concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur fully in parts I, II, III-B, III-C-1, and III-C-2 of Judge Kennedy’s thorough and thoughtful opinion. I agree that the FHAA requires the city of Taylor to accommodate the elderly disabled by permitting AFC facilities for the elderly disabled to operate with nine or fewer residents in neighborhoods zoned for single-family use, but that it does not require the city to permit such facilities to operate with more than nine residents in such neighborhoods. Accordingly, I agree that the injunction should be vacated and that the case should be remanded for a recalculation of damages.
However, I must respectfully dissent from parts III-A and III-C-3 of the opinion, which conclude that the city of Taylor did not intentionally discriminate against the elderly disabled and that a civil penalty is not appropriate. Because I believe that the record amply supports the district court’s finding of intentional discrimination and the imposition of a penalty, I would affirm those portions of the district court’s decision.
I.
As an initial matter, the majority does not address the proper standard of review. We may set aside the findings of fact of a district judge sitting without a jury only if those findings are clearly erroneous. Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a). A finding of discriminatory intent is such a finding of fact. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287-88, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 1789-90, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982). A finding is clearly erroneous only when, although there is evidence to support the finding, the reviewing court, after having reviewed all the evidence, is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Stevens v. McGinnis, Inc., 82 F.3d 1353, 1355-56 (6th Cir.1996) (citation omitted).
II.
Here, the district court explicitly found that the city of Taylor’s refusal to allow Mortenview Manor to expand was motivated by a discriminatory animus. United States v. City of Taylor, Mich. (Taylor II), 872 F.Supp. 423, 436 (E.D.Mich.1995). The majority opinion recharacterizes the issue as whether Taylor discriminated when it failed to rezone Mortenview. This describes the inquiry too narrowly. As the majority recognizes, the city had many ways of accommodating Mortenview when Smith & Lee petitioned for rezoning. For example, the city could have amended its zoning ordinance to provide an exception for AFC facilities. Thus, the real question is whether the city’s failure to rezone or otherwise accommodate Mortenview’s desire to expand was motivated by a discriminatory purpose.1
To constitute intentional discrimination against the handicapped, the city of Taylor’s refusal to accommodate need not have been motivated solely, or even primarily, by a discriminatory animus. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66, 97 S.Ct. 555, 563-64, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977). Rather, the plaintiffs must show that “discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor.” Id. at 270, 97 S.Ct. at 566. Once the plaintiffs do so, the burden shifts to the defendants to show that they would have reached the same decision absent the discriminatory motive. Id. at 270 n. 21, 97 S.Ct. at 566 n. 21.
*800Here, the district court relied on four different sources to conclude that the city was motivated by a discriminatory animus against the handicapped when it decided not to rezone or otherwise accommodate Mortenview: (1) the city’s characterization of Mortenview as a “multiple-family” use; (2) the city’s disparate application of its zoning ordinances; (3) paternalistic and discriminatory statements made by city officials; and (4) evidence of historical discrimination against the handicapped. Taylor II, 872 F.Supp. at 429. While I agree that some of these reasons are not convincing, we may not reverse simply because we do not like some of the reasons given by the district court. Rather, the circuit must examine the record in its entirety and determine whether the cumulative effect of all the evidence supports the finding of intentional discrimination. I believe that the record as a whole supports the district court’s finding of intentional discrimination.
A Multiple-Family Characterization
First, the district court found that the city’s determination that Mortenview was a multiple-family use and not a single-family use was evidence of discrimination. Taylor II, 872 F.Supp. at 429-33. I agree with the majority that this is not evidence of discrimination. The zoning ordinance clearly defines a family as a non-profit housekeeping unit. Taylor Zoning Ordinance § 2.02(36) (emphasis added). The district court conceded that Mortenview, as a for-profit concern, is not a family within the meaning of the statute. Taylor II, 872 F.Supp. at 431.
