The central issue presented in this appeal is whether the district court clearly erred in denying a drug courier who imported 512.4 grams of 85 percent pure heroin from Colombia into the United States a two-point downward adjustment for her minor role in the offense under § 3B1.2 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3B1.2 (1996) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.]. We hold that the district court did not commit clear error, that there was in fact ample evidence in the record to support its determination that the defendant did not play a minor role in the offense, and, finally, that the district court did not misapprehend either the law of this Circuit or the rules established in the Guidelines. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
More broadly, we reaffirm our longstanding view that a district court’s determination of whether a defendant qualifies for a minor role adjustment under the Guidelines is a finding of fact that will be reviewed only for clear error. We reemphasize, moreover, that the proponent of the downward adjustment bears the burden at all times of establishing her role in the offense by a preponderance of the evidence. Finally, we believe that two legal principles should guide the district court in this fact-finding endeavor. First and foremost, the district court must measure the defendant’s role against her relevant conduct, that is, the conduct for which she has been held accountable under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3. The Guidelines and our ease precedent plainly require the district court to undertake this method of analysis in every case where a role adjustment is at issue. See U.S.S.G. Ch. 3, Pt. B, intro, comment. Second, where the record evidence is sufficient, the district court may also measure the defendant’s conduct against that of other participants in the criminal scheme attributed to the defendant. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, comment. (n.3). These principles advance both the directives of the Guidelines and our ease precedent by recognizing the fact-intensive nature of this inquiry and by maximizing the discretion of the trial court in determining the defendant’s role in the offense.
I.
On June 12, 1996, Isabelle Rodriguez De Varón (“De Varón”) smuggled 70 heroin-filled pellets into the United States. She had ingested the pellets and smuggled them from Colombia into the United States inside her body. Upon arrival, De Varón reported to United States Customs. Suspecting that she was an internal carrier of narcotics, the customs officials confronted De Varón and she confessed. The government then accompanied De Varón to a hospital and ultimately recovered 512.4 grams of 85 percent pure heroin. At the time of her arrest, De Varón was carrying $2,350. De Varón admitted that a-woman identified only as “Nancy” provided her *935with $1,350 of travel advance money and instructed her to bring an additional $1,000 of her own money to cover her expenses. De Varón said that upon delivery of the drugs in Miami she had expected to receive $6,000.
A federal grand jury returned a two-count indictment against De Varón, charging her with importing heroin into the United States, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 952(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count I), and with possessing heroin with the intent to distribute it, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count II). Pursuant to a plea agreement with the government, De Varón pled guilty to the allegations in Count I and agreed to forfeit the $2,350 she was carrying at the time of her arrest in return for the government agreeing to dismiss Count II. The government also agreed that it would not oppose De Varon’s request for a three-level sentence reduction for timely acceptance of responsibility, see U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, or her application for the “safety valve” protection provided in the Guidelines if she met all of the requirements, see U.S.S.G. •§ 5C1.2.
The district court accepted the plea and ordered a probation officer to prepare a Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”). The PSI set De Varon’s base offense level under the Guidelines at 28. The officer then deducted two levels because De Var-on qualified for the “safety valve” provision under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(6)1 and three more levels for De Varon’s timely acceptance of responsibility for her conduct under U.S.S.G. § 3El.l(a), (b)(2). After these adjustments, De Varon’s resulting offense level was 23. The probation officer then assigned De Varón a criminal history category of I because she had no prior criminal convictions. The sentencing guideline range for an offense level of 23 with a criminal history of I is 46 to 57 months.
De Varón objected to the PSI’s assessment and claimed, inter alia, that she should be granted a downward adjustment for her minor role in the offense under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. In support of her claim, De Varón argued that she was an internal carrier of narcotics and that she was recruited by another, more culpable participant. Specifically, De Varón relied on the oral statement that she had given to the probation officer who prepared her PSI. That statement is recounted in De Varon’s PSI as follows:
[De Varón] reports that she met a lady by the name of Nancy at the office where she works in Colombia. Nancy inquired about moving some items with the trucking company [that employed De Varón]. After several visits to the company, Nancy asked [De Varón] if she *936possessed a visa. [De Varón] reports that Nancy knew that [De Varón] was having financial problems. [De Varón] reports that her son is mentally retarded and requires medical attention. Nancy asked [De Varón] if she would bring drugs to the United States. [De Varón] was told that she would have to swallow some pills and that [she] would be paid $6,000. [De Varón] relates that she agreed to swallow the drugs because she needed the money for her ill child. [De Varón] states that she knew what she did was wrong and regrets her actions.
At sentencing, De Varon’s counsel further said that De Varón was “prepared to testify to that statement before the Court today, if the Court so chooses.” De Varón did not present any other information or evidence in support of her claim.
The district court then denied De Var-on’s request for a minor • role reduction, making the following statements:
Under Veloza, the act of transporting ... or importing as a courier does not determine that a defendant is or is not entitled to a[n] adjustment. Secondly, the burden is on the defendant to establish the minor or minimal participation.
I would say [De Varon’s] statement standing alone is not sufficient to establish a minor or minimal level of participation. But even if we were to accept it as true, the fact that she can point to other people that may have provided the narcotics to her would not alter my own determination that she played an integral and essential part in the scheme to import.
As I have noted in the past, but for individuals willing to perform the role that this defendant played, we would not have the importation being attempted or succeeding in other instances.
