James Rowland appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from his residence pursuant to an anticipatory search warrant. Rowland argues the warrant was invalid for lack of probable cause because the supporting affidavit failed to establish a sufficient nexus between the items to be seized and Rowland’s residence. Although we conclude the warrant was not supported by probable cause, we affirm the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress based on the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.
BACKGROUND
In 1993, United States Postal Inspector Patrick Carr learned that Rowland had filled out and mailed a questionnaire distributed by a sexually oriented business, expressing an *1199interest in child pornography. In this questionnaire, Rowland gave his name and the address of a private post office box and indicated that he was interested in incest, pedophilia, and transvestites. About three years later, Carr targeted Rowland in a child pornography sting operation. On February 5, 1996, Carr mailed to Rowland’s private post office box a brochure which had a picture of a young girl on a bicycle and which stated: “New in Colorado!! Not your typical fantasy!!! Forbidden Lifestyles!!!” The brochure provided a telephone number and an e-mail address. Within a few days, Rowland called the telephone number and left a message indicating an interest in young girls, video tapes, magazines, and “possibly meetings.” Rowland gave the telephone number of a public pay phone and left the address of his private post office box.
On February 13, in response to the telephone message, Inspector Carr sent a second solicitation letter to Rowland. This letter thanked him for calling the “Family Affairs Hotline.” The letter contained descriptions and prices of nine sexually explicit video tapes, referred to the availability of “a wide variety of both foreign and domestic magazines,” and provided an order form. The following day, Rowland mailed an order for two video tapes, along with a money order for $125. Rowland also requested information about the magazines.
After receiving this order,' government agents conducted surveillance of Rowland’s post office box to determine his identity and to determine where he went after collecting his mail. The agents obtained a description of Rowland, learned that he worked for the Colorado Department of Revenue, and determined his home address. The agents also learned that the private post office box had been rented by someone other than Rowland, but Rowland was authorized to receive mail there.
On March 7, 1996, the government applied for and a magistrate judge issued an order for the installation of a mobile tracking device (“beeper”) in a package containing the two ordered video tapes to be delivered to Rowland’s private post office box. The government also obtained an anticipatory warrant to search Rowland’s residence. The search warrant allowed investigators to search Rowland’s residence once the package containing the video tapes was brought into the residence.
On March 8, the government delivered a package containing the two ordered video tapes and the beeper to Rowland’s private post office box. At about 10:30 a.m., government agents observed Rowland pick up the package and walk back to his place of employment. While Rowland was walking back to work with the package, the beeper went into alarm mode, indicating that the package had been opened. The agents maintained surveillance outside Rowland’s place of employment for the remainder of the day. Rowland was observed leaving his work at lunch time, but the beeper indicated that the package remained in the building.
Before Rowland left work at about 4:30 p.m., the beeper stopped functioning because the batteries had been exhausted. Government agents observed Rowland leave the building and walk to his car carrying a backpack and plastic bag, but they could not determine visually or by radio signal whether Rowland had the video tapes. The agents followed Rowland as he then drove for about six blocks, turned around, went back to his work, parked his car, and entered the building for a minute or two. He then returned to his car and the agents followed as he drove straight home.
Once Rowland was home, government agents observed him enter his residence, but they were still unable to determine whether he had the video tapes. Accompanied by three or four police officers, Inspector Carr then approached Rowland’s residence and knocked on the door. Rowland’s wife answered the door. Carr identified himself and said he wanted to speak to Rowland. Rowland’s wife invited them in. Rowland then appeared and Carr questioned him about the package he had received in the mail. Rowland at first stated he didn’t know what Carr was talking about. Carr told Rowland he had been observed picking up the package and taking it to his place of employment. Rowland responded that the package was at work. Carr then asked him where the con*1200tents of the package were. Rowland pointed to a backpack about four or five feet away and said the video tapes were in the backpack. Carr then showed Rowland the search warrant and notified him that the officers were going to search his residence. In the course of the search, the video tapes were found in the backpack. In accordance with the warrant, the officers also seized other items during the search of Rowland’s home, including sexually oriented magazines and books.
Rowland was charged with knowingly receiving in the U.S. mail a package containing video tapes with visual depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2). Rowland subsequently filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized at his home pursuant to the anticipatory search warrant. After a hearing on the motion to suppress, the district court denied Rowland’s motion, determining that the warrant was supported by probable cause and that the police had satisfied the warrant conditions in executing the warrant. Alternatively, the district court determined that even if the warrant was invalid, the evidence need not be suppressed because the Leon good-faith exception applied to the search.
Rowland then entered a conditional guilty plea to the charge of receiving child pornography, reserving the right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(a)(2). Rowland was sentenced to fifteen months imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release.
On appeal, Rowland argues the district court erred in failing to suppress the evidence obtained from his home pursuant to the anticipatory search warrant. Rowland specifically asserts the anticipatory warrant was defective for lack of probable cause to believe the contraband would be found in Rowland’s home.1 Alternatively, Rowland asserts that, assuming the warrant was valid when issued, “the warrant’s efficacy dissipated” when the beeper failed. Rowland also argues the Leon good-faith exception does not apply and therefore suppression of the evidence obtained pursuant to the invalid search warrant is appropriate.
