dissenting in part.
While I join the majority’s opinion on the question of invalidity, I disagree that the question of infringement must await a remand and would instead affirm the judgment of noninfringement. I do agree that the district court erred in construing the expression “means for supplying gas” to require supplying gas “under pressure.” However, in view of the readily understandable nature of the subject matter involved, we can ascertain that this error was harmless.
Smiths’ argument concerning infringement of its patent by the Code Blue and 7100MM devices is untenable. Smiths’ theory as to how the “means for supplying gas having ... first and second openings at opposite ends” limitation is met in the accused products is made clear with the help of the following diagrams from Smiths’ brief which highlight those portions of the accused devices that allegedly correspond to this limitation:
*1360[[Image here]]
Smiths contends that the “connectors” (in solid black) in the accused, devices between the valve assemblies and the air inlet passages meet the disputed limitation. Smiths does not contend that any connector disclosed in the ’9¿1 patent is the structure that corresponds to the claimed function in the disputed limitation under § 112, ¶ 6. If it did so, it would logically argue that the connectors in the accused devices have the same or equivalent structure as the connectors disclosed in the patent. However, Smiths concedes that the relevant structure disclosed in the patent is the squeeze bag. The only elements in the accused devices that correspond to this limitation are the squeeze bag of the Code Blue device and the “breathing tube” of the 7100MM. These elements clearly do not literally meet the disputed limitation. The squeeze bag of the Code Blue does not have first and second openings “at opposite ends”; they are on the same side. Moreover, no reasonable fact finder could conclude that the solid breathing tube of the 7100MM is structurally equivalent to a flexible squeeze bag. These elements also do not meet the disputed limitation under the doctrine of equivalents. Because the openings of the Code Blue are on the same ends, Smiths’ infringement argument would completely eradicate the “opposite end” limitation from the claims; it is thus precluded as a matter of law. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 39 n. 8, 117 S.Ct. 1040, 1053 n. 8, 137 L.Ed.2d 146, 41 USPQ2d 1865, 1875 n. 8 (1997) (“[I]f a theory of equivalence would entirely vitiate a particular claim element, partial or complete judgment should be rendered by the court, as there would be no further material issue for the jury to resolve.”) (emphasis deleted). Because the breathing tube of the 7100MM is not a structural equivalent under § 112, ¶ 6, and because the tube is not an “after-arising” component in relation to *1361the date of the patent, infringement under the doctrine of equivalents is again precluded. See Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., Inc., 145 F.3d 1303, 1311, 46 USPQ2d 1752, 1758 (Fed.Cir.1998).
Apparently realizing that these elements in the accused devices do not meet the disputed limitation, Smiths attempts to urge a finding of infringement when there is none by pointing to the connectors (see diagrams, supra) as the infringing structure. Not only is such a theory specious given the more obvious relevance of the squeeze bag and the breathing tube to the disputed limitation, but the theory again fails for an obvious lack of structural equivalence. A solid connector is not structurally equivalent to a squeeze bag and therefore does not come within the disputed § 112, ¶ 6 limitation either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents. See Chiuminatta, supra.
The majority bends over backwards to try to accommodate this far-fetched infringement theory by effectively broadening the disclosure corresponding to the disputed limitation under § 112, ¶ 6. See maj. op. at 1358 (“Thus, the ’941 specification suggests at least three different characteristics that inform how the disclosed squeeze! ]bag is a ‘means for supplying gas’: first, as a flexible bag that can be squeezed to provide pressure for forcing air to the patient; second, as a hollow structure through which gas passes on its way to the patient; and third, as a reservoir for collecting oxygen or other gas that will be delivered to the patient.”). The majority believes that consideration on remand of one of these disclosed “characteristics” may warrant a finding that the connector is an infringement. I disagree. In the end, all three “characteristics” relate to but one structure: the squeeze bag disclosed in the patent. Section 112, ¶ 6, directs consideration to whether an element of an accused device is the same or structurally equivalent to the disclosed structure which corresponds to the claimed function, not to the operative characteristics of the disclosed structure. Smiths should not be able to ignore the structural characteristics of the squeeze bag and focus on its function.
I therefore see no need for a remand. I would thus affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment that neither the Code Blue nor the 7100MM devices literally infringes the ’941 patent and the court’s judgment that neither device infringes under the doctrine of equivalents.*
I understand the district court to have found noninfringement of the 7100MM under the doctrine of equivalents, even though it was not specifically discussed by the district court in its post-trial opinion.