And thirdly, the guidelines refer to a small amount of drugs to entitle a defendant to a reduction. And I would conclude that 512.4 grams of heroin is not a minor amount within the meaning of the guidelines in order to entitle someone to a minor or minimal level role. So I’ll note your objection and deny it.
The district court subsequently sentenced De Varón to 46 months of imprisonment, three years of supervised release, and a $100 assessment. The district court also ordered that De Varón be deported as a condition of her supervised release.2 De Varón appealed her sentence on the ground that the district court erred in failing to reduce her sentence based on her minor role as a heroin courier.
On appeal, a panel of this Court vacated De Varon’s sentence and remanded the case to the district court for resentencing. United States v. De Varon, 136 F.3d 740 (11th Cir.1998). Following the issuance of the panel’s opinion, the government filed a suggestion of rehearing en banc with this Court. On May 29,1998, this Court grant; ed the government’s petition, entered an order vacating the panel’s decision, and set the case for en banc rehearing. United States v. De Varon, 141 F.3d 1468 (11th Cir.1998) (en banc).
II.
A. Standard of Review
As an initial matter, we must address the appropriate standard of review to be applied in this case. De Varón argues that this Court reviews a district court’s determination whether a defendant qualifies for a minor role adjustment de novo. In contrast, the government contends that this *937determination is a finding of fact subject to review only for clear error.
This Court has long and repeatedly held that a district court’s determination of a defendant’s role in the offense is a finding of fact to be reviewed only for clear error. We reaffirm that holding today. See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 139 F.3d 820, 821-22 (11th Cir.1998) (“A sentencing court’s determination of a defendant’s role in an offense is a factual finding reviewed for clear error.”); United States v. Everett, 129 F.3d 1222, 1224 (11th Cir.1997) (per curiam) (“We consider the district court’s determination of appellee’s role in the offense a factual finding, and thus review it for clear error.”); United States v. Fernandez, 92 F.3d 1121, 1123 (11th Cir.1996) (per curiam) (holding that the district court’s factual determination of a defendant’s role in the offense was not clearly erroneous); United States v. Mosquera, 95 F.3d 1012, 1014 (11th Cir.1996) (per curiam) (“A sentencing court’s determination of the defendant’s role as a ‘minor’ or ‘minimal’ participant in an offense is also reviewed for clear error.”); United States v. Veloza, 83 F.3d 380, 381 (11th Cir.1996) (holding that the district court’s factual finding that the defendant did not play a minor role in the offense was not clearly erroneous); United States v. Camargo-Vergara, 57 F.3d 993, 997 (11th Cir.1995) (“A district court’s determination of a defendant’s role in an offense is a finding of fact subject to review only for clear error.”); United States v. Costales, 5 F.3d 480, 483 (11th Cir.1993) (per curiam) (“A district court’s determination of a defendant’s role in an offense is a finding of fact that we will not disturb unless it is clearly erroneous.”); United States v. Gates, 967 F.2d 497, 501 (11th Cir.1992) (per curiam) (holding that the district court was not clearly erroneous in refusing to reduce the defendant’s offense level for being a minor participant); United States v. Zaccardi, 924 F.2d 201, 202-03 (11th Cir.1991) (per curiam) (“The district court’s determination that appellant was not a minor participant in the conspiracy is a finding of fact which will be reversed on appeal only if ‘clearly erroneous.’ ”); United States v. Smith, 918 F.2d 1551, 1565 (11th Cir.1990) (“[T]he trial judge’s determination of whether a defendant is a ‘minor’ or ‘minimal’ participant is a factual finding subject to the clearly erroneous standard.”); United States v. Asseff, 917 F.2d 502, 505 (11th Cir.1990) (per curiam) (“[T]he sentencing court’s determination regarding a defendant’s role in the offense is a factual finding subject to the clearly erroneous standard.”); United States v. Sellers, 906 F.2d 597, 605 (11th Cir.1990) (“Our standard of review on this factual issue [the defendant’s role in the offense] is whether the district court’s decision was ‘clearly erroneous.’ ”); United States v. Alston, 895 F.2d 1362, 1369 (11th Cir.1990) (“The requirement in Guideline § 3B1.2 that a judge determine whether the defendant was a ‘minor’ or ‘minimal’ participant is a factual determination and therefore subject to the clearly erroneous standard.”).3
Moreover, every other circuit has adopted the clear error standard to review a district court’s determination of a defendant’s role in the offense.4 See, e.g., Unit*938ed States v. Edwards, 98 F.3d 1364, 1371 (D.C.Cir.1996) (mixed question); United States v. Thompson, 76 F.3d 442, 456-58 (2d Cir.1996) (fact question); United States v. Lampkins, 47 F.3d 175, 180 (7th Cir.1995) (question “heavily dependent on the facts”); United States v. DeFranco, 30 F.3d 664, 669 (6th Cir.1994) (fact question); United States v. Carr, 25 F.3d 1194, 1207 (3d Cir.1994) (mixed question); United States v. Arredondo-Santos, 911 F.2d 424, 425 (10th Cir.1990) (fact question); United States v. Ellis, 890 F.2d 1040, 1041 (8th Cir.1989) (per curiam) (fact question); United States v. Sanchez-Lopez, 879 F.2d 541, 557 (9th Cir.1989) (fact question); United States v. Daughtrey, 874 F.2d 213, 218 (4th Cir.1989) (Wilkins, J.) (mixed question); United States v. Wright, 873 F.2d 437, 443-44 (1st Cir.1989) (Breyer, J.) (mixed question); United States v. Franco-Torres, 869 F.2d 797, 801 (5th Cir.1989) (fact question). While we unquestionably afford deference to a district court’s subsidiary factual findings, the ultimate determination of role in the offense is also a fundamentally factual determination entitled to due deference and not a legal conclusion subject to de novo review.
