concurring.
At issue is whether the plaintiffs have stated a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), Fed.R.Civ.P.7 The plaintiffs’ complaint cannot be dismissed “if relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.” NOW v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 256, 114 S.Ct. 798, 803, 127 L.Ed.2d 99 (1994). The district court dismissed the claims because it imported into RICO a *578standing requirement that the plaintiffs must be “innocent victims.” See Roma Constr. Co. v. aRusso, 906 F.Supp. 78, 81 (D.R.I.1995). The review by this court of the dismissal is de novo. Aulson v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1996). This ruling, one of law, was, I believe, in error. The question is, eoncededly, one of first impression here. Because I analyze the matter differently than does the majority, I write separately.
The question of who has standing to bring actions under RICO is a matter of federal law. The pertinent provision of RICO provides:
Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.
18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). There is no qualification on the phrase “any person injured in his business or property” limiting the phrase to “innocent” persons. RICO defines a “person” as “any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3). On the language of the statute, plaintiffs meet this definition.8
In general, the intent of Congress manifested in the text of the statute governs the issue of standing:
In determining the scope of a statute, we look first to its language. If the statutory language is unambiguous, in the absence of “a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.”
United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 2527, 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981) (quoting Consumer Product Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 2056, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980)). The language of RICO should thus be the primary guide to determining Congressional intent. See Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 495 n. 13, 105 S.Ct. 3275, 3284 n. 13, 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985). Indeed, the Supreme Court has consistently adhered to the language of RICO in interpreting its meaning and rejected surplus requirements not found in the statutory language. See, e.g., Scheidler, 510 U.S. at 261-63, 114 S.Ct. at 806 (holding that RICO does not require an economic motive behind the racketeering activity); Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 177-79, 113 S.Ct. 1163, 1169-70, 122 L.Ed.2d 525 (1993) (looking to statutory language to determine the scope of RICO liability for “conduct” or “participation”); Sedima, 473 U.S. at 488-92, 105 S.Ct. at 3280-83 (holding that private actions under RICO do not require a criminal conviction on the underlying predicate offenses); Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580-87, 101 S.Ct. at 2527-31 (holding that the term “enterprise” as used in RICO is not restricted to criminal enterprises); cf. Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 265-69, 112 S.Ct. 1311, 1316-18, 117 L.Ed.2d 532 (1992) (construing the word “injury” to require proximate cause by reference to statutory history and judicial interpretation of same language in Clayton Act).
Despite the lack of any “innocent victim” requirement in the statutory language, the district court relied upon an isolated statement in the legislative history to fashion a requirement that only “innocent victims” be allowed to sue. The district court’s reliance on a snippet of legislative history, lifted out of context,9 to create an absolute standing *579bar to anyone not “innocent,” was inappropriate. “[E]ven if we were to read this statement to say what [defendants] say[] it means, it would not amount to more than background noise drowned out by the statutory language.” Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269 n. 15, 112 S.Ct. at 1318 n. 15. This selection from the legislative history cannot overcome the plain text of RICO, which is unambiguous. It represents “a rather thin reed upon which to base a requirement ... neither expressed nor ... fairly implied in the operative sections of [RICO].” Scheidler, 510 U.S. at 260, 114 S.Ct. at 805. Even were there occasion to consider the legislative history relied upon by the district court, it says only that the statute will protect innocent victims, not that the statute will deny standing to those who are not innocent victims. See Turkette, 452 U.S. at 591, 101 S.Ct. at 2533 (noting that “negative inference[s]” need not be drawn from positive statements in legislative history).
The Supreme Court has emphasized the broad reach of RICO’s language: “If the defendant engages in a pattern of racketeering activity ... and the racketeering activities injure the plaintiff in his business or property, the plaintiff has a claim -under § 1964(c). There is no room in the statutory language for an additional ... requirement.” Sedima, 473 U.S. at 495, 105 S.Ct. at 3284. There is nothing in the language of RICO which suggests that Congress intended to deny standing to plaintiffs who are alleged to have committed bribery or paid extortion, whether under coercion or not.