This court exercises jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. In reviewing the district court’s denial of Rowland’s motion to suppress, we accept the district court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous and view the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing in the light most favorable to the government. See United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 785 (10th Cir.1995). The ultimate determination of the reasonableness of the search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment, however, is a question of law which we review de novo. See id.
ANALYSIS
I. ANTICIPATORY WARRANTS
This court first considered the constitutionality of anticipatory warrants in United States v. Hugoboom, 112 F.3d 1081 (10th Cir.1997). In Hugoboom, the court joined the majority of other circuits in holding that anticipatory search warrants, or warrants “which only become[ ] effective upon the happening of a future event, [are] not unconstitutional per se.” Id. at 1085; see also United States v. Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d 8, 11 (1st Cir.1993) (reviewing general approval of anticipatory warrants by federal circuits). The court further recognized that anticipatory warrants are not “ ‘somehow suspect or legally disfavored,’ ” but have instead “repeatedly been upheld, assuming probable cause and so long as the conditions precedent to execution are clearly set forth in the warrant or in the affidavit in support of the anticipatory warrant.” Hugoboom, 112 F.3d at 1085 (quoting United States v. Gendron, 18 F.3d 955, 965 (1st Cir.1994)).
In determining that anticipatory warrants are not per se unconstitutional, the court *1201noted that the United States Constitution only requires that “ ‘a search ... not be “unreasonable,” and that warrants ... be supported by “probable cause.” ’ ” Id. (quoting Gendron, 18 F.3d at 965 (quoting U.S. Const, amend. IV)). The court recognized that
“[t]here is nothing unreasonable about authorizing a search for tomorrow, not today, when reliable information indicates that [the contraband] will reach the house, not now, but then. Nor does it seem automatically unreasonable to tie the warrant’s search authority to the future event that brings with it the probable cause.... In principle, the use of a ‘triggering event’ can help assure that the search takes place only when justified by ‘probable cause.’ ”
Id. (quoting Gendron, 18 F.3d at 965) (citation omitted).
As the court indicated in Hugoboom, the two general requirements for a valid anticipatory warrant are (1) that it be supported by probable cause and (2) that the warrant or supporting affidavit clearly set out conditions precedent to the warrant’s execution. See id.
A. Probable Cause
Anticipatory warrants differ from traditional search warrants in that at the time of issuance they are not supported by probable cause to believe that contraband is currently located at the place to be searched. See United States v. Dennis, 115 F.3d 524, 528 (7th Cir.1997). “In fact, a court issues an anticipatory warrant with the knowledge that the contraband does not presently exist at the location to be searched.” Id. This does not mean, however, that anticipatory warrants need not be supported by probable cause. Instead, before issuing an anticipatory warrant the magistrate must determine, based on the information presented in the warrant application, that there is probable cause to believe the items to be seized will be at the designated place when the search is to take place. See United States v. Garcia, 882 F.2d 699, 702 (2d Cir.1989) (“[T]he fact that the contraband is not ‘presently located at the place described in the warrant’ is immaterial, so long as ‘there is probable cause to believe that it will be there when the search warrant is executed.’ ” (quoting United States v. Lowe, 575 F.2d 1193, 1194 (6th Cir.1978))).
Probable cause for anticipatory warrants is contingent on the occurrence of certain expected or “triggering” events, typically the future delivery, sale, or purchase of contraband. Therefore, in making the probable cause determination, the magistrate must “take into account the likelihood that the triggering event[s] will occur on schedule and as predicted.” Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d at 11. If the triggering events do not occur, the anticipatory warrant is void. See Garcia, 882 F.2d at 702 (“An anticipatory warrant, by definition, is a warrant that has been issued before the necessary events have occurred which will allow a constitutional search of the premises; if those events do not transpire, the warrant is void.”).
In addition to taking into account the likelihood that the triggering events will occur, the magistrate must also determine the likelihood that, after the triggering events have occurred, the contraband will be at the designated place when searched. As with all warrants, probable cause to support an anticipatory warrant “does not exist unless a sufficient nexus between the [contraband] and the place to be searched exists.” Dennis, 115 F.3d at 530.
B. Conditions Precedent
Because the probable cause for an anticipatory warrant is contingent on the occurrence of anticipated events, the warrant or affidavit should express conditions permitting the search to be conducted only after the anticipated events have taken place.2 See id. *1202at 528 (“[A]t the time a court issues an anticipatory warrant, probable cause exists to believe that contraband will be located at the premises to be searched after certain events transpire. Thus, conditions precedent to the execution of an anticipatory warrant are integral to its validity.” (citation omitted)). This not only ensures against premature execution of the warrant, see Garcia, 882 F.2d at 703-04, but also maintains judicial control over the probable cause determination and over the circumstances of the warrant’s execution, see generally Ricciar-delli, 998 F.2d at 12 (stating that because warrants conditioned on future events present potential for abuse beyond that of traditional warrants, magistrates issuing such warrants must protect against opportunities for government agents to exercise unfettered discretion, in part by explicitly placing conditions on execution). Consistent with these purposes, the conditions governing the warrant’s execution should be “explicit, clear, and narrowly drawn so as to avoid misunderstanding or manipulation by government agents.” Garcia, 882 F.2d at 703-04; accord Dennis, 115 F.3d at 528; Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d at 12. The particularity with which the magistrate should specify the conditions, however, will vary based on the individual facts of each case.
