Specially Concurring in Part C:
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that Fiorillo and Krueger caused the transportation of the hazardous waste under 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(1) and were, therefore, properly found guilty by the jury. Because I disagree with the majority’s interpretation of the Government’s argument, I write separately.
The majority writes that the Government argued that section 6928(d)(1) applies to those who do nothing more than receive hazardous waste. Although during oral argument the Government may have stated that Fiorillo and Krueger were liable under section 6928(d)(1) for simply receiving the hazardous waste, an examination of the Government’s brief shows that the Government argued that section 6928(d)(1) was not limited to those who generate hazardous waste, not that section 6928(d)(1) should apply to those who simply receive hazardous waste. The majority agrees with the Government’s argument that section 6928(d)(1) is not limited to generators of hazardous waste by concluding that it applied to Fiorillo and Krueger, who were not generators.
Additionally, the majority s discussion of whether section 6928(d)(1) applies to those who only receive hazardous waste is unnecessary. The facts show that Fiorillo and Krueger did more than receive the waste; they played