dissenting:
In the waning days of the United Kingdom’s sovereignty over Hong Kong, the majority’s holding is a death knell for Hong Kong corporations seeking access to our federal courts under alienage jurisdiction. Because I believe the failure to recognize Hong Kong as a “foreign state” or as a “citizen or subject” of the United Kingdom—at this critical juncture—is contrary to the purposes of alienage jurisdiction—I respectfully dissent.
As Dorothy said in the Wizard of Oz: “if I ever go looking for my heart’s desire ... I won’t look any further than my own backyard.” This applies with equal force when we consider the extent to which we will open federal courts to foreigners under alienage diversity jurisdiction. We need look no further than our own Constitution.
The basis for diversity jurisdiction stems from Article III of the Constitution, which extends judicial power, inter alia, to all cases “between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.” U.S. Const. art. Ill, § 2. The primary reason for diversity jurisdiction is to provide a neutral forum. Another compelling reason for establishing alienage jurisdiction is to avoid entanglements with foreign sovereigns. Providing a neutral federal forum avoids the appearance of injustice or grounds for resentment in the relations of the United States with other nations. See Hong Kong Deposit and Guar. Co. Ltd. v. Hibdon, 602 F.Supp. 1378, 1383 (S.D.N.Y.1985). Because the quintessence of alienage diversity jurisdiction is being challenged today, we risk antagonizing two world forces—the United Kingdom and China. The burgeoning global business community fosters economic interdependence and the United States cannot act without regard to the concerns of the rest of the world.
Despite the loss of Hong Kong, there are several remaining British Crown Colonies subject to direct control by the British Government.1 Corporations in the colonies as well as other dependent territories are placed in jeopardy by the majority’s holding. Currently, Great Britain opens its courts to foreign corporations. See 7(2) Halsbury’s Laws of England ¶ 1786 (Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone ed., 4th ed.1996) (referring to companies regulated by the Companies Act 1985 of Great Britain). Will this decision have an adverse effect resulting in changes to British law limiting American corporations’ access to British courts?
*89When Congress implemented the Article III constitutional grant of authority with the Judiciary Act of 1789, it used the terms “foreigner” and “alien” instead of “subject” and “citizen.” The use of such terms strongly suggests that the Framers intended to grant access to federal courts to all aliens involved in litigation with a United States citizen. Nearly one hundred years later, Congress amended the Act to conform to the language in the Constitution. However, nowhere is there an indication that such an amendment intended to limit jurisdiction. The terms “subject” and “citizen” were used to open our courts to all foreigners despite the government under which they lived {e.g. a monarchy has “subjects;” a republic has “citizens.” 15 James Wm. Moore et. al., Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 102.74 (3d ed.1997)). A person with no affiliation is “stateless” and cannot avail himself of diversity jurisdiction. This is the result that would be achieved should we refuse to recognize Hong Kong as a “subject” or “citizen” of the United Kingdom.
The idea of statelessness was not in the contemplation of the Framers and it is likely that the Framers envisioned “citizens or subjects of foreign states” to be anyone who is not a United States citizen. This reasoning was corroborated in 1833 by Justice Story when he reviewed the jurisdictional provisions of the Constitution. He wrote: “ ‘[t]he inquiry may here be made, who are to be deemed aliens entitled to sue in the courts of the United States? The general answer is, any person who is not a citizen of the United States.’ ” 11 Am. U.J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 195, 211 (quoting 2 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 1700 at 499 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., 5th ed. Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1891)(1833); The Federalist No. 80, at 588-89 (Alexander Hamilton) (B. Wright ed., 1961)). Nevertheless, our jurisprudence has heretofore barred stateless persons from access to our federal courts. Today, the majority bars stateless corporations as well.
A stateless corporation is an oxymoron. In the United States, a corporation cannot be created without the imprimatur of the state. This is also true in Great Britain and Hong Kong. Under British law, companies incorporated in parts of the Commonwealth outside Great Britain, without establishing a place of business in Great Britain, are governed by the corporate legislation in force in the area of incorporation. See 7(2) Halsbury’s Laws of England ¶ 1781. Similarly, under Hong Kong law, companies incorporated outside Hong Kong are considered “overseas companies.” Companies Ordinance 1984 of Hong Kong § 332. However, the exclusion by British law of such companies was not intended to create a “stateless corporation.” Indeed, the opposite is true. The Companies Act of 1985 ensures “a home” for companies by providing that corporate nationality be associated with the country in which it was registered. See 7(1) Halsbury’s Laws of England ¶ 94. As a result of such concern, a Hong kong corporation, such as Matimak, is denied access to our federal courts under alienage diversity jurisdiction because it is not a British corporation. Is it thus so easy to disavow a person or a corporate entity?
