Shop ‘n Save Warehouse Foods, Inc., a grocery chain operating stores in the St. Louis metropolitan area, appeals from the judgment of the District Court in favor of Kimberly Brandt on her claims of sex discrimination. We reverse.
Brandt, a member of the United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW) Local 88 labor union, worked as a “casual” meat wrapper out of the union hall from 1987 to July 1991.1 That is, she worked for Shop ‘n Save and other grocery stores on an “as needed,” temporary basis.2 The Shop ‘n Save employees who knew Brandt and worked with her, without exception, praised her work. In August 1990, Brandt sent a letter to Richard *936Marty, then acting senior vice president of human resources for Shop ‘n Save, and a similar letter to Harold “Butch” Covili, Shop ‘n Save’s senior vice president of operations, expressing interest in joining Shop ‘n Save as a permanent employee, in a position as, in her words, a “female apprentice meat cutter,” or in front-end management or co-management. As a courtesy, Marty interviewed Brandt on September ,7, 1990, and told her then and in a follow-up letter dated ten days later that Shop ‘n Save did not have a position to offer her. ■ Marty’s letter, said Brandt’s resume would be retained in Shop ‘n Save’s “active files” for one year. Brandt testified ■ that, in the same time frame, she. also told Danny Howard, who was one of three “meat specialists” each assigned to supervise meat operations at approximately one-third of Shop ‘n Save’s twenty-eight stores, of her interest in an apprentice meat cutter position with Shop ‘n Save. As of trial, Shop ‘n Save had only one female meat cutter, who had been hired by the company when it acquired a Kroger store where she was employed. The evidence also shows that, of the 600-650 meat cutters on Local 88’s membership roster at that time, only three or four were female. .
In May 1991, Marty hired John Dougherty to fill the position of senior vice president of human resources, the position Marty himself had been holding temporarily, and Marty returned to his position with Shop ‘n Save’s parent corporation. At this time, Covili also was no longer working in Shop ‘n Save’s St. Louis office. So Marty and Covili were out of the picture as far as the day-to-day operations of Shop ‘n Save’s St. Louis area stores were concerned, but Howard, who also knew of Brandt’s ambitions, was still working for the company as a meat specialist. During the month of May, after Dougherty was hired, the events leading up to Brandt’s lawsuit transpired, although the record does not establish a precise sequence.
Sometime during the month, after Dough-erty assumed his duties, he received a call from Bob Frentzel, an old friend he had known since 1966. Frentzel had experienced some employment setbacks since 1988, and in fact had been unemployed for five months before he called Dougherty. He sought whatever employment assistance Dougherty could offer. Also in May, Dougherty, together with Bill Fant, Shop ‘n Save’s meat manager, who had overall responsibility for the meat departments in all area stores, decided to hire an apprentice meat cutter, someone with management experience and “some college,” but not necessarily any meat experience. The apprentice meat cutter job description in the UFCW Local 88 contract with Shop ‘n Save in effect at that time did not say that the apprentice position was a management position, nor did the job description give any indication that any college education would be preferred, much less required, of the successful meat cutter apprentice. Dougherty and Fant’s ostensible goal, however, was to move the person who was hired for the job into management after the two-year meat cutter apprenticeship was completed. This was the first time (and the last, as it turns out) that Shop ‘n Save created an apprentice meat cutter position, although the union contract allowed one such position in each store if Local 88 gave its permission, as it did in this case.
In hiring a person to fill this new job, Dougherty and Fant never searched the “active files” for potential candidates who might have applied for employment with Shop ‘n Save before the apprentice position was created. The job was never posted or otherwise advertised. Frentzel was the only person interviewed or even considered to fill the position. Dougherty, Fant, and Howard (who reported to Fant) all participated in the hiring of Frentzel. Frentzel had management experience, although not for several years; he had “some college,” although serious doubt was cast upon both just how much “some” is and the extent to which the decision-makers were genuinely interested in that aspect of Frentzel’s background; and he had virtually no meat experience. Brandt had neither management experience nor “some college,” but she did have extensive meat experience. By June 3, 1991, Bob Frentzel was on the job in the apprentice position, at the Shop ‘n Save store where Brandt happened to be working as a meat wrapper out of the union hall. As of the date of trial on Brandt’s claims, three and one-half *937years after he was hired and one and one-half years after he completed the apprentice program, Frentzel had not been promoted to a management position, despite the fact that Shop ‘n Save had filled several openings for such positions with other individuals.