Instead, the district court found that Mor-tenview is not a permitted multiple-family use either. Id. Therefore, the district could conclude that the city arbitrarily designated Mortenview Manor as a multiple-family use. Id. This is simply not correct. First, it contradicts the circuit’s previous opinion. The circuit expressly held that the zoning ordinance permitted AFC facilities as a special use in multiple-family districts. Smith & Lee Assoc., Inc. v. City of Taylor, Mich., 13 F.3d 920, 926 (6th Cir.1993) (citing Taylor Zoning Ordinance § 7.03). Thus, that finding is the law of the ease, and may not be overturned. Miles v. Kohli & Kaliher Associates, Ltd., 917 F.2d 235, 241 (6th Cir.1990). Moreover, that ruling is unquestionably correct; the zoning ordinance specifically provides that housing for the elderly is a permitted special use in multiple-family zones. Taylor Zoning Ordinance § 7.03(3). It is not discriminatory to conclude that Mortenview provides housing for the elderly; it is a statement of fact.
B. Disparate Application of the Zoning Ordinances
Second, the district court found that the city’s disparate application of its zoning ordinances was evidence of intentional discrimination. Taylor II, 872 F.Supp. at 433-35. It is well-settled that discriminatory enforcement of otherwise neutral zoning practices may be evidence of illegal discrimination. Smith & Lee, 13 F.3d at 927.
1. : Home Businesses
The first form of discriminatory enforcement identified by the district court is that the city treated home businesses in single family zones differently than it treated Mor-tenview. Again, I agree that this is not evidence of discrimination. The city’s zoning ordinance specifically allows some home businesses in single-family zones if they are incidental to the property’s primary use as a residence. Taylor Zoning Ordinances § 2.02(42). Mortenview does not fit within the city’s definition of home business, however; its primary existence is as a business, arid the business is not incidental to the property’s use as a residence. Thus, Mortenview is not truly comparable to the home businesses in Taylor, and the city did not discriminate by treating it differently. See Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir.1992).
2. Treatment of Norir-Profit AFC Facilities
The second form of discriminatory enforcement identified by the district court is the city’s disparate treatment of disabled and non-disabled groups of more than six residents who wish to live together in a nonprofit setting. Taylor II, 872 F.Supp. at 434-35. Because the majority opinion does *801not discuss this issue, some background is helpful:
Mortenview is located in a single-family zone. The city of Taylor defines a family as follows:
a. A family is defined as: an individual or group of two or more persons related by blood, marriage or adoption, together with foster children and servants of the principal occupants, with not more than one (1) additional unrelated person who are domiciled together as a single, domestic, housekeeping unit in a dwelling unit, or
b. A collective member [sic] of individuals domiciled together in one (1) dwelling unit whose relationship is of a continuing non-transient domestic character and who are cooking and living as a single nonprofit housekeeping unit.
Taylor Zoning Ordinance § 2.02(36) (emphasis added). Thus, while there is no limit on the number of people who can live together in a nonprofit setting, for-profit uses are prohibited entirely in the single family zone.
However, Michigan law provides that all AFC facilities with six or fewer residents are considered residential uses and permitted in all residential zones, notwithstanding any local ordinance to the contrary:
In order to implement the policy of this state that persons in need of community residential care shall not be excluded by zoning from the benefits of normal residential surroundings, a state licensed residential facility providing supervision or care, or both, to 6 or less persons shall be considered a residential use of property for the purposes of zoning and a permitted use in all residential zones, including those zoned for single family dwellings, and shall not be subject to a special use or conditional use permit or procedure different from those required for other dwellings of similar density in the same zone.
M.C.L. § 125.588b(2). Thus, the combined effect of the city ordinance and the state statute is to limit for-profit AFC facilities in single family zones to no more than six residents, but to place no limit on the number of residents in nonprofit AFC facilities in single family zones.
In accordance with this statutory scheme, the city argued at the first trial that it denied the petition to expand Mortenview beyond six residents because Smith & Lee was a for-profit entity. Joint Appendix at 901-02, 910-11. On the first appeal, we specifically noted that if Mortenview were a non-profit facility, the city would have allowed it to expand. Smith & Lee, 18 F.3d at 931.
