In this case the parties ask us to decide whether the words “I have a gun” constitute a “threat of death” for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F) when made in the context of a bank robbery.
On September 11, 1996, defendant entered a bank, placed a bag on the counter and declared, “This is a robbery.” The teller asked, “Are you for real?” Defendant responded, “This is a robbery. Put the money in the bag. I have a gun.” According to the teller, as the defendant announced that he had a gun, he also moved his hand toward his waist. The teller saw a bulge in the defendant’s shirt near his waist and she thought the bulge was a gun. The defendant departed from the bank with a bag containing $2600. He was arrested shortly thereafter and pled guilty to bank robbery.
At sentencing, defendant admitted to saying, “I have a gun,” but denied making any downward gesture. Although the district judge invited the parties to address the factual dispute regarding the existence or nature of a gesture, neither party offered testimony on that point. The district court assumed, for purposes of sentencing, that the defendant made some downward gesture but concluded that the words, “I have a gun” plus the gesture fall short of an “express threat of death” under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F).
The government, as the party seeking the enhancement, had the burden of proving the factual basis for the increase by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Wyatt, 102 F.3d 241, 246 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Foutris, 966 F.2d 1158, 1160 (7th Cir.1992). Since the government declined to carry its burden, we assume that the defendant made no gesture. Accordingly, we must decide whether the words alone merit the enhancement.
Whether a robber’s statement can constitute an express threat of death involves the legal interpretation of a sentencing guideline which we review de novo. See United States v. Jones, 83 F.3d 927, 929 (7th Cir.1996). If it can constitute a death threat, then we must decide whether the robber’s statement constituted such a threat in this case. The latter issue is a fact question, which we review for clear error. “This court must give ‘due deference’ to the district court’s application of the Guidelines to the *793facts.” United States v. Hunn, 24 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir.1994).
We address the legal question first— whether “I have a gun” can constitute a threat of death. Until November 1,1997, the Sentencing Guidelines required a two-level enhancement for a robber who makes an express threat of death. The Circuits were split on the question whether an express threat of death must, in fact, be express. Compare United States, v. Canzater, 994 F.2d 773, 775 (11th Cir.1993) (stating that the enhancement “is appropriate only when the threat of death is express, meaning directly or distinctly stated, and not when*the threat is implied or left to inference”) with United States v. Robinson, 86 F.3d 1197, 1203 (D.C.Cir.1996) (“[W]e have concluded that express threats of death can be based on inferences.”). The majority of circuits have taken the latter approach. United States v. Figueroa, 105 F.3d 874, 877 (3d Cir.1997) (“The majority of the courts of appeals ... have held that the defendant can make an express threat of death without explicitly threatening to kill the victim.”). Our Circuit has adopted the majority approach—implied threats of death fall within the meaning of the guideline. See United States v. Hunn, 24 F.3d at 994.
Effective November 1, 1997, the Sentencing Commission omitted the word “express” from the Guideline; the guideline now applies where there is simply “a threat of death.” The Commission also added a sentence to the commentary stating that “the defendant does not have to state expressly his intent to kill the victim in order for the enhancement to apply.” U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1 comment, (n.6). The amendment “addresses a circuit court conflict” and “adopts the majority appellate view which holds that the enhancement applies when the combination of the defendant’s actions and words would instill in a reasonable [victim teller] a greater amount of fear than necessary to commit the robbery.” U.S.S.G. Appendix C, amendment 552.
Thus, an issue is raised whether to apply only the foregoing guideline or to consider the amended version as well. “[I]f a court applies an earlier edition of the Guidelines Manual, the court shall consider subsequent amendments, to the extent that such amendments are clarifying rather than substantive changes.” U.S.S.G. § lBl.ll(b)(2); see United States v. Goudy, 78 F.3d 309, 314 (7th Cir.1996). We need not decide whether the amendment is technically substantive or clarifying because the amendment adopted our Circuit’s view, and therefore, our analysis remains the same before and after November 1,1997.1
No cases in our circuit are precisely on point. In United States v. Hunn, 24 F.3d at 994, the defendant entered a bank and handed the teller a note that read “This is a holdup. I have a gun,” while keeping his right hand in a coat pocket, pointed at the teller. We held that the defendant had made an express threat of death because “a reasonable victim could understand Hunn’s message loud and clear as a death-threat.” Id. at 998. Likewise, in United States v. Bomski, 125 F.3d 1115 (7th Cir.1997), the defendant placed a bag on the counter and said,, “this is a bomb,” and “give me all of your money.” We held that the defendant had made an express threat of death.
The defendant’s threat here poses a slightly different question than that raised by Hunn’s gun and Bomski’s bomb. In those cases, the defendant’s statement was accompanied with a threatening gesture. In Hunn there was a finger pointed through a coat pocket,2 and in Bomski there was a purport*794ed bomb placed on the counter. These gestures combined with the verbal statements would succeed in causing a reasonable teller to fear for his life.