Standing involves three analytically distinct requirements: injury-in-fact, a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of, and whether the wrong may be redressed. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136-37, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). All three elements of the standing inquiry are satisfied on the pleadings here. Plaintiffs have adequately alleged injury-in-fact (financial loss), a causal connection (defendants’ corruptly demanding payments), and that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision (availability of RICO damages). See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496, 105 S.Ct. at 3285 (noting that RICO plaintiff has standing only if “he has been injured in his business or property by the conduct constituting the violation”); Libertad v. Welch, 53 F.3d 428, 436 (1st Cir.1995). This is not a case where the plaintiffs attempt to assert the rights of others. Cf. Carter v. Berger, 777 F.2d 1173 (7th Cir.1985) (county, not individual taxpayers, may sue under RICO for bribery scheme resulting in underpayment of taxes). Accordingly, I would end the standing analysis there.
In considering whether there is an “innocent victim” standing requirement, I doubt that Congress intended for the federal courts to refer to and incorporate state law.10 The *580defendants argue that the innocent victim requirement is to be found in the distinction, found in some state laws, between bribery and coercive extortion. They buttress their argument by reference to provisions of the Model Penal Code. The matter of whether the activities in which these plaintiffs engaged fit within the category of bribery or of coercive extortion is, in my view, not relevant to the issue of standing.11
Although RICO references state law in its definition of “racketeering activity,”12 it makes no substantive distinction between “bribery” and “extortion.” RICO defines “racketeering activity” in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A) to mean, inter alia, “any act or threat involving ... bribery [or] extortion ... which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year.” Thus, the federal statute recognizes, without distinction, acts “involving” either bribery or extortion as predicate offenses for purposes of RICO. Further, even in defining such a predicate offense, state law plays a limited role:
The labels placed on a state statute do not determine whether that statute proscribes bribery for purposes of the RICO statute. Congress intended for “bribery” to be defined generically when it included bribery as a predicate act. H.R.Rep. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News 4007, 4032 (“State offenses are included by generic designation”). Thus, any statute that proscribes conduct which could be ge-nerieally defined as bribery can be the basis for a predicate act.
United States v. Garner, 837 F.2d 1404, 1418 (7th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1035, 108 S.Ct. 2022, 100 L.Ed.2d 608 (1988); accord United States v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127, 1137 (3d Cir.1977). Here, the plaintiffs’ complaint also alleges, in addition to the state law predicate offense, a predicate federal offense, violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (wrongful use of official authority to obstruct, delay, and effect commercial activity in interstate commerce). That statute also does not draw the distinction defendants urge.
Nonetheless, standing issues aside, the question remains whether there is some form of requirement in RICO, which may be tested on a motion to dismiss, that plaintiffs be innocent victims. .At least two other possibilities emerge: that such a requirement is inherent in the cause of action or that it is an affirmative defense.
To the extent that the existence of a cause of action is a matter analytically distinct from the issue of standing, see Libertad, 53 F.3d at 438 n. 5, a cause of action has been stated here.13 There is nothing in the language of RICO which suggests that only innocent plaintiffs have a cause of action. See Scheidler, 510 U.S. at 261, 114 S.Ct. at 806 (“[T]he statutory language is unambiguous and [the] legislative history [evidences] no such ‘clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary5 that would warrant a different construction.” (citation omitted)). Under the proximate causation test of Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268, 112 S.Ct. at 1317-18, there is a cause of action stated.14 The damages alleged here on the *581pleadings are neither remote nor speculative. These plaintiffs have alleged direct injury to their property, which Holmes requires. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 265-69, 112 S.Ct. at 1316-18; see also id. at 276-86, 112 S.Ct. at 1322-27 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (analyzing the causation issue as part of the standing issue). Again, viewing this as a matter of whether there is an “innocent victim” requirement inherent in stating a cause of action, I do not believe state law is pertinent.