However, at the second trial and on this appeal, the city maintained that it would not allow an AFC with more than six residents in a single-family district even if it were nonprofit, claiming' that such a use would create density problems. Taylor II, 872 F.Supp. at 434 (emphasis added); Joint Appendix at 1600-01, 1616-17; Brief for Appellants at 12. This violates the city’s own zoning ordinances, which do not put any limit on the number of people who may live together in a non-profit setting. See Taylor Zoning Ordinances § 2.02(36). In contrast, the city did not declare that it would not allow more than six non-disabled residents to live in a nonprofit housekeeping unit in a single-family zone. See Taylor II, 872 F.Supp. at 434. In other words, the city explicitly stated that it would treat the disabled differently than those who were not disabled in violation of its own ordinances. This discriminatory enforcement is strong evidence of a discriminatory animus, and standing alone is sufficient to support the district court’s finding of intentional discrimination. In addition, it entirely undercuts the non-discriminatory rationale for the city’s decision, i.e., that the city was simply following its ordinances, which distinguish between profit and non-profit living arrangements.
Furthermore, the very fact that the city changed its rationale is evidence of discrimination. As we have specifically held in the employment discrimination context, a change in the reasons offered for a decision supports a finding that the reasons offered are pretexts for discrimination. Schwartz v. Gregory 45 F.3d 1017, 1021 (6th Cir.1995). Here, the city’s change in the rationale for its rejection of the petition to rezone is evidence of intentional discrimination.
Moreover, the density argument given by the city fails to withstand close inspection. *802The city would not prevent any number of people from living together as a non-profit unit in a single-family area if they did not live in an AFC facility. Taylor Zoning Ordinances § 2.02(36). Yet a large number of people living together would have the same impact on density regardless of whether they lived in an AFC facility. The fact that the city is concerned only with the density of AFC facilities is further evidence of discrimination.
In summary, the city has admitted that it would violate its own ordinances to exclude an AFC facility. This is clear evidence of discrimination, and supports the district court’s finding of intentional discrimination.
C. Discriminatory Statements
Next, the district court relied on discriminatory statements made by city officials. Taylor II, 872 F.Supp. at 435. The majority concedes that city officials made a few discriminatory remarks, but considers them minor and not sufficient, standing alone, to warrant a finding of discrimination. This understates the number and import of the remarks.
First, Gerald Crouch, the city’s executive director of developmental services, told the head of the Michigan Department of Social Services that he feared an AFC facility would house the mentally ill. Joint Appendix at 1180-81. He also testified on remand that it was his duty to protect Taylor’s single-family property owners from AFC facilities in their neighborhoods. Taylor II, 872 F.Supp. at 435. This is clear evidence of a discriminatory attitude toward the disabled.
Moreover, one consultant to the city stated that he feared the disabled adults might endanger the safety of neighbors. Joint Appendix at 1631-33. The chairman of the city council said that he opposed Mortenview Manor because it would lower property values. Taylor II, 872 F.Supp. at 435. He also justified the decision based on fear for the safety of the residents in a fire. Id. Obviously, the fire safety issue is not relevant to whether the AFC facility is located in a single-family or a multiple-family neighborhood; the fire safety issue remains the same regardless of where the house is located.
The majority only addresses the remarks made by the chairman, which it would dismiss as the opinion of one member of the city council. However, those remarks evidence a paternalistic and discriminatory attitude toward the handicapped, at least on behalf of one member of the council. In addition, this reasoning ignores the other comments. Finally, the majority holds that these comments are not sufficient, standing alone, to warrant a finding of discrimination. However, these comments do not stand alone. When they are combined with the other evidence of discrimination, they support a finding that discrimination was a motivating factor in the decision not to rezone.
D. Historical Discrimination
Finally, the district court relied on the city’s history of discrimination against the disabled. Taylor II, 872 F.Supp. at 435-36. Historical discrimination is often excellent evidence of discriminatory intent. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266, 97 S.Ct. at 563-64; Smith & Lee, 13 F.3d at 927-28. As the district court noted, Taylor has previously challenged the state’s AFC licensing act in an attempt to keep an AFC facility out of Taylor. See United States v. City of Taylor, Mich. (Taylor I), 798 F.Supp. 442, 448-49 (E.D.Mich.1992). This is strong historical evidence of discrimination against the disabled. On the first appeal, we specifically held that although this evidence is remote, it is also admissible and relevant. Smith & Lee, 13 F.3d at 928.
The majority relies on the remoteness of this evidence to discount its probative value. It is true that Taylor filed its challenge to the state law fifteen years ago. However, the events at issue in this case took place over 6 years ago. Thus, Taylor’s challenge to Michigan’s AFC licensing act occurred less than nine years before it denied the petition to rezone Mortenview. Moreover, even if the majority is correct, and this evidence, standing alone, is not sufficient to warrant a finding of discrimination, this evidence does not stand alone. It must be considered along with the discriminatory statements made by the city’s officials and employees, and the *803city’s stated willingness to discriminate against the disabled in violation of its own ordinances.