In United States v. Jones, 83 F.3d 927, 929 (7th Cir.1996), the defendant entered a bank and stated “(1) that he had a gun, (2) that it was ‘no joke,’ (3) that the tellers were ‘not to pull any alarms,’ for if they did (4) ‘I’ll use it.’ ” Id. We held that these statements constituted an express threat of death because “Jones’ statements were sufficient to put a reasonable person in the teller’s position in fear of death ...”3 Id.
Carbaugh argues that his case is different than Jones because Carbaugh merely stated that he had a gun rather than threatening to use it. “I’ll use it,” he claims, makes all the difference because it involves a statement of willingness inherent in a threat. At Carbaugh’s sentencing hearing, the district court accepted this distinction:
In this case the defendant’s statement that he had a gun without any other threatening statement, in my opinion, does not rise to the level of the threatening statement in Jones and Robinson. In both of those eases the bank robbers explicitly threatened to use their guns against the tellers if the tellers did not do what the robbers ordered.
In contrast, [Carbaugh] did not express any readiness or willingness to use his weapon against the teller. He simply stated that he had a gun.
Sentencing Tr. at 17.
We disagree with the district court’s conclusion. A threat of death need not include a statement of readiness or willingness to use the gun. True, the statement “I have a gun,” when viewed grammatically is merely a declaration of possession. But we do not examine the statement grammatically, or even from the robber’s perspective. Instead, the proper focus is on the perspective of the reasonable teller. See Hunn, 24 F.3d at 998 (stating that court “should apply an objective test, what a ‘reasonable’ victim would read from the robber’s conduct”). If a robber makes this statement because he thinks it will increase the teller’s level of fear, we agree with his assessment.4 A reasonable teller would ordinarily experience a fear of being shot when the robber confronting her announces he has a gun. Therefore, we hold that the statement “I have a gun” can constitute a threat of death under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F).
Our conclusion accords with the Third Circuit’s result in United States v. Figueroa, 105 F.3d 874 (3d Cir.1997). There, the court also held that a robber’s note saying “I have a gun” constitutes an express threat of death. “Even if there is no gun, or if the defendant actually never would use the gun, the victim alerted that there is a gun is justified in believing it exists and will be used, and that his or her life is therefore in danger.” Id. at 880.
Having determined that “I have a gun” can be a threat of death, we must now consider whether the statement is such a threat in this case. It is conceivable that unusual mitigating circumstances accompanying this statement could deprive the words of their plain meaning.
Here, the defendant placed a bag on the bank counter and declared, “This is a rob*795bery.” When the teller asked, “Are you for real?” defendant responded, “This is a robbery. Put the money in the bag. I have a gun.” There were no circumstances here that tend to strip the words of their ordinary and expected meaning. In fact, just the opposite is true. When the teller tested Carbaugh’s sincerity, Carbaugh alluded to the gun as if to emphasize the full and urgent import of his words. Accordingly, we have no doubt that Carbaugh’s statement would cause a reasonable teller to fear death. Therefore, the district court improperly declined to enhance Carbaugh’s sentence under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F).
Reversed and Remanded.
. We note that the new commentary makes one other change in terminology. The earlier version stated that "the intent of the underlying provision is to provide an increased offense level for cases in which the offender(s) engaged in conduct that would instill in a reasonable [victim teller], significantly greater fear than that necessary to constitute an element of the offense of robbery." U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2) comment, (n.6) (emphasis added). The italicized portion has been deleted and replaced with "a fear of death.” We do not think the new terminology alters the outcome in this case.
. We acknowledge Bomski dicta stating, “we held in United. States v. Hunn that the statement T have a gun’ can satisfy the Guidelines’ requirement.” Bomski, 125 F.3d at 1118 (citation omitted). However, Hunn repeatedly and unmistakably relied on the fact that the robber also pointed the (imaginary) gun at the teller. See Hunn, 24 F.3d at 997 ("We believe that pointing *794one’s hand, hidden in a coat so as to imitate the presence of a handgun aimed at another, is well within the plain text of § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F).”); id. ("We ... hold that a bank robber’s pointing his hand through his coat pocket, while claiming to have a gun, can be a sentence-enhancing death threat expression under the plain text of Guideline § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F).”); id. at 999 ("The combination of Hunn’s note ... and his gesture that he was pointing a gun through his right pocket at the teller, comprised an express threat that if she disobeyed she would be shot.”). Hunn clearly did not hold that the mere words "I have a gun” can constitute an express threat of death.
. The government also cites United States v. Robinson, 20 F.3d 270 (7th Cir.1994) for the proposition that "I have a gun and am not afraid to use it,” warrants the enhancement. In fact, Robinson made other threatening statements during his five robberies. See id. at 276 ("In a third robbeiy, the defendant said she had a gun and would 'spray' the teller____’’). Accordingly, Robinson is less relevant than the government contends.
. Carbaugh, for example, who had no gun during the actual robbeiy nonetheless claimed to have a gun. PSR at 2.