dissenting.
During the morning of June 29, 1977, twenty-four year old Deborah Lee Grosec-lose was raped twice, strangled into unconsciousness, stabbed three or four times in the back, kidnapped from her house, and left locked in the trunk of her automobile which was abandoned in a parking lot in Memphis, Tennessee. Deborah’s badly decomposed body was not found until five days later. It was determined that Deborah, who was still alive at the time her automobile was abandoned, had died from heat exposure. By the time Deborah’s body was found on July 4, 1977, her eyeballs had been eaten by the maggots which filled her eye sockets.
In 1978, Petitioner William E. Groseclose (Groseclose), Deborah’s husband and the ’father of her infant son Nathan, was convicted of first degree murder for hiring Ronald Eugene Rickman to kill Deborah, and the jury subsequently sentenced Groseclose to die in Tennessee’s electric chair. In 1981, the Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed Gro-seclose’s and Rickman’s convictions and death sentences, finding the evidence of guilt “overwhelming.” State v. Groseclose, 615 S.W.2d 142, 146 (Tenn.1981). Today, more than twenty years after Deborah’s horrific murder, the majority in the present ease affirms the district court’s grant of a writ of habeas corpus overturning Groseclose’s conviction and death sentence on the grounds that Groseclose was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. I disagree. A defendant asserting an ineffective assistance claim generally must show not only that defense counsel’s performance was deficient but also that this deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, *1172104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Even assuming that Attorney Brackstone’s representation was deficient, Groseclose has not shown that Brackstone’s representation actually prejudiced his defense.1 In addition, I do not agree with the district court’s decision to presume prejudice in this case. For these reasons, I would reject Groseclose’s ineffective assistance of counsel argument. I, therefore, respectfully dissent.
I.
A.
As the Supreme Court explained in United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 665 n. 38, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 2050 n. 38, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984): “We consider in this case only the commands of the Constitution.... We address not what is prudent or appropriate, but only what is constitutionally compelled.”2 In Cronic, the Court also stated that “the right to the effective assistance of counsel is recognized not for its own sake, but because of the effect it has on the ability of the accused to receive a fair trial.” Id. at 658, 104 S.Ct. at 2046. Therefore, notwithstanding an attorney’s deficient performance, the Sixth Amendment generally is not implicated unless there is some effect on the reliability of the trial. Id. A defendant must generally prove the prejudice, if any, which resulted from defense counsel’s deficient performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692,104 S.Ct. at 2067. The defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s particular errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt with respect to the defendant’s guilt. Id. at 695, 104 S.Ct. at 2068-69. Similarly, with respect to a death sentence, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, absent counsel’s errors, the sentencer, including an appellate court to the extent it independently reweighs the evidence, would have concluded that the balance of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant the imposition of the death penalty. Id. A reasonable probability is one which is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceeding. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068.
In Strickland, the Supreme Court discussed in detail the approach a reviewing court should take in conducting this inquiry. The Court stated as follows:
In making this determination, a court hearing an ineffectiveness claim must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury. Some of the factual findings will have been unaffected by the errors, and factual findings that were affected will have been affected in different ways. Some errors will have had a pervasive effect on the inferences to be drawn from the evidence, altering the entire evi-dentiary picture, and some will have had an isolated, trivial effect. Moreover, a verdict or conclusion only weakly supported by the record is more likely to have been affected by errors than one with overwhelming record support. Taking the unaffected findings as a given, and taking due account of the effect of the errors on the remaining findings, a court making the prejudice inquiry must ask if the defendant has met the burden of showing that the decision reached would reasonably likely have been different absent the errors.
Id. at 695-96, 104 S.Ct. at 2069.
Recently, in Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369-70, 113 S.Ct. 838, 842-43, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993), the Court explained that the focus of Strickland’s prejudice inquiry is not solely on outcome determination. The Court quoted from Strickland where it explained that “a criminal defendant alleging prejudice must show that ‘counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliablé.’ ” Id. at 369, 113 S.Ct. at 842 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064). The Lockhart Court stated:
[A]n analysis focusing solely on mere outcome determination, without attention to *1173whether the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable, is defective. To set aside a conviction or sentence solely because the outcome would have been different but for counsel’s error may grant the defendant a windfall to which the law does not entitle him. See Cronic, supra, at 658, 104 S.Ct. at 2046.
