Santee Sioux Tribe of Nebraska (Tribe) appeals the district court’s1 order dismissing for lack of jurisdiction the Tribe’s action against the State of Nebraska (State) and its governor, E. Benjamin Nelson, filed pursuant to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-21 (1994). The district court determined the State had not consented to the Tribe’s suit and, relying on Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, — U.S. , 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996), sua sponte dismissed the Tribe’s action. The Tribe appeals, asserting the State waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity by enacting a statute referencing the IGRA, or alternatively, by filing an answer and counterclaim in this lawsuit. The Tribe further argues that Governor Nelson is subject to suit pursuant to the doctrine of Ex parte Young.2 We affirm.
I.
The IGRA was enacted in 1988 for the purpose of providing a statutory basis for the operation and regulation of Indian gaming. See 25 U.S.C. § 2702; Seminole Tribe, — U.S. at -, 116 S.Ct. at 1119. Under the IGRA, Indian gaming is divided into three classes; class I (social games for prizes of minimal value or traditional forms of Indian gaming performed in connection with tribal ceremonies or celebrations), class II (bingo and other games of chance similar to bingo, and certain card games), and class III (all other forms of gaming that are not class I or class II gaming). See 25 U.S.C. § 2703(6)-(8). Section 2710 describes those situations where class III gaming is legal, and provides in part that such gaming must be “conducted in conformance with a Tribal-State compact entered into by the Indian Tribe and the State” under the IGRA. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(C). The IGRA further describes the manner of negotiating Tribal-State compacts; any Indian tribe having jurisdiction over Indian lands where class III gaming is being conducted, or is to be conducted, must request the state in which the lands are located to enter into negotiations for the purpose of entering into a Tribal-State compact governing such class III gaming. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3). Upon receiving such a request, the state is required to negotiate in good faith with the Indian tribe to enter into such a compact, and United States district courts have jurisdiction over any cause of action initiated by an Indian tribe arising from a state’s failure to enter into negotiations or to conduct such negotiations in good faith. See id.; 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)®.
In February 1996, the Tribe filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska, alleging the State and Governor Nelson failed to conduct good faith negotiations with the Tribe for purposes of entering into a Tribal-State compact for conducting class III gaming on the Tribe’s reservation. The Tribe sought declaratory relief and requested an order compelling the *430State to form a Tribal-State compact within sixty days. The State answered, urging that the suit was barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity; the State also filed a counterclaim, requesting a declaratory judgment that the Tribe’s casino operations were being conducted in violation of IGRA and seeking a permanent injunction enjoining the Tribe from operating its casino.
In March 1996, the Supreme Court decided Seminole Tribe, holding that Congress lacked authority under the Indian Commerce Clause to abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity, and that section 2710(d)(7) cannot grant federal jurisdiction over states that do not consent to suit. See Seminole Tribe, — U.S. at -, 116 S.Ct. at 1119. The Court further held the doctrine of Ex parte Young inapplicable to allow suit against Florida’s governor, thus finding the suit against the governor also barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at ---, 116 S.Ct. at 1132-33.
In April 1996, the district court dismissed the Tribe’s action sua sponte, relying on Seminole Tribe; the court dismissed the State’s counterclaim as well. The court denied the Tribe’s motions for a new trial and to amend the complaint. The Tribe appeals, arguing that the State waived its immunity by enacting Neb.Rev.Stat. § 9-1,106 (Supp. 1996), entitled “Tribal-state compact governing gaming; Governor; powers,” which states in relevant part:
(1) Upon request of an Indian tribe having jurisdiction over Indian lands in Nebraska, the Governor or his or her designated representative or representatives shall, pursuant to 25 U.S.C. 2710 of the federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, negotiate with such Indian tribe in good faith for the purpose of entering into a tribal-state compact governing the conduct of Class III gaming as defined in the act. A compact which is negotiated pursuant to this section shall be executed by the Governor without ratification by the Legislature.
* * *
(3) Such compact negotiations shall be conducted pursuant to the provisions of 25 U.S.C. 2710 of the federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.