Although the conditions precedent ensure that an anticipatory warrant will not be executed prematurely, such conditions do not serve as a substitute for the magistrate’s probable cause determination. See United States v. Hendricks, 743 F.2d 653, 654-56 (9th Cir.1984) (holding anticipatory warrant for search of defendant’s home was invalid because affidavit provided no assurance that defendant would take package to his home after collecting it at the airport, despite fact that warrant contained condition that it was not to be executed until package arrived at defendant’s house). If an anticipatory warrant is based solely on speculation that contraband will be found at a given location at some time in the future, it lacks a probable cause foundation at the moment of its issuance and is therefore invalid regardless of the extent to which the warrant’s provisions assure that no search will be commenced until probable cause exists. See State v. Gutman, 670 P.2d 1166, 1172 (Alaska Ct.App.1983). The conditions precedent to execution of an anticipatory warrant are mere guarantees that the probable cause determination at the time of issuance has reached fruition when the warrant is executed.
In sum, the magistrate must not abdicate the judicial function of determining probable cause at the time the warrant is sought by relying on police assurances that the search warrant will not be executed unless probable cause exists. Instead, the magistrate must require a particularized showing, based on facts existing when the warrant is issued, that the items to be seized will be at the designated location when the search takes place. See Hendricks, 743 F.2d at 655; see generally State v. Wright, 115 Idaho 1043, 772 P.2d 250, 258-59 (Ct.App.1989) (Burnett, J., concurring) (discussing risk of judicial abdication of probable cause determination as one of the possible dangers of anticipatory warrants); State v. Lee, 93 Md.App. 408, 613 A.2d 395, 398-400 (1992) (same), aff'd, 330 Md. 320, 624 A.2d 492 (1993).
C. Anticipatory Warrants Based on Delivery of Contraband
As recognized in Hugoboom, when the warrant application indicates there will be a government-controlled delivery of contraband to the place to be searched, probable cause for a search is established and an anticipatory warrant may be issued, provided the warrant’s execution is conditioned on the contraband’s delivery to, or receipt at, the designated place. See 112 F.3d at 1086-87; see also Garcia, 882 F.2d at 702-03. In this context, the Hugoboom court indicated that when the warrant affidavit refers to a controlled delivery of contraband to the place designated for search, the nexus requirement of probable cause is satisfied and the affida*1203vit need not provide additional independent evidence linking the place to be searched to criminal activity. See 112 F.3d at 1086.
When the delivery of contraband is not completely within the government’s control, however, or when the delivery is to be made to a place other than the premises designated for search, additional reliable information in the warrant application must indicate that the contraband will be at the designated premises at the time of the search. For example, when the delivery of contraband is not within the control of the government, the supporting affidavit should show not only that the agent applying for the warrant believes a delivery of contraband is going to occur, but also how the agent learned of the expected delivery, how reliable the information is, and what the role of law enforcement officers will be in the expected delivery. See Garcia, 882 F.2d at 703; United States v. Leidner, 99 F.3d 1423, 1426 (7th Cir.1996); see also 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 3.7(c), at 366-67 (3d ed.1996) (stating that to establish probable cause for anticipatory warrant, affidavit must “indicate how it is known that the items to be seized will on a later occasion be at the place specified” and stating that more details will be necessary in non-controlled delivery eases). Similarly, when a controlled delivery is not made to the place to be searched, such as when a defendant is required to pick up a package containing contraband at a post office, the warrant application must present additional facts establishing the contraband will be taken to the place designated for search. Cf. Hendricks, 743 F.2d at 654-55 (holding anticipatory warrant for search of defendant’s home was invalid when defendant was required to pick up suitcase containing contraband at airport and there was no assurance at time warrant was issued that defendant would take suitcase to his home).
II. VALIDITY OF ANTICIPATORY WARRANT TO SEARCH ROWLAND’S RESIDENCE
Rowland argues the anticipatory warrant in this case was invalid for lack of probable cause because the supporting affidavit failed to establish a nexus between Rowland’s residence and the contraband or any suspected criminal activity. Rowland asserts that although his private post office box had been linked to suspected criminal activity, the warrant affidavit failed to establish any link between such activity and his home.
