Defabian Shannon challenges the sentence he received after pleading guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). For the following reasons, we vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing.
I.
On June 14, 1994, Shannon was indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (Count I) and for intimidating a witness to the possession in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1) (Count II). The court appointed Paul Barrett to represent Shannon. Mr. Barrett reached a deal with the government in which Shannon agreed to plead guilty to both counts. Thereafter a presentence report (PSR) was ordered and completed. On October 14, 1994, the government informed the district court that it intended to seek an increase in Shannon’s sentence based on evi-denee that he had committed a homicide for which he was never charged. Soon after, Mr. Barrett withdrew as Shannon’s attorney for health reasons and his colleague, Monika Neu, took on the case. Ms. Neu then filed a motion to withdraw the guilty plea, but a week later Shannon changed his mind and withdrew the motion, thus maintaining the original plea.
At a sentencing hearing held on December 15, 1994, the district judge found that Shannon’s conviction for second degree sexual assault of a child (statutory rape) was a prior crime of violence which would affect his offense level under United States Sentencing Guideline (USSG) § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A). He further found that Shannon had threatened a witness, which would also impact his offense level under USSG §§ 2J1.2(b) and 3C1.1. Finally, the judge found that Shannon had participated in an uncharged homicide, which could justify an upward departure under USSG § 4A1.3, though no decision on whether to depart upward was made at that time. The case was then recessed with sentencing to continue a few days later. In the interim, fearing the magnitude of the potential sentence, Shannon’s mother retained new counsel, Alan Eisenberg, who revived the motion to withdraw the guilty plea at the next hearing on December 19,1994. The merits of the motion were debated in further proceedings on January 18 and February 15, 1995. Concerned that Shannon had not been properly informed of his potential sentence, the court granted the motion to withdraw and set the case for trial.
Mr. Eisenberg then withdrew and Michael Holzman, Shannon’s current attorney, was appointed counsel in his stead. Mr. Holzman negotiated a new plea agreement in which Shannon pleaded guilty only to the firearm charge (Count I). Sentencing on the second plea was set for June 2, 1995 and a second PSR was ordered.
Before sentencing Shannon filed a motion to reopen the factual determinations made at the previous hearings regarding the sexual assault, intimidation of a witness (i.e., obstruction of justice), and homicide. The court denied this request, holding that its *1068prior findings were the law of the case, [R.71:p.5,7] though at the hearing the court did consider and address specific defense objections to the PSR. [Id. at 7]
The court computed Shannon’s sentence as follows: The finding that Shannon had previously been convicted of a violent felony (second degree sexual assault) increased his initial base offense level from 14 to 20. USSG § 2k2.1(a)(4). The obstruction of justice finding further increased it by two, USSG § 3C1.1, but Shannon’s willingness to accept responsibility and provide complete information to the government decreased it by three, USSG §§ 3E 1.1(a) & 3El.l(b), for a total offense level of 19. Depending on a defendant’s criminal history, an offense level of 19 yields a sentence between 30 and 78 months. Though only 22 years old, Shannon had a lengthy criminal resume that included car theft, retail theft, battery, damaging property, obstructing an officer, and sexual assault. His criminal history category therefore was computed at V, which combined with an offense level of 19 established a sentencing range of 57 to 71 months. However, there was persuasive evidence that Shannon had committed an uncharged murder, and the court decided to depart upward and impose a sentence of 115 months, five months short of the statutory maximum. See USSG § 4A1.3 (authorizing upward departure where “criminal history category does not adequately reflect the seriousness of the defendant’s past criminal conduct or the likelihood that [he] will commit other crimes”).
II.
Shannon appeals his sentence on three grounds. First, he argues the district court erred in determining that his prior conviction for statutory rape was a violent crime under the Sentencing Guidelines. Next, Shannon challenges the court’s willingness to consider and ultimately believe evidence that he participated in an uncharged homicide and its concomitant decision to depart upward from the recommended sentence. Finally, he disputes the court’s use of the doctrine of law of the case to bar reconsideration of its factual determinations on the obstruction of justice issue. We address each of these contentions in turn.
A. Whether Statutory Rape Is a Crime of Violence
Under the Sentencing Guidelines, the base offense level for the crime of possession of a firearm by a felon is dictated in part by the defendant’s criminal history. United States v. Lee, 22 F.3d 736, 737 (7th Cir.1994). If a defendant has a “prior felony conviction of ... a crime of violence,” his base offense level is 20. USSG § 2k2.1(a)(4)(A). The Sentencing Guidelines define a “crime of violence” as “any offense under federal or state law punishable by imprisonment” for more than a year that either:
(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another, or
(ii) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves the use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.
USSG § 4B1.2(1).