Both the Guidelines and the relevant statutory language also explicitly recognize that a district court’s determination of a defendant’s role in the offense is essentially factual and that such findings must be afforded deference. The commentary to ■the Guidelines states that the determination of mitigating role in the offense “is heavily dependent upon the facts of the particular case.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, comment. (backg’d.).5 The statute conferring jurisdiction on this Court to review a district court’s sentencing decisions also instructs that appellate courts “shall accept the findings of fact of the district court unless they are clearly erroneous and shall give due deference to the district court’s application of the Guidelines to the facts.” 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (1994). Moreover, we believe that the district judge is in the best position to weigh and assess both the defendant’s role in her relevant conduct and the relative degrees of culpability of the other participants in that conduct. Intensely factual inquiries such as these are properly consigned to the experienced discretion of the district judge. See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574-75, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985) (expounding on the meaning of the clearly erroneous standard and recognizing the trial judge’s superior position in making credibility determinations and general expertise in fact finding relative to appellate courts); cf. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 98, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996) (“A district court’s decision to depart from the Guidelines, by contrast, will in most cases be due substantial deference, for it embodies the traditional exercise of discretion by a sentencing court.”). Therefore, in light of these directives and our unambiguous case precedent, we reaffirm our holding that a district court’s determination of a defendant’s role in the offense is a question of fact to be reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard.
B. Mitigating Role in the Offense
The sentence imposed for a particular offense is based upon the applicable sentencing offense levels set forth in Chapter Two (Offense Conduct) of the Sentencing *939Guidelines. A sentence adjustment for “the role the defendant played in committing the offense” (either mitigating or aggravating) may also be available. U.S.S.G. Ch. 3, Pt. B, intro, comment. Specifically, a defendant may receive a two to four level reduction in her base offense level where her role in the offense can be described as minimal, minor, or somewhere in between. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. Minimal participants may receive a four-level reduction, minor participants may receive a two-level reduction, and those whose participation falls in between may receive a three-level reduction. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(a), (b). The commentary to the Guidelines instructs that a four-level reduction “is intended to cover defendants who are plainly among the léast culpable of those involved in the conduct of a group .... [and their] lack of knowledge or understanding of the scope and structure of the enterprise and of the activities of others is indicative of a role as minimal participant.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, comment, (n.l). The application note provides, for example, that a four-level reduction would be appropriate “for someone who played no other role in a very large drug smuggling operation than to offload part of a single marihuana shipment, or in a case where an individual was recruited as a courier for a single smuggling transaction involving a small amount of drugs.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, comment, (n.2). In contrast, a minor role in the offense “means any participant who is less culpable than most other participants, but whose role could not be described as minimal.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, comment, (n.3).
The proponent of the downward adjustment — here the defendant — always bears the burden of proving a mitigating role in the offense by a preponderance of the evidence. See Everett, 129 F.3d at 1224 (citing Gates, 967 F.2d at 501); Camargo-Vergara, 57 F.3d at 997-98. This principle has been recognized by every circuit. See, e.g., United States v. IsazaZapata, 148 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir.1998); United States v. Beltran, 109 F.3d 365, 370 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.—, 118 S.Ct. 145, 139 L.Ed.2d 92 (1997); United States v. Gonzalez-Soberal, 109 F.3d 64, 74 (1st Cir.1997); United States v. Carrazco, 91 F.3d 65, 67 (8th Cir.1996); United States v. Atanda, 60 F.3d 196, 198 (5th Cir.1995) (per curiam); United States v. Davis, 36 F.3d 1424, 1436 (9th Cir.1994); United States v. McCann, 940 F.2d 1352, 1359 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Garcia, 920 F.2d 153, 156 (2d Cir.1990) (per curiam); United States v. Perry, 908 F.2d 56, 58 (6th Cir.1990); United States v. Gordon, 895 F.2d 932, 935 (4th Cir.1990); see also United States v. White, 1 F.3d 13, 18 (D.C.Cir.1993) (“The defendant ‘properly bears the burden of proof under those sections of the Guidelines that define mitigating factors’ ....”) (quoting United States v. Burke, 888 F.2d 862, 869 n. 10 (D.C.Cir.1989)). It falls to the district court then to evaluate the evidence presented and determine whether this burden has been satisfied.