“Probable cause undoubtedly requires a nexus between [the contraband to be seized or] suspected criminal activity and the place to be searched.”3 United States v. *1204Corral-Corral, 899 F.2d 927, 937 (10th Cir.1990); see also Dennis, 115 F.3d at 530; 2 LaFave, supra, § 3.7(d). Probable cause to search a person’s residence does not arise based solely upon probable cause that the person is guilty of a crime. Instead, there must be additional evidence linking the person’s home to the suspected criminal activity. See Hendricks, 743 F.2d at 655; see also United States v. Lalor, 996 F.2d 1578, 1582-83 (4th Cir.1993) (stating . “residential searches [are] upheld only where some information links the criminal activity to the defendant’s residence”).
Under the probable cause analysis traditionally employed in non-anticipatory warrant cases, probable cause to issue a search warrant only exists when the supporting affidavit sets forth sufficient-facts that would lead a prudent person to believe that a search of the described premises would uncover contraband or evidence of a crime. See United States v. Burns, 624 F.2d 95, 99 (10th Cir.1980). In determining whether probable cause exists to issue a search warrant, a magistrate’s task is to make a “practical, common-sense decision” based on the totality of the circumstances as set forth in the affidavit. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983); see also Corral-Corral, 899 F.2d at 931. Reviewing courts should give the magistrate’s ultimate probable cause decision “great deference.” United States v. Cusumano, 83 F.3d 1247, 1250 (10th Cir.1996) (en banc) (citation omitted). Nevertheless, this court will not defer to the magistrate’s determination if the affidavit does not provide “ ‘a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.’ ” Id. (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39, 103 S.Ct. 2317).
The affidavit in this case contained information supporting a probable cause determination that Rowland was involved in criminal activity and that the delivery to Rowland’s private post office box would take place. The affidavit indicated that Rowland had ordered the video tapes and had requested that they be sent to him at his post office box. The affidavit further indicated that the agents planned to make a controlled delivery of the video tapes to Rowland at the post office box and planned to maintain surveillance over the post office box to determine that Rowland picked up the package. The affidavit also indicated that Rowland had been observed on several occasions collecting his mail from the post office box and then walking back to work.
Because the controlled delivery was made to Rowland’s private post office box and not to his residence, however, establishing probable cause that the delivery would take place does not mean there was probable cause that the video tapes would be at Rowland’s residence when the search took place. Therefore, this court must determine whether the affidavit supporting the anticipatory warrant contained evidence establishing a nexus between the contraband and Rowland’s residence. See Hendricks, 743 F.2d at 654-55 (holding anticipatory warrant for search of defendant’s home was invalid because contraband was picked up by defendant rather than being delivered to his home and affidavit failed to provide facts establishing a nexus between contraband and defendant’s home).
Only an oblique reference was made in the affidavit to the anticipated route of the contraband after its delivery to Rowland’s post office box. The affidavit stated: “It is anticipated that [Rowland, after picking up the tapes from the post office box,] will go to his place of employment and after work to his residence.” The affidavit contained no information suggesting that Rowland had previously transported contraband from his private post office box to his home or that he had previously stored contraband at his home. Nor did the affidavit provide any facts linking Rowland’s residence to suspected illegal activity, such as in the past having similar video tapes or other illegal materials delivered directly to his home.
*1205The government nevertheless contends that the affidavit contained sufficient information for the magistrate to determine there was probable cause that Rowland would collect the package and then take it to his home after he left work. The government notes the affidavit contained information that Rowland’s usual practice was to pick up his mail and then walk back to work, and the affidavit also indicated that Rowland was employed by the Colorado Department of Revenue. The government asserts that from this information, a “logical inference” was that Rowland would not store or view the illegal video tapes at work, but would instead take the video tapes to his home.4
In making the probable cause determination, the issuing magistrate may draw reasonable inferences from the material provided in the warrant application. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 240, 103 S.Ct. 2317; cf. United, States v. Lawson, 999 F.2d 985, 987 (6th Cir.1993) (stating that in determining whether there is probable cause to support a warrant, the issuing magistrate is “entitled to draw reasonable inferences about where evidence is likely to be kept, based on the nature of the evidence and the type of offense” (internal quotations omitted)). In this ease, a magistrate could infer from the affidavit that Rowland would be unlikely to view or store the video tapes at his place of employment. A further possible inference was that, after removing the tapes from his workplace, Rowland would take the tapes home to view or store. Rowland’s home, however, was but one of an otherwise unlimited possible sites for viewing or storage. The Carr affidavit provided no basis to either limit the possible sites or suggest that Rowland’s home was more likely than the otherwise endless possibilities. As a consequence, the possible inference that Rowland would take the tapes home, in and'of itself, is insufficient to provide a substantial basis for concluding there was probable cause to believe the contraband would be in Rowland’s home at the time the search was to take place.5
Given the absence of any facts in the affidavit linking the contraband to Rowland’s home, the magistrate had no information from which to determine, at the time he issued the warrant, there was probable cause to believe the contraband would be at Rowland’s residence when the search was to take *1206place.6 Cf. Hendricks, 743 F.2d at 654-56 (holding anticipatory warrant for search of defendant’s home was invalid when defendant was required to pick up suitcase containing contraband at airport and there was no information indicating defendant would take suitcase home or otherwise linking defendant’s residence to illegal activity); State v. Goble, 88 Wash.App. 503, 945 P.2d 263, 268-69 (1997) (holding anticipatory warrant for search of defendant’s home was invalid because facts made known to magistrate did not establish, at time warrant was issued, the required nexus between the contraband to be seized, which was mailed to defendant’s post office box, and defendant’s home); see also Lalor, 996 F.2d at 1582-83 (holding, in non-antieipatory warrant context, search warrant for defendant’s home was invalid based on failure of affidavit to establish nexus between drug activity and defendant’s home). We therefore conclude the warrant was not supported by probable cause and was thus invalid.7
III. LEON GOOD-FAITH EXCEPTION
Although the warrant was not supported by probable cause, the evidence seized at Rowland’s residence pursuant to the warrant need not be suppressed if the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, set out in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), applies.8 The applicability of the Leon good-faith exception is a question of law which this court reviews de novo. See Corral-Cotral, 899 F.2d at 929.