The same day Frentzel went to work for Shop ‘n Save, Brandt confronted Dougherty and told him she had previously submitted a resume and had expressed an interest in a position as an apprentice meat cutter. She told Dougherty she believed his failure to consider her for the apprentice job was sex discrimination. Two weeks later, Brandt filed a charge of employment discrimination against Shop ‘n Save with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Missouri Commission on Human Rights. Brandt filed suit against Shop ‘n Save in May 1992, alleging sex discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17, and the comparable Missouri employment discrimination law, Mo.Rev.Stat. §§ 213.010-.126. Trial was held before a jury and, by consent of the parties and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), before a magistrate judge. The jury found for Shop ‘n Save on Brandt’s claim of retaliation, but for Brandt on her claim of sex discrimination. The jury farther determined that Shop ‘n Save’s conduct in this matter was such that punitive damages were warranted. In addition, in derogation of the court’s instructions, the jury specified not only an amount of punitive damages (which was supposed to be determined in a later proceeding and for which the jury had no evidence), but also that Shop ‘n Save should pay Brandt’s attorney fees. After disposing of post-trial motions, the Magistrate Judge entered judgment on the jury’s verdict, awarding Brandt equitable relief and $22,500 in compensatory damages. The court also awarded Brandt $35,000 in punitive damages and $39,852.25 in attorney fees and costs. Judgment was entered in favor of Shop ‘n Save on Brandt’s claim of retaliation. Shop ‘n Save appeals.
For its first issue on appeal, Shop ‘n Save contends that the court erred in denying its motion for judgment as a matter of law (JAML). We review de novo, “applying the same standard as the district court and overturning the verdict only if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, is insufficient to support the verdict.” Karcher v. Emerson Elec. Co., 94 F.3d 502, 507 (8th Cir.1996), petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3587 (Feb. 5, 1997) (No. 96-1304). We have recited the facts in this opinion mindful of that standard, but we have omitted those facts relating to Brandt’s retaliation claim, the adverse judgment on which Brandt does not appeal.
Shop ‘n Save makes a two-part argument on its JAML issue. First, the company claims that Brandt faded to prove a prima facie case of sex discrimination under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), and its progeny.3 In the event we disagree and conclude that Brandt proved her prima facie case, Shop ‘n Save alternatively argues.that Brandt did not sustain her ultimate burden of proof under St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2749, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). That is, Shop ‘n Save contends it answered Brandt’s prima facie case with legitimate reasons for its actions, and that she was unable to show those reasons were a pretext for intentional discrimination. Because we conclude as a matter of law that Brandt did not prove that her gender was a motivating factor in Shop ‘n Save’s decision to hire Frentzel instead of her, we do not consider the challenged aspects of the prima facie case. We assume for purposes of this appeal that Brandt proved a prima facie case of sex discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence.
Once the employee offers sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination, it becomes the employer’s burden to produce evidence that it had legitimate, nondiseriminatory reasons for its actions. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 507, 113 S.Ct. at 2747. If it does so, the “presumption [of *938discrimination] raised by the prima facie case is rebutted.” Id. (quoting Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094-95, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981)) (alteration added by this Court). The burden of persuasion — “the ultimate burden” — then moves to the employee to prove that the employment action in question was taken at least in part because of her sex. Id. In this phase of the case, the employee ordinarily attempts to prove that the employer’s articulated reasons are pretextual, thus raising the inference that sex was a motivating factor for the adverse employment action. But it is not enough that the employee submit evidence of pretext such that the jury disbelieves the defendant’s “legitimate” reasons. See O’Bryan v. KTIV Television, 64 F.3d 1188, 1192 (8th Cir.1995) (“[A] plaintiffs proof of pretext, with respect to the defendant’s proffered reason for its actions, is relevant to, but not dispositive of, the ultimate issue of intentional discrimination.”) (emphasis added). “That the employer’s proffered reason is unpersuasive, or even obviously contrived, does not necessarily establish that the plaintiffs proffered reason of [sex] is correct. That remains a question for the factfinder to answer, subject, of course, to appellate review — which should be conducted ... under the ‘clearly erroneous’ standard_” Hicks, 509 U.S. at 524, 113 S.Ct. at 2756. We conclude, after de novo review and giving Brandt the' benefit of all reasonable inferences that might be drawn from the evidence, that the jury’s finding of unlawful discrimination cannot be sustained as there is insufficient evidence to support it, and that Shop ‘n Save was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Brandt’s claims of sex discrimination.