In evaluating who are the citizens of another country, this Court has held “[i]t is the undoubted right of each country to determine who are its nationals, and ... such a determination will usually be accepted by other nations.” Murarka v. Bachrack Bros. Inc., 215 F.2d 547, 553 (2d Cir.1954). However, it is time to reevaluate whether our courts should look to foreign laws to determine who are foreign citizens for purposes of United States’ alienage diversity jurisdiction. We would not allow foreign law to grant privileges in the United States, why should we allow foreign law to deny privileges afforded under the Constitution? It is undisputed that the privileges of British nationality are not conferred on corporations formed under the laws of Hong Kong. However, two things are clear: (1) Great Britain did not enact the Companies Act of 1985 in contemplation that a Hong Kong corporation would be denied access to United States’ federal courts; and (2) the United States is not concerned with disputes between two foreign persons or entities. We are concerned with the disputes between our citizens and the “citizens or subjects” of foreign states.
*90There is grave danger if access to our federal courts is determined by foreign law. If we grant or deny jurisdiction based on another country’s definition of its citizenry, we may unintentionally promote discrimination against certain classes of people or entities. Here, British law states that a Hong Kong corporation is not a “citizen” of Great Britain. Therefore, diversity jurisdiction is denied. After reversion, the citizenry of China and the right of abode will be determined according to the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Nationality Act. The complexity of these laws raises concern because they differentiate between ethnic and non-ethnic Chinese residents of Hong Kong leaving some to speculate whether they will become stateless. See Samantha B. Whitehouse, “Status of Residents of Hong Kong After July 1, 1997,” 10 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 799 (1996); “Looking to the Future with Confidence,” South China Morning Post, April 13, 1996 (1996 WL 3756051); Kewalram Sital, “Why the Ethnic Minorities Deserve Better Treatment,” South China Morning Post, August 29,1993. However, reversion gives a Hong Kong corporation no advantage. Under the Basie Law, laws previously in force in Hong Kong shall be maintained. See Article 8, Basic Law. Extending the same logic used to interpret citizenship under British law—a Hong Kong corporation will be governed by the Hong Kong Companies Ordinance of 1984 and not the Chinese Nationality Act which applies to natural persons. Therefore, a Hong Kong corporation will remain a citizen of Hong Kong after reversion and once again we sit on the horns of a dilemma. Unless we recognize Hong Kong as a limited purpose foreign state or as a political subdivision of China— alienage diversity jurisdiction will be denied.
The United States and the international community recognize Hong Kong as an autonomous force. Congress recognizes Hong Kong as a separate foreign state for the purposes of per-country numerical limitations under Section 202 of the Immigration and Naturalization Act. H.R.Rep. No. 101-723(1) at 196 (1990), reprinted, in 1990 U.S.S.C.A.N. 6710. Hong Kong is: recognized as an autonomous entity in the economic and trade arena, see 22 U.S.C. § 5701 (1997)2; a contracting party to the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade, see id. § 5712(3), and thereby accorded most favored nation status by the United States; considered a member country in the United States Information Agency educational exchange program, see H.R.Rep. No. 128(1), 104th Cong. § 2403 (1995); and a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Hong Kong is a founding member of the World Trade Organization and strongly supports an open multilateral trading system and is a member in its own right in several multilateral economic organizations including the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation and the Asian Development Bank. With respect to the legislative arena and international conventions, Hong Kong has acceded to the Paris Convention on industrial property, the Berne copyright convention, and the Geneva and Paris Universal Copyright Conventions. See Department of State, 1995 and 1996 Country Reports on Economic Policy and Trade Practices (Hong Kong).
Eschewing such widespread recognition of Hong Kong as a limited purpose autonomous entity to justify alienage diversity jurisdiction, the majority also rejects the argument that a Hong Kong corporation may be recognized as a “citizen or subject” of the United Kingdom. Until reversion, Hong Kong remains a British Crown Colony. Hong Kong law is not merely traceable to Great Britain—it exists only through the Queen. The Governor of Hong Kong is appointed by the Queen. He is empowered by the Letters Patent to make laws (ordinances) for Hong Kong. However, all ordinances must be sent to England and should they be found to be defective, the Queen can disallow them. *91Hong Kong is a part and parcel of the Commonwealth. In fact, in multilateral fora, such as the International Telecommunications Union or the International Labor Organization, Hong Kong participates as part of the United Kingdom as it does in those conventions that only allow sovereign state participation. These are ties that bind, not strangle. For the past 155 years, Hong Kong was inexorably linked to Great Britain and should be afforded similar privileges under United States law.
There is a dearth of eases addressing this issue because our federal courts have inherently recognized Hong Kong, as well as other British Dependent Territories. This Court recognized Bermuda for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, stating:
[tjhere is no question that diversity jurisdiction exists. NSC is a Bermuda corporation with its principal place of business in Bermuda----the statutory and constitutional requirements of diversity jurisdiction are satisfied.
