concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority that the district court erred in dismissing for lack of jurisdiction. McQueen exhausted his claim that, by virtue of being between ages 60 and 64, he is eligible for disability benefits unless his skills are found to be highly marketable. In a letter to the Appeals Council, his attorney contended:
Furthermore, Interrogatories propounded to the vocational expert concerning sedentary jobs which Mr. McQueen could perform may have been based on erroneous information. In one of the questions, the Administrative Law Judge asked the vocational expert'to determine if there would bé any change once Mr. McQueen became fifty (50) years old. Obviously, this is an error on the part of the vocational expert, because Mr. McQueen was sixty (60) years old at the time the Interrogatories were propounded. Therefore, the information is invalid insofar as it relates to Mr. McQueen’s ability to perform work.
This argument clearly was inspired by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(d) (1998), which states, in part, “If you are close to retirement age (60-64) and have a severe impairment, we will not consider you able to adjust to sedentary or light work unless you have skills which are highly marketable.” In .overruling the objection to the Administrative Law Judge’s interrogatory, the Appeals Council also effectively rejected the position implicit in the objection that McQueen was entitled to disability benefits based on this portion of § 404.1563(d). McQueen, therefore, exhausted his claim that he cannot be denied disability benefits without a finding that he possesses highly mar*157ketable skills.1 The district court was mistaken in reaching the contrary conclusion and dismissing for lack of jurisdiction.
I also agree that, having found jurisdiction, we should proceed to address McQueen’s challenge to the denial of his application for disability benefits, which the district court never reached. We usually “remand a case where the lower court has not considered a pertinent issue.” In re Hronek, 568 F.2d 296, 298 (6th Cir.1977). We depart from this practice when sound judicial administration calls for doing so. See Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 70-72, 88 S.Ct. 709, 715, 19 L.Ed.2d 906 (1968); Levin v. Mississippi River Fuel Corp., 386 U.S. 162, 169-170, 87 S.Ct. 927, 932, 17 L.Ed.2d 834 (1967). This appeal, as it now stands, presents such an instance. Whether or not the Commissioner was required to find that McQueen’s skills are highly marketable before denying disability benefits is a question of law. Because we stand in as good a position as the district court to decide this issue, we do so rather than remand. See Morel v. Sabine Towing & Transp. Co., 669 F.2d 345, 346 (5th Cir.1982) (addressing question raised for first time on appeal because it “is a matter of law and a remand solely for its consideration is neither in the interest of justice nor judicial economy”); see also Grosso, 390 U.S. at 70-72, 88 S.Ct. at 715 (disposing of issue petitioner had failed to raise because holdings in the case and in another one dictated the outcome).
Like the majority, I conclude that the Commissioner’s final decision was reversible error.2 The Commissioner was obliged to find that McQueen’s skills are highly marketable before denying disability benefits for the period starting on September 29,1994,3 when McQueen turned age sixty.4 As he did not, part of his final decision was not supported by substantial evidence. See Kerns v. Apfel, 160 F.3d 464, 466-69 (8th Cir.1998); Emory v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1092, 1094-95 (10th Cir.1991); Pineault v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 848 F.2d 9, 10-11 (1st Cir.1988) (per curiam); Varley v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 820 F.2d 777, 781-82 (6th Cir.1987); Renner v. Heckler, 786 F.2d 1421, 1424-25 (9th Cir.1986) (per curiam); Tom v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 1250, 1256-57 (7th Cir.1985). This shortcoming dictates reversal of his rejection of McQueen’s application.
I, however, disagree with the majority’s award of disability benefits to McQueen. When the evidence is not substantial, we remand with the instruction to make an award if the record enables us to determine definitively that the claimant is entitled to benefits. See Ferguson v. Schweiker, 641 F.2d 243, 250 n. 8 (5th Cir. Unit A Mar.1981) (citing Johnson v. Harris, 612 F.2d 993, 998 (5th Cir.1980) (per curiam)); see also Rini v. Harris, 615 F.2d 625, 627 (5th Cir.1980) (reversing and remanding with direction to enter judgment where the evidence was not substantial and the record clearly showed the claimant’s right to benefits). We otherwise *158remand to the Commissioner to take additional evidence. See Ferguson, 641 F.2d at 250 n. 8 (citing Johnson).
We should not grant disability benefits to McQueen. We cannot make a definitive determination on his application now because none of the findings go to whether or not his skills are highly marketable.5 In light of this circumstance, we should remand to the Commissioner to take additional evidence.6 See Kerns, 160 F.3d at 469; Pineault, 848 F.2d at 11; Varley, 820 F.2d at 782; Tom, 779 F.2d at 1257.
Accordingly, I concur in part and dissent in part.
. A claimant exhausts when the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) makes a final decision on his claim. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Commissioner identifies the Appeals Council's decision as an event that constitutes his final decision. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.981 (1998) (providing that the Appeals Council’s decision triggers the period for the claimant to seek judicial review).
. We review "whether (1) the [final] decision is supported by substantial evidence and (2) proper legal standards were used to evaluate the evidence.” Martinez v. Chater, 64 F.3d 172, 173 (5th Cir.1995) (per curiam). Substantial evidence is "more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v. National Labor Relations Bd., 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 217, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938)).
. McQueen claims that he was entitled to disability benefits beginning on September 10, 1992.
. The Commissioner uses .a five-step sequential process to decide if a claimant qualifies for disability benefits. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b)-(f) (1998). At the last stage — the one at issue here— he must grant benefits unless he proves that the claimant is unable to do any work done in the past because of a severe impairment and cannot perform other work. See id. § 404.1520(f); Bowling v. Shalala, 36 F.3d 431, 435 (5th Cir.1994). His success at showing the ability to do other jobs turns on the claimant’s age, education, past work experience and residual functional capacity. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(0(1998).
. I agree with the definition of highly marketable skills given in Prestar v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 14 F.3d 1107, 1112-13 & n. 2 (6th Cir.1994).
. I appreciate that allowing the Commissioner to take additional evidence would prolong a dispute that has lasted more than five years. To counteract this situation, I would urge the Commissioner to expedite his consideration, giving final resolution of McQueen’s application highest priority. See Partes v. Harris, 614 F.2d 83, 84-85 (5th Cir.1980).