Shannon pleaded guilty to second degree sexual assault under Wisconsin law. Shannon denies this constitutes a conviction for a violent felony for purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines. Second degree sexual assault in Wisconsin is a statutory rape offense: ‘Whoever has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a person who has not attained the age of 16 years is guilty of a Class C felony.” Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2). By the terms of the statute, no physical force, or even the slightest threat of physical force, is necessary for a conviction; there is no “element” of force, threatened or otherwise, in the crime. That excludes the possibility that it is a crime of violence under the definition in § 4B1.2(l)(i).
Section 4B1.2(l)(u) defines a crime of violence to include a conviction for conduct that “present[ed] a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” Here the criminal complaint alleged that Shannon forced his victim into a house, dragged her down the stairs into the basement, and then raped her. If we were permitted to credit such allegations, we would obviously conclude that *1069Shannon had committed a crime of violence. But we cannot.. The Guidelines plainly limit our inquiry into whether the offense “presented a serious risk of physical injury” to “an examination of the facts charged in the relevant indictment or information.” Lee, 22 F.3d at 740.1
The information in its entirety simply stated:
[ Defendant] [i]ntentionally and feloniously had sexual intercourse with a person who had not attained the age of Sixteen (16 years), to wit: Josanthia S. Lawrence, d/o/b: 04/27/77, contrary to the form of the statute § 948.01(2), in such case made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the State of Wisconsin.
These facts standing alone do not suggest violence. They merely indicate that Shannon, who at the time was 17, had sex with a girl under the age of 16. (Because the date of birth was included, we know she was 13 years, 10 months old.) Confined to these sparse details, we cannot say Shannon’s conviction for second degree sexual assault was a conviction for a crime of violence under § 4B1.2(l)(ii).
Which leaves us with the possibility that in Wisconsin second degree sexual assault is by its nature — that is, always, without regard to circumstance — violent. Based upon his own “viewing of many sexual assault victims [and] studies done by sexual assault units,” the district judge adopted this position, concluding that second degree sexual assault poses an inherent risk of physical injury. We review this determination de novo. United States v. Bauer, 990 F.2d 373, 374 (8th Cir.1993) (‘Whether statutory rape is a violent crime is a legal, rather than a factual, determination and therefore is reviewed de novo.”).
We are unable to accept the district court’s reasoning. In United States v. Lee, the underlying facts disclosed a victim who was forcibly seized and had her coat ripped as one of three robbers took her purse. But the actual charge of conviction recited only the terms of the statute. On appeal we declined to hold that the crime of “theft from the person of another” — a crime also without an explicit element of violence — was an inherently violent offense since some such thefts, pick-pocketings for instance, can be essentially nonviolent. 22 F.3d at 740-41; cf. United States v. Smith, 10 F.3d 724, 733-34 (10th Cir.1993) (second degree burglary conviction deemed not “crime of violence”). Admittedly, second degree sexual assault is a closer case, but the problem remains that although violence often accompanies the crime (as it likely did here), it is not essential to it. Under Wisconsin law, a boy one day over the age of 16 commits second degree sexual assault by having sex with his girlfriend the night before her 16th birthday.2 Although certainly a crime in Wisconsin, like *1070pick-pocketing, such conduct is not necessarily violent. Here, Shannon was 17 and the girl 13 years, 10 months. Though both immoral and criminal, many teenagers have nonviolent, noncoereive sex with no hint of physical injury. Without something in the indictment or information suggesting otherwise, we cannot simply presume violence attends this crime.
We are aware that the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Rodriguez, 979 F.2d 138, 140-41 (8th Cir.1992), held that the defendant’s “lascivious acts with children of the tender age of ten,” one of them his own daughter, was “by its nature a crime of violence” even though no element of coercion or violence appeared in the statute. Id. at 141.3 At least three other circuits have relied on Rodriguez to reach the same conclusion where significant age disparities existed between the child and the defendant. United States v. Passi, 62 F.3d 1278, 1279, 1281-82 (10th Cir.1995) (father pleads guilty to knowingly engaging in sexual acts with 13 year old daughter on federal property and stipulates to impregnating daughter); Ramsey v. INS, 55 F.3d 580, 581, 582-83 (11th Cir.1995) (lawful permanent resident since 1976 convicted of lewd assault and attempted lewd assault of a child under 16 years in 1990 and 1993, respectively); United States v. Wood, 52 F.3d 272, 273-75 (9th Cir.1995) (19 year old defendant convicted of taking indecent liberties with 4 — 5 year old victim); United States v. Reyes-Castro, 13 F.3d 377, 378-79 (10th Cir.1993) (father pleads guilty to attempted sexual abuse of a child after initially being charged with sexually abusing 12 year old daughter);4 see also United States v. Arnold, 58 F.3d 1117, 1124 (6th Cir.1995) (facts of the indictment control “crime of violence” determination; case remanded to district eourt to determine whether indictment (missing from record) for sexual battery suggested serious potential risk of violence).