Id. at 369-70, 113 S.Ct. at 842-43 (internal footnote omitted). For the reasons discussed below, Groseelose fails both aspects of the prejudice inquiry.
B.
The majority in this case determines that Groseelose has shown that Attorney Brack-stone’s representation was objectively unreasonable and that Groseclose’s defense was prejudiced as a result of this representation. In the majority’s view, the prosecution’s evidence linking Groseelose to the perpetrators of the murders was “relatively weak.” Maj. op. at pp. 1170-1171. The majority opines that a defense - which capitalized on this “weakness” and marshaled evidence emphasizing it “could certainly” have produced a different verdict. Id. at p. 1171. The majority concludes: “all that Brackstone need have done to create a much greater probability of a favorable verdict would have been to employ any defense, however anemic, that was specifically tailored to Groseelose____” Id.
The majority’s analysis is as conclusory as it is unconvincing. In Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696, 104 S.Ct. at 2069, the Supreme Court recognized that some attorney errors will have only an “isolated, trivial effect” on the evidentiary picture. Such is the case here with respect to the alleged errors of Attorney Brackstone. Assuming that Attorney Brack-stone’s representation was deficient, there is not a reasonable probability that, but for this allegedly deficient representation, the jury would have had a reasonable doubt with respect to Groseclose’s guilt in this case. As the Tennessee Supreme Court noted, the evidence of Groseclose’s guilt was “overwhelming.” State v. Groseclose, 615 S.W.2d at 146. Moreover, despite several post-eon-viction challenges over the past two decades, Groseelose has never presented any exculpatory evidence. Nor is there even a scintilla of evidence to suggest that Rickman and Britt planned Deborah’s murder and then sought to implicate Groseelose after the fact in order to mitigate their own responsibility.3 Groseclose’s ineffective assistance claim must fail. Cf. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696, 104 S.Ct. at 2069 (“a verdict or conclusion only weakly supported by the record is more likely to have been affected by errors than one with overwhelming record support.”).
The following is a summary of some of the overwhelming evidence of Groseclose’s guilt introduced by the State at trial almost twenty years ago:
1. Barton Wayne Mount, a naval recruit Groseelose met while employed in the Navy Recruiting Service, testified that Groseelose wanted Deborah’s murder to look like a “rape-robbery,” presumably to divert suspicion from himself. Mount testified that Groseelose was originally willing to pay $50 for Deborah’s murder. After Mount informed Groseelose that Britt was unwilling to do it for this amount, Groseelose increased the terms of the deal. Groseelose agreed to pay $200 up front and $500 after the murder, and he would also give Britt a .45 caliber pistol. Mount further testified that, while he was with Groseelose on June 27, 1977, Grosec-lose withdrew $100 from an automated teller machine at the corner of Hollywood and James Roads in Memphis and borrowed $50 from a friend at the Cracker Barrel convenience store. Mount testified that Groseelose then handed him $150 and instructed him to give the money to Britt. This was two days prior to Deborah’s murder. As corroboration, the prosecution offered the testimony of Wayne Robertson of First Tennessee Bank of Memphis and Melville Taylor. Mr. Robertson testified that $100 was withdrawn from Deborah and Bill Groseelose’s account at 9:03 p.m. on June 27, 1977, by use of the *1174bank card issued to Bill Groseclose. Mr. Robertson testified that the money was withdrawn from the machine at the Hollywood and James branch of First Tennessee Bank. Mr. Taylor testified that he ran into Groseclose on the evening of June 27, 1977, while leaving the Cracker Barrel Quick Shop Grocery. Mr. Taylor testified that he loaned Groseclose $50 after Gro-seclose asked for it so that he could pay for a psychiatrist for his wife.
In affirming Groseclose’s first degree murder conviction and death sentence, the Tennessee Supreme Court properly described Mount’s testimony as “devastating.” State v. Groseclose, 615 S.W.2d at 145. Although cross-examined by counsel for all three defendants, Mount’s testimony clearly demonstrates that the murder was committed by Rickman and Britt on behalf of, and after being procured by, Grosec-lose. Id.