In making the ultimate determination of the defendant’s role in the offense, the sentencing judge has no duty to make any specific subsidiary factual findings. See United States v. West, 898 F.2d 1493, 1503 (11th Cir.1990) (“When the court mandates no departure, the sentencing judge need not offer further reasons justifying the sentence.”). So long as the district court’s decision is supported by the record and the court clearly resolves any disputed factual issues, a simple statement of the district court’s conclusion is sufficient. See United States v. Wilson, 884 F.2d 1355, 1356 (11th Cir.1989) (“The findings of fact of the sentencing court may be based on evidence heard during trial, facts admitted by a defendant’s plea of guilty, undisputed statements in the presentence report, or evidence presented at the sentencing hearing.”); Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(c)(1) (“For each matter controverted, the court must make either a finding on the allegation or a determination that no finding is necessary because the controverted matter will not be taken into account in, or will *940not affect, sentencing.”)- Although we have never explicitly addressed this question in the context of § 3B1.2, many other circuits have recognized that a final determination of the defendant’s role in the offense is the only specific factual finding that a district court is required to make. See, e.g., United States v. Haut, 107 F.3d 213, 217-18 (3d Cir.) (“We are mindful that ‘[a] simple statement by the district court’ together with some supporting facts of record concerning a defendant’s status as a minimal participant is ‘typically sufficient to settle the question.’ ”) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1127, 117 S.Ct. 2528, 138 L.Ed.2d 1028 and — U.S.—, 118 S.Ct. 130, 139 L.Ed.2d 80 (1997); United States v. Edwards, 98 F.3d 1364, 1370 (D.C.Cir.1996) (holding that district court need not “use magic words ‘relative culpability’ or ... make explicit findings of relative culpability on the record”); United States v. Davis, 36 F.3d 1424, 1436 (9th Cir.1994) (“The district court has no duty to make a finding regarding a defendant’s relative culpability; it only needs to make its resolution of disputed matters clear.”); United States v. Flores-Payon, 942 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir.1991) (holding that district court is not required to make “factual findings of [defendant’s] culpability relative to that of his co-defendants”); United States v. Ocampo, 937 F.2d 485, 491 (9th Cir.1991) (“A simple statement by the district court that the defendant was not a minor participant is typically sufficient to settle the question.”); United States v. Caruth, 930 F.2d 811, 816 (10th Cir.1991) (holding that although a statement of reasons for denying a mitigating role adjustment would be helpful, district court “ ‘is in no way required to make detailed findings, or explain why a particular adjustment is or is not appropriate’ ”) (citation omitted); United States v. Gallegos, 868 F.2d 711, 713 (5th Cir.1989) (“Although we encourage judges to supply more specific factual findings, a simple statement that the defendant was not a ‘minor participant’ will suffice as a factual finding.”). But see, e.g., United States v. Miranda-Santiago, 96 F.3d 517, 532 (1st Cir.1996) (holding that district court has obligation to make specific factual findings in support of its denial of adjustment for defendant’s mitigating role in the offense); United States v. Webster, 996 F.2d 209, 212 (9th Cir.1993) (per curiam) (remanding for factual findings regarding defendant’s role and culpability in his relevant conduct); United States v. Melton, 930 F.2d 1096, 1099 (5th Cir.1991) (holding that district court must articulate the factual basis upon which it concludes that defendant was not minor participant). Though we “urg[e] district courts to clarify their ultimate factual findings by more specific findings when possible,” West, 898 F.2d at 1503-04 (quoting United States v. Mejia-Orosco, 867 F.2d 216, 221 (5th Cir.1989)), we hold that a district court is not required to make any specific findings other than the ultimate determination of the defendant’s role in the offense.
Notwithstanding our deference to the district court’s discretion in this uniquely fact-intensive inquiry, the district court’s ultimate determination of the defendant’s role in the offense should be informed by two principles discerned from the Guidelines: first, the defendant’s role in the relevant conduct for which she has been held accountable at sentencing, and, second, her role as compared to that of other participants in her relevant conduct. We address each of these principles in turn.
1. Role in the Relevant Conduct
First and foremost, the district court must measure the defendant’s role against the relevant conduct for which she has been held accountable. This measurement is compelled by both the Guidelines and our case precedent. The Guidelines provide that the district court should evaluate the defendant’s role in the offense “on the basis of all conduct within the scope of § 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct), i.e., all conduct included under § lB1.3(a)(l)-(4), and not solely on the basis of elements and acts *941cited in the count of conviction.”6 U.S.S.G. Ch. 3, Pt. B, intro, comment. In other words, the district court must assess whether the defendant is a minor or minimal participant in relation to the relevant conduct attributed to the defendant in calculating her base offense level.
We believe that this principle of symmetry of relevant conduct is analytically sound. One main purpose of the Guidelines is to punish similarly situated defendants in a like-minded way. However, given the relatively broad definition of relevant conduct under § IB 1.3, some defendants may be held accountable for conduct that is much broader than their specific acts. A conspiracy conviction is the classic example of this phenomenon. In such cases, a defendant’s Relevant conduct may be coextensive with the entire conspiracy even though her role in that conspiracy was relatively minor. Under these circumstances, a district court may adjust the defendant’s sentence for her mitigating role in this broad criminal conspiracy. This adjustment allows a district court to impose a sentence that more closely mirrors the defendant’s actual conduct, furthering the Guidelines’ goal of imposing comparable sentences for similar acts. However, such an adjustment only makes sense analytically if the defendant can establish that her role was minor as compared to the relevant conduct attributed to her. Otherwise, a defendant could argue that her relevant conduct was narrow for the purpose of calculating base offense level, but was broad for determining her role in the offense. A defendant cannot have it both ways. Application note four illustrates this principle by analogy: “If a defendant has received a lower offense level by virtue of being convicted of an offense significantly less serious than warranted by his actual criminal conduct, a reduction for a mitigating role under this section ordinarily is not warranted because such defendant is not substantially less culpable than' a defendant whose only conduct involved the less serious offense.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, comment, (n.4). According to this example, a defendant must prove that she played a minor role in the relevant conduct attributed to her. Where her actual conduct is more serious than her base offense level suggests, a defendant will not be able to meet this burden. Similarly, where the relevant conduct attributed to a defendant is identical to her actual conduct, she cannot prove that she is entitled to a minor role adjustment simply by pointing to some broader criminal scheme in which she was a minor participant but for which she was not held accountable.
