dissenting.
While I accept the premise upon which the majority opinion is based, I nevertheless remain troubled by the inherent lack of equity, rationality, and fairness in the sentencing scheme for crack cocaine offenders. Because I believe that the recommendations of the Sentencing Commission concerning issues of sentencing are entitled to deference, I believe that the downward departure granted by the district court was proper because it was based on the conclusions of the Sentencing Commission. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion which vacates Gaines’s sentence and remands for re-sentencing. Instead, I would affirm the judgment of the district court.
In Furman v. Georgia, Justice Marshall noted that the death penalty only continues to be tolerated because it falls primarily on the poor and members of minority groups, the “forlorn, easily forgotten members of society.” 408 U.S. 238, 366, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 2791, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall’s admonishment concerning the death penalty rings equally true for the current crack cocaine sentencing mechanism.
The Sentencing Commission was created because of a disillusionment with the then-current sentencing scheme that varied depending on the sentencing judge. The Sentencing Commission was intended to consolidate the power that had previously been held by the sentencing judge into a uniform body. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 367, 109 S.Ct. 647, 652, 102 L.Ed.2d 714 (1989). The Sentencing Commission was established with the following purposes:
*332(1) [to] establish sentencing policies and practices for the Federal criminal justice system that—
(A) assure the meeting of the purposes of sentencing as set forth in section 3553(a)(2) of title 18, United States Code;
(B) provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct while maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors not taken into account in the establishment of general sentencing practices; and
(C) reflect, to the extent practicable, advancement in knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the criminal justice process; and
(2) develop means of measuring the degree to which the sentencing, penal, and correctional practices are effective in meeting the purposes of sentencing as set forth in section 3553(a)(2) of title 18, United States Code.
28 U.S.C. § 991(b). The Sentencing Commission has several functions. It is required to “review and revise” the Sentencing Guidelines, 28 U.S.C. § 994(o), promulgate amendments and modifications to the Guidelines, 28 U.S.C. § 994(p), make recommendations to Congress concerning whether particular grades and penalties should be modified, 28 U.S.C. § 994(r), submit to Congress annual reports concerning the operation of the Guidelines, 28 U.S.C. § 994(w), and issue policy statements concerning the Guidelines, 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2). Moreover, the Commission is required to “assure that the guidelines and policy statements are entirely neutral as to the race, sex, national origin, creed and socioeconomic status of offenders.” 28 U.S.C. § 994(d).
In Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 109 S.Ct. 647, 102 L.Ed.2d 714 (1989), the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the sentencing guidelines established by the Sentencing Commission. The Court observed that the Sentencing Commission was created because of the disparity in sentencing. Id. at 365-66, 109 S.Ct. at 651-52. In addition, the Court noted that in adopting mandatory sentencing guidelines Congress rejected “determinate sentencing” as well as a proposal to make the Guidelines permissive rather than mandatory. Id. at 366-67, 109 S.Ct. at 651-52. In upholding the constitutionality of the Guidelines, the Court rejected the petitioner’s argument that Congress’ delegation of power to the Commission was unconstitutional. Id. at 371,109 S.Ct. at 654. The Court wisely concluded that “Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives.” Id. at 372, 109 S.Ct. at 655. Noting previous decisions where the Court upheld Congress’ delegation of tasks to specific agencies, the Court found that “Congress’ delegation of authority to the Sentencing Commission is sufficiently specific and detailed to meet the constitutional requirements.” Id. at 374, 109 S.Ct. at 656. The Court found that Congress prescribed goals for the Commission and also armed the Commission with the tools to execute those goals. Id. The Court further found that the Commission has the power to “determine the relative severity of federal crimes and to assess the relative weight of the offender characteristics that Congress listed for the Commission to consider.” Id. at 377, 109 S.Ct. at 657 (citation omitted).
There may be a “forked tongue” at play here. Congress created the Sentencing Commission and gave it a mandate. Yet, as the Commission endeavors to fulfill its mandate, the force of the judgment it is to exercise is compromised. I think that it is, therefore, important to review the justification advanced for having such a body and analyze the powers it is expected to discharge.
The reasoning behind the existence of the Sentencing Commission is that an expert body was needed to promulgate rules to standardize sentencing of criminal defendants. See id. at 379, 109 S.Ct. at 658 (“Developing proportionate penalties for hundreds of different crimes by a virtually limitless array of offenders is precisely the sort of intricate, labor-intensive task for which delegation to *333an expert body is especially appropriate.”) (emphasis added).
