concurring.
I agree that the grant of summary judgment as to Dalton and Rainwater must be reversed because factual questions on both the disability and reasonable accommodation issues are present. As to the other claimants, I would uphold the grant of summary judgment not only because, as Judge Wood notes, they fail on the reasonable accommodation issue, but because they also are not “disabled” as that term is defined under the ADA. Most of these claimants have some variation of carpal tunnel syndrome (CTS), a physical impairment no doubt, but as my concurring opinion in our companion case (DePaoli v. Abbott Laboratories, 140 F.3d 668 (7th Cir.1998)) notes, more than a “physical impairment” is required before a finding of “disability” can be made under the ADA. Also, by holding that they are “disabled” under the Act, the majority creates a strange anomaly, for now a person with CTS who makes Subaru’s in Lafayette, Indiana (population 43,674), is substantially limited in a major life activity while someone who makes Toyota’s in Georgetown, Kentucky (population 11,414), is not. See McKay v. Toyota Motor Manufacturing, U.S.A, Inc., 110 F.3d 369 (6th Cir.1997).