Recognizing this principle, we have unambiguously held that a defendant’s role in the offense may not be determined on the basis of criminal conduct for which the defendant was not held accountable at sen*942tencing. See United States v. Fernandez, 92 F.3d 1121, 1123 (11th Cir.1996) (per curiam); United States v. Holley, 82 F.3d 1010, 1011-12 (11th Cir.1996) (per curiam). For example, in Fernandez, we considered whether a defendant’s role in a drug offense was properly determined by reference to the conduct that determined his base offense level or by reference to the greater drug conspiracy which produced that conduct. 92 F.3d at 1123. Squarely rejecting the broader inquiry, we held that “the conspiracy on which a defendant’s base offense level is founded is the relevant conspiracy for determining role in the offense.” Id. We continue to adhere to this principle of symmetry of relevant conduct and acknowledge that several other circuits have adopted this approach. See, e.g., United States v. James, 157 F.3d 1218, 1220 (10th Cir.1998) (holding that defendant’s role in the offense is determined on the basis of the relevant conduct attributed to him in calculating his base offense level); United States v. Burnett, 66 F.3d 137, 140 (7th Cir.1995) (same); United States v. Atanda, 60 F.3d 196, 199 (5th Cir.1995) (per curiam) (same); United States v. Lampkins, 47 F.3d 175, 180 (7th Cir.1995) (same); United States v. Gomez, 31 F.3d 28, 31 (2d Cir.1994) (per curiam) (same); United States v. Lucht, 18 F.3d 541, 555-56 (8th Cir.1994) (same); United States v. Olibrices, 979 F.2d 1557, 1560 (D.C.Cir.1992) (“To take the larger conspiracy into account only for purposes of making a downward adjustment in the base level would produce the absurd result that a defendant involved both as a minor participant in a larger distribution scheme for which she was not convicted, and as a major participant in a smaller scheme for which she was convicted, would receive a shorter sentence than a defendant involved solely in the smaller scheme.”). But see, e.g., United States v. Isaza-Zapata, 148 F.3d 236, 240-41 (3d Cir.1998) (relying on this Court’s panel opinion in De Varón and holding that a court must examine all relevant conduct even if defendant is sentenced only for own acts); United States v. Ruelas, 106 F.3d 1416, 1419 (9th Cir.) (recognizing that “[t]he defendant’s role in relevant conduct may provide a basis for an adjustment even if that conduct is not used to calculate the defendant’s base offense level” but holding that defendant was “not entitled to a reduction in his sentence simply because he was tied to a larger drug trafficking scheme”), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1282, 117 S.Ct. 2470, 138 L.Ed.2d 225 (1997); United States v. Demers, 13 F.3d 1381, 1383 (9th Cir.1994) (declining “to restrict the scope of relevant conduct on which a downward adjustment may be based to the relevant conduct that is included in the defendant’s base offense level.”) (citing Webster, 996 F.2d at 211).
Moreover, a defendant’s status as a drug courier does not alter the principle that the district court must assess the defendant’s role in light of the relevant conduct attributed to her. In Veloza, we recognized that courier status in and of itself is not dispositive of whether a defendant is entitled to or precluded from receiving a downward adjustment for role in the offense. 83 F.3d at 382. Simply put, the drug courier may or may not qualify for a minor role reduction. See, e.g., United States v. Cacho, 951 F.2d 308, 309-10 (11th Cir.1992) (“Although [defendant] was a courier who carried the drugs into the United States, that fact alone does not establish that she was either, a minimal or minor participant in the conspiracy.”); Smith, 918 F.2d at 1566 (“[A] drug courier is not necessarily a minor or minimal participant within the meaning of the Sentencing Guidelines.”). Having posited this unremarkable proposition, however, it is perfectly legitimate for a district court to consider any fact related to a defendant’s conduct as a courier in an importation scheme, including her status and assigned tasks in that scheme. Indeed, in many drug courier cases these are the only discernable facts. Therefore, when a drag courier’s relevant conduct is limited to her own act of importation, a district court may legitimately conclude that the courier *943played an important or essential role in the importation of those drugs. This is permissible even though facts related to the defendant’s status as a drug courier form the basis for this determination. We do not create a presumption that drug couriers are never minor or minimal participants, any more than that they are always minor or minimal. Rather, we hold only that the district court must assess all of the facts probative of the defendant’s role in her relevant conduct in evaluating the defendant’s role in the offense.
We further note, in the drug courier context, that the amount of drugs imported is a material consideration in assessing a defendant’s role in her relevant conduct. See Asseff, 917 F.2d at 507 (“It is evident that [the defendants’] conduct does not warrant a downward adjustment in sentencing because of their apparent knowledge of their criminal activity and the great amount of cocaine involved.”); see also Webster, 996 F.2d at 212 n. 5 (recognizing that “the amount of contraband may be relevant to whether a defendant is a minor participant”). Indeed, because the amount of drugs in a courier’s possession — whether very large or very small — may be the best indication of the magnitude of the courier’s participation in the criminal enterprise, we do not foreclose the possibility that amount of drugs may be dispositive — in and of itself — in the extreme case. See, e.g., United States v. Carrazco, 91 F.3d 65, 67 (8th Cir.1996) (holding that when defendant is “apprehended in possession of a very substantial amount of drugs,” that is “a circumstance that tends to suggest that his participation in the criminal enterprise was itself very substantial”); United States v. Lui, 941 F.2d 844, 849 (9th Cir.1991) (“[W]e have recognized that possession of a substantial amount of narcotics is grounds for refusing to grant a sentence reduction.”); United States v. Garvey, 905 F.2d 1144, 1146 (8th Cir.1990) (per curiam) (recognizing that district court may refuse “to grant a minor and/or minimal participant reduction based solely on the significant amount of drugs involved”).