Alternatively, the Tribe suggests the State waived its immunity by filing a counterclaim and requesting declaratory and injunctive relief. Finally, the Tribe argues that the State’s enactment of section 9-1,106 subjects Governor Nelson to suit under Ex parte Young.
The State urges that section 9-1,106 did not waive Eleventh Amendment immunity as to either the State or Governor Nelson, and that an assistant attorney general may not waive the State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity by answering a complaint in federal court and filing a counterclaim.
II.
Under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, the “[jjudicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const, amend. XI. While not specifically set forth in the text, the Eleventh Amendment has been interpreted “to extend to suits by all persons against a state in federal court.” Moad v. Arkansas State Police Dep’t, 111 F.3d 585, 586 (8th Cir.1997) (internal quotations omitted). A state, however, may consent to suit in federal court. See Burk v. Beene, 948 F.2d 489, 493 (8th Cir.1991).
This court reviews de novo the question of whether a state waives Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Thomas v. FAG Bearings Corp., 50 F.3d 502, 504 (8th Cir.1995). “The test for determining whether a State has waived its immunity from federal-court jurisdiction is a stringent one.” Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241, 105 S.Ct. 3142, 3146, 87 L.Ed.2d 171 (1985). A State is “deemed to have waived its immunity only where stated by the most express language or by such overwhelming implication from the text as will leave no room for any other reasonable construction.” Id. at 239-40, 105 S.Ct. at 3146 (internal quotations omitted). Federalism interests “require that such a waiver be clear and unequivocal.” Burk, 948 F.2d at 493 (citing *431Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 305, 110 S.Ct. 1868, 1872-73, 109 L.Ed.2d 264 (1990)). A State’s general waiver of sovereign immunity is insufficient to waive Eleventh Amendment immunity, because to waive Eleventh Amendment immunity, the state must specify an intent to subject itself to federal court jurisdiction.3 See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 241, 105 S.Ct. at 3146-47.
III.
A.
We conclude neither the language of section 9-1,106, nor its purpose as reflected in its legislative history indicates the State of Nebraska’s consent to federal court jurisdiction. The plain language of section 9-1,106 does not contain a clear and unequivocal waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Further, the legislative history of section 9-1,106 reflects that the legislature was concerned that the IGRA does not designate which state official shall be responsible for negotiating the Tribal-State compact, and was aware that at least one other state’s court had concluded the state’s governor lacked authority to negotiate on behalf of the state.4 Accordingly, section 9-1,106 was introduced and passed for the purpose of assuring the governor of Nebraska the power to negotiate Tribal-State compacts on behalf of the State of Nebraska without ratification by the Nebraska Legislature. See Introducer’s Statement of Intent on L.B. 231, Neb. Unicameral, 93rd Leg., 1st Sess. (Feb. 22, 1993); Kenneth C. Winston, Committee Counsel, Memo to Members of the General Affairs Committee of the Nebraska Unicameral regarding L.B. 231 (Feb. 22, 1993); Committee Statement of the General Affairs Committee of the Nebraska Unicameral, L.B. 231, 93rd Leg., 1st Sess. (Feb. 22,1993); Hearing on L.B. 231, Before Committee on General Affairs of the Nebraska Unicameral, 93rd Leg., 1st Sess. 82-85 (Feb. 22, 1993) (remarks of Kenneth Winston and John Adams).
Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Val-U Construction Co., 50 F.3d 560 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 78, 133 L.Ed.2d 37 (1995), cited by the Tribe is inapposite. In Rosebud, we concluded that the Rosebud Tribe’s contractual agreement to decide disputes in accordance with arbitration rules, which themselves contained a consent to judgment upon an arbitration award by a federal court, constituted a waiver of tribal sovereign immunity as to claims arising “under the contract.” Id. at 562-63. In the instant action, by contrast, the Nebraska Legislature has merely specified that Nebraska’s governor shall conduct class III negotiations without ratification of the Legislature and that the negotiations are to be conducted pursuant to IGRA. It cannot reasonably be said that, by referring to a federal statute that includes an unconstitutional attempt to abrogate states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity, the Nebraska Legislature intended to waive Nebraska’s immunity.
B.
