth in part II B of the majority’s opinion, I agree that the failure to fully establish the factual basis for a *1156guilty plea in violation of Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 319(a) is not by itself a basis for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.2
On October 21, 1981, Philip Meyers pleaded guilty to second degree murder in the Court of Common Pleas in Bucks County Pennsylvania. Subsequently, on November 9, 1981, the trial judge sentenced petitioner to life imprisonment without parole. Nearly ten years later, the judge determined that the colloquy he administered when he accepted petitioner’s guilty plea included the complete factual basis for the plea.
Yet, three weeks after entry of the guilty plea, at the sentencing hearing that was held in November, Assistant District Attorney Raymond McHugh, began his presentation to the court as follows:
Your Honor, we are here on Criminal Information 2854 of 1981 in which defendant Philip Meyers has already entered a plea of second degree murder. We are here to establish the factual basis of that plea, (emphasis supplied).
App. at 5. McHugh then proceeded to offer the testimony of Bucks County Detective John Mullin. Mullin testified that he investigated the death of Hugh Daily; interrogated and arrested Meyers; and took a broad, inculpatory statement from the petitioner. Id. at 6-7. He testified as to the findings of the Commonwealth’s autopsy report and an additional statement Meyers gave to Detective Gilbert Bush conceding an intent to rob the victim. Id. at 8-9. Finally, McHugh inquired whether Mullin’s investigation indicated that Meyers committed the murder of Daily on July 13, 1981. Mullin said it did. Id. at 9-10.
Thus, I conclude that the district court was correct in finding that the factual basis for petitioner’s plea was not established during the guilty plea colloquy, despite both the trial judge’s finding to the contrary, and the presumption to which that finding is entitled. To conclude otherwise, as the majority does today, means that the trial judge sat silently as the prosecutor misstated the status of the record, and then allowed the prosecutor to call witnesses whose testimony would have been redundant, unnecessary and a waste of precious time. It means that the trial judge did not interrupt as the prosecutor introduced evidence to establish facts which the prosecutor now argues had already been established during the guilty plea colloquy. Especially in light of the Ingram line of cases set forth above at n. 2, I cannot imagine that the trial judge would not only fail to interrupt McHugh’s bald statement of purpose at the beginning of the sentencing hearing (i.e., “we are here to establish the factual basis ... ”) but permit the full-blown presentation of a factual basis more than three weeks after acceptance of the guilty plea if it were not necessary to allow that testimony to proceed.
My colleagues unquestioningly accept the Commonwealth’s gratuitous suggestion that the prosecutor was “merely supplementing” the factual basis at sentencing. Maj. Op. at 1150-51. I cannot agree. The prosecutor’s announced intent to “merely supplement” the factual basis, is clearly belied by the unqualified statement of purpose (i.e., “we are here to establish the factual basis ... ”) and the comprehensive nature of the testimony he then presented. The testimony at the November 9, 1981 sentencing, would — by itself — likely suffice as a factual basis for peti*1157tioner’s guilty plea. I conclude that is why it was offered. Indeed, even if the prosecutor did merely supplement the factual basis as the majority surmises, petitioner should still have been asked whether he was admitting the assertions contained in the new testimony. Clearly, in Pennsylvania, a prosecutor cannot obtain a valid guilty plea by having a defendant admit to some facts during a guilty plea colloquy and then “supplement” the colloquy with additional facts at the sentencing in the belief that the defendant’s prior plea will also carry over to things he may not have admitted to that were elicited for the first time at a sentencing hearing. Moreover, even if the prosecutor felt it necessary to “merely supplement” the record at the sentencing, that very determination — unchallenged by the trial judge — further undermines the trial judge’s finding that Meyers received “the most complete colloquy required by law.” Maj. Op. at 1149-50. Either the prosecutor did not agree that the prior colloquy was all that complete or he was willing to waste the court’s time, his own time, his witness’ time, and the defense attorneys’ time by putting on evidence that he knew was unnecessary.