E. Alternative Rationales for the Decision
In summary, I believe that the evidence relied on by the district court is sufficient to support a finding that discrimination was a motivating factor in the decision not to rezone or otherwise accommodate Mortenview. Therefore, the burden shifts to the city to show that it would have reached the same decision absent any discriminatory motive.
The reasons provided by Taylor are entirely unconvincing. First, Taylor abandoned its argument that it was simply following the dictates of its ordinances, and admitted that it would have denied the petition even if Mortenview were non-profit and complied with the zoning ordinances. Second, Taylor relies on its concerns about density. However, as noted above, the city’s density concerns are equally implicated by any large group of people living together. There is nothing especially dense about an AFC facility. Yet, Taylor would not have made the same decision if a group of non-disabled people had decided to live together. Thus, density would not have led the city to the same decision absent discrimination. •
The majority argues that the city would have made the same decision due to its concerns about spot zoning. It is true that the city was reluctant to spot zone any property because it feared losing control over fixture uses of the property. Taylor II, 872 F.Supp. at 441. Thus, the district court concluded that rezoning was not a reasonable accommodation. Id. However, the city’s concerns about spot zoning fail to explain the city’s failure to accommodate Mortenview in other ways. As the majority recognizes, the city had many ways to accommodate Mortenview without spot zoning. For example, the city could have simply amended its zoning ordinance to create an exception for AFC facilities. In this way, the city could have accommodated Mortenview without losing control over the property.2
Because I believe that the evidence supports the district court’s conclusion that a discriminatory animus was a motivating factor in the city’s decision not to rezone or otherwise accommodate Mortenview, and that the evidence does not support the conclusion that the city would have reached the same conclusion' absent that discriminatory animus, I would affirm the finding of the district court as to intentional discrimination.
III.
Finally, because I disagree with the majority on the issue of intentional discrimination, I also disagree with the conclusion in part III-C-3 of the opinion that a civil penalty is inappropriate. The FHA provides that the district court may award a civil penalty of up to $50,000 for a first violation to vindicate the public interest. 42 U.S.C. § 3614(d)(1)(C)(i). We review the district court’s decision to impose a penalty for abuse of discretion. Smith & Lee, 13 F.3d at 932. In determining whether to assess a penalty, the district court should consider “the nature and circumstances of the violation, the degree of culpability, any history of past violations, the financial circumstances of that Defendant and the goal of deterrence, and other matters that justice may require.” Id. at 932 (quoting H.R. 711, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 40, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2201).
If I agreed that the city did not intentionally discriminate, then I might agree that a penalty is inappropriate. As we noted in our prior opinion, the law of reasonable accommodation is not sufficiently settled to justify a penalty simply for failure to accommodate. Smith & Lee, 13 F.3d at 932. However, because the district court found upon remand that the city intentionally discriminated, I believe that a penalty is in order.
On remand, the district court specifically did not impose a penalty for the city’s failure to accommodate Mortenview Manor; rather *804it imposed a penalty for the city’s intentional discrimination. Taylor II, 872 F.Supp. at 444. The district court then went on to detail the reasons for its findings. First, it pointed to the need to send a strong message to other communities that might seek to discriminate. Id. It also attacked what it called the city’s discriminatory behavior and its “not in my backyard” attitude. Id. In light of these findings, which are supported by the evidence, I cannot find that the district court abused its discretion in awarding a penalty of $20,000.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, while concurring in parts I, II, III-B, III-C-1, and III-C-2 of the majority opinion, I respectfully dissent from parts III-A and III-C-3.
. This is not to say that a failure to accommodate is always intentional discrimination. Rather, it simply means that a failure to accommodate may be intentional discrimination if it is motivated by a discriminatory animus.
. This is not to say that the district court should have ordered the city to amend its zoning ordinance. I agree with the majority that we lack the power to order the city to enact legislation. Rather, I am merely observing that a general refusal to spot zone does not, and cannot, explain the city’s refusal to accommodate Mortenview, because the city had other ways of accommodating Mortenview without spot zoning.