Indeed, the Guidelines explicitly recognize that amount of drugs may be determinative in the context of minimal participants. Application note two states that an adjustment for minimal participation “would be appropriate, for example, for someone who played no other role in a very large drug smuggling operation than to offload part of a single marihuana shipment, or in a case where an individual was recruited as a courier for a single smuggling transaction involving a small amount of drugs.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, comment. (n.2). We do not believe that the Guidelines intended to preclude a district court from considering the amount of drugs as a factor in the context of minor participants. Application note three states that “[fjor purposes of § 3B1.2(b), a minor participant means any participant who is less culpable than most other participants, but whose role could not be described as minimal.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, comment, (n.2). Although this definition seems to suggest that the relevant inquiry for minor participants is solely comparative, we can discern nothing in the Guidelines to suggest that the analysis of role in the offense varies with the level of participation at issue. In fact, the Guidelines instruct just the opposite. The commentary background states that “[t]his section provides a range of adjustments for a defendant who plays a part in committing the offense that makes him substantially less culpable than the average participant.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, comment, (backg’d.) (emphasis added). The very fact that an intermediate role exists for defendants who fall in between minimal and minor roles, moreover, suggests that the analysis used to measure role in the offense must be uniform. Therefore, we reaffirm that amount of drugs is a relevant factor and recognize that under some circumstances it may be dispositive.
To reiterate, in determining a defendant’s role in the offense, a district *944court must measure the defendant’s role against the relevant conduct attributed to her in calculating her base offense level. This methodology is essential to any evaluation of mitigating role. Only if the defendant can establish that she played a relatively minor role in the conduct for which she has already been held accountable— not a minor role in any larger criminal conspiracy — should the district court grant a downward adjustment for minor role in the offense.
2. Role as Compared to Other Participants in the Relevant Conduct
The second principle we derive from the text of the Guidelines is that the district court may also measure the defendant’s culpability in comparison to that of other participants in the relevant conduct. We draw this principle from two application notes. Application note one states that minimal participants are those “who are plainly among the least culpable of those involved in the conduct of a group:” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, comment, (n.l). Application note three says that “a minor participant means any participant who is less culpable than most other participants, but whose role could not be described as minimal.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, comment, (n.3). These definitions clearly contemplate some assessment of relative culpability. However, not all participants may be relevant to this inquiry. First, the district court should look to other participants only to the extent that they are identifiable or discernable from the evidence. This is a fact-intensive inquiry. Second, the district court may consider only those participants who were involved in the relevant conduct attributed to the defendant. The conduct of participants in any larger criminal conspiracy is irrelevant.
Relative culpability does not end the inquiry, however. The fact that a defendant’s role may be less than that of other participants engaged in the relevant conduct may not be dispositive of role in the offense, since it is possible that none are minor or minimal participants. In United States v. Daughtrey, 874 F.2d 213 (4th Cir.1989), Judge Wilkins gave the following example to illustrate this principle:
[I]f three individuals had entered a bank with the intent to commit robbery and one stood guard at the door, another sprayed paint on the camera, and the third gathered the money from a teller’s cage, no adjustment for Role in the Offense would be warranted. Even if one of the participants deserved an aggravating adjustment because of other acts he committed, the other participants would not be entitled to minimal or minor Role in the Offense adjustments.
Id. at 216. We recognized this position in Zaccardi, 924 F.2d 201. Zaceardi claimed that he was entitled to a minor role adjustment because the PSI characterized him as the least culpable participant in the conspiracy. See id. at 202. We rejected that argument on the ground that it “would require sentencing courts to regard the least culpable member of any conspiracy as a minor participant, regardless of the extent of that member’s participation.” Id. at 203; see also United States v. Miller, 159 F.3d 1106, 1111 (7th Cir.1998) (“Though comparative roles are important to determining whether to grant an offense level reduction, they are not determinative.”); United States v. Rotolo, 950 F.2d 70, 71 (1st Cir.1991) (Breyer, C.J.) (recognizing that “one who, say, points a gun at a bank teller and seizes the money is not entitled to a downward adjustment simply because someone else in the gang supervised his activities”). Simply put, a defendant is not automatically entitled to a minor role adjustment merely because she was somewhat less culpable than the other discernable participants. Rather, the district court must determine that the defendant was less culpable than most other participants in her relevant conduct.7
*945In sum, we believe that a district court’s determination of a defendant’s mitigating role in the offense should be informed by two modes of analysis: First, and most importantly, the district court must measure the defendant’s role against the relevant conduct for which she was held accountable at sentencing; we recognize that in many cases this method of analysis will be dispositive. Second, the district court may also measure the defendant’s role against the other participants, to the extent that they are discernable, in that relevant conduct.
