dissenting as to Part VI:
In an issue of first impression requiring de novo review,1 Edmondson contends that the district court’s use of sentencing by video conferencing violated Rules 32 and 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Rule 32 requires that the court “address the defendant personally” at the imposition of sentence.2 Rule 43 also provides as follows:
(a) Presence Required. The defendant shall be present at the arraignment, at the time of the plea, at every stage of the trial including the impaneling of the jury and the return of the verdict, and at the imposition of sentence, except as otherwise provided by this rule.3
There are certain exceptions in Rule 43 to the presence requirement, none of which are applicable here.4
Edmondson contends that by sentencing him via video conferencing that the district judge did not address him “personally,” in violation of Rule 32. He also maintains that because he appeared by video he was not “present” at the sentence, as required by Rule 43(a). He relies on Valenzuelar-Gonzalez v. United States Dist. Ct. for Dist. of *240Arizona5 for this second proposition. In Valenzuelar-Gonzalez, the Ninth Circuit held that arraignment by video violated Rules 10 and 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.6 Edmondson contends that video sentencing, like video aiTaignment, violates the Federal Rules.
The government, in response, asserts that Edmondson and the district judge were essentially in the same location because they were able to see and hear each other clearly and because Edmondson was able to confer fully with his counsel, who was physically present with him in Sherman, Texas. The government also notes the importance of the use of video sentencing, including expedience in concluding the sentencing process, and the obvious very significant savings of judicial resources and the direct and indirect expenses thus avoided by the court, government, and defense.
In determining whether the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were violated, I am persuaded that we should first examine the language of the Rules, giving that language its plain, common-sense meaning7 and construing the language to secure procedural simplicity and eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay.8 In so doing, we should note that no court has yet addressed this precise issue. “Presence,” as required by Rule 43, is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as an “[a]ct, fact, or state of being in a certain place and not elsewhere, or within sight or call, at hand, or in some place that is being thought of.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1183 (6th ed.1990) (emphasis added). See also Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1793 (1976) (defining “presence” as “the condition of being within sight or call, at hand, or in a place being thought of’).9
Notwithstanding the foregoing meaning of “presence,” reflecting that a defendant is “present” when “within sight or call,” I am aware of contrary interpretations suggesting that “present” requires physical presence in a location. For example, besides the “within sight or call” definition, dictionaries also define “presence” and “present” as connoting physical existence in a place.10 Further, I am aware that “presence,” as used in other parts of Rule 4311 and as discussed in the advisory committee notes,12 suggests physical presence. These sources would apply the aspect of the “presence” definition indicating physical presence in a location. Presence, however, is not limited solely to physical existence. As the alternate definitions state, presence can also be accomplished by being “within sight or call.” Although the physical existence definition is certainly a sustainable position, giving appropriate effect to the clear intent of Rule 2 mandating a just determination in criminal proceedings and directing us to construe the Rules so as to eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay, requires that I conclude that the more appropriate view of “presence” includes the “within sight or call” aspect of the definition. I am persuaded that we should give it that *241meaning herein. Having said this, I am fully aware of the force of the majority’s reasoning. I feel compelled by prudence, however, to read the Rules so as to give the district courts a critically needed flexibility herein.
Considering next the meaning of being “personally” addressed, I find that the right of presence at sentencing in Rule 43 and the right of allocution in Rule 32 are related and often have been combined.13 The common law right of allocution permitted the defendant to personally ask the court for leniency and to have that request considered by the court in sentencing.14 Further, the dictionary defines “personally” as “in person.”15 It therefore appears that the requirement in Rule 32(c)(3)(C) that the court “address the defendant personally” at sentencing means that the district judge, and not someone else, speak directly to the defendant. I perceive nothing inherent in the meaning of “personally” or “in person” that mandates a face-to-face encounter; rather, there need only be a personal one-on-one interaction between the judge and the defendant.
Turning to the case at bar, I would reject Edmondson’s contention that Valenzuelar-Gonzalez prohibits the use of sentencing by video conferencing. In one portion of the opinion, our sister circuit colleagues stated that Rule 10 and Rule 43 “together” required the district court to conduct arraignments with the defendant physically present in the courtroom.16 Later in the opinion, they stated that “arraignment by closed circuit television does not constitute substantial compliance with either Rule 10 or Rule 43.”17 They also expressed concerns about sentencing.
I appreciate our sister circuit colleagues’ concerns, but decline to accept their conclusion. It is my perception that Valenzuelar-Gonzalez fails to recognize the alternative meaning of presence, focusing exclusively on the physical presence notion. Further, although our colleagues found that video arraignment violated provisions of both Rule 10 and Rule 43, the “open court” language so dominant there presents no issue in the case before us.18 Finally, I cannot agree with their conclusion, persuaded that it does not properly acknowledge and apply the simplicity and expedience mandate of Rule 2.
Having considered the meaning of the Rules 32(c)(3)(C) and 43(a), I am persuaded beyond peradventure that Edmondson was “personally” addressed and “present” at his sentence as required by those rules. The room in Beaumont where the judge was located and the video conference room in Sherman where Edmondson, his attorney, and the Assistant United States Attorney were located, contain identical equipment. Each room had a camera and two 33-ineh television monitors that could be set to either a full or split screen view. One monitor gave almost a full view of the room in Sherman, including the tables at which the parties were located. The second monitor in each conference room gave a full view of the district judge. Microphones were located next to the parties and the video operator could focus in more closely on anyone speaking.
Using this technology, Chief Judge Schell was able to communicate clearly with Edmondson and the other parties in the Sherman conference room. He was able to see the parties and ask the defendants and their attorneys questions. The attorneys and the defendants likewise were able to see and respond to the judge. The judge was *242able to interact with and observe the demeanor and body language of the defendants through real-time video communication.19 This interaction in the video conference results in far superior observation of demeanor for credibility assessments than judges and juries experience when observing a witness who is testifying by video deposition, a practice that long has been accepted by the courts.