The Sentencing Commission was intended to be comprised of those adept at addressing issues concerning our criminal justice system, particularly sentencing. At least three members must be federal judges. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a). The additional members of the Commission are chosen by the President following consultation with “representatives of judges, prosecuting attorneys, defense attorneys, law enforcement officials, senior citizens, victims of crime, and others interested in the criminal justice process---- ” 28 U.S.C. § 991(a). The Sentencing Commission consists of experts in the area of criminal justice who are entrusted with the task of ensuring that the Sentencing Guidelines “provid[e] certainty and fairness in sentencing and reduc[e] unwarranted sentence disparities.” 28 U.S.C. § 994(f). It was created in order to place the adjudication of this nation’s sentencing requirements in the hands of an expert body who is best prepared to administer our system of sentencing, uniformly, fairly, and accurately. The process has not been without its critics because of the way it intrudes upon the exercise of independent judgment by judges.
While Congress has created an expert body entrusted with the adjudication of the Sentencing Guidelines, its suggestions go unheeded. After extensive study the Sentencing Commission has found that the 100:1 ratio is excessive. The Commission found “to the extent that Congress has created a sentencing system that so disparately and substantially punishes crack cocaine over other forms of the same drug, the absence of comprehensive data substantiating this legislative policy is troublesome.” Special Report to the Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy, 179-80 (1995) (“Cocaine Report”). I will attempt to summarize the findings of the Cocaine Report succinctly.
The Commission found that “[i]n the early to mid-1980’s, a national sense of urgency surrounded the drug problem generally, and crack cocaine specifically.” Id. at 180. Crack cocaine was perceived to be more dangerous than powder cocaine. Id. It was viewed as extremely addictive, responsible for an increase in crime, the cause of an increase in drug-related deaths, and particularly attractive to young people because of its availability and cost. Id. at 180-81. The Commission found that when Congress adopted the crack cocaine differential, the sale and use of crack were still in the early stages. Id. at 181. In reassessing the premises behind the differential with the benefit of additional information, the Cocaine Report demonstrates that those premises are flawed.
The Commission found that cocaine is not physiologically addictive in either its powder form or the crack cocaine form. Id. Rather, both crack and powder cocaine are psychologically addictive. Id. Furthermore, crack and powder cocaine differ in the manner of ingestion, but “use of cocaine produces the same type of physiological and psychotropic effects.” Id. at 182. Thus the Commission concluded that the form of cocaine is only significant because the form generally dictates the manner in which the cocaine is ingested. Id. Cocaine users that inject or smoke the substance usually use cocaine more frequently and are more likely to become addicted. Id. This can occur regardless of whether crack cocaine or powder cocaine is used. “Determining the appropriate degree of enhancement in penalty based solely on the form of cocaine, therefore, is difficult.” Id.
The Commission also determined that there is little scientific research to support or disapprove the link between psychosis and crack cocaine use. Id. Evidence is sparse— and indeed questionable as to whether the link between crack cocaine and psychosis is greater or lesser than the link between powder cocaine and psychosis. Id. at 183. The Commission also found that crack cocaine is associated with systemic crime (crime that is related to the marketing and distribution of crack cocaine), but that the connection with non-systemic crime had not yet been proven. Id at 185.
The Commission advises that while crack cocaine does pose greater harms to society than powder cocaine, the differences could not support a 100:1 differential. At the time that Congress adopted the ratio in 1986, the Commission states, there were no Sentencing *334Guidelines but the Sentencing Guidelines currently account “for some of those same factors subsumed in the ratio.... ” Id. at 195. In the Cocaine Report, the Sentencing Commission fulfilled its mandate to “review and revise, in consideration of comments and data coming to its attention, the guidelines promulgated....” 28 U.S.C. § 994(o).
The Sentencing Commission is analogous to a federal agency. See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 44-45, 113 S.Ct. 1913, 1919, 123 L.Ed.2d 598 (1993) (“The Sentencing Commission promulgates the guidelines by virtue of an express congressional delegation of authority for rulemaking, ... and through the informal rulemaking procedure in 5 U.S.C. § 553, see 28 U.S.C. § 994(x). Thus, the guidelines are the equivalent of legislative rules adopted by federal agencies.”). It is a specialized agency created to adjudicate issues concerning sentencing. The application and evaluation of the Sentencing Guidelines are “within the Commission’s particular area of concern and expertise and [involve an area] which the Commission itself has the first responsibility to formulate and announce.” Id. at 45, 113 S.Ct. at 1919. I remain committed to the idea that the interpretation by an agency of an area of expertise is entitled to deference by federal courts unless the agency’s interpretation violates the Constitution or a federal statute.