We further conclude the Nebraska assistant attorney general’s conduct in answering the complaint and filing a counterclaim does not constitute a waiver of Nebraska’s Eleventh Amendment immunity. While it is true that a state may waive Eleventh Amendment immunity through its conduct, see Hankins v. Finnel, 964 F.2d 853, 856 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1013, 113 S.Ct. 635, 121 L.Ed.2d 566 (1992), a state official may waive the state’s immunity only where specifically authorized to do so by that state’s constitution, statutes, or decisions. See Ford *432Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 467, 65 S.Ct. 347, 352, 89 L.Ed. 389 (1945); Booth v. Maryland, 112 F.3d 139, 145 n. 2 (4th Cir.1997); Estate of Porter ex rel. Nelson v. Illinois, 36 F.3d 684, 690-91 (7th Cir.1994); Silver v. Baggiano, 804 F.2d 1211, 1214 (11th Cir.1986). The Tribe has failed to demonstrate that waiver of the State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity is within the authority of Nebraska’s attorney general. See O’Connor v. Slaker, 22 F.2d 147, 152-53 (8th Cir.1927), appeal dismissed, 278 U.S. 188, 49 S.Ct. 158, 73 L.Ed. 258 (1929).
We thus conclude the Tribe’s action against the State is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
C.
We also conclude the Tribe’s action against Governor Nelson is barred by the Eleventh Amendment, as the amendment operates to bar suit against a state official where the state is the “ ‘real, substantial party in interest.’ ” See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101, 104 S.Ct. 900, 908, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984) (quoting Ford Motor Co., 323 U.S. at 464, 65 S.Ct. at 350-51); Dover Elevator Co. v. Arkansas State Univ., 64 F.3d 442, 447 (8th Cir.1995). Although the doctrine of Ex parte Young, allows suit against state officials in their official capacity for prospective injunctive relief to prevent continuing violations of federal law, see Seminole Tribe, - U.S. at -, 116 S.Ct. at 1132, we must reject the Tribe’s assertion that its suit against Governor Nelson falls within this exception. In Seminole Tribe, the Supreme Court held the doctrine of Ex parte Young inapplicable to a suit against the governor of Florida to enforce IGRA, recognizing that Congress had prescribed a detailed remedial scheme for enforcing section 2710(d)(3), with significantly fewer remedies than those available under Ex parte Young, thus signaling Congress’s intent to limit relief to that available under the statute. See Seminole Tribe, — U.S. at -, 116 S.Ct. at 1133.
We further reject the Tribe’s contention that the State’s enactment of section 9-1,106 subjects Governor Nelson to liability under the doctrine of Ex parte Young. While any failure of Nelson to comply with section 9-1,106 may amount to a violation of state law, the doctrine of Ex parte Young operates to prevent only violations of federal law. See Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 106, 104 S.Ct. at 911.
We thus conclude the Tribe’s suit against Governor Nelson is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
D.
Finally, given our disposition of this matter, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Tribe’s motions for a new trial and to amend its complaint. See Harbor Ins. Co. v. Essman, 918 F.2d 734, 739 (8th Cir.1990).
TV.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
. The Honorable William G. Cambridge, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the District of Nebraska.
. In Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), the Supreme Court recognized that suits may be brought in federal court against a stale official in his official capacity where prospective injunctive relief is sought to end a continuing violation of federal law. See In re SDDS, Inc., 97 F.3d 1030, 1035 (8th Cir.1996) (citing Fond du Lac Band of Chippewa Indians v. Carlson, 68 F.3d 253, 255 (8th Cir.1995)).
. While the Nebraska Constitution provides that the "state may sue and be sued, and the Legislature shall provide by law in what manner and in what courts suits shall be brought,” Neb. Const, art. V, § 22, "the provision is not self-executing, it permits the state to lay its sovereignty aside and consent to be sued on such terms and conditions as the Legislature may prescribe.” See Hoiengs v. County of Adams, 245 Neb. 877, 516 N.W.2d 223, 234 (1994).
. In State ex rel. Stephan v. Finney, 251 Kan. 559, 836 P.2d 1169, 1185 (1992), the Kansas Supreme Court deterniined that Kansas's governor could negotiate with the tribes for a Tribal-State compact, but lacked authority to bind the State to the compact.