In Leon, the Supreme Court modified the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule by holding that evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant later found to be invalid need not be suppressed if the executing officers acted in objectively reasonable, good-faith reliance on the warrant. See 468 U.S. at 922, 104 S.Ct. 3405. The Leon Court stated that the “suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant should be ordered only on a case-by-case basis and only in those unusual cases in which exclusion will further the purposes of the exclusionary rule.” Id. at 918, 104 S.Ct. 3405. The Court explained that the exclusionary rule’s purpose is “to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates.” Id. at 916, 104 S.Ct. 3405. The Court further reasoned that *1207police misconduct would not be deterred by excluding evidence seized by officers acting pursuant to a search warrant in the objectively reasonable belief that their conduct did not violate the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 918-21,104 S.Ct. 3405.
Although the Court indicated that evidence seized pursuant to a warrant should only be suppressed in unusual cases, the Court did recognize that there are circumstances in which an officer’s reliance on a warrant could not be objectively reasonable and suppression is appropriate. See id. at 922-23, 104 S.Ct. 3405. The Court described four such situations, two of which Rowland argues apply here. First, an officer’s reliance is not objectively reasonable when the warrant is “based on an affidavit ‘so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.’ ” Id. at 923, 104 S.Ct. 3405 (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-11, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part)). Second, the good-faith exception will not apply and suppression is appropriate when the warrant is “so facially deficient ... that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.” Id.
In determining whether the Leon-good-faith exception should be applied, the “good-faith inquiry is confined to the objectively ascertainable question whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate’s authorization.” Id. at 922 n. 23, 104 S.Ct. 3405 n. 23. In making this determination, we consider “all of the circumstances,” id, and assume the executing officers have “a reasonable knowledge of what the law prohibits,” id. at 919 n. 20, 104 S.Ct. 3405 n. 20.
Rowland argues the good-faith exception does not apply in this ease because the affidavit’s failure to establish a sufficient nexus between the contraband and the location to be searched was a “readily observable,” “non-technical defect [that] ... should have been easily detected by an experienced postal inspector.” We disagree. Although the affidavit did not establish a sufficient nexus between the contraband and Rowland’s residence to provide probable cause to search, the warrant and supporting affidavit were not so facially deficient or so lacking in indicia of probable cause that the officers’ reliance on the warrant in conducting the search was objectively unreasonable.
Despite the affidavit’s failure to demonstrate a sufficient link between the contraband and Rowland’s home for probable cause purposes, the affidavit as a whole was not a bare bones affidavit, containing only conclu-sory statements and completely devoid of factual support. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 926, 104 S.Ct. 3405; United States v. McKneely, 6 F.3d 1447, 1454 (10th Cir.1993); United States v. Cardall, 773 F.2d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir.1985). As described above, the affidavit contained information detailing the investigation into Rowland’s suspected criminal activity. The affidavit linked Rowland to the contraband and indicated Rowland was likely to pick up the video tapes at his post office box and take them back to his workplace. The affidavit also provided information from which it could reasonably be inferred that Rowland would not leave the video tapes at work, but would take them elsewhere, possibly his home, to view or store.
The supporting affidavit also placed specific conditions on the execution of the warrant. The affidavit contained Inspector Carr’s assurances that government agents would maintain surveillance over the package after it was delivered to Rowland’s post office box and that the warrant would not be executed unless the contraband was brought into Rowland’s home. The record establishes, as discussed in Part IY below, that the officers complied with the conditions in executing the warrant.
Finally, we note that at the time the warrant was issued and executed, this circuit had not yet ruled on the constitutionality of anticipatory warrants and had not set out conditions on the validity of such warrants. Given the unsettled state of the law, it was not unreasonable for the officers to rely on the magistrate’s authorization. See Ca?'dall, 773 F.2d at 1133 (stating that in considering the Leon good-faith principles “it must ... be remembered that the knowledge and under*1208standing of law enforcement officers and their appreciation for constitutional intricacies are not to be judged by the standards applicable to lawyers”); see also Leon, 468 U.S. at 919, 104 S.Ct. 3405 (“If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct, then evidence obtained from a search should be suppressed only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.” (internal quotations omitted)).