Congress has given the Sentencing Commission the authority to review the Sentencing Guidelines periodically and revise them as needed. The Commission has followed this mandate and concluded that a 100:1 ratio is not acceptable in light of the information currently available to the Commission. The opinion of this expert body is entitled to deference by the courts.
The Sentencing Commission has examined the 100:1 ratio in depth and concluded that it is no longer viable. The Supreme Court has noted that “Congress necessarily contemplated that the Commission would periodically review the work of the courts, and would make whatever clarifying revisions to the Guidelines conflicting judicial decisions might suggest.” Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 348, 111 S.Ct. 1854, 1858, 114 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991). The Commission has done just that. Spurred at least in part by both the public outcry concerning the ratio1 as well as the view of some federal judges that the ratio is unjust,2 the Commission attempted to evaluate and review our current sentencing scheme. The Commission’s findings are found in the Cocaine Report. The Cocaine Report is an authoritative conclusion that the 100:1 ratio is unjust and should be revised. The Commission’s recommendations are entitled to deference.
It is a basic principle of administrative law that an agency’s interpretation of its regulations should be given “controlling weight” as long as the interpretation does not violate the Constitution or a federal statute and is consistent with the regulation. See Stinson, 508 U.S. at 45, 113 S.Ct. at 1919 (“[p]rovided an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations does not violate the Constitution or a federal statute, it must be given ‘controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.’ ”) (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414, 65 S.Ct. 1215, 1217, 89 L.Ed. 1700 (1945)). The Sentencing Commission is an agency and the Sentencing Guidelines are the regulations of the Sentencing Commission. See id. (“[t]he guidelines are the equivalent of legislative rules adopted by federal agencies.”). The guidelines were created by the Commission and continue to be revised and amended by the Commission. I emphasize again that Congress has delegated this authority to the Sentencing Commission. Therefore, unless the revised sentencing ratio violates the Constitution, a federal statute, or is plainly erroneous or inconsistent *335with the regulations, the Sentencing Commission’s rejection of the 100:1 ratio is entitled to “controlling weight.” See also Kenneth R. Davis & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., 1 Administrative Law Treatise, § 6.6, 283 (3d ed. 1994) (“The Sentencing .Commission issues ‘sentencing guidelines’ that have the same effect as legislative rules: They bind courts as long as they do not violate the Constitution or a federal statute.”).
The Supreme Court has a long history of upholding an agency’s interpretation of its own rules. See, e.g., Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 357, 109 S.Ct. 1835, 1849-50, 104 L.Ed.2d 351 (1989) (holding that the National Forest Service’s interpretation of the National Environmental Policy Act was entitled to deference and reversing the decision of the Court of Appeals because it failed to give adequate deference to the Forest Service’s interpretation of its own regulation); Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 939, 106 S.Ct. 2333, 2341, 90 L.Ed.2d 921 (1986) (finding that the Court of Appeals did not give adequate deference to the Secretary of Agriculture’s interpretation of the Consolidated Farm and Rural Development Act and noting “the Court of Appeals’ holding runs roughshod over the established proposition that an agency’s construction of its own regulations is entitled to substantial deference.”); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 565, 100 S.Ct. 790, 797, 63 L.Ed.2d 22 (1980) (“Unless demonstrably irrational, Federal Reserve Board staff opinions construing the [Truth in Lending] Act or Regulation [Z] should be dispositive.... ”).3 It is axiomatic that the Sentencing Commission should also be entitled to the same deference. The Sentencing Commission is similar to any other federal agency to which Congress has delegated specific authority to regulate a particular field based on its given expertise. The Sentencing Commission has expertise in the area of criminal sentencing just as the Securities and Exchange Commission and Federal Trade Commission have expertise in the areas of securities regulation and international trade. The Sentencing Commission’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines are entitled to deference by this court. See Milhollin, 444 U.S. at 566, 100 S.Ct. at 797 (“The Court has often repeated the general proposition that considerable respect is due ‘the interpretation given [a] statute by the officers or agency charged with its administration____ ’ This traditional acquiescence in administrative expertise is particularly apt ... because [the agency] has played a pivotal role in ‘setting [the statutory mechanism] in motion’.... Congress delegated broad administrative lawmaking power to the [agency] when it framed [the act]. The Act is best construed by those who gave it substance in promulgating regulations thereunder.”) (internal citations omitted).