Netherlands Shipmortgage Corp., Ltd. v. Madias, 717 F.2d 731, 735 (2d Cir.1983). That same year, the Southern District recognized the Channel Islands for purposes of diversity jurisdiction even though they are “not a fully integrated part of the United Kingdom.” Cedec Trading Ltd. v. United Am. Coal Sales, Inc., 556 F.Supp. 722, 724 (S.D.N.Y.1983). It is interesting to note that the Cedec court recognized the Channel Islands even though they are specifically excluded as part of the United Kingdom under the Companies Act of 1948. One year later, the same court opined, in dicta, that Hong Kong is a “foreign state” for purposes of diversity jurisdiction stating: “[i]t would seem hyperteehnieal to preclude Hong Kong corporations from asserting claims in our courts simply because Hong Kong has not been formally recognized by the United States.... ” Tetra Finance (HK) Ltd. v. Shaheen, 584 F.Supp. 847, 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
Other courts follow this line of reasoning. The Seventh Circuit held that the Cayman Islands (as a British Dependent Territory) was a “foreign state” for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. See Wilson v. Humphreys (Cayman), Ltd., 916 F.2d 1239, 1242 (7th Cir.1990) (relying on this Court’s reasoning in Netherlands Shipmortgage). In Timco Engineering, Inc. v. Rex & Co., Inc., 603 F.Supp. 925, 930 n. 8 (E.D.Pa.1985) the court sua sponte found the reasoning of the Southern District of New York (in Tetra Finance (HK)) to be persuasive and held that the presence of a Hong Kong citizen (plaintiff corporation) does not deprive the court of jurisdiction. In fact it is only Windert and its progeny3 that urge “form” over “substance.” Later cases reflect challenges to or outright rejection of Windert’s reasoning.4 But these cases, pro or con, were decided well before the full implications of reversion were realized.
The majority emphasizes the importance of affording deference to the Executive Branch. In fact, it extensively quotes from Calderone in which this Court sustained alienage diversity jurisdiction because the Executive Branch made its wishes known. Calderone, 325 F.2d at 77. In this case, the Department of State and the Department of Justice unequivocally made their wishes known'—they withdrew support of de facto recognition of Hong Kong and urged this Court to recognize Hong Kong as a “citizen or subject” of the United Kingdom. Finally, although political and economic considerations are not the realm of the judiciary, the United States has strong economic and political interests in Hong Kong. See 22 U.S.C. § 5701(4); Department of State, 1996 Country Reports on Economic Policy and Trade Practices (through November 1996, Hong Kong’s trade with the United States exceeded $23 billion).
*92The facts, actions and other factors discussed above, when considered in the aggregate, demonstrate an implicit willingness by Congress and an explicit request by the Executive Branch to permit a Hong Kong corporation to litigate its claims in our federal courts. Hong Kong is a unique and critical component in the scheme of international policies and global economic expansion. Access to our federal courts is justified without exceeding the boundaries of judicial authority. There are adequate constitutional, statutory and prudential grounds to open our federal courts to Matimak by: (1) recognizing Hong Kong as a “foreign state” for the limited purpose of alienage diversity jurisdiction; (2) recognizing Hong Kong as a political subdivision of a foreign state; or (3) recognizing Hong Kong’s people and entities as “citizens or subjects” of the United Kingdom today and after July 1, 1997, of the People’s Republic of China. Today’s contrary conclusion opens the door to the very political entanglements the Constitution and § 1332 sought to avoid.
. Bermuda, St. Helena, Falkland Islands, British Virgin. Islands, Cayman Islands and Gibraltar.
. Congress enacted the Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 to give Hong Kong special status enabling it to maintain its autonomous role in: bi-lateral agreements with the United States; participation in multilateral organizations; economic and trade matters; transportation; cultural and educational exchanges; and the application of United States law. The United States will continue to treat Hong Kong as a distinct legal entity, separate and apart from China, in all areas in which China has agreed to grant such autonomy. See 22 U.S.C. § 5701 et seq.
. See St. Germain v. West Bay Leasing, Ltd., No. 81-CV-3945 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1982); Iran Handicraft and Carpet Export Ctr. v. Marjan Int’l Corp., 868 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir.1988).
. See Wilson, 916 F.2d at 1243 ("the force of the Windert decision has been eroded by a more recent case from the same court.” (referring to Tetra Finance v. Shaheen, 584 F.Supp. 847 (S.D.N.Y.1984))); Creative Distribs., Ltd. v. Sari Niketan, Inc., No. 89 C 3614, 1989 WL 105210, at *2 (N.D.Ill. Sept. 1, 1989) (“We are not persuaded by the Court’s reasoning in Windert.")-, Timco, 603 F.Supp. at 930 n. 8 ("The Windert decision does not ... represent an unchallenged view of Hong Kong’s status.").