Opinion by Judge CYNTHIA HOLCOMB HALL; Dissent by Judge REINHARDT.
CYNTHIA HOLCOMB HALL, Circuit Judge:Miguel A. Ramirez, a Nevada state prisoner, appeals the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We consider in this opinion Ramirez’s challenge to the definition of reasonable doubt in the trial court’s jury charge.1 Finding no constitutional error in the trial court’s instructions, we affirm.
I
The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution requires the government to prove every element of a charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072-73, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). The jury charge in Ramirez’s trial as it relates to reasonable doubt stated the following:
The defendant is presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved. This presumption places upon the State the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt every material element of the crime charged and that the defendant is the person who committed the offense.
A reasonable doubt is one based on reason. It is not mere possible doubt but is such a doubt as would govern or control a *1211person in the more weighty affairs of life. If the minds of the jurors, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, are in such a condition that they can say they feel an abiding conviction of the truth of the charge, there is not a reasonable doubt. Doubt to be reasonable must be actual and substantial, not mere possibility or speculation.
If you have a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the defendant, he is entitled to a verdict of not guilty.
(Emphasis added). Between 1967 and 1991, the definition of reasonable doubt in the second paragraph of the jury charge was codified at Nev.Rev.Stat. § 175.211 (hereinafter “the Nevada instruction”).2
“[T]he Constitution does not require that any particular form of words be used in advising the jury of the government’s burden of proof. Rather, ‘taken as a whole, the instructions [must] correctly conve[y] the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury.’ ” Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5, 114 S.Ct. 1239, 1243, 127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994) (quoting Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140, 75 S.Ct. 127, 137-38, 99 L.Ed. 150 (1954)) (internal citation omitted). This court has previously held that the Nevada instruction comports with, due process. Darnell v. Swinney, 823 F.2d 299, 302 (9th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1059, 108 S.Ct. 1012, 98 L.Ed.2d 978 (1988). Ramirez, however, seeks reconsideration of this holding in light of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 111 S.Ct. 328, 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990) (per curiam), and Victor.
In evaluating the constitutionality of the jury charge, we must determine “whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instructions to allow conviction based on proof insufficient to meet” the requirements of due process. Victor, 511 U.S. at 6, 114 S.Ct. at 1243. If we find such a likelihood, then we must grant Ramirez’s writ of habeas corpus; there can be no harmless error in this context. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 280-81, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2082-83, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993).
ii
Ramirez argues that the jury charge violated due process by equating reasonable doubt with:' (1) “actual and substantial doubt”; and (2) “such a doubt as would govern or control a person in the more weighty affairs of life.” We consider each contention in turn.
A.
We, examine first Ramirez’s contention that the Nevada instruction impermissibly equates “reasonable- doubt” with “actual and substantial doubt,” thus lessening the government’s burden of proof below that required for due process. Although we recognize that a description of reasonable doubt as “substantial doubt” can be problematic, we conclude that the phrase as used in the Nevada instruction is unexceptionable.
Ramirez relies primarily on Cage, the only case in which the Supreme Court has held that a reasonable doubt instruction violated due process, to challenge the “substantial” language. In Cage, the trial court had instructed the jurors as follows:
[A reasonable doubt] is one that is founded upon a real tangible substantial basis and not upon mere caprice and conjecture. It must be such doubt as would give rise to a grave uncertainty, raised in your mind by reasons of the unsatisfactory character of the evidence or lack thereof. A reasonable doubt is not a mere possible doubt. It is an actual substantial doubt. It is a doubt that a reasonable man can seriously entertain. What is required is not an absolute or mathematical certainty, but a moral certainty.