Given how easily young bodies and minds can be damaged, and in light of the coercion naturally attending sexual acts with small children, we agree with cases like Rodriguez and Wood that such conduct involves a serious potential risk of physical injury and thus may be labeled a crime of violence under the Guidelines. Wisconsin recognizes the added graveness of sexual acts with young children. Had Shannon’s victim been a 10 year old, as in Rodriguez, he could have been convicted of a much more serious offense: “(1) First degree sexual assault. Whoever has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a person who has not attained the age of 13 years is guilty of a Class B felony.” Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1). Coercion, and thus a serious potential risk of physical injury, can also be presumed where the indictment or information indicates a significant age disparity between the defendant and his victim, and especially where incest is at issue. See Passi 62 F.3d at 1279, 1281-82 (incest); Ramsey, 55 F.3d at 581, 582-83 (significant age disparity); Reyes-Castro, 13 F.3d at 378-79 (incest). But here we have neither significant age disparity nor incest; the facts specified in the indictment could have related to a violent encounter or to routine teenage sex. Again, the girl was almost 14 and Shannon 17 — a situation that is not inherently violent, whatever its legality or morality. Therefore, the district court erred in its determination that regardless of the facts specified in a criminal indictment or information, second degree sexual assault in Wisconsin is a crime of violence.
Our dissenting colleague makes several arguments why federal courts should deem see-*1071ond degree sexual assault in Wisconsin a violent felony for purposes of USSG §§ 2k2.1(a) and 4B1.2. The first argument is one of federal-state comity: because the Wisconsin legislature labeled second degree sexual assault an “assault” — as opposed to, say, “unlawful fornication” — and because it defines the crime as a “sexually violent offense” for purposes of its new civil commitment statute for sexually violent persons, see Wis. Stat. Ann. § 980.01 et seq. (West.Supp. 1995), federal courts applying the federal Sentencing Guidelines to federal convictions should consider it a crime of violence. [See Dissent at 1079.] Relying on labels like “assault” is problematic. The word “assault” in Wisconsin bears several legal meanings, not all of which entail violence. For instance, Wisconsin’s definition of “fourth degree sexual assault” encompasses even the slightest intentional sexual touching. Wis. Stat. § 940.225. A tortious assault and battery likewise can be physically harmless. See Trogun v. Fruchtman, 58 Wis.2d 569, 207 N.W.2d 297, 310 (1973) (“A battery or assault and battery in this state has been defined as an intentional contact with another which is unpermitted.”).
Wisconsin does label second degree sexual assault a “sexually violent offense” in at least one civil context. [See Dissent at 1080.] In 1993, after Shannon had pleaded guilty to second degree sexual assault, the State of Wisconsin enacted what it titled the “Sexually Violent Person Commitments” statute. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 980. (The statute was made effective June 2, 1994.) This statute created “a civil commitment procedure primarily intended to protect the public and to provide concentrated treatment to convicted sexually violent persons.” State v. Carpenter, 197 Wis.2d 252, 541 N.W.2d 105, 107 (1995). In the definition section of the statute, second degree sexual assault is labeled a “sexually violent offense.” This definition emerged out of an apparent legislative effort to identify all sex offenders who were being released from prison and who were considered “dangerous because he or she suffers from a mental disorder that makes it substantially probable that the person will engage in acts of sexual violence.” Wis. Stat. Ann. § 980.01(7). (For a comprehensive analysis of the requirements and procedures of this statute see State v. Post, 197 Wis.2d 279, 541 N.W.2d 115 (1995).) Although this definition applies only to a statute governing civil commitments (a point the Wisconsin Supreme Court relied on in Carpenter to avoid ex post facto concerns), the dissent is highly critical because we do not unequivocally apply the “sexually violent offense” label to the federal Sentencing Guidelines. Although labels in criminal codes may be useful, at least when determining who is a career criminal, this court’s determination under the Guidelines must, as a matter of federal law, be “ ‘independent of the labels employed by the various state’s criminal codes.’” Smith, 10 F.3d at 733 (quoting Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 592, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 2155, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990)).5
In short, the Guidelines dictate that federal courts applying federal sentencing provisions to defendants convicted of federal crimes should employ federal standards when determining whether a prior conviction was for a violent felony. Section 4B1.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines rejects a “label-based” approach to defining the terms “crime of violence” and “prior felony conviction,” both of which are at issue here. We have already laid out the objective federal criteria for establishing a “crime of violence.” Those for identifying a “prior felony conviction” are likewise independent of state definitions and labels. Application Note 3 for § 4B1.2 *1072states: “ Trior felony conviction’ means a prior adult federal or state conviction for an offense punishable by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, regardless of whether such offense is specifically designated as a felony and regardless of the actual sentence imposed.”6 (Emphasis added.) Thus, the Guidelines have established a uniform federal approach for determining whether a prior state or federal conviction was for a violent felony. That approach is nevertheless respectful of the diverse criminal laws of the various states. The severity of the potential punishment, which will vary widely from state to state, is key to identifying a prior felony conviction; and the elements of a state-defined offense often dictate whether the crime will be considered violent. The Guidelines merely specify one set of state-created criteria (length of sentence, elements of the crime, etc.) over another (felony vs. misdemeanor label, violent vs. nonviolent label, etc.) for determining when federal courts must deem state convictions prior violent felonies. It strikes us that under the dissent’s approach a state could designate as “nonviolent” a crime that objectively “presented a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” USSG § 4B1.2(l)(ii). Would federal courts be bound by that designation to impose a lesser sentence for a subsequent federal crime? We think not. Regardless of whether a state labels as “violent” a crime that the Guidelines’ analysis would denominate “nonviolent,” or vice versa, federal courts are only bound to consider those factors that the Guidelines specify.