In making the ultimate finding as to role in the offense, the district court should look to each of these principles and measure the discernable facts against them. In the drug courier context, examples of some relevant factual considerations include: amount of drugs, fair market value of drugs, amount of money to be paid to the courier, equity interest in the drugs, role in planning the criminal scheme, and role in the distribution. This is not an exhaustive list, nor does it suggest that any one factor is more important than another. In the final analysis, this decision falls within the sound discretion of the trial court. Indeed, we acknowledge that a similar fact pattern may on occasion give rise to two reasonable and different constructions. This is inherent in the fact-intensive inquiry specifically contemplated by the Guidelines. As the Supreme Court has recognized, a trial court’s choice between “two permissible views of the evidence” is the very essence of the clear error standard of review. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574, 105 S.Ct. 1504. So long as the basis of the trial court’s decision is supported by the record and does not involve a misapplication of a rule of law, we believe that it will be rare for an appellate court to conclude that the sentencing court’s determination is clearly erroneous.8
III.
Applying the aforementioned analysis to the instant case, the district court’s determination that De Varón did not play *946a minor role in the relevant conduct of heroin importation was not clearly erroneous. Again, we review the district court’s determination of De Varon’s role in the offense only for clear error and we recognize that the district court had considerable discretion in making this fact-intensive determination. Moreover, we do not construe the statements of the district court as propounding a conclusion of law that all couriers are ineluctably precluded from receiving a downward adjustment for their role in the offense. The district court simply stated that De Varón “played an integral and essential part in the scheme to import.” We read this statement as reflecting no more than the district court’s measurement of De Varon’s role against her relevant conduct. As we have discussed, such a finding is suggested by both the Guidelines and our case precedent. Thus, we are satisfied that the court evaluated the particular evidence presented in this case and arrived at a finding of fact that De Varón was not a minor participant in the offense.
The record amply supports the district court’s finding that De Varón did not play a minor role in her offense of heroin importation. See United States v. Suarez, 939 F.2d 929, 934 (11th Cir.1991) (“When evaluating a district court’s reasons for imposing a particular sentence, an appellate court may consider the record from the entire sentencing hearing and need not rely upon the district court’s summary statement made at the closing of the sentencing hearing.”) (citations omitted). First, De Varón played an important or essential role in her relevant conduct of importing 512.4 grams of 85 percent pure heroin from Colombia into the United States in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 952(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. De Varón knowingly and intentionally entered the United States with the entire amount of drugs in her possession. Although De Varón claims that she did not supply the heroin, we believe that it was within the trial court’s discretion to conclude that her participation was central to the importation scheme. Second, De Varon’s relevant conduct involved carrying a substantial amount of heroin of high purity. Third, although De Varón was, by one construction of the evidence, arguably less culpable than the only other known participant, Nancy, it is altogether possible on this abbreviated record for the trial court to have concluded that Nancy was no more than a messenger and of relatively equal culpability to De Varón. The facts, as recounted by De Varón, even if fully credited by the trial court, establish no more than that she was hired by someone (Nancy) to smuggle one-half kilogram of heroin into the United States, and to deliver the drugs to someone else — albeit unidentified — in Miami. This bare record does not compel the conclusion that Nancy was sufficiently more culpable than De Varón. At all events, these choices fell within the district court’s discretion under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. Fourth, De Varon’s admission that she furnished $1000 of her own money to finance the smuggling enterprise may likewise be taken as support for the district court’s conclusion, notwithstanding De Varon’s claim that she became involved in the enterprise because of financial problems.
We reiterate that the burden of establishing a minor role in the offense rests with the proponent. De Varón was free to put on evidence in support of her position, and the district court was free to find, as it plainly did, that De Varón failed to meet this burden. The defendant’s suggestion that the district comb somehow barred De Varón from testifying at the sentencing hearing is belied by the record. While.counsel for De Varón suggested that she was available to testify to the statements she made to the probation officer “if the court so chooses,” the district court was not obliged to decide for De Varón whether she should testify. This is an adversarial process, and the decision to testify belongs solely with the defendant and her counsel. Cf. United States v. *947Teague, 953 F.2d 1525, 1533 n. 8 (11th Cir.1992) (en banc) (noting that it is inappropriate for the district court to become involved in defendant’s decision whether to take the witness stand).
Moreover, the defendant’s alternate suggestion that the district court was obligated to investigate and make detañed findings concerning the relative roles of all who may participate in a far-flung narcotics enterprise — that may stretch from the grower, to the manufacturer in a foreign land, through the distribution mechanism, to the final street-level distributor in the United States — is similarly without merit. Again, it misapprehends the defendant’s burden of proof; it violates the essential principle that the district court must measure the defendant’s role against her relevant conduct, that is, the conduct for which she has been held accountable under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3; and it imposes an obligation on the trial court that we have explicitly rejected. So long as the district court’s conclusion as to defendant’s role in the offense is supported by the record, and the court has resolved any disputed factual issues in conformity with Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(c)(1), a simple statement of the district court’s conclusion is sufficient.
On the basis of this record and consonant with this Circuit’s longstanding view affording substantial deference to the district court, we conclude that the district court’s determination that De Varón was not entitled to a downward adjustment for her minor role in the offense was not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, De Var-on’s sentence must be, and is, AFFIRMED.
