dissenting:
Because I am of the opinion that McGann must pay the full filing fee before any further consideration may be given to his appeal, I respectfully dissent.
The statute in question is clear enough: “[I]f a prisoner brings a civil action or files an appeal in forma pauperis, the prisoner shall be required to pay the full amount of a filing fee.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) (as amended). I see no reason to ascribe any meaning to that provision other than its plain meaning: one who chooses to sue or appeal while incarcerated is responsible for the payment of the entire filing fee. Although the statute goes on to allow deductions from the prisoner’s account in installments as one *31means of payment, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(l)-(2) (as amended), it contains no provision to forgive the debt upon release from confinement.
There is no question that the statute was enacted to discourage the filing of frivolous suits and appeals by prisoners. Congress apparently thought that such meritless litigation was causing a serious drain on federal court resources. The statute was not enacted to discourage the filing of frivolous appeals by those who are not prisoners, and the fact that one who has been released from prison may file an appeal in an action relating to prison conditions or other civil matters was not within the orbit of congressional concern. My colleagues say that the burden upon a released prisoner required to pay after release the balance of a filing fee partially paid during incarceration would be “more onerous” than the burden imposed upon those who remain incarcerated. I do not see this burden, if indeed it is one, as contravening the congressional purpose.
My colleagues acknowledge the possibility that the conclusion they reach may lessen the deterrent to filing in the case of prisoners about to be released. They find this possibility outweighed, however, by the fact that a prisoner so inclined could in any event wait until release and then commence an action or file an appeal in forma pauperis without payment of fee. The short answer to that argument lies in the experience of federal judges throughout the nation: prisoners are much less likely to pursue frivolous litigation after their release from confinement. I must assume that this experience was not unknown to Congress.
Finally, it just makes no sense to me to allow a prisoner to take the balance in his prison account with him upon his release and owe nothing further on his filing fee. The decision we render today allows him to do so. The partial payment provision requires an initial payment of 20 percent of the greater of the average monthly deposits to the account or the average monthly balance in the account for the 6-month period preceding the filing. § 1915(b)(l)(A)-(B). Subsequent payments are to be computed on the basis of 20 percent of the income credited to the account dining the preceding month. § 1915(b)(2). We have established a procedure that requires dismissal of the appeal unless the prisoner signs a form authorizing these deductions. Leonard v. Lacy, 88 F.3d 181, 187 (2d Cir.1996). Despite the deductions, a prisoner may have substantial funds remaining in his account at the time he is discharged from confinement. It cannot be the intent of Congress that the remaining funds not be applied to the filing fee.
But there is no need to delve into questions of congressional intent in this ease. My dissent is compelled by the simple and familiar principle that when the language of a statute is plain and enacted within the constitutional authority of Congress, as it is here, “the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.” Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485, 37 S.Ct. 192, 194, 61 L.Ed. 442 (1917).