Shop ‘n Save contends that it proffered a legitimate reason for hiring Frentzel instead of Brandt. According to the company, Brandt was not qualified to fill the apprentice position as it was conceived by Dougherty and Fant, because she had neither management experience nor “some college.” We have carefully reviewed the record in this case, and we are confident that the jury easily might have found that Shop ‘n Save— Dougherty specifically, with Fant’s assistance — created the apprentice meat cutter position and its qualifications with the express purpose of hiring Frentzel to fill it, that is, that Shop n’ Save’s proffered “legitimate reason” was a fabrication, a pretext for its true reasons. We are so persuaded ourselves. But notwithstanding Shop ‘n Save’s arguable dissembling about its reasons for hiring Frentzel, we do not believe that Brandt has met her burden of proving that the pretext was intended to conceal unlawful discrimination or that her gender in any way motivated the hiring of Frentzel instead of Brandt. The “fact sensitive” issue at this stage of the analysis is “whether the employee has provided evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the employer intentionally discriminated against the employee for a prohibited reason.” Rothmeier v. Investment Advisers, Inc., 85 F.3d 1328, 1334 (8th Cir.1996). We hold that she has not.
The evidence shows that- Frentzel took advantage of his “network” to land the apprentice meat cutter position, and that Dougherty obliged his friend by supporting his application for the position, if not creating a tailor-made position for Frentzel. We do not condone the exclusion of Brandt as a viable candidate on this basis. But it is not intentional sex discrimination for Dougherty to hiré an unemployed old friend who happens to be male, without considering an applicant who is neither unemployed nor an old friend and happens to be female. An employer’s business decision concerning hiring need not be a good decision to withstand a challenge for sex discrimination; it is enough that it not be motivated by the gender of the employee who is adversely affected by the decision. The proof at trial was that Shop ‘n Save had hired no males or females to be apprentice meat cutters before Frentzel, and has hired none since. It is apparent that the position was created for Frentzel, with the job’s “qualifications” tailored to Frentzel’s background, rather than that Frentzel coincidentally and fortuitously happened into a just-created position that required his “qualifications.” The fact that Frentzel has yet to be promoted to a management position lends credence to that inference. But such actions, although, unfair from the standpoint of *939Brandt and persons of either gender who are similarly situated, are not a violation of state and federal laws prohibiting sex discrimination in employment. See Hutson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 63 F.3d 771, 781 (8th Cir.1995) (“[T]he employment-discrimination laws have not vested in the federal courts the authority to sit as super-personnel departments reviewing the wisdom or fairness of the business judgments made by employers, except to the extent that those judgments involve intentional discrimination.”). The evidence suggests that at no time during the proceedings did Shop ‘n Save fully acknowledge the reasons Frentzel was selected to fill the apprentice meat cutter position, and the jury evidently found the company’s prevarication not at all to its liking. Nevertheless, no reasonable jury could have found that Frentzel was hired to the exclusion of Brandt because Brandt is female. See Gathright v. St. Louis Teacher’s Credit Union, 97 F.3d 266, 268 (8th Cir.1996) (stating that denial of motion for JAML should be affirmed “if a reasonable jury could differ as to the conclusions that could be drawn”). Shop ‘n Save thus is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Nothing in our recent en banc decision in Ryther v. KARE 11, 108 F.3d 832 (8th Cir. 1997), requires a contrary conclusion. This is a case “where the evidence of pretext is inconsistent with an inference of intentional discrimination.” Id. at 837 n. 2. Of course, Brandt was free to “rely on the same evidence to prove both pretext and discrimination,” but that does not prevent our reversal of the denial of Shop ‘n Save’s motion for JAML where “the evidence is insufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to infer unlawful discrimination.” Id. at 848 n. 13 (Loken, J., in a partial separate concurrence commanding a majority of the Court en banc.)
Shop ‘n Save raises a number of other issues in its appeal. Because of our disposition of the first issue, it is unnecessary for us to consider those that remain.
The judgment of-the District Court is reversed and the case is remanded with instructions for the court to enter judgment for Shop ‘n Save.
. The 1993 UFCW Local 88 collective bargaining agreement with Shop 'n Save now calls the meat wrapper position "meat clerk,” and has broadened the job description to include all duties previously assigned the “meat cutter” position, except operating a band saw.
. In July 1991, Brandt was hired by Shop 'n Save as a permanent employee, working as a meat wrapper (now meat clerk).
. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), sets out the analysis to be applied to cases where the proof of alleged discrimination is circumstantial. Brandt makes no claim that there is direct evidence Shop ‘n Save discriminated against her, so the McDonnell Douglas framework is appropriate here.