The district court in the instant case properly determined that a downward departure was warranted based on the reasoning of the Sentencing Commission embodied in the Cocaine Report. The district court gave “controlling weight” to the determination of the Sentencing Commission concerning a regulation that it is entitled to administer. The administrative deference given to the Sentencing Commission by the district court is consistent with established Supreme Court precedent. See, supra, note 3 and accompanying text. I believe that the district court’s decision to grant Gaines a downward departure based on the senténcing disparity between crack and powder cocaine should be upheld.
I am aware that the position that I am advocating could be viewed by critics as creating sentencing disparity based on the personal view of a particular judge concerning the propriety of the 100:1 ratio and therefore *336bringing the sentencing system back to the confusion present prior to the creation of the Sentencing Commission. However, I echo the sentiments of my colleague Judge Wald of the D.C. Circuit in regard to this issue:
Naturally, I do not suggest that a court should be permitted to depart whenever it decides that a sentence is greater than necessary to satisfy the purposes set forth in § 3553(a). Such a result would gravely undermine one of the central goals of the guidelines — restricting the discretion accorded sentencing judges, in the interests of eliminating unwarranted disparity in sentences. But this case is sui generis in the history of the guidelines. Here, the Commission itself has acknowledged that its crack guidelines bear no meaningful relationship to the culpability of defendants sentenced pursuant to them. To my knowledge, the Commission has never before made such an extraordinary mea culpa acknowledging the enormous unfairness of one of its guidelines. For this reason, authorizing departures based on the Special Report could not conceivably start courts down the slippery slope of granting departures every time a defendant claims the guidelines for his type of offense is unfair.
United States v. Anderson, 82 F.3d 436, 449-50 (D.C.Cir.1996) (Wald, J., dissenting), cert. denied,—U.S.-, 117 S.Ct. 375, 136 L.Ed.2d 264 (1996).
Blind adherence to rules that have been proven ineffective, meaningless, and unjust serves no purpose. Not only does such adherence unjustly deprive an individual defendant of his or her liberty, it also deprives the federal courts of their inherent justice. Our current crack cocaine sentencing scheme is unjust. The Sentencing Commission has so acknowledged and now it is time for the federal courts to do the same. I implore my judicial colleagues to acknowledge the admissions of the Cocaine Report and accord it the deference that it deserves. I am not calling for a reduction in the stiffness of our drug sentences, but am only seeking equality in sentencing. “It may profit us very little to win the war on drugs if in the process we lose our soul.” Spade, supra, at 1233 (noting the words of United States District Court Judge William W. Schwarzer as he imposed a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years on a Defendant with no prior criminal record). And once again, courts are forced to engage in a “wink and a nod,” particularly, as the statistics show, the defendants are racial minorities or otherwise socially disfavored. I dissent.
. In Just Punishment: Public Perceptions and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, a study done by the Sentencing Commission, 69.2% of survey respondents preferred punishment for crack cocaine offenses below the current guideline range. See Linda D. Maxfield, Willie Martin & Christine Kitchens, Just Punishment: Public Perceptions and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines at *3 (1993-94).
. See William Spade, Jr., Beyond the 100:1 Ratio: Towards a Rational Cocaine Sentencing Policy, 38 Ariz. L.Rev. 1233, 1282 n.299 & accompanying text (1996).
. The Supreme Court has also affirmed this principle in other cases involving other federal agencies. See Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 432, 97 S.Ct. 2399, 2409, 53 L.Ed.2d 448 (1977) (Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare); United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 872, 97 S.Ct. 2150, 2155-56, 53 L.Ed.2d 48 (1977) (Department of the Navy); United. States v. City of Chicago, 400 U.S. 8, 10, 91 S.Ct. 18, 20, 27 L.Ed.2d 9 (1970) (per curiam) (Interstate Commerce Commission); INS v. Stanisic, 395 U.S. 62, 72, 89 S.Ct. 1519, 1525-26, 23 L.Ed.2d 101 (1969) (Immigration and Naturalization Service); Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 393 U.S. 268, 276, 89 S.Ct. 518, 523, 21 L.Ed.2d 474 (1969) (Housing and Urban Development); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 4, 85 S.Ct. 792, 795, 13 L.Ed.2d 616 (1965) (Department of the Interior).