Application of the good-faith exception in this case is also consistent with the exception’s rationale. As the Court stated in Leon, the exclusionary rule should only be applied in those unusual cases when its purpose, to deter police misconduct, will be furthered. See 468 U.S. at 918, 104 S.Ct. 3405. As indicated, the officers’ reliance in this case on the magistrate’s determination of probable cause was not objectively unreasonable, and there is no indication in the record that the officers were involved in any misconduct in executing the warrant. Penalizing the officers for a mistake not their own “cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations.” Leon, 468 U.S at 921, 104 S.Ct. 3405. Consequently, the evidence seized at Rowland’s home pursuant to the warrant need not be suppressed.9 Cf. Hendricks, 743 F.2d at 656 (upholding admission of evidence obtained in search under Leon good-faith exception, despite concluding anticipatory warrant was invalid for lack of probable cause because sufficient nexus between contraband and defendant’s residence was not established).
IV. EXECUTION OF WARRANT
Rowland also argues the agents could not reasonably rely on the warrant in conducting the search because they failed to satisfy the warrant’s conditions. Rowland first asserts that the warrant’s execution was conditioned on the beeper continuing to function until the contraband arrived at Rowland’s residence. Therefore, Rowland suggests that when the beeper failed, the officers could not properly execute the warrant.10
*1209We disagree. The warrant was not expressly conditioned on the continued functioning of the beeper. Instead, the supporting affidavit stated that the “package [containing the video tapes] will be kept under' surveillance by [Carr] and/or other law enforcement officers until it is received at [Rowland’s] residence” and that “[o]nee received by an individual at the residence described and only when brought into the residence, this search warrant will be executed.” The affidavit did not contain any reference to a beeper or to the specific means of maintaining surveillance.
Rowland was observed collecting the package containing the video tapes and taking the package back to his place of employment. The beeper indicated that he opened the package while walking back to work and further indicated that when Rowland later left work during the lunch hour, the package remained at his work. Although the beeper stopped functioning before Rowland finally left work, government agents continued to maintain surveillance over Rowland, following him from his work to his residence. The agents observed Rowland leaving work carrying a backpack and bag, both of which he took into his apartment. The agents reasonably believed Rowland was likely carrying the video tapes in the backpack or the bag, but they were unable to absolutely determine that Rowland carried the video tapes into his residence. Before executing the warrant, however, Inspector Carr was able to confirm, based on Rowland’s admission, that the video tapes were in the backpack in Rowland’s home. At the suppression hearing, Carr testified he did not indicate to Rowland that he had a search warrant until Rowland admitted the tapes were in his home. Carr also testified that his understanding of the warrant was that if he had not been able to confirm the video tapes were in the apartment, the warrant could not have been executed. Thus, the officers did satisfy the warrant conditions in executing the search warrant.
Rowland further argues, however, that his statement to Inspector Carr indi-eating the video tapes were in his home was not voluntarily made, and thus the statement could not be relied upon to satisfy the warrant condition. Rowland specifically asserts the statement was “involuntary in light of the invalid warrant, the intimidating atmosphere created by numerous armed police officers in his entry and Carr’s questioning him there, and nowhere for Rowland to retreat.” Whether Rowland’s statement was involuntary is a question of law subject to de novo review, although we accept the district court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. See United States v. Hernandez, 93 F.3d 1493, 1501 (10th Cir.1996).
“The [F]ifth [A]mendment’s privilege against self-incrimination prohibits the admission of incriminating statements where governmental acts, threats or promises cause the defendant’s will to become overborne,” thus rendering the statements involuntary. United States v. Matthews, 942 F.2d 779, 782 (10th Cir.1991). In determining whether the defendant’s will was overborne, this court looks at the totality of the circumstances. See id.
At the suppression hearing, Inspector Carr testified that after observing Rowland enter his apartment, he and several officers knocked on Rowland’s door and were invited in by Rowland’s wife. Carr then asked Rowland about the package. Rowland at first denied knowing anything about the package. Carr informed Rowland that he had been observed picking up the package and taking it to his place of employment. Rowland then stated that the package was at his workplace. Carr again asked Rowland where the contents of the package were. In response, Rowland admitted the video tapes were in the apartment. Carr then informed Rowland that he had a warrant to search Rowland’s home.
The record establishes that Carr’s entry into Rowland’s residence was consensual. Carr did not rely on the warrant to gain entry into Rowland’s home or to elicit incul-patory statements from Rowland, but only *1210disclosed that he had a search warrant after Rowland stated the video tapes were in his home. Although Carr was accompanied by several officers, they remained behind Carr while he spoke with Rowland, and the record does not indicate that they exhibited any signs of force or intimidation. The record contains no evidence that Rowland was subjected to improper threats or promises. Rowland was not in police custody or placed under arrest at the time the inculpatory statement was made. Under these circumstances, Rowland’s statement was voluntary.