The district court opinion also suggests that the “innocent victim” argument may be available as an affirmative defense. If so, there are a range of possibilities for the contours of the defense. The range includes a sort of absolute defense if the plaintiff has done anything wrong, which is what the district court thought and to which it applied the label of an in pari delicto defense.15 At the other end of the range is the position that the relative guilt of the plaintiff is irrelevant. That, I believe, cannot be so,16 and even the plaintiffs do not argue that position. While some affirmative defenses, such as the statute of limitations, may on occasion be decided on the pleadings, the assertion of an affirmative defense here would not afford a basis to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). Under any of the plausible articulations of such a defense, the inferences to be drawn from the facts pled here do not permit dismissal.
I would reject the proposition, urged by defendants, that an absolute in pari delicto defense is embedded in RICO. In construing the language of RICO, the Supreme Court has looked to precedent under the Clayton Act, the statute upon which RICO was modeled. See Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268, 112 S.Ct. at 1317-18 (“We may fairly credit the 91st Congress, which enacted RICO, with knowing the interpretation federal courts had given the words earlier Congresses had used first in [the Sherman Act], and later in the Clayton Act’s § 4. It used the same words, and we can only assume that it intended them to have the same meaning that courts had already given them.” (citations omitted)). The Supreme Court, in Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 138-40, 88 S.Ct. 1981, 1984-85, 20 L.Ed.2d 982 (1968), overruled on other grounds by Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 104 S.Ct. 2731, 81 L.Ed.2d 628 (1984), explicitly rejected the existence of an in pari delicto defense under the Clayton Act. In Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 108 S.Ct. 2063, 100 L.Ed.2d 658 (1988), the Court reaffirmed that in its contemporary “broadened” construction, precisely the construction contemplated by the district court here, the in pari delicto defense “is not appropriate in litigation arising under federal regulatory statutes.” Id. at 632, 108 S.Ct. at 2071; see Sullivan v. National Football League, 34 F.3d 1091, 1107-09 (1st Cir.1994), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 1252, 131 L.Ed.2d 133 (1995). For the same reasons, an “unclean hands” defense would seem to be unavailable, as it is not a defense to an antitrust treble damage action. See Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 214, 71 S.Ct. 259, 261, 95 L.Ed. 219 (1951), overruled on other *582grounds by Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 104 S.Ct. 2731, 81 L.Ed.2d 628 (1984); see also Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 84 S.Ct. 1051, 12 L.Ed.2d 98 (1964).
That there is no in pari delicto defense does not mean there is no defense at all in which the relative guilt of the plaintiffs may be weighed. It is far more likely that there is in RICO an “equal involvement” defense similar to the “equal involvement” defense recognized under the Clayton Act in Perma Life?17 Recognition of such a defense, patterned on the Clayton Act defense, was extended to securities actions in Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 306-11, 105 S.Ct. 2622, 2626-29, 86 L.Ed.2d 215 (1985). The equal involvement defense is more demanding of those asserting it than the in pari delicto defense and only bars the claims of a plaintiff who “truly bore at least substantially equal responsibility [as the defendant] for the violation” of the federal law at issue. Id. at 308, 105 S.Ct. at 2628.
This circuit has also recognized an equal involvement defense in antitrust actions. Sullivan, 34 F.3d at 1107 (“A plaintiffs ‘complete, voluntary, and substantially equal participation’ in an illegal practice under the antitrust laws precludes recovery for that antitrust violation.” (quoting CVD, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 769 F.2d 842, 856 (1st Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016, 106 S.Ct. 1198, 89 L.Ed.2d 312 (1986))).
Testing the allegations of the complaint against the Supreme Court’s articulation of the equal involvement defense, this complaint survives a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Under that defense:
a private action for damages ... may be barred on the grounds of the plaintiffs own culpability only where (1) as a direct result of his own actions, the plaintiff bears at least substantially equal responsibility for the violations he seeks to redress, and (2) preclusion of suit would not significantly interfere with the effective enforcement of [RICO] and the protection of the ... public.
Bateman, 472 U.S. at 310-11, 105 S.Ct. at 2629. Both the Supreme Court and this court have cautioned against deciding such defenses in the absence of factual development. See id. at 311 n. 21, 105 S.Ct. at 2629 n. 21 (“We note, however, the inappropriateness of resolving the question of respondents’ fault solely on the basis of the allegations set forth in the complaint.”); Sullivan, 34 F.3d at 1109 (“Ultimately ... these are factual questions for the jury_”).