One primary goal of the Guidelines is uniformity. As the Tenth Circuit noted in United States v. Brunson, 907 F.2d 117 (10th Cir.1990), were we to rely on state law to determine when a state felony conviction may be classified as a crime of violence under § 4B1.2, “the uniformity in sentencing the Guidelines [were] intended to ensure would be jeopardized. Criminals with similar records might receive vastly different sentences [for a federal crime] simply because their past [state] crimes were defined differently by different states.” Id. at 121. The court concluded that “uniformity in sentencing may best be achieved by applying the Guidelines without strict reference to state criminal law definitions,” noting that “not even the question of whether a prior state conviction constitutes a felony under § 4B1.1 is to be determined by state law.” Id. Surely Wisconsin’s definition of second degree sexual assault under a civil statute should not be allowed to dictate this court’s application of § 4B1.2. We are aware of no case authority suggesting otherwise.
The dissent also disagrees with our holding that second degree sexual assault is not inherently a crime of violence. [See Dissent at 1078.] We join our colleague’s concern about the psychological, social, and moral damage caused by sex between teenagers. But the reality is that much teen sex (as opposed to sex between a full adult and a young child or teen) does not involve a serious risk of physical injury. Wisconsin makes a felon out of anyone, presumably even those under 16, who has sex with another under 16. A statute of such sweep inevitably criminalizes some nonviolent behavior, belying the possibility that the crime is inherently violent. Prosecutors may use their discretion and not bring criminal charges against two minors who engaged in “consensual” sex, but their conduct nevertheless violates state law. Conduct constituting second degree sexual assault cannot automatically be considered violent within the meaning of § 4B1.2.
Nor does the dissent’s reliance on lack of legal consent save its inherently violent argument. [See Dissent at 1083-1084.] In Wisconsin, a minor’s inability to consent to sex is a legal fiction, not a fact. The Wisconsin courts have made that abundantly clear.7 *1073Federal courts are not bound by a legal fiction (one that Wisconsin’s courts at times discard) to declare contrary to reality that all sex — regardless of age disparity — involving someone under the age of 16 entails a serious risk of physical injury. Moreover, the dissent’s consent argument proves too much. A victim’s lack of consent cannot alone define a crime of violence, otherwise virtually all crimes, from Lee’s purse snatching to embezzlement, would be crimes of violence.
Finally, the dissent advocates overruling Lee on the ground that it unnecessarily constrains the sentencing judge to the information or indictment, potentially permitting someone like Shannon to receive a lighter sentence than he deserves. [See Dissent at 1086 et seq.] The dissent believes the sentencing judge should be able to consider the allegations contained in the criminal complaint, whether or not they are proven. The crux of the controversy centers on the proper interpretation of USSG § 4B1.2(1), Application Note 2, which states, in part, that a sentencing court looks to “the conduct set forth (i.e., expressly charged) in the count of which the defendant was convicted” in determining whether a prior crime was violent. We agree with Lee and many of the other circuits which have addressed the issue that in light of the concerns behind Note 2, this language is best read as constraining the senteneer to consideration of the conduct set forth in the indictment or information. See supra, note 1; see also Fitzhugh, 954 F.2d at 254 (“[T]he [Sentencing] Commission has repudiated [our eases] which held that a sentencing court can look beyond the face of the indictment in considering this issue.”).
