dissenting:
I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that Miller’s constitutional rights were violated in this case. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
The premise of the majority’s conclusion is that the State of Maryland forced Miller to forfeit his constitutional right to an attorney of his choice when he sought to assert his constitutional right to a trial transcript at state expense. This premise is flawed, however, because the State of Maryland never deprived Miller of his constitutional right to counsel of his choice.
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecu*131tions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his de-fence.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The right to counsel confers on a state criminal defendant the absolute right to be represented by counsel at trial, see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), and, provided the state has appellate review, on a first direct appeal, see Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963).*
The Sixth Amendment also protects a criminal defendant’s right to counsel of his or her choice. See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 1697, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988). However, unlike the right to counsel, the right to counsel of choice is not absolute. See United States v. Gallop, 838 F.2d 105, 107 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1211, 108 S.Ct. 2858, 101 L.Ed.2d 895 (1988). The right to counsel of choice enables a criminal defendant “to select and be represented by [his or her] preferred attorney.” Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159, 108 S.Ct. at 1697. However, a criminal defendant cannot “insist on representation by an attorney he [or she] cannot afford.” Id. This is so because the protections of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice do not extend “beyond ‘the individual’s right to spend his [or her] own money to obtain the advice and assistance of ... counsel.’ ” Caplin & Drysdale Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 626, 109 S.Ct. 2646, 2652, 105 L.Ed.2d 528 (1989) (quoting Walters v. Nat'l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 370, 105 S.Ct. 3180, 3215, 87 L.Ed.2d 220 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting)); see also Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159, 108 S.Ct. at 1697 (noting that “the essential aim of the [Sixth] Amendment is to guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal defendant rather than to ensure that a defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom he prefers”). Consequently, an indigent criminal defendant has no constitutional right to have a particular lawyer represent him or her. Gallop, 838 F.2d at 108; see also Green v. Abrams, 984 F.2d 41, 47 (2d Cir.1993) (“indigent defendant has no right to choose the particular counsel appointed”); United States v. Bradley, 892 F.2d 634, 635 (7th Cir.) (indigent criminal defendants “cannot pick and choose among members of the district court’s bar”), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 909, 110 S.Ct. 1935, 109 L.Ed.2d 298 (1990); Thomas v. Wainwright, 767 F.2d 738, 742 (11th Cir.1985) (“indigent criminal defendant has an absolute right to be represented by counsel, but he does not have a right to have a particular lawyer represent him”), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1031, 106 S.Ct. 1241, 89 L.Ed.2d 349 (1986).
In this case, it cannot be gainsaid that Miller is indigent. Accordingly, Miller does not have a constitutional right to demand that a particular attorney represent him on his direct appeal. The Constitution requires that the State of Maryland provide Miller counsel on direct appeal, and the State of Maryland has fulfilled this obligation by providing that service through its public defender’s office. The State of Maryland’s decision to fulfill its obligation to indigent criminal defendants by requiring that they obtain counsel through the public defender’s office is eminently reasonable and constitutionally proper. Thus, the State of Maryland’s decision cannot, and should not, be questioned by this court. In short, as an indigent, Miller has no right to demand counsel on his own terms and the State of Maryland has fulfilled its obligation to provide him counsel.
Nor were Miller’s rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment violated in this case. In the context of indigent criminal defendants exercising rights of appeal, the Fourteenth Amendment prevents states from “arbitrarily cut[ting] off the appeal rights for indigents while leaving open avenues of appeal for more affluent persons.” Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 607, 94 S.Ct. 2437, 2442, 41 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974). While the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages ... [or] ... require the State to equalize conditions,” id. at 612, 94 S.Ct. at 2444 (citation and internal quotes omitted), it “does require that ... indigents have an adequate opportunity to present their claims *132fairly within the adversary system,” id (citation and internal quotes omitted). Thus, a state cannot adopt procedures which leave an indigent criminal defendant “entirely cut off from any appeal at all,” by virtue of his or her indigency, Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 481, 83 S.Ct. 768, 771, 9 L.Ed.2d 892 (1963) (striking down Indiana law that only public defender could obtain free transcript of hearing on coram nobis application; thus, if public defender declined to request one, indigent could not obtain a transcript), or extend to such indigent criminal defendants merely a “meaningless ritual” while the more affluent have a “meaningful appeal,” Douglas, 372 U.S. at 358, 83 S.Ct. at 817 (holding unconstitutional California’s requirement that counsel on appeal would be appointed only if appellate court determined that such appointment would be helpful to the indigent or the court). In short, the duty of the states is to ensure that indigent criminal defendants have “an adequate opportunity to present [their] claims fairly in the context of the State’s appellate process.” Ross, 417 U.S. at 616, 94 S.Ct. at 2447.
The State of Maryland’s procedure assures indigent criminal defendants of an “adequate opportunity” to present their cases on appeal. Under the State of Maryland’s system, all indigent criminal defendants are provided effective assistance of counsel, whether represented by the public defender’s office, by a private attorney appointed by the public defender’s office, or by an attorney appointed by the court. All the State of Maryland asks is that the indigent criminal defendant first apply for representation with the public defender’s office. In addition, under the State of Maryland’s system, all indigent criminal defendants receive transcripts at state expense, provided they likewise comply with the simple procedure of applying for representation with the public defender’s office. The type of appeal an indigent criminal defendant receives in the State of Maryland does not turn on the amount of money he has, but rather on his or her willingness to accept counsel as provided by the laws of the State of Maryland. Because the laws of the State of Maryland provide Miller with an “adequate opportunity” to present his claims on direct appeal, his rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment were not violated.
In summary, Miller was not forced to forfeit his right to counsel of his choice because, as an indigent, he had no right to counsel of his choice. The State of Maryland’s procedure for providing counsel and transcripts for the purpose of enabling indigent criminal defendants to pursue direct appeals complies with the mandates of the Constitution. Because I would affirm the judgment of the district court, I respectfully dissent.
A state is not required to provide appellate courts or appellate review. McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687-88, 14 S.Ct. 913, 914-15, 38 L.Ed. 867 (1894).