The defendants make a misplaced attempt to argue in favor of the more defendant-helpful in pari delicto defense by relying on Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 110 S.Ct. 792, 107 L.Ed.2d 887 (1990). Tafflin, they urge, weakens the analogy of RICO to the Clayton Act, and, therefore, to the equal involvement defense. In Tafflin, the Court held that RICO did not vest exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts where the language of the statute did not purport to do so and the legislative history did not show that Congress addressed the question. Id. at 460-62, 110 S.Ct. at 795-97. The Court rejected the argument that it should derive such an exclusivity from the fact that actions under the Clayton Act may only be brought in federal court. Id. at 462-63, 110 S.Ct. at 796-97. The analogy to the Clayton Act did not provide the answer because Congress was also *583presumed to have operated against a backdrop of well-established law governing when there was exclusive federal jurisdiction. Id. at 459-60, 110 S.Ct. at 795-97. There is no such “judicial default rule” which operates in defendants’ favor here. Cf. Landgraf v. U.S.I. Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, -, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 1505, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994) (discussing judicial default rules in the context of retroactivity of statutes).
Similarly, there is no comfort for defendants in the Supreme Court’s rejection in Sedima of application of the “antitrust injury” rule to RICO. “[T]his is so because ‘RICO injury1 would [otherwise] be an unintelligible requirement, not because there is no parallel between the two statutes.” Carter v. Berger, 777 F.2d 1173, 1176 (7th Cir.1985) (noting the Court’s remark in Sedima, 473 U.S. at 489-90 & n. 8, 105 S.Ct. at 3281-83 & n. 8, that Congress relied on the analogy to antitrust).
Indeed, RICO was enacted in 1970, after the Perma Life decision, of which Congress was undoubtedly aware. The modelling of RICO on the Clayton Act was done against the backdrop of judicial recognition of an equal involvement defense. The piece of legislative history relied upon by defendants, to the extent it should be considered at all, may be equally read to support the proposition that Congress implicitly allowed an affirmative equal involvement defense as under the Clayton Act.
But defendants do have a point. The analogy to the Clayton Act is not perfect. Indeed, the American Bar Association report from which the civil RICO provisions emerged suggests that not all the accoutrements of the Clayton Act should be imported into RICO. See 115 Cong. Rec. 6995 (1969) (Report of A.B.A. Antitrust Section); Abrams, supra, § 1.4, at 25-26. This may be a situation where Congress did not explicitly contemplate the question and so congressional “intent” in the classic formulation simply does not exist. The courts then are left with the delicate task of providing the answer.
I very much doubt that the federal definition of “innocence” for purposes of the equal involvement defense would ordinarily involve reference to and incorporation of state law, as the majority asserts.18 The Supreme Court did not look to state law to define the defense in either Perma Life or Bateman, nor should we do so here. Nor has this court looked to state law to define the defense under the Clayton Act in the aftermath of Perma Life.
To say there is some form of affirmative defense like the equal involvement defense does not describe precisely the content of such a defense. Even the Supreme Court Justices in Perma Life did not agree on the content. See supra footnote 17. In the absence of factual findings in which to set the questions of the honing of such a defense, there is, and should be, reluctance to engage now in such refinement. The precision of any standard awaits further development. It is enough now to say that the positions at the extremities — that any wrongdoing disables a plaintiff or that wrongdoing is irrelevant— are untenable.
The equal involvement defense recognized under the Clayton Aet and the Securities Act derives its contours from federal policy as recognized by federal statutes. There is no reason not to apply that paradigm to RICO.19
*584As to the claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiffs have adequately alleged that the harm they suffered was caused by the extortionist policies and practices in which the town officials are claimed to have engaged. Again, there is no need to delve into the distinction between coercive extortion and bribery.
. At oral argument, plaintiffs stipulated that their RICO claim is not asserted against the town, but only against the individual defendants.