2.Pam Baker Lindsey, Rickman’s former girl friend, testified at trial that Rick-man confessed to her that he and Britt had murdered Deborah, and he explained to her how they carried it out. Mrs. Lindsey also described in detail two meetings she attended at a Shoney’s restaurant in the days immediately preceding Deborah’s murder.4 Mrs. Lindsey testified that the first meeting was three days before the murder. Groseclose and Rickman talked mainly about Deborah, and Groseclose showed Rickman a picture of her. Mrs. Lindsey attended a second meeting the night before the murder in which Grosec-lose, Rickman, and Britt were present. Mrs. Lindsey stated that Groseclose, Rick-man, and Britt discussed a “job” that Rick-man and Britt were to do for Groseclose the following morning. Mrs. Lindsey explained that Groseclose instructed Rick-man and Britt to arrive at his house at 6:30 a.m. the next morning and to wait for him in the tool shed in the back of his house. Mrs. Lindsey testified that, after leaving Shoney’s, she and Rickman followed Gro-seclose to an automatic teller machine where he withdrew money and gave it to Mrs. Lindsey who passed it to Rickman.5 In addition, Mrs. Lindsey testified that she drove with Rickman and Britt to Grosec-lose’s house either during the afternoon of the day Deborah was murdered or during the afternoon of the following day. Britt got out of the car and spoke with Grosec-lose at the house.
3. Deborah’s mother, Aline Watts, testified that Groseclose and Deborah were having marital problems at the time of Deborah’s murder. Mrs. Watts also testified that she received a telephone call from Groseclose on the morning of the murder. Groseclose informed Mrs. Watts that he had received a call from Deborah’s employer after she did not show up for work. Mrs. Watts telephoned the police and then went to Groseclose’s house to pick up the couple’s infant child. Mrs. Watts testified that, while at the house, she saw Mount and Britt, at separate times, talking to Groseclose.
4. Doyle Scroggins testified that in June 1975 Groseclose purchased an insurance policy on Deborah’s life. Groseclose was the beneficiary of the policy, which had a face value on the date of Deborah’s murder of approximately $12,000. In addition, James Perkins testified that he sold Groseclose a life insurance policy in late July or August 1975. Groseclose purchased $30,000 of life insurance on himself, as well as a rider6 on Deborah for $20,000. Groseclose was the first beneficiary on Deborah’s portion of the policy. Mr. Perkins testified that Groseclose contacted his office in May 1977, the month prior to Deborah’s murder, and stated that there was an error in his policy. Mr. Perkins testified that Groseclose contended that the entire policy should have been on Deborah’s life, and he wanted the policy changed accordingly. Mr. Perkins stated that he convinced Groseclose that it was in his best interests to leave the policy as *1175written. The Tennessee Supreme Court noted that Groseclose’s desire to obtain the life insurance proceeds may have been one of the motives for the murder. State v. Groseclose, 615 S.W.2d at 144.
5. John Shanks, who was recruited by Groseclose for the Navy, testified that Gro-seclose had asked him, in November or December of 1976, if he would be interested in killing Groseclose’s wife. Michael Blasco, another recruit, testified that Gro-seclose had asked him, in May or June of 1977, if he knew somebody who would do some “hit work.”
Because there is neither a reasonable probability that the outcome of the guilt phase of Groseclose’s trial would have been any different but for Attorney Braekstone’s alleged errors, nor any basis for concluding that Groseelose's trial was fundamentally unfair or unreliable, no Sixth Amendment violation inheres. Lockhart, 506 U.S. at 370, 113 S.Ct. at 843; Scarpa v. Dubois, 38 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir.1994).7
C.
The majority finds the prejudice resulting from Attorney Brackstone’s representation at the sentencing stage “even easier to discern.” Id. The majority opinion states that, in addition to having no criminal record, Gro-seclose was active in his church, had a positive military record, and a “plethora” of family members who were willing to testify on his behalf. Id. The majority concludes that, but for Attorney Brackstone’s “utter failure to develop or even advert to these mitigating factors,” there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have concluded that the balance of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the case did not warrant a death sentence. Id. I disagree.