The wisdom of this constraint is manifest in the present case. Shannon pleaded guilty to an information accusing him of having sex with a girl under the age of 16 who, the record suggests, was a former girlfriend with whom he had once been sexually active. He did not plead guilty to the allegations of violence in the criminal complaint; he vigorously denied that he forced the girl to have sex. But of course, there was no point in contesting the allegations because violence and lack of consent are irrelevant to a statutory rape conviction. The information that Shannon pleaded guilty to states only the facts necessary to satisfy the elements of the crime of second degree sexual assault, and nothing more. Under Lee, a federal court determining whether this constitutes a prior conviction for a crime of violence has only to look at the facts specified in the information and conduct the relatively straightforward analysis of § 4B1.2(1). But open the criminal complaint and consider its unproven allegations and, as the dissent indicates, defendants like Shannon will be entitled to call witnesses to rebut the accusations. Yet that is the very thing the most recent version of Application Note 2 was intended to preclude. Lee, 22 F.3d at 739-40. The inquiry necessary to resolve the factual disputes arising out of the potentially sweeping allegations of a criminal complaint would likely plunge the sentencing court into the very “elaborate fact finding process” the Supreme Court discouraged in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 601, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 2159, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990). We believe it is preferable to maintain the approach established in Lee and followed by most of the other circuits.
We acknowledge that in some states the criminal complaint may be the only charging document, even for felonies. [See Dissent at 1088.] How to proceed in such situations given Lee is unclear in the abstract. Obviously the sentencing court must review some charging document. What steps will be necessary to avoid the mini-trial the Guidelines clearly intended to foreclose is not apparent from our present vantage point. Without the benefit of briefing on this issue, we leave the matter for another day. For now it is enough that under the facts of this case Lee’s holding remains valid.
*1074 B. Upward Departure for Uncharged Murder
Though never charged or arrested, the district court found that in 1991 Shannon murdered Randi Majors in cold blood on a Racine, Wisconsin street. On that basis, the court departed upward from the Sentencing Guidelines, increasing Shannon’s sentence to 115 months from a Guidelines maximum of 71. Shannon challenges the factual basis of this decision. The evidence for the murder was substantial, though perhaps not enough to convince a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, which may explain why Shannon was not prosecuted. No matter. For sentencing purposes, the government only had to prove the crime by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Walls, 80 F.3d 238, 241 (7th Cir.1996); McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91 [106 S.Ct. 2411, 2418-19, 91 L.Ed.2d 67] (1986). On appeal we review the district court’s finding for clear error. United States v. Willey, 985 F.2d 1342, 1349 (7th Cir.1993).
At the hearing, Christal Lee, Shannon’s erstwhile girlfriend and the mother of his daughter, testified that very soon after Majors was slain Shannon described to her the deed in great detail. She maintained Shannon bragged about shooting Majors in the back of the head. (Majors was in fact shot in the back of the head.) Shannon also gave Lee important details about his efforts to escape detection. He said he threw the gun into a lake and immediately returned to a party so he would have an alibi, and that he spent about an hour scrubbing gunpowder off his hands. Then at one point in their conversation, Shannon referred to a corner on State Street in Racine as “my corner,” leaving Lee with the impression that the killing had occurred on State Street — which was true. Lee testified she warned Shannon not to talk about the killing and that later Shannon issued the same warning to her accompanied by a threat to kill her or take her daughter if she talked. Cross-examination did not reveal any important inconsistencies in Lee’s account.
Next, Bennie Nunn, the victim’s cousin, testified that he was walking alongside Majors when two men came upon them from behind, shot Majors in the back of the head, and fled. Nunn claimed that from a distance of about two feet, he clearly saw the face of one of the killers when the man turned to look at him before running away. Cross-examination revealed that Nunn’s statements to the police immediately following the shooting did not point to Shannon. Nunn described the killer as an Hispanic (Shannon is black) and picked another man out of a photo lineup. However, Nunn testified that later, while incarcerated in a Wisconsin State prison, he recognized Shannon as the killer because of Shannon’s distinctive “floating” eye. Apparently a botched childhood cataract surgery left Shannon blind in his left eye. Nunn reported this to the Racine Police Department.
Finally, the government submitted a statement given by Ben Anderson to the Racine Police Department about ten months after Majors was murdered in which Anderson claimed Shannon admitted to the murder. Anderson refused to testify at the sentencing hearing claiming he was afraid for his life. At the hearing Shannon’s attorney disparaged Anderson’s absence and questioned the statement’s probative value.
For its part, the defense first called Sa-Rhonda Shannon, Shannon’s little sister, to testify that contrary to an earlier statement by Lee, she was not in the car when her brother allegedly told Lee about the murder. In her testimony, Lee admitted she had been mistaken on that point. SaRhonda also testified that she was unaware of threats made by Shannon to Lee. Next, Shannon’s mother, Margaret Smith, testified that Lee was not afraid to leave her daughter with Shannon and that even after his confession Lee still wanted to marry him. This presumably was intended to cast doubt on Lee’s testimony that she feared Shannon after he threatened to kill her if she talked. It appears that the defense also submitted a statement by one Joyce Logan, an eyewitness to the shooting, indicating that two men ran away from the murder scene and that one was an Hispanic male. Like Nunn, Logan twice failed to pick Shannon out of a photographic lineup. The government countered this by noting that Logan had previously named the offender as *1075“Fabian,” the son of “Margaret Shannon, a black female.”