Further, I think the district court was correct in not placing great significance in the fact that the trial judge invested 30 minutes in petitioner’s guilty plea colloquy.3 A 30 minute colloquy for a criminal offense, especially one requiring life imprisonment without parole, does not support the conclusion that this petitioner received “the most complete colloquy ...” Maj. Op. at 1149-50. Likewise, the prosecutor’s form that was checked off as the petitioner was asked “all of the required questions”, see id. at 1150, certainly does not establish that the mandated, defense-specific evidence was presented at the time of the plea. It merely corroborates that the required questions were asked, not that the required information was provided petitioner. If asking “all of the required questions” has the effect now urged upon us by the Commonwealth, I am even more at a loss to know why so much valuable time was consumed with establishing a factual basis at the sentencing hearing. Thus, the prosecutor’s assertion at this late date that “there was nothing [he] could think of to [suggest adding to the colloquy]” is less than persuasive. Maj. Op. at 1150-51.
Ultimately, only the recollections of the trial judge himself and attorneys McHugh and Kastendieck — each furnished more than seven years after the October 21, 1981 plea proceeding — support the finding that a complete factual basis was articulated before the plea was accepted. Defense counsel Neifield testified that she did not recall the colloquy questions of October 21, 1981. App. at 49. Given the well-documented events of record, I must agree with the district court that the trial judge’s determination is simply not fairly supported by this record, and that the presumption of correctness that attaches under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is rebutted.4 As noted above, although I believe the district court’s decision to overturn the state court’s finding was correct, I do not think this entitles the petitioner to habeas relief. Accordingly, I believe that this matter must be remanded so that the district court can determine whether the plea was voluntary and intelligent. Thus, I concur in this judgment.
. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) provides, in relevant part, that a state court's factual determinations "shall be presumed to be correct, unless the applicant shall establish or it shall otherwise appear, ... that such factual determination is not fairly supported by the record ...”
. Rule 319(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure provides, in relevant part, that "[t]he judge may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, and shall not accept it unless he determines after inquiry of the defendant that the plea is voluntary and understandingly tendered. Such inquiry shall appear on the record ..." The commentary to the Rule provides that a guilty plea colloquy should inquire into the factual basis for the plea. The Pennsylvania courts have mandated that trial judges establish the factual basis for a guilty plea before it is accepted. See Commonwealth v. Ingram, 455 Pa. 198, 316 A.2d 77 (1974) (Trial judge must establish a factual basis for the plea before its acceptance); Commonwealth v. Anthony, 504 Pa. 551, 557, 475 A.2d 1303 (1984) (''pjhe court must determine whether there is a factual basis for the plea ... to prevent a plea where in fact the legal requirements have not been met.”); Commonwealth v. Manning, 263 Pa.Super. 430, 398 A.2d 212 (1979) (Presentation of the factual basis after acceptance of the guilty plea is insufficient to satisfy the requirements of Rule 319). Commonwealth v. Johnson, 242 Pa.Super. 188, 363 A.2d 1223 (1976) (by implication); Commonwealth v. Kearse, 233 Pa. Super. 489, 334 A.2d 720 (1975).
. Judge Rufe's bench notes from October 21, 1981, indicated that he began the colloquy at 2:03 p.m. and accepted the plea at 2:33 p.m. Of course, there is no notation to allow one to conclude that none of that time was consumed by the attorney and his client conferring about questions that the client may have wanted to ask his attorney at counsel table, “off the record,” or by the attorney taking time to resolve any last minute doubts that frequently arise before one pleads guilty to the charge of murder. Indeed, experience teaches that much, if not most, of the 30 minutes could have been spent in just such off-the-record conferences.
. Of course, I certainly do not doubt the integrity or veracity of the distinguished trial judge when he states that he recalls giving the most complete colloquy to petitioner. However, the judge's belief appears based not upon his specific recollection of this defendant, but upon the notes he took as to the duration of the colloquy.