At the outset, I wish to clarify several points with respect to the majority’s analysis. First, Groseclose did, in fact, testify on direct examination during the sentencing stage that he had never previously been arrested or indicted for a crime. The prosecution did not rebut this on cross-examination. Second, although his actual military records were not introduced, Groseclose nonetheless testified that he had been assigned to a destroyer during the Vietnam conflict, had been in combat, and had received a few wounds. Groseclose testified that he had been awarded., among other things, the Vietnamese Service Medal with three bronze stars and the Good Conduct Medal. On cross-examination, the prosecution did not question this aspect of Groseclose’s testimony either. Third, I am unconvinced that Groseclose was active in his church. Gladys Adams, the general overseer of the Church of God in Memphis, Tennessee, testified in the district court that she knew Groseclose who was her son’s neighbor. Mrs. Adams testified that, after Groseelose’s arrest, she visited with him weekly in the Shelby County jail, and, in her view, Grosec-lose was “sincere about his commitment to Christ.” Following his conviction and death sentence, Groseclose became an ordained minister of the Church of God. Mrs. Adams testified that the Church licensed Groseclose “in desperation to get religious services in the Death Row.” However, when asked what church Groseclose had attended prior to his arrest, Mrs. Adams could only testify: “He was a Methodist, and I think that he did attend.” The district court testimony of Mrs. Watts, Groseclose’s mother-in-law, is *1176also instructive. Mrs. Watts was asked on direct examination if she was aware of any religious activity on the part of Groseclose before his arrest. Mrs. Watts succinctly responded: “I have never known him to go to church.” It appears that Groseclose’s religious conversion did not occur until after his conviction and death sentence for his wife’s contract murder.
There are several reasons why I reject the majority’s decision to find prejudice at the sentencing stage. First, as the facts plainly demonstrate, Deborah’s murder was absolutely horrific, “one of the most brutal and atrocious imaginable.” State v. Groseclose, 615 S.W.2d at 145. Second, Groseclose was the master mind behind this murder. Third, Deborah was Groseclose’s wife and the mother of his infant child. Fourth, in the event additional mitigating character evidence had been introduced, the prosecution would have responded in kind. In the district court, Hugh Stanton, former District Attorney General for Shelby County, testified that the prosecution would have attacked Groseclose’s character by recalling Mrs. Watts to testify as to how Groseclose “whipped on” Deborah while she was pregnant. Fifth, unlike the district court below, I would place no reliance on the fact that Britt was only sentenced to life in prison as opposed to the death penalty. Indeed, as the Tennessee Supreme Court noted, there were compelling differences between Britt and his co-defendants. Some of these included: (1) Britt was only nineteen years old at the time of the murder; (2) there was substantial evidence in the record that Britt was subject to domination and influence by the older Rickman; and (3) unlike his co-defendants, Britt manifested regret and remorse over the incident. Id. at 149. Britt did not formulate the plan to kill Deborah, nor was he the victim’s husband and the father of her baby.
The legal standard articulated in Strickland is “highly demanding.” Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 382, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 2586-87, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986). The defendant must demonstrate that a reasonable probability exists that, but for defense counsel’s errors, the sentencer, including an appellate court to the extent it independently reweighs the evidence, would have concluded that the balance of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the case did not warrant the imposition of the death, penalty. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. at 2068-69. A reasonable probability, the Supreme Court explained, is one which is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. The jury at Groseclose’s trial found two aggravating circumstances: (1) Groseclose employed another to commit the murder for remuneration; and (2) the murder was especially heinous in that it involved depravity of mind. I conclude that there is not a reasonable probability that either the jury or the Tennessee Supreme Court would have concluded that Groseclose did not deserve the death penalty for Deborah’s murder. In my view, the balance of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances still would have warranted the death penalty in the case of this horrific contract murder. Because there is not a reasonable probability that the outcome of the sentencing stage of Grosec-lose’s trial would have been any different but for Attorney Brackstone’s allegedly deficient representation, nor any basis for concluding that Groseclose’s death sentence was fundamentally unfair or unreliable, I would reject Groseclose’s ineffective assistance challenge to the sentencing stage as well. Lockhart, 506 U.S. at 370, 113 S.Ct. at 843.
II.
The majority finds that the prejudice resulting from Attorney Brackstone’s representation is “so patent” that the majority need not consider the apparently more difficult question of whether Attorney Brackstone’s representation was “so inept as to amount to a constructive denial of counsel, relieving Groseclose of the need to show prejudice.” Maj. op. at p. 1170. Unlike the majority, the district court below reached this question and concluded that there was prejudice per se. The district court found that Attorney Brackstone failed to remain an “active advocate” who observed a duty of “zealous and loyal representation” of his client. Groseclose v. Bell, 895 F.Supp. at 960. The district court determined that Attorney Brackstone deprived Groseclose of a fair trial because Brackstone failed to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing and failed to function in any meaningful sense as *1177the Government’s adversary. Id. The court relied, in large part, upon dicta contained in the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984), as well as upon the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Osborn v. Shillinger, 861 F.2d 612 (10th Cir.1988). The court also cited to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Swanson, 943 F.2d 1070 (9th Cir.1991). Since I would reject Groseclose’s actual prejudice argument, I must consider the district court’s decision to find prejudice per se.