Edmondson also could not have been more “personally” addressed had he been standing a few feet in front of the judge in Beaumont, Texas. The judge, and not another person, was able to speak directly to the defendant, and not another person, in a one-on-one interaction and exchange, thus satisfying the requirements of Rule 32. Similarly, although he was not physically located in front of the judge, Edmondson was also “present” for the imposition of sentence because he was “within sight or call,” was “at hand,” and was able to participate directly in the proceeding both with the court and his attorney.20
The disposition I would reach today would give the required regard to the practical necessities involved herein. The round trip from Beaumont to Sherman, Texas is 630 miles. Sentencings by video conference manifestly would save significant time and travel expenses of the judge and the judicial staff, other court personnel, prosecutors and defense counsel, and their staffs. I am also sensitive to the reality that video conferences make possible more prompt sentencing.21 As I have noted, Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure aptly states: “[tjhese rules are intended to provide for the just determination of every criminal proceeding. They shall be construed to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay.” It is my view that we should recognize that face-to-face sentencing for each and every case is a preference that we no longer should insist on.22
Accordingly, I would conclude and hold that Rules 32 and 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were not violated when Edmondson was sentenced utilizing the video conference technology.23
. In re Taylor, 132 F.3d 256 (5th Cir.1998).
. Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(c)(3)(C).
. The scope of Rule 43 is much broader than normal due process protections, United. States v. Gordon, 829 F.2d 119 (D.C.Cir.1987), and encompasses the common law concept that after an indictment is handed down, "nothing shall be done in the absence of the prisoner.” Id. at 124 n. 4 (quoting Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 372, 13 S.Ct. 136, 36 L.Ed. 1011 (1892)).
.For example, a defendant's presence is not required for organizational defendants, for minor crimes, for conferences solely on questions of law, or for correction of sentences under Rule 35. Fed.R.Crim.P. 43(c). Defendants may also be excused from court proceedings by voluntarily excusing themselves either through disruption or choice. Fed.R.Crim.P. 43(b).
. 915 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir.1990).
. Rule 10 provides that "[a]rraignment shall be conducted in open court.” Fed.R.Crim.P. 10.
. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989).
. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 2.
. The district court noted that many cases invalidating proceedings under Rule 43 involved situations in which defendants were physically absent from the proceedings and were not participating in any manner. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 919 (5th Cir.1994).
. See Black’s Law Dictionary 1183 (6th ed.1990) (also defining "presence” as the “existence of a person in a particular place at a given time particularly with reference to some act done there and then”); Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1793 (1976) (defining "present” as "being in one place and not elsewhere”).
. An exception to a defendant’s presence in Rule 43(b) allows the defendant to be removed "from the courtroom" after being "initially present,” suggesting that the defendant is to be physically present in the courtroom unless an exception applies.
. For example, the notes to the 1974 Amendment imply that closed-circuit television would not enable a defendant to be present, as do the notes to the 1944 Adoption, which expressly do not require a defendant’s presence for misdemeanor cases because of the travel and hardship involved. See also Fed.R.Civ.P. 43(c) (reflecting a decision to allow live video testimony for “good cause shown” in civil cases).
. United States v. Moree, 928 F.2d 654 (5th Cir.1991).
. Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 81 S.Ct. 653, 5 L.Ed.2d 670 (1961).
. Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 867 (10th ed.1994).
. Valenzuela-Gonzalez, 915 F.2d at 1280.
. Id. at 1281 (emphasis added).
. I note that although the public was able to be present in both the Beaumont and Sherman conference rooms the record seems to indicate that the Sherman conference room is of such size as to have possibly excluded family members of defendants or other observers in the past. At such time as video conferencing may be allowed, we should encourage district courts, in order to make full use of this technology and to avoid possible problems with public exclusion, to use video conferencing in facilities where the public can have full access, such as existing courtrooms.
. But cf. United States v. Reynolds, 44 M.J. 726 (Army Ct.Crim.App.1996) (prohibiting use of a pre-trial proceeding by telephone under a military rule "very similar” to Rule 43 because the parties would not be able to see and observe each other).
. In so holding, I recognize the potential for concern if defense counsel was not present with the defendant at sentencing, but instead was either in the courtroom with the judge or at another location by video link. The risk exists that effective and secret privileged communications, and possibly zealous and adequate representation of the client, might not occur if defense counsel were at a different location than the defendant. See Fredric I. Lederer, Technology Comes to the Courtroom, and ..., 43 Emory L.J. 1095, 1106-07 (1994). I emphasize that nothing in the disposition I propose endorses sentencing by video conferencing where the defense attorney is not personally present with the defendant.
. It has long been noted that both the government and the defendant have an interest in the prompt resolution of criminal charges. Ecker v. Scott, 69 F.3d 69 (5th Cir.1995); see United States v. Hughey, 147 F.3d 423, 432 (5th Cir.1998) (noting the “general interest in prompt and efficient administration of justice”).
. I am keenly aware of the concern that such procedures might be viewed with some discomfort. I underscore that defendants and judges would still be able to "look each other in the eyes.” I am also confident that the individualized attention district judges have traditionally displayed in sentencing defendants would continue, whether that attention comes via video conferencing or in face-to-face encounters.
. If my view had prevailed, I would emphasize that it addresses only the sentencing proceeding. This decision approving sentencing via video conferencing would be buttressed in this case because there was no testimony by witnesses. We necessarily would have to reserve for another day any confrontation clause issue which such witnesses might occasion or which might arise at other phases of the criminal process.