. Of course, other questions about the parameters of RICO standing are not raised by this case, which concerns only whether there is an "innocent victim" requirement.
. The court relies on a statement by Representative Steiger on October 7, 1970, that “[i]t is the intent of this body, I am certain, to see that innocent parties who are the victims of organized crime have a right to obtain proper redress." 116 Cong. Rec. 35,346-47 (1970). That statement was made during debate over a proposed amendment, ultimately withdrawn, which would have authorized private injunctive relief. See Abrams, The Law of Civil RICO § 1.4, at 30 (1991). The district court’s characterization of the remarks as coming from "the sponsor of the provision that eventually created a private civil remedy” could cause a misapprehension. In fact, RICO originated in a bill filed in the Senate, S. 30. By October 7, 1970, the Judiciary Committee had already reported out that bill, which included “the RICO provision ultimately enacted as section 1964(c), which created a treble damage remedy." Id. at 30. The debate in which *579Representative Steiger made the quoted remarks was over private injunctive relief.
Further, Representative Steiger referred, in the very same remarks relied upon by the district court, to victims of "organized crime.” Yet it was clear to both the House and the Senate that the reach of civil RICO extended well beyond organized crime. "Congress knew what it was doing when it adopted commodious language capable of extending beyond organized crime.” H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 246, 109 S.Ct. 2893, 2904, 106 L.Ed.2d 195 (1989); see also Sedima, 473 U.S. at 499, 105 S.Ct. at 3286 ("Congress wanted to reach both 'legitimate' and ‘illegitimate’ enterprises. The former enjoy neither an inherent incapacity for criminal activity nor immunity from its consequences. The fact that § 1964(c) is used against respected businesses allegedly engaged in a pattern of specifically identified criminal conduct is hardly a sufficient reason for assuming that the provision is being misconstrued.” (citation omitted)); Abrams, supra, § 1.1, at 5 ("RICO’s name might suggest that the private cause of action reaches primarily racketeers and other organized crime figures. Developments since RICO’s 1970 enactment, however, have laid firmly to rest any suggestion of limited reach.").
. Caselaw holding that minority shareholders suffer no injury to their property apart from the injury the corporation suffers and so have no standing to sue under RICO provides no comfort to defendants. Such caselaw does not support the principle that reference should be made to state law to determine the contours of any "innocent victim” defense. It is true that some decisions refer to state law to define property interests of shareholders as opposed to corporations to determine whether the former may bring a RICO action. See, e.g., Leach v. FDIC, 860 F.2d 1266 (5th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 905, 109 S.Ct. 3186, 105 L.Ed.2d 695 (1989). Other caselaw, including that of this circuit, see Roeder v. Alpha Indus., 814 F.2d 22, 29-30 (1st Cir.1987), refers to general principles of corporate *580law to hold that a shareholder may not sue under RICO to vindicate a duty owed to the corporation. See Rand v. Anaconda-Ericsson, Inc., 794 F.2d 843, 849 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 987, 107 S.Ct. 579, 93 L.Ed.2d 582 (1986); Warren v. Manufacturers Nat’l Bank of Detroit, 759 F.2d 542, 545 (6th Cir.1985); Abrams, supra, § 3.3.6, at 147-52. In any event, the issue of whether state law should be referenced in defining the term “property" is simply not present in this case.
. If it were, then I would agree that on the facts pleaded it is impossible to draw the conclusion that this case involves exclusively bribeiy.
. This reference to state law is in the context of RICO’s definition of predicate offenses. From this, defendants would infer a Congressional desire — expressed nowhere in the statute — to reference state law with respect to affirmative defenses as well.
. But cf. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88. Colum. L.Rev. 1432, 1433 (1988) (arguing that "[flor purposes of standing, the principal question should be whether Congress has created a cause of action”).
. It may also be, as the district court suggested, see Roma, 906 F.Supp. at 82 n. 1, that the plaintiffs' relative culpability may be considered in deciding, under Holmes, the issue of proximate causation based on the evidence presented. See, e.g., Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 142-47, 88 S.Ct. 1981, 1986-89, 20 L.Ed.2d 982 (White, J., concurring) *581(treating relative culpability, in antitrust context, as part of causation analysis), overruled on other grounds by Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 104 S.Ct. 2731, 81 L.Ed.2d 628 (1984). The issue of proximate cause may not be decided at the pleading stage given the allegations in this complaint.