CONCLUSION
This court concludes the anticipatory warrant was invalid for lack of probable cause based on the affidavit’s failure to establish a sufficient nexus between the contraband and the location to be searched. Nevertheless, the district court did not err in refusing to suppress evidence recovered in the search of Rowland’s home because the officers acted in objectively reasonable, good-faith reliance on the warrant and because the officers complied with the warrant conditions and properly executed the warrant. Therefore, under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, suppression was not required. Accordingly, this court AFFIRMS.
. Rowland originally argued on appeal that anticipatory warrants are per se unconstitutional. After the filing of Rowland's initial brief, however, this court issued United States v. Hugoboom, 112 F.3d 1081 (10th Cir.1997), in which the court held that anticipatory warrants are not per se unconstitutional. See id. at 1085-86. Rowland accordingly abandoned this argument in his reply brief and we do not address the argument in this opinion.
. Although the preferred practice is for the anticipatory warrant to itself set out, or incorporate by reference, the conditions for the warrant's execution, this court has held that the failure to state the conditions in the warrant does not necessarily render the warrant invalid. See Hu-goboom, 112 F.3d at 1087. As the court indicated in Hugoboom, there is no Fourth Amendment violation requiring suppression when the conditions for execution of the anticipatory warrant are " 'stated in the affidavit that solicits the warrant, accepted by the issuing magistrate, and *1202actually satisfied in the execution of the warrant.' ” 112 F.3d at 1087 (quoting United States v. Moetamedi, 46 F.3d 225, 229 (2d Cir.1995)).
. Some courts have held that to satisfy the nexus requirement of probable cause in the anticipatory warrant context, the warrant application must demonstrate the contraband is "on a sure and irreversible course to its destination” before a warrant may be issued. United States v. Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d 8, 12-13 (1st Cir.1993); see also United States v. Leidner, 99 F.3d 1423, 1427-28 (7th Cir.1996) (noting several circuits have adopted sure course requirement), cert. denied, -U.S.-, 117 S.Ct. 1434, 137 L.Ed.2d 542 (1997); United States v. Garcia, 882 F.2d 699, 702-03 (2d Cir.1989) (noting wide variety of courts have upheld anticipatory warrants when sure course requirement was met). As one court has explained:
The sure course standard functions as a proxy for the actual presence of the contraband at the locus to be searched. It offers the magistrate a trustworthy assurance that the contraband, though not yet on the site, will almost certainly be located there at the time of the search, thus fulfilling the requirement of future probable cause.
Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d at 13; see also United States v. Hendriclcs, 743 F.2d 653, 654-55 (9th Cir.1984) (holding anticipatory warrant was invalid for lack of probable cause because, at time warrant was issued, the contraband was not on a sure course to the place to be searched and there was no assurance defendant would take contraband to that place).
The "sure course” requirement is typically satisfied in controlled delivery cases when the delivery is made directly to the place to be searched. Indeed, in Hugoboom, a controlled-delivery case in which the contraband was addressed to and sent directly to the defendant’s residence, the court stated that the "sure course” standard was clearly satisfied by the facts of the case. See 112 F.3d at 1086-87. The court did not, however, expressly adopt the "sure course” requirement for the Tenth Circuit. See id.
It is unclear how, or whether, the heightened "sure course” requirement applies to anticipatory warrants outside the controlled delivery context. We recognize that the "sure course” standard is one way of satisfying the traditional nexus requirement of probable cause. In this *1204case, however, because we conclude the warrant did not satisfy traditional probable cause requirements, see infra Part II, we need not further determine whether the more stringent "sure course” requirement is a necessary prerequisite to validity for all anticipatory warrants.
. In holding that the warrant was supported by probable cause, the district court agreed with the government that it was "a reasonable inference ... that given the previous activities that the officers had observed, one might expect that the video[s] would eventually make [their] way to the apartment to be searched and not stay permanently at the defendant’s place of work.” The district court further explained that the
officers had observed the defendant pick up packages, go back to his office. They had also been where he resided. They could reasonably infer that the contents of this particular package would not be readily usable at the defendant’s office. And I do not find it to be an unreasonable inference to assume that the contents of the package would eventually make their way to the defendant’s home where they could more likely be viewed than they could at the office.
Although, as the district court and government suggest, it was reasonable to infer that Rowland would not view or store the illegal video tapes at work, particularly given the fact that Rowland was a State employee, the district court did not address and the government has not explained why it was logical to infer Rowland would take the tapes home to view or store, rather than taking the tapes to some other location.
. In arguing the warrant was supported by probable cause, the government also asserts that a magistrate may consider an affiant’s experience and expertise in making the probable cause determination, and notes the affidavit in this case described Inspector Carr’s training and investigative experience in the area of child sexual exploitation and child pornography. The affidavit did not, however, set out any facts suggesting that, based on Carr's experience, there was reason to believe Rowland would be likely to view or store such materials at his home, rather than viewing or storing the materials at another location. Therefore, we reject this argument.