A.
In Cronic, the Supreme Court explained in dicta that certain circumstances are so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their effect on a particular case is unjustified:
Most obvious, of course, is the complete denial of counsel. The presumption that counsel’s assistance is essential requires us to conclude that a trial is unfair if the accused is denied counsel at a critical stage of his trial.[25] Similarly, if counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing, then there has been a denial of Sixth Amendment rights that makes the adversary process itself presumptively unreliable.
Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658-59 & n. 25, 104 S.Ct. at 2046-47 & n. 25. The Court cautioned, however, that apart from circumstances of this magnitude, there generally exists no basis for finding a Sixth Amendment violation unless the defendant can show that counsel’s specific errors undermined the reliability of the finding of guilt. Id. at 659 n. 26, 104 S.Ct. at 2047 n. 26.
In my dissenting opinion in the companion case of Rickman v. Bell, I set forth at length my understanding of the Cronic dicta. I reviewed our circuit’s narrow applications of the Cronic dicta, and I noted my disagreement with the more expansive interpretations of Cronic by the Ninth and Tenth Circuits in Swanson and Osborn, respectively. I also explained how these expansive interpretations of the Cronic dicta frustrated a principal policy underlying the prejudice per se exception; i.e., the desire to avoid the cost of case-by-case litigation over the existence of actual prejudice. I need not repeat this analysis here.
Nor need I recount here the particular elements of Attorney Brackstone’s representation which, in the district court’s view, warranted the application of the Cronic dicta. See Groseclose v. Bell, 895 F.Supp. at 958-60. Suffice it to say, there is no reason why the errors in Attorney Brackstone’s representation, as found by the district court, are not amenable to the traditional Strickland analysis and its requirement of actual prejudice. See Scarpa v. Dubois, 38 F.3d 1, 12-13 (1st Cir.1994); Rickman v. Bell, (Suhrheinrich, J., dissenting). As the Fifth Circuit explained in Mclnemey v. Puckett, 919 F.2d 350, 353 (5th Cir.1990): “bad lawyering, regardless of how bad, does not support the [per se] presumption; more is required.” Indeed, Groseclose himself does not argue on brief that we should find prejudice per se. Groseclose contends only that he has shown actual prejudice resulting from Attorney Brackstone’s representation in this case. See Appellee’s Br. at p. 41.
B.
The instant case is unlike either of the two examples of constructive denial of counsel discussed in Cronic. See Woodard v. Collins, 898 F.2d 1027, 1028-29 (5th Cir.1990); Rickman v. Bell, (Suhrheinrich, J., dissenting). First, the Supreme Court has consistently found constitutional error without any showing of prejudice where counsel was totally absent or prevented from assisting the defendant during a critical stage of the proceeding. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659 n. 25, 104 S.Ct. at 2047 n. 25. Neither situation occurred here. Second, Attorney Brackstone did not entirely fail to subject the prosecution’s ease to meaningful adversarial testing. Id. at 659, 104 S.Ct. at 2047.
At Groseclose’s state post-conviction relief hearing in 1982, Attorney Brackstone 8 testi*1178fied that he asked Groseclose during then-initial meetings for information that would assist Braekstone in preparing a defense. Attorney Braekstone testified that Grosec-lose stated that “he didn’t do it” and Brack-stone responded “I’ll need more than that.” Attorney Braekstone testified that he asked Groseclose about his neighbors, and Grosec-lose provided Braekstone with the names of several. Attorney Braekstone testified that he met with the neighbors Groseclose had mentioned, as well as with other neighbors that Braekstone had found, in order to determine if any could be of assistance to Grosec-lose.