498 U.S. at 40, 111 S.Ct. at 329 (emphasis provided by the Supreme Court). The Supreme Court held that “the words ‘substantial’ and ‘grave,’ as they are commonly understood, suggest a higher degree of doubt than is required for acquittal under the reasonable-doubt standard.” Id. at 41, 111 S.Ct. *1212at 329. When the reference to “moral,” as opposed to evidentiary, certainty was added into the equation, the Court determined that a reasonable juror “could have interpreted the instruction to allow a finding of guilt based on a degree of proof below that required by the Due Process Clause.” Id,3
Although the use of the term “substantial” to describe reasonable doubt has been disfavored in this and other circuits both before and after Cage, inclusion of the term in a reasonable doubt instruction does not render the instruction unconstitutional when there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury misunderstood the government’s burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Beverly v. Walker, 118 F.3d 900, 904 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 211, 139 L.Ed.2d 147 (1997); Adams v. Aiken, 41 F.3d 175, 182 (4th Cir.1994); Bias v. Ieyoub, 36 F.3d 479, 481 (5th Cir.1994); Darnell, 823 F.2d at 302. Indeed, the instruction in Cage was constitutionally flawed not for its use of the term “substantial,” but instead for its creation of “a downward swing in the prosecution’s burden of proof: the instruction began appropriately with ‘reasonable’ doubt, moved to ‘grave uncertainty,’ and then to ‘substantial’ doubt, and concluded by suggesting that the jury could convict on the basis of a ‘moral certainty’ rather than an evidentiary certainty.” Brown v. Cain, 104 F.3d 744, 755 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 1489, 137 L.Ed.2d 699 (1997).4
The Supreme Court in Victor repudiated any suggestion that “substantial doubt” terminology automatically renders a reasonable doubt instruction unconstitutional. Victor, 511 U.S. at 19-20, 114 S.Ct. at 1249-50. While recognizing that equating reasonable doubt with substantial doubt can be “somewhat problematic,” the Court found the equation “unexceptionable” when used to distinguish a reasonable doubt from a speculative one rather than to describe a degree of doubt greater than that required for acquittal under the Due Process Clause. Id.5
That “substantial” in the Nevada instruction means “not seeming or imaginary” as opposed to “that specified to a large degree,” see id., 511 U.S. at 19, 114 S.Ct. at 1250, becomes clear upon reading the entire .sentence in which the challenged term appears: “Doubt to be reasonable must be actual and substantial, not mere possibility or speculation.” (Emphasis added). The Supreme Court has expressly approved this contrast between reasonable doubt and “mere possi*1213ble doubt,” and doubt that does not rise above pure speculation is not reasonable. Victor, 511 U.S. at 17, 114 S.Ct. at 1248-49; see United States v. Artero, 121 F.3d 1256, 1258 (9th Cir.1997), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 1089, — L.Ed.2d - (1998). Given the direct contrast in the Nevada instruction between “substantial” doubt and mere possibility or speculation, it is unlikely that jurors would understand the term “substantial” to raise the quantum of doubt required for acquittal.6 Accordingly, we find use of the term in the trial court’s jury charge unexceptionable.
B.
Ramirez also challenges the equation of reasonable doubt with “such a ■ doubt as would govern or control a person in the more weighty affairs of life.” This circuit has endorsed a definition of reasonable doubt as the kind of doubt that would cause a reasonable person to hesitate to act, see United States v. Robinson, 546 F.2d 309, 313-14 (9th Cir.1976), and the Supreme Court has indicated that “the hesitate to act standard gives a commonsense benchmark for just how substantial [a reasonable] doubt must be.” Victor, 511 U.S. at 20-21, 114 S.Ct. at 1250. Ramirez contends that Nevada’s “govern or control” instruction equates reasonable doubt with the kind of doubt that would cause a person to refrain from acting, and that the instruction therefore violates due process.
Nevada’s “govern or control” instruction is really just the flip side of a “willingness to act” instruction, which defines proof beyond a reasonable doubt in the following (or some substantially similar) manner: “In order that the evidence submitted shall afford proof beyond a reasonable, doubt, it must be such as you would be willing to act upon in the most important and vital matters relating to your own affairs.” Robinson, 546 F.2d at 313.7 The Supreme Court and various circuits have expressed disapproval of the “willingness to act” formulation of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See Holland, 348 U.S. at 140, 75 S.Ct. at 137-38; United States v. Nolasco, 926 F.2d 869, 871 (9th Cir.1991).8 The “willingness to act” formulation has come Under attack primarily because “the most important decisions in life-choosing a spouse, buying a house, borrowing money, and the like-may involve a heavy element of uncertainty and risk-taking and are wholly unlike the decisions jurors ought to make in criminal cases.” United States v. Jaramillo-Suarez, 950 F.2d 1378, 1386 (9th Cir.1991) (quoting Commentary to Ninth Circuit Model Jury Instruction *1214No. 3.03). Because people often act in important matters notwithstanding substantial uncertainty, the fear is that defining proof beyond a reasonable doubt in relation to a person’s willingness to act in the weightier affairs of life might understate the government’s burden of proof.9
This concern notwithstanding, neither the Supreme Court nor any circuit has invalidated an instruction which includes the willingness to act terminology where “the charge, taken as a whole, fairly and accurately conveys the meaning of reasonable doubt.” Robinson, 546 F.2d at 314. The charge in this case communicated correctly the concepts of presumed innocence, the government’s burden of proof, and the nature of reasonable doubt. See id. The jurors were told that they must have “an abiding conviction of the truth of the charge,” i.e., of defendant’s guilt, a correct formulation of the government’s burden of proof under Victor, 511 U.S. at 14-15, 114 S.Ct. at 1247-48. Moreover, the charge plainly directed jurors to reach their decision based upon all of the evidence, with no suggestion that moral certainty might suffice in the absence of eviden-tiary proof, and the instruction employed no other suspect language.10
While we do not endorse the Nevada instruction’s “govern or control” language, “not every unhelpful, unwise, or even erroneous formulation of the concept of reasonable doubt in a jury charge renders the instruction constitutionally deficient.” Vargas v. Keane, 86 F.3d 1273, 1277 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 240, 136 L.Ed.2d 169 (1996); see also Victor, 511 U.S. at 27, 114 S.Ct. at 1253-54 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (“[T]he test we properly apply in evaluating the constitutionality of a reasonable doubt instruction is not whether we find it exemplary....”). Considering the jury instructions in this case in their entirety, we hold that the “govern or control” language did not render the charge unconstitutional.