The government additionally asserts the warrant affidavit indicated Rowland had been “observed in his daily routine,” which included picking up his mail, walking back to his office, and "driving] to his residence after work.” The affidavit, however, in fact only stated that Rowland had been observed picking up his mail and walking back to his place of employment, and later leaving work and walking to his car at a nearby parking lot. The affidavit did not indicate whether Rowland would typically drive directly home after work, nor did it indicate whether Rowland would typically take home any mail he had collected that day from his private post office box.
. The government also asserts that because Carr “made no attempt to execute the search warrant until [Rowland] first indicated to him that the videotapes were in his residence,” Carr "[i]n effect ... delayed the search until the ... nexus requirement had been met." Although officers must comply with an anticipatory warrant’s conditions for the warrant to be validly executed, such compliance docs not satisfy the threshold requirement that, at the time of the warrant’s issuance, the warrant must be supported by probable cause. As discussed above, by placing conditions on a warrant's execution, a magistrate can ensure that the warrant is not executed prematurely. Such conditions do not, ■ however, themselves provide the magistrate with a basis for making the probable cause determination. See Hendricks, 743 F.2d at 654-56. The magistrate must ensure that the judicial function of determining the existence of probable cause is not improperly delegated to government agents by relying on police assurances that a search will not take place unless there is probable cause.
. Because we have concluded the affidavit failed to provide a substantial basis for the magistrate's probable cause determination, we need not consider whether, assuming probable cause had existed, the warrant conditions were adequate for a valid anticipatory warrant.
.This court has recognized that a reviewing court may, in appropriate cases, turn directly to the good-faith issue without first considering the validity of the warrant under the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. McKneely, 6 F.3d 1447, 1453 (10th Cir.1993); accord United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 924-25, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). When there are important Fourth Amendment questions at issue, however, and resolution of such questions is "necessary to guide future action by law enforcement officers and magistrates,” it is appropriate to first address the Fourth Amendment issues before turning to the good-faith issue. Leon, 468 U.S. at 925, 104 S.Ct. 3405; see also United States v. Dahlman, 13 F.3d 1391, 1397 (10th Cir.1993). In addition, resolution of the Fourth Amendment issue is often necessary, as in this case, to determine whether the officers’ reliance on the warrant was reasonable for purposes of the good-faith analysis. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 925, 104 S.Ct. 3405; see also Dahlman, 13 F.3d at 1397 (stating officers’ reliance on warrant language found to be overbroad was "reasonable in part because this practice [of using certain boilerplate language in warrants] had not been ruled unconstitutional prior to today”). Based on these considerations, it was appropriate that this court first address the underlying validity of the warrant before considering the good-faith exception.
. Rowland also argues the affidavit was submitted to the magistrate without full disclosure of all the facts. Specifically, he asserts "Inspector Carr knew, that there were no pre-existing facts connecting criminal activily to Rowland's home” and yet "failed to so inform the magistrate.” He also asserts Carr "failed to inform the magistrate of the known risk that the beeper's batteries would fail."
Suppression of evidence is appropriate if “the officers were dishonest or reckless in preparing their affidavit” and the magistrate was misled by information in the affidavit. Leon, 468 U.S. at 926, 923, 104 S.Ct. 3405. Here, the record does not indicate Inspector Carr was dishonest or reckless in preparing the affidavit for the warrant. As discussed above, Carr's belief that the affidavit was sufficient to provide probable cause for issuance of a warrant to search Rowland's home was not objectively unreasonable. There is no evidence indicating that Carr was actually aware that the affidavit was insufficient to provide probable cause. Likewise, there is no evidence that Carr knew the beeper would fail or could reasonably expect such a failure. As the Government points out,
it is unreasonable to expect Inspector Carr to have anticipated that: (1) the defendant would pick up his mail 15 minutes after the package had been delivered to his box in the morning; (2) the defendant would open the package immediately, thus triggering the alarm mode on the beeper [which mode requires more power and thus drains the batteries more quickly]; and (3) the beeper would stop functioning before the defendant left for his residence after work. A more logical assumption was that the defendant would pick up his mail during his lunch break, thus allowing the beeper enough time to continue functioning until the defendant got off work and proceeded to his residence.
We therefore reject Rowland's argument.
. The Leon good-faith exception will not save an improperly executed warrant. See United States v. Moland, 996 F.2d 259, 261 (10th Cir.1993). Instead, the good-faith analysis assumes "that the officers properly executed the warrant and searched only those places and for those objects that it was reasonable to believe were covered by the warrant.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 918 n. 19, 104 S.Ct. 3405 n. 19; see also United States v. Medlin, 798 F.2d 407, 410 (10th Cir.1986) (noting that the exclusionary rule is aimed at deterring police misconduct and explaining that “[u]nlike cases in which the police properly executed an invalid warrant that they reasonably thought was valid, in cases of improper execution there is police conduct that must be deterred"). Therefore, only if the execution was in accordance with the terms of the warrant may the good-faith exception be applied. See Moland, 996 F.2d at 261.
We note that in determining whether the officers complied with the warrant conditions in *1209executing the warrant, we do not make any determinations concerning the sufficiency of the conditions themselves.