. Section 2D 1.1 (b)(6) provides: “If the defendant meets the criteria set forth in subdivisions (l)-(5) of § 5C1.2 (Limitation on Applicability of Statutory Minimum Sentences in Certain Cases) and the offense level determined above is level 26 or greater, decrease by 2 levels.” As set forth in § 5C1.2, these five criteria include:
(1) the defendant does not have more than 1 criminal history point, as determined under the sentencing guidelines;
(2) the defendant did not use violence or credible threats of violence or possess a firearm or other dangerous weapon (or induce another participant to do so) in connection with the offense; ■
(3) the offense did not result in death or serious bodily injury to any person;
(4) the defendant was not an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of others in the offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines and was not engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise, as defined in 21 U.S.C. § 848; and
(5)not later than the time of the sentencing hearing, the defendant has truthfully provided to the Government all information and evidence the defendant has concerning the offense or offenses that were part of the same course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan, but the fact that the defendant has no relevant or useful other information to provide or that the Government is already aware of the information shall not preclude a determination by the court that the defendant has complied with this requirement.
. The district court had no jurisdiction to independently order deportation. After De Varon's sentencing on October 10, 1996, we held in United States v. Romeo, 122 F.3d 941, 943-44 (11th Cir.1997), that 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (Supp. Ill 1997), effective on April 1, 1997, eliminated the jurisdiction of the district courts to independently order deportation as a condition of supervised release. This jurisdictional bar also applies to cases pending on appeal. See id. at 944. De Varón, however, does not challenge the district court’s order of deportation on appeal.
. This Circuit also applies a clearly erroneous standard to other complex factual inquiries under the Guidelines. For example, we have held that a district court's determination of whether a defendant has played an aggravating role in the offense under U.S.S.G. § 3B 1.1 is a finding of fact subject to a clearly erroneous standard of review. See, e.g., United States v. Carrillo, 888 F.2d 117, 118 (11th Cir.1989) (per curiam). Similarly, "[b]ecause the sentencing judge is uniquely positioned to evaluate the defendant’s acceptance of responsibility [under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1],” we have also held that this determination is a factual question entitled to review only for clear error. United States v. Anderson, 23 F.3d 368, 369 (11th Cir.1994) (per curiam).
. We have consistently held that the district court's determination of the defendant's role in the offense is a finding of fact. Although many other circuits have adopted this view, some have concluded, in contrast, that this determination is a mixed question of fact and *938law, derived from the application of the Guidelines to the facts of each case. See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 873 F.2d 437, 443 (1st Cir.1989) (citing Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289 n. 19, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982)). Whether a fact question or a mixed question, however, every circuit agrees that the proper standard of review is clear error. See infra text accompanying note 4.
. See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 37, 113 S.Ct. 1913, 123 L.Ed.2d 598 (1993) ("[Cjommentary in the Guidelines Manual that interprets or explains a guideline is authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline.'').
. Section IB 1.3(a) specifies that adjustments in chapter 3, e.g., § 3B1.2, shall be determined on the basis of the following relevant conduct:
(1)(A) all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant; and
(B) in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity (a criminal plan, scheme, endeavor, or enterprise undertaken by the defendant in concert with others, whether or not charged as a conspiracy), all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity, that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation ior that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense;
(2) solely with respect to offenses of a character for which § 3D 1.2(d) would require grouping of multiple counts, all acts and omissions described in subdivisions (1)(A) and (1)(B) above that were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction;
(3) all harm that resulted from the acts and omission specified in subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) above, and all harm that was the object of such acts and omissions; and
(4) any other information specified in the applicable guideline.
. We also recognize that the Guidelines contemplate that the district court measure the *945defendant’s role in the offense against the roles of ''average” participants in similar criminal schemes. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, comment, (n.4) & (backg’d.). Some courts have explicitly incorporated this form of comparison. See, e.g., United States v. Ajmal, 67 F.3d 12, 18 (2d Cir.1995) (holding that defendant only played a minor role in the offense if he was less culpable than his co-conspirators as well as the average participant in such a crime); United States v. Thomas, 932 F.2d 1085, 1092 (5th Cir.1991) (holding that defendant was not entitled to minor role adjustment because his role "was greater than the minimal participation exercised by the defendants to whom we have previously allowed a downward adjustment”); Caruth, 930 F.2d at 815 ("The Guidelines permit courts not only to compare a defendant's conduct with that of others in the same enterprise, but also with the conduct of an average participant in that type of crime.”); Daughtrey, 874 F.2d at 216 (holding that the court should measure both the relative culpability of each participant in relation to the relevant conduct and the defendant’s acts and relative culpability against an objective standard); Rotólo, 950 F.2d at 71 (distinguishing between aggravating and mitigating roles and suggesting that "substantially less culpable than the average participant” means an objective comparison between the defendant and an average person engaged in such conduct). This normative analysis advances the Guidelines' goal of like sentences for similarly situated defendants. However, because we are concerned about how a district court will be able to assess factually what level of conduct constitutes that of an "average” participant, we believe that this normative analysis generally should not be disposi-tive of the district court’s role in the offense determination. To the extent the district court does rely on this mode of analysis, we caution that the court must base its conclusions on a sufficient evidential foundation, and make sufficient factual findings to support its assessment of an “average” participant.
. This is not a case in which a drug courier convicted of importation was granted a role reduction even though the only drugs attributed to her for base offense level purposes were those that she personally brought into this country in or on her person, her personal effects, or her luggage. Accordingly, we have no occasion to decide whether a role reduction could be appropriate in such a case, and leave that issue for another day.