C.
Because the trial court’s use of the term “substantial” is unexceptionable under Victor, the “govern or control” language proves satisfactory in context, and the requirement that the jurors reach an abiding conviction of Ramirez’s guilt based on all of the evidence correctly states the government’s burden of proof, we hold that the jury charge did not unconstitutionally misstate the concept of reasonable doubt. Whether or not Ramirez’s jury could have understood the Nevada instruction to impermissibly lower the government’s burden of proof, we find no reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instruction'in this way. See Gilday v. Callahan, 59 F.3d 257, 266 (1st Cir.1995) (holding jury charge constitutional despite “find[ing] it difficult to say that a juror could not have been led astray” by the instructions).
This circuit has previously upheld instructions that combine “willingness to act” and “substantial doubt” components, Hatheway v. Secretary of the Army, 641 F.2d 1376, 1384 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 864, 102 S.Ct. 324, 70 L.Ed.2d 164 (1981), including the Nevada instruction itself. Darnell, 823 F.2d at 302.11 Nothing in Cage or Victor *1215persuades us that the result should be different today.12
HI
Because Cage and Victor do not undermine this court’s decision in Darnell that the, Nevada instruction comports with due process, we ultimately need not decide whether these cases announced a “new rule” of constitutional law and, if so, whether application of the rule to this case is barred by the retroactivity doctrine of Teague v. Lane, 48.9 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989). See Aiken, 41 F.3d at 178-79 (holding that Cage applies retroactively under Teague); Nutter v. White, 39 F.3d 1154, 1157-58 (11th Cir.1994) (same); see also Humphrey v. Cain, 120 F.3d 526, 530 (5th Cir.1997) (holding the court bound by a prior, unpublished opinion in the Fifth Circuit denying the retroactive application of Cage and Victor), reh’g en banc granted (Sept. 9,1997).
IV
Our review on habeas is limited to determining whether the trial court’s reasonable doubt instruction was constitutionally infirm. Although we do not herald the Nevada instruction as exemplary, we conclude that the overall charge left the jury with an accurate impression of the government’s heavy burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we hold that the jury charge satisfied the requirements of due process.
AFFIRMED.
. We affirm the district court's denial of relief with respect to Ramirez’s other claims in a memorandum disposition filed concurrently with this opinion.
. The statute was amended in 1991 to omit the words "and substantial" from the last sentence of the definition. Nev.Rev.Stat.§ 175.211.
. The Supreme Court has subsequently clarified that the proper standard is not whether jurors could have understood the instruction to lower the government's burden of proof, but instead whether there exists a reasonable likelihood that the jurors so understood the instruction. See Victor, 511 U.S. at 6, 114 S.Ct. at 1243; Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72-73 & n. 4, 112 S.Ct. 475, 482 & n. 4, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991).
. That the Supreme Court in Cage was concerned with this "downward swing” in the government’s burden of proof, and not-with use of the term "substantial” standing alone, is suggested by the Court’s attention to the term only in connection with the "grave uncertainty” and "moral certainty” language. Cage, 498 U.S. at 41, 111 S.Ct. at 329-30. In fact, the Court did not even identify as suspect the trial court’s description of a reá-sonable doubt as "one that is founded upon a real tangible substantial basis.” Id. at 40, 111 S.Ct. at 329.
