dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
*706I would affirm the judgment of the district court affirming the bankruptcy court order exempting the annuity, which was a portion of the structured settlement.
In my view, the court today gives far too little weight to Medill v. State, 477 N.W.2d 703 (Minn.1991). In Medill the Supreme Court of Minnesota emphasized that there were strong social policies in favor of exempting damage awards resulting from personal injuries. The Minnesota Supreme Court stated:
These policies [of protecting debtors from “absolute want”] apply with even more force to the personal injury right of action exemption because it deals not so much with the debtor’s property, but with the debtor’s human capital.... The debtor who suffers serious personal injury is deprived of using his or her human capital in getting a fresh start.
Id. at 708. The Minnesota Supreme Court drew no distinction between a debtor’s interest in a personal injury claim already reduced to settlement or judgment and his interest in a pending claim. The Minnesota court’s policy arguments apply equally to both situations. Indeed, Medill stated:
“We can find no reason why the creditor should be able to attach a structured settlement any more than a homestead. To allow it is to place the burden on the taxpaying public while the creditors benefit from the award- Here, the social policy to exempt the recovery is even stronger [than in the case of homestead].”
Id. at 709 (emphasis added).
It is true that Medill deals with the constitutionality of the exemption statute, and does not speak to the precise issue before us, and that the statements in the opinion are dictum. On the other hand, the statements are powerful expressions by the state supreme court en banc of state public policy at the heart of the question before us. The question of exemption is one of state law, and when an issue has not been decided by the Supreme Court of a state, it is our responsibility to predict how that court would decide the case before us. I know of no clearer indicator of the direction the Minnesota Supreme Court would take than a statement by that court en banc, dictum though it may be.
The court states that “Medill’s tort claim was pending trial at all relevant times.” Supra at 704 n. 2. The Minnesota Supreme Court did not say anything to indicate that it relied on the fact that the claim was pending, rather than reduced to judgment, at any particular “relevant time.” The Medill decision itself reflects that judgment on the tort claim had been entered on March 15, 1989, before the Minnesota Supreme Court rendered its opinion approving the exemption on November 22, 1991. Id. at 704.
I believe that these statements of the Minnesota Supreme Court en banc in Medill show that it would apply the exemption in this case. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the district court affirming the order of the bankruptcy court.