Attorney Braekstone further testified that he spoke with the State’s investigators, the attorney general, and counsel for the other co-defendants. Attorney Braekstone testified that the State allowed him to review the physical evidence it had in the case, and counsel for the co-defendants provided him with information as to their clients’ confessions, which Braekstone subsequently had the opportunity to read. Attorney Brack-stone testified that he later interviewed Rick-man and Britt in order to verify their statements.9
Attorney Braekstone testified that he informed Groseclose that he had reviewed the State’s evidence in the case. Attorney Braekstone testified that he told Groseclose “some of the things that I saw,” and he advised Groseclose that Groseclose would probably be convicted if the case proceeded to trial “with the evidence that they had.” Moreover, Attorney Braekstone testified that he recommended the possibility of a plea bargain to Groseclose whose response was simply: “no way.” 10
Attorney Braekstone testified that, after Groseclose rejected the possibility of a plea bargain, Braekstone conducted legal research and had discussions with several attorneys who had previously handled death penalty cases in which the guilt and penalty stages of the trial were bifurcated. In addition, Attorney Braekstone filed a Motion of Defendant for State to Produce Statements and Material, which requested, among other things, the names of prosecution witnesses and any evidence that would tend to exculpate Grosec-lose. The trial court granted this motion. Attorney Braekstone also filed a Motion of Defendant for Psychological Evaluation in order to determine if Groseclose was competent to stand trial. The trial court ordered an evaluation, and the examining physician determined that Groseclose was, in fact, competent.
As the majority notes, Attorney Brack-stone agreed to allow Robert Livingston, Rickman’s attorney, to act as lead counsel at trial. Attorney Braekstone also testified that his theory at trial “was to do the best I could with what I had.” Attorney Braekstone noted that the other defendants had given eon-*1179fessions, while Groseclose had not. Attorney Brackstone also pointed out that defendant Mount had received a separate trial, and the prosecution had actually used him as a witness in the case. Attorney Brackstone testified that he tried to bring to the jury the possibility “that it could have been some of the codefendants telling a different version of it than he[Groseclose] told.” In addition, Attorney Brackstone, like the attorneys for the other two co-defendants, did not put on a defense after the prosecution had presented its case. Thomas Pera, a trial attorney for defendant Britt, testified in the district court and explained that this allowed the defense to “cut away the State’s rebuttal.” Mr. Pera stated: “Generally around those courts the way the prosecutors do it is they have the opening final argument and then they lay out the case about the guilt and everything and usually rebuttal is when you come back and start talking about the bad things ... the defense doesn’t want to hear.” While Attorney Brackstone’s decision to allow Attorney Livingston to act as lead counsel, his theory at trial, and his strategic decision not to put on a defense may have been deficient, there is still no reason why these errors are not amenable to the traditional Strickland prejudice analysis. See Scarpa, 38 F.3d at 12-13.
Finally, with respect to the sentencing stage of the trial, Attorney Brackstone called five witnesses. These included Groseclose, one of his neighbors, and three employees from the Navy Recruiting Service where Groseclose had worked. Attorney Brack-stone testified that another neighbor, who was allegedly a “good friend” of Groseelose’s, “emphatically” refused to testify, and Grosee-lose’s mother had been sick and did not think she could make the trip to testify. In addition, Attorney Brackstone testified that two of the mitigation witnesses offered testimony that was different than what Brackstone had expected following his interviews with the witnesses. Attorney Brackstone testified that he thought Groseclose’s neighbor would be outspoken and attempt to assist Grosec-lose. Attorney Brackstone also testified that Chief John Purcell from the Navy recruiting station “didn’t speak so highly” of Grosec-lose. Attorney Brackstone stated that “he [Chief Purcell] was the one I was told to look up____ Mr. Groseclose gave me his name.” The majority and the district court have found that Attorney Brackstone could have presented additional mitigating evidence. Again, assuming that Attorney Braekstone’s representation was deficient in this respect, this error should be subject to the Strickland analysis; it is not a basis for finding prejudice per se.
III.
In my dissenting opinion in Rickman v. Bell, I explained that, although I did not condone Attorney Livingston’s representation in that case, it nevertheless satisfied the minimum standard demanded by the Constitution. Similarly, in the present ease, I do not necessarily approve of the representation provided by Attorney Brackstone. I have concluded, however, that Attorney Brack-stone’s representation comported with the minimum requirements of the Constitution, and that is the end of my inquiry. As the Supreme Court declared in Cronic, 466 U.S. at 665 n. 38, 104 S.Ct. at 2050 n. 38: “We address not what is prudent or appropriate, but only what is constitutionally compelled.”
Groseclose is unable to show actual prejudice resulting from his attorney’s representation, and his case does not fall within the narrow exception to this requirement discussed in dicta in Cronic. Therefore, I would reject Groseclose’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The majority’s holding to the contrary grants “the defendant a windfall to which the law does not entitle him.” Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 370, 113 S.Ct. 838, 843, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993). From that holding, I respectfully dissent.
. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2069-70, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the Supreme Court indicated that it was not necessary to address both components of an ineffectiveness inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.
. The Supreme Court further observed in United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 665 n. 38, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 2050 n. 38, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984): "It is entirely possible that many courts should exercise their supervisory powers to take greater precautions to ensure that counsel in serious criminal cases is qualified.”
. Rickman and Britt gave incriminating statements to the police, which discussed the murder and implicated Groseelose. After a full suppression hearing, both statements, in redacted form, were admitted into evidence and read to the jury. References to the other co-defendants were deleted from the redacted versions of each statement. At the sentencing hearing following trial, Rick-man's and Britt’s unredacted statements were read in full.
. Mrs. Lindsey was not indicted in connection with Deborah's murder.
. Mr. Robertson testified that $40 was withdrawn from Deborah and Bill Groseclose’s account at 6:36 p.m. on June 28, 1977, by use of the bank card issued to Bill Groseclose. The money was withdrawn at the Hollywood and James branch of First Tennessee Bank.
.A "rider” is an additional insured person on the named insured’s policy.
. Also unconvincing is the testimony of Grosec-lose’s experts. In the district court, Groseclose offered the testimony of William Marett, an attorney who actually represented Groseclose for a time in the 1980’s during Groseclose’s state post-conviction proceedings. Mr. Marett testified that he believed that Attorney Brackstone's representation resulted in legal prejudice to Groseclose. With respect to the existence of any possible evidence which would have supported Grosec-lose's defense, Mr. Marett testified that he never conducted any investigation; however, Mr. Mar-ett opined that there were "a lot of things" which could have been brought out to challenge the statements of the co-defendants and cast doubt on their veracity. In addition, despite rendering an opinion as to prejudice, Mr. Marett conceded on cross-examination that he was "not very familiar” with respect to the facts of the case as to guilt. Groseclose also offered the expert testimony of Charles Fels. Mr. Fels testified that, on the basis of the deficiencies he perceived in Attorney Brackstone’s performance, Brackstone was, in fact, an “ally of the prosecution” and this was “inherently prejudicial.” This analysis seems more like a finding of prejudice per se than a finding of any actual prejudice resulting from Attorney Brackstone’s representation. I shall address this issue in section II.
The Court has uniformly found constitutional error without any showing of prejudice when counsel was either totally absent, or prevented from assisting the accused during a critical stage of the proceeding.
. Attorney Brackstone died in 1994.
. The majority opinion states that "none of the district court’s findings of primary fact is in any measure inconsistent with the state courts’ findings." Maj. op. at p. 1166. This statement is incorrect. The district court found that Attorney Braekstone "failed to investigate any of the circumstances of the case.” Groseclose v. Bell, 895 F.Supp. 935, 955 (M.D.Tenn.1995). However, as the majority opinion itself notes, the state trial court had previously concluded, in rejecting Gro-seclose’s petition for post-conviction relief, that Attorney Braekstone " 'did[,j after numerous discussions with the petitioner, conduct an investigation of the petitioner's case.’ ” Maj. op. at p. 1165 (quoting the Tennessee state court's findings). The state trial court’s opinion also discussed the elements of this investigation. See id.
. Notwithstanding this testimony, the district court concluded that "Mr. Braekstone failed to form any kind of working relationship with his client” and failed to report to Groseclose "what, if anything, he investigated or what his results were." Groseclose v. Bell, 895 F.Supp. at 955. As support for its conclusions, the district court apparently relied upon the testimony of Grosec-lose at his state post-conviction relief hearing in 1982. See id. Two points must be made. First, Groseclose’s testimony is not an acceptable basis for concluding that Attorney Braekstone did not conduct an investigation with respect to the case, because Groseclose was in custody at that time awaiting trial for the contract murder of his wife and could not possibly have known what Attorney Braekstone was doing. Second, with respect to the district court’s conclusions as to what Attorney Braekstone actually told Groseclose, the district court apparently made a credibility determination and found Groseclose’s self-serving, uncorroborated, death row testimony more credible than Attorney Brackstone’s. While I acknowledge that our review of factual findings is deferential, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a), the basis for the district court’s conclusions is nevertheless highly suspect. In any event, these findings do not affect my ultimate determination that we should not presume prejudice in this case.