After reviewing all the evidence and observing the demeanor of the various witnesses, the district court found that the accounts of the government witnesses were essentially consistent with the known facts about Shannon and the murder and that neither Lee nor Nunn had any incentive to fabricate their stories; indeed, as the mother of his child, Lee had several reasons to he on Shannon’s behalf. The district judge indicated he was impressed by the detail Lee gave of the murder and Shannon’s actions in its aftermath. Further, testimony from Shannon’s sister and mother did nothing to undermine the evidence against him. Conceding the evidence was not overwhelming, the court nevertheless concluded that the preponderance of the evidence indicated Shannon was involved in the shooting.
This determination was not clearly erroneous. The evidence against Shannon included an eyewitness account and Shannon’s own admissions as reported by a former girlfriend and mother of his daughter. Virtually no countervailing evidence was presented on Shannon’s behalf, just a few snipes at the details of the opposing witnesses’ accounts. The credibility of the government’s witnesses was obviously critical to the court’s determination. Thus, it is significant that the court explicitly found them credible. We owe the credibility findings of a district court “particular deference” because of its “unique opportunity to hear testimony and observe the demeanor of the witnesses.” United States v. McNeal, 77 F.3d 938, 946 (7th Cir.1996); United States v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1093, 1096 (7th Cir.1990). In short, credible evidence indicated Shannon’s guilt and essentially none supported his innocence. We have no reason to upset the district court’s finding on this matter.
C. Law of the Case Doctrine
Prior to sentencing on his second plea agreement, Shannon moved the district court to reopen the factual determinations reached at the December 15 sentencing hearing under the first plea agreement. The court declined, invoking the doctrine of law of the ease. On appeal, Shannon attacks this ruling as it relates to the obstruction of justice finding.
At the December 15 sentencing hearing, the government sought an eight-level increase in the offense level for the obstruction of justice count (Count II) based on evidence that Shannon had “threaten[ed] to cause physical injury to a person ... in order to obstruct the administration of justice.” USSG § 2J1.2(b). The government also sought a two-level increase for the same conduct under § 3C1.1 for the gun charge (Count I). The district judge reviewed the PSR and heard arguments from both sides regarding the report’s reliability and coherence on the obstruction issue. The first PSR stated that while Shannon was in custody for illegal possession of a gun, he and a friend, JoAnne Berryhill, via a three-party telephone call, tried to convince a witness to ignore a subpoena and refuse to testify against Shannon. When despite their efforts the witness said she would testify, Shannon reportedly told her that was the wrong decision and stated, “You’ll get yours.” He said both she and her boyfriend, a witness who also planned to testify, would regret their decisions. Although unable to recall any specific threats, Berryhill admitted the tone of the conversation was threatening. Telephone records verify the calls.
Shannon contested these findings, specifically denying he threatened anyone, but he did not offer any evidence in contradiction. The government argued in support of the PSR. After hearing both sides, the district judge gave an in-depth analysis of the evidence and a detailed explanation as to why he was concluding by a preponderance of the evidence that Shannon had indeed threatened a witness.
Under the second plea agreement the obstruction count was dropped, so the eight-level enhancement for obstruction through threats under § 2J1.2(b) was no longer in play. But the second PSR contained the exact same facts concerning obstruction as the first because Shannon still faced a two-level enhancement for obstruction (with or without threats) under § 3C1.1. In a motion *1076prior to the final sentencing hearing on June 2, 1995, Shannon argued that the obstruction question should be reopened because the withdrawal of the original guilty plea had vitiated the findings of the prior hearing. He further argued that the earlier hearing had addressed only whether threats had been made for purposes of § 2J1.2(b), not for § 3C1.1. Shannon sought to present additional arguments and a supposedly new statement from JoAnne Berryhill to the effect that Shannon never told her to threaten Christine Cadirci. As noted, the court relied on its previous finding and denied the motion as contrary to the law of the ease. On appeal Shannon claims he also would have testified that he did not threaten or cause anyone else to influence or threaten a witness. We are unable to locate Shannon’s offer to testify in the record of the proceedings below; it appears this matter was first mentioned on appeal.