Relative culpability may also be relevant to the measure of damages. The opinions in Perma Life posit that the benefits received by a plaintiff from its participation in wrongdoing “can of course be taken into consideration in computing damages." Perma Life, 392 U.S. at 140, 88 S.Ct. at 1985; see also II Areeda & Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 365c3, at 248 (1995 rev. ed.).
. This common law defense derives from the Latin in pari delicto potior est conditio defenden-tis: "In a case of equal or mutual fault ... the condition of the [defending] party is the better one.” Black’s Law Dictionary 791 (6th ed.1990). The in pari delicto defense, though “[i]n its classic formulation ... narrowly limited to situations where the plaintiff truly bore at least substantially equal responsibility for his injury ...” is now generally given "a broad application to bar actions where plaintiffs simply have been involved generally in ‘the same sort of wrongdoing’ as defendants.” Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 306-07, 105 S.Ct. 2622, 2627, 86 L.Ed.2d 215 (1985) (quoting Perma Life, 392 U.S. at 138, 88 S.Ct. at 1984).
. See, e.g., discussion in footnote 14 supra.
. In Perma Life, five concurring Justices, in four separate opinions, recognized the existence of the equal involvement defense. Justice White wrote that he "would deny recovery where plaintiff and defendant bear substantially equal responsibility for [the] injury resulting to one of them...." 392 U.S. at 146, 88 S.Ct. at 1988 (White, J., concurring). According to Justice Fortas, "[i]f the fault of the parties is reasonably within the same scale — if the ‘delictum ’ is approximately ‘par' — then the doctrine should bar recovery." 392 U.S. at 147, 88 S.Ct. at 1989 (Fortas, J., concurring). Justice Marshall wrote that he "would hold that where a defendant in a private antitrust suit can show that the plaintiff actively participated in the formation and implementation of an illegal scheme, and is substantially equally at fault, the plaintiff should be barred from imposing liability on the defendant.” 392 U.S. at 149, 88 S.Ct. at 1989-90 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Harlan, in an opinion joined by Justice Stewart, indicated that the defense should be allowed in cases where "the plaintiffs were substantially as much responsible ... as the defendants.” 392 U.S. at 156, 88 S.Ct. at 1993 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
. There may be situations, not present here, in which the state has such an exceptionally strong policy interest in the enforcement of its own laws that Congress would choose to accommodate that interest in the RICO enforcement scheme. This may be more true under RICO than other statutes in as much as Congress has referred to violations of state law in defining predicate offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A). However, the recognition of an interest in enforcement is not the same as the recognition of an interest in a defense. The Rhode Island bribery and extortion statutes do not evidence such an overwhelming interest in affording defendants an in pari delicto defense, even before reaching the issue of whether Congress would have wanted to import Rhode Island law into RICO.
. The district court was very troubled by the notion of rewarding people who pay bribes to public officials with RICO treble damages, whatever the circumstances of the payment. Roma, 906 F.Supp. at 82-83. That is certainly a reasonable concern. Policy arguments may be made both for and against such a result. In the antitrust field, the Supreme Court has noted that because of the "important public purposes” served by private suits, it is inappropriate to invoke "broad common-law barriers to relief.” Perma Life, 392 U.S. at 138, 88 S.Ct. at 1984. *584Thus "the plaintiff who reaps the reward of treble damages may be no less morally reprehensible than the defendant, but the law encourages his suit to further the overriding public policy in favor of competition.” Id. at 139, 88 S.Ct. at 1984.
This strong enforcement rationale certainly is present in RICO, a statute intended to increase the arsenal of weapons striking at criminal activity. In addition, it may be inherently unfair to deny plaintiffs any ability to pursue a RICO claim where their fault is relatively small. An absolute "innocent victim” requirement would create such an undesirable imbalance.