. In Victor, the Supreme Court considered and rejected constitutional challenges to two state court definitions of reasonable doubt. The second, which equated reasonable doubt with "substantial doubt,” read as follows:
'Reasonable doubt’ is such a doubt as would cause a reasonable and prudent person, in one of the graver and more important transactions of life, to pause and hesitate before taking the represented facts as true and relying and acting thereon. It is such a doubt as will not permit you, after full, fair, and impartial consideration of all the evidence, to have an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the guilt of the accused. At the same time, absolute or mathematical certainly is not required. You may be convinced of the truth of a fact beyond a reasonable doubt and yet be fully aware that possibly you may be mistaken. You may find an accused guilty upon the strong probabilities of the case, provided such probabilities are strong enough to exclude any doubt of his guilt that is reasonable. A reasonable doubt is an actual and substantial doubt reasonably arising from the evidence, from the facts or circumstances shown by the evidence, or from the lack of evidence on the part of the State, as distinguished from a doubt arising from mere possibility, from bare imagination, or from fanciful conjecture.
511 U.S. at 18, 114 S.Ct. at 1249 (emphasis provided by the Supreme Court).
. See Weston v. Ieyoub, 69 F.3d 73, 74-75 (5th Cir.1995) (upholding instruction that included both "substantial doubt” and "grave uncertainty" language); Flamer v. Delaware, 68 F.3d 736, 757 (3d Cir.1995) (upholding instruction that contrasted "substantial doubt” with "a mere possible doubt,” "a vague, speculative” doubt, and a "whimsical doubt”); Aiken, 41 F.3d at 181 (upholding instruction that contrasted "substantial doubt” with "whimsical,” "imaginary,” "weak,” and "slight" doubt).
. Even if Nevada's "govern or control” instruction were understood to define reasonable doubt as that which would cause a person to refrain from acting, it would still be constitutionally indistinguishable from the "willingness to act” instruction. See United States v. Tobin, 576 F.2d 687, 694 (5th Cir.) (expressly treating a "refrain from acting” instruction as equivalent to a “willingness to act” instruction), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1051, 99 S.Ct. 731, 58 L.Ed.2d 711 (1978).
. Curiously, although the "hesitate to act” formulation of reasonable doubt might be understood to describe a higher burden of proof than the “willingness to act” formulation of proof beyond a reasonable .doubt, this distinction may not be. what motivated the Supreme Court to endorse the “hesitate to act” formulation in the first place. In Holland, "the Supreme Court disapproved of the definition of reasonable doubt as "the kind of doubt ... which you folks in the more serious and important affairs of your own lives might be willing to act upon.” 348 U.S. at 140, 75 S.Ct. at 138. The Court’s problem seems to' have been’ not with the willingness to act phrasing itself, but instead with the definition of doubt as something people would act upon. The instruction should have either defined proof beyond a reasonable doubt as the kind of certainty people would act upon or, as the Court suggested, defined reasonable doubt as the kind of doubt that would undermine a person's willingness to act. Id.
That the Court was concerned with the instruction's nonsensical phrasing rather than the quantum of doubt described thereby is suggested by its observation that "[a] definition of doubt as something the jury would act upon would seem to create confusion rather than misapprehension.” Id.; see also United States v. Drake, 673 F.2d 15, 20 n. 5 (1st Cir.1982) (examining the common misreading of Holland).
. Even the preferred hesitate to act formulation frames reasonable doubt in terms of a person's decision-making in the weightier affairs of life and thus has faced increasing scrutiny and criticism. See Victor, 511 U.S. at 24-25, 114 S.Ct. at 1252-53 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
. Ramirez also objects to language in the instruction that the jury should reach its decision as to guilt "after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence." Use of the term “comparison," Ramirez contends, suggests the existence of a burden on the defendant. Quite to the contrary, the Supreme Court in Victor endorsed identical "comparison and consideration" language and deemed it a protection against deficiencies in a reasonable doubt instruction. Victor, 511 U.S. at 16, 114 S.Ct. at 1248; see also Aiken, 41 F.3d at 180.
.We are not persuaded by the Tenth Circuit’s analysis in Monk v. Zelez, 901 F.2d 885 (10th Cir.1990), in which the court invalidated an instruction that combined "substantial doubt" and "willingness to act” language. Even if we were otherwise persuaded by Monk, we are not convinced that the case would come out the same after Victor. The Monk Court held only that the jury could have been misled, not that it reasonably likely was misled, by the instruction. Moreover, the "substantial doubt” language that the court found "constitutionally defective” described the existence, rather than degree, of *1215doubt, id. at 890, and thus would be unexceptionable under Victor.
. The Nevada Supreme Court has also held the Nevada instruction constitutional following the Supreme Court's decisions in Cage and Victor. See Bollinger v. State, 111 Nev. 1110, 901 P.2d 671, 674 (1995); Lord v. State, 107 Nev. 28, 806 P.2d 548, 555-56 (1991).