The law of the case doctrine has “developed to maintain consistency and avoid reconsideration of matters once decided during the course of a single continuing lawsuit.” Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction § 4478 (1981). In Messenger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 444, 32 S.Ct. 739, 740, 56 L.Ed. 1152 (1912), Justice Holmes noted that the doctrine “merely expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what has been decided.” More recently this court stated: “The doctrine of law of the case establishes a presumption that a ruling made at one stage of a lawsuit will be adhered to throughout the suit.” Avitia v. Metropolitan Club of Chicago, Inc., 49 F.3d 1219, 1227 (7th Cir.1995). Yet the doctrine is not a straightjacket. “[I]t is clear that all federal courts retain power to reconsider [issues] if they wish. Law of the case principles ... are a matter of practice that rests on good sense and the desire to protect both court and parties against the burdens of repeated reargument by indefatigable diehards.” Wright, Miller & Cooper, § 4478. The doctrine applies to criminal cases, United States v. Nechy, 827 F.2d 1161, 1164 (7th Cir.1987), and has been employed in the sentencing context. United States v. Mazak, 789 F.2d 580, 581 (7th Cir.1986). The question before us is whether, under the particular facts of this case, the district court improperly applied the doctrine. Our review is for abuse of discretion. Avitia, 49 F.3d at 1228 (7th Cir.1995).
The district court’s original ruling adopted the findings of the first PSR without an evidentiary hearing. This was entirely proper. It is well established that “[a] defendant cannot show that a PSR is inaccurate by simply denying the PSR’s truth. Instead, beyond such a bare denial, he must produce some evidence that calls the reliability or correctness of the alleged facts into question.” United States v. Mustread, 42 F.3d 1097, 1102 (7th Cir.1994) (quotation marks omitted); United States v. Coonce, 961 F.2d 1268, 1280 (7th Cir.1992). Shannon did not proffer any contradictory evidence on this issue at the first sentencing hearing. Thus the district judge was within bounds to adopt the findings of the first PSR.
This factual ruling did not cease to be the law of the ease when the first plea was withdrawn. Withdrawing the plea did not alter the fact that this was still one “case,” one proceeding to resolve a matter of criminal law. Of course, if a plea is withdrawn the conclusions of a sentencing hearing may become irrelevant — after an acquittal, for instance, there is no continuing case to which prior sentencing determinations (now moot) would apply. And when the trial court permits a guilty plea to be withdrawn the prior plea and transcripts of the arraignment proceedings where the guilty plea was made are not admissible at trial to prove the defendant’s guilt. In that sense, “the entire proceedings of entering the plea are a nullity.” United States v. Long, 323 F.2d 468, 472 (6th Cir.1963) (emphasis added). But neither of these situations is the case here. The obstruction of justice findings related not only to sentencing for Count II (under § 2J1.2(b)), for which a guilty plea was withdrawn, but to Count I (under the lesser standard of § 3C1.1), for which Shannon ultimately pleaded guilty. Moreover, the government has not sought to use the prior guilty plea on the obstruction charge to secure an enhancement.
*1077In sum, at the first sentencing hearing the court found by the preponderance of the evidence that Shannon had threatened a witness with violence in an effort to prevent her from testifying against him. Since it was also relevant to sentencing under the second plea, the withdrawal of the first plea left this finding intact as the law of the case. Absent previously unavailable evidence, or some other unusual circumstance or compelling reason, see Wzorek v. City of Chicago, 906 F.2d 1180, 1185 (7th Cir.1990), the court was not required to revisit the issue for purposes of sentencing on the new guilty plea. The second hearing entailed the same legal question (obstruction) on the same set of facts, with the same parties: a paradigmatic situation for application of the doctrine of law of the case.
It is worth noting that even if the obstruction matter had been fully revisited at the June 2 sentencing hearing, the outcome would have been the same. The second PSR contained the exact same allegations on the obstruction issue as the first; nothing new was added. The only significant difference was that the facts now related solely to the potential two-level increase under § 3C1.1 instead of also to the potential eight-level increase under § 2J1.2(b) which would have applied to Count II. Despite his request to reopen the issue, Shannon did not proffer any new evidence “call[ing] the reliability or correctness of the alleged facts [in the PSR] into question.” Mustread, 42 F.3d at 1102. He merely pointed out that Berryhill’s rendition of the events did not mean she heard Shannon threaten a witness. That was hardly a retraction, as the district judge noted in response; Berryhill had always denied hearing an actual threat. At any rate, the point was irrelevant: obstruction of justice under § 3C1.1 does not require a threat. Overwhelming evidence established that Shannon attempted to persuade a subpoenaed witness not to testify. Under § 3C1.1, that alone is enough for a two-level enhancement. USSG § 3C1.1, comment, (n. 3(a) & 3(i)). Therefore revisiting the obstruction question would have yielded the same result. The district judge did not abuse his discretion in relying on his prior finding.
III.
The district court did not err in determining that Shannon was involved in a prior uncharged homicide or in its application of the doctrine of law of the case to its earlier factual rulings. However, under the facts of this ease, the court improperly found that for purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines Shannon’s conviction for statutory rape constituted a prior conviction for a violent crime. Therefore, we Vacate Shannon’s sentence and Remand for sentencing consistent with this opinion.
. See also United States v. Talbott, 78 F.3d 1183, 1190 (7th Cir.1996) ("Guidelines are a charge-offense rather than a real-offense sentencing system, a vital distinction that district judges must bear in mind.”); United States v. Joshua, 976 F.2d 844, 856 (3d Cir.1992) (“[A] sentencing court should look solely to the conduct alleged in the count of the indictment charging the offense of conviction in order to determine whether that offense is a crime of violence trader subsection (ii) of the guideline.”); United States v. Neal, 27 F.3d 90, 93 (4th Cir.1994) (per curiam) ("If the statutory definition of the offense does not use [the enumerated] terms, then the trial court may look to the conduct described in the indictment against the defendant (but no further) in determining if the offense presented a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”); United States v. Fitzhugh, 954 F.2d 253, 255 (5th Cir.1992) ("The sentencing court should consider conduct expressly charged in the count of which the defendant was convicted, but not other conduct that might be associated with the offense.”); United States v. Young, 990 F.2d 469, 472 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 901, 114 S.Ct. 276, 126 L.Ed.2d 226 (1993), (The inquiry "must be limited to conduct charged in the indictment or information;” the sentencing court is not free to inquire into specific circumstances surrounding the conviction.); United States v. Palmer, 68 F.3d 52, 57-58 (2d Cir.1995) (reviewing recent cases).
. Even more telling, it appears that under the strict terms of the Wisconsin statute, two 15 year olds commit second degree sexual assault against each other when they have sex. See State v. Rushing, 197 Wis.2d 631, 541 N.W.2d 155, 159 (App.1995) ("The essential elements of second-degree sexual assault of a child, § 948.02(2), STATS., where the charged crime is sexual intercourse are: (1) that the defendant had sexual intercourse with the child; and (2) that the child had not attained the age of sixteen years at the time of the sexual intercourse.”).
. In Bauer, the Eighth Circuit reaffirmed its holding in Rodriguez. However, the exact ages of the defendant and the victim were unclear. The statute at issue defined rape to include sex with "any female child under the age of sixteen years” or if the defendant is "over the age of twenty-five years,” sex with "any female under the age of seventeen years.” Id. at 374; Iowa Code § 698.1 (repealed 1976).
. USSG § lB1.2(a) directs that when a plea agreement contains a stipulation that specifically establishes a more serious offense than the offense of conviction, the sentencing judge is to determine the offense guideline most applicable to the stipulated offense. Thus, in addition to the criminal indictment or information of which the defendant was convicted, the sentencing judge may consult the stipulated facts of a plea agreement to determine whether a statutory rape offense presented a serious potential risk of violence to the victim. Accord Palmer, 68 F.3d 52 (sentencing judge can look to plea agreement to determine if crime of violence).
. It is worth noting that Wisconsin's civil law does not always treat sex with minors as a serious offense. For instance, J.J.G. v. L.H., 149 Wis.2d 349, 441 N.W.2d 273 (App.1989), held that an adult woman who seduced and became pregnant by a 15-year-old boy (thus committing second degree sexual assault of a child) was nevertheless entitled to child support from her victim. Cf. Loveridge v. Chartier, 161 Wis.2d 150, 468 N.W.2d 146 (1991) (intent to injure cannot be inferred from adult’s "consensual” sexual encounter with 16- or 17-year-old since, although criminal, such conduct is not always harmful to child; insurance company therefore liable for claim against homeowner’s policy for adult’s transmission of heipes to child). In light of this, we are not as convinced as our colleague that Wisconsin always considers sex with minors, even those under 16, a crime of violence.
. Neither party raised the possibility that Shannon's conviction (actually a guilty plea) for second degree sexual assault may not be a prior felony conviction at all due to his age at the time of the crime. See USSG § 4B1.2, Application Note 3.
. See J.J.G., 441 N.W.2d at 275 ("We reject appellant’s assertion that because he was fifteen years old when he had intercourse with L.H., he was incapable of consent.... The hugging, kissing, petting and other acts leading to intercourse detailed [in the record] can only be read as evidence of his willing and voluntary participation.”); id. at 278 (contention that "because [15 year old] was the victim of a 'statutory rape,’ the intercourse was nonconsensual” is “a conclu*1073sion of law” and does not indicate as a “matter of fact” that there was no consent); Duane N. v. Natalie T., 182 Wis.2d 395, 513 N.W.2d 669, 673 (App.1994) (affirming conclusion in J.J.G.); Loveridge, 468 N.W.2d at 153 (“Sexual contact between an adult and a 16- or 17-year-old is not substantially certain to harm the psychological and emotional well-being of the 16- or 17-year old.... [Source cited by dissenting opinion] clearly is not discussing the consequences of a 16- or 17-year-old having consensual sexual contact with an adult.") (emphasis added).