concurring.
I concur in the majority opinion but for different reasons.
Preliminarily, I think it important to point out my basic disagreement with the application of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis to the ADA claim. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Both parties in this case used the McDonnell Douglas analysis to argue for and against the plaintiffs discrimination claim under the ADA. This was not the proper analysis, however, because the claim the plaintiff asserts is not a disparate treatment claim.6
The ADA prohibits discrimination “against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability ...” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Under the ADA, the term “discriminate” includes:
(5)(A) not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless [the employer] can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of [the employer]; or
(B) denying employment opportunities to a job applicant or employee who is an otherwise qualified individual with a disability, if such denial is based on the need of [the employer] to make reasonable accommodation to the physical or mental impairments of the employee or applicant.
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)-(B). In most ADA cases, therefore, the focus is on whether the employer should have reasonably accommodated the employee’s disability but did not. In such cases, as here, the McDonnell Douglas disparate treatment analysis is inappropriate. See Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne Community Schs., 100 F.3d 1281, 1283-84 (7th Cir.1996); Monette v. Electronic Data Systems Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1183 (6th Cir.1996); see also Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1112 (8th Cir.1995) (stating that once the plaintiff makes a facial showing that reasonable accommodation is possible, the burden of production shifts to the employer to show that it is unable to accommodate the employee); Wood v. Omaha Sch. Dist., 985 F.2d 437, 439 (8th Cir.1993) (stating that under the Rehabilitation Act a plaintiff need only make a facial showing that reasonable accommodation is possible and finding that the plaintiff met that burden by proposing certain accommodations); Arneson v. Heckler, 879 F.2d 393, 396 (8th Cir.1989) (reversing dismissal of Rehabilitation Act claim because the plaintiff was “only required to provide evidence sufficient to make ‘at least a facial showing that reasonable accommodation is possible’ ” before the burden shifts to the employer to prove it is unable to make the accommodation) (citation omitted); Stewart v. Happy Herman’s Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278, 1285-87 (11th Cir.1997) (holding that a plaintiff can show they were unlawfully discriminated against when an employer does not reasonably accommodate their disability, unless the employer can show such an accommodation would pose an undue hardship); Aka v. Washington Hosp. Center, 156 F.3d 1284, 1288 (D.C.Cir.1998) (applying the McDonnell Douglas analysis to a plaintiffs disparate treatment claim under the ADA, but finding that a reasonable accommodation claim in the same complaint was subject to its own specialized legal standards).
Under the appropriate reasonable accommodation analysis, the plaintiffs ADA claim must fail. The plaintiff does not demonstrate that his work inadequacies (which he denies in setting forth the prima facie case for age discrimination) are related to his narcolepsy or that the defendant failed to reasonably accommodate him. In fact, the record shows that John Deere did accommodate the plaintiff. For example, they allowed the plaintiff to take naps during the day and made other adjustments in his work schedule. The plaintiff even testified that John Deere willingly provided him with any assis-*563tanee he, or his doctor, requested regarding his medical condition.
With respect to his age discrimination claim, I feel the plaintiff created a factual dispute as to his prima facie case. The plaintiff is, after all, entitled to all favorable inferences as the nonmoving party. The plaintiff, however, did not prove pretext. As this court points out in Ryther v. KARE 11, 108 F.3d 832 (8th Cir.1997), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 2510, 138 L.Ed.2d 1013 (1997), a plaintiff must show pretext by evidence, viewed in conjunction with the elements of the prima facie case, which permits an inference of discrimination. I agree with the majority that there was no evidence to permit such an inference in this case and so his age discrimination claim must fail.
Evidence of pretext may not include a reason for termination which is inconsistent with such inference. See Rothmeier v. Investment Advisers, Inc., 85 F.3d 1328, 1337 (8th Cir.1996) (affirming summary judgment in an age discrimination case where there was evidence that the plaintiff was fired for confronting his employers about SEC violations). Although a plaintiff may plead alternative and even inconsistent claims, he may not assert a reason for his discharge which may well prove pretext, but is nonetheless inconsistent with the inference of discrimination. Here, in an attempt to verify his retaliatory discharge claim, the plaintiff asserts that his knowledge of the company’s misconduct made him a potential “whistle blower” and, therefore, the company’s reason for discharge was pretextual. If we accept the plaintiffs assertions as true, his evidence of pretext defeats his claim of age discrimination because it negates intent, showing that the plaintiff thought he was fired for a reason other than age. Furthermore, the plaintiffs assertion that he had knowledge of misconduct does not salvage his retaliation claim under the facts of this case. There is no proof to establish a reasonable inference that the employer knew that the plaintiff had evidence of misconduct and discharged him because he might reveal this evidence to the authorities.
I can fully understand plaintiffs frustration. He was a loyal employee who performed his job for over twenty-eight years. Why was he suddenly discharged as he neared retirement age? Unsure of the reason, his lawyer obviously “shot-gunned” his claims — not knowing which one would work. In other words, the plaintiff “protests too much.” The plaintiffs multiplicity of claims against the defendant backfired, not only weakening but defeating some of his legitimate claims. Although the timing of the discharge seems questionable, there is not enough evidence to support any of the plaintiffs claims. The result here leaves the plaintiff feeling an injustice has been done and, although I lack a legal basis for saying so, I'am not so sure that I disagree.
. If a claimant under the ADA were making a disparate treatment claim, such as an employer placing a greater burden on disabled workers than on other employees, then the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis would apply. Cf. Price v. S-B Power Tool, 75 F.3d 362 (8th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 910, 117 S.Ct. 274, 136 L.Ed.2d 197 (1996) (No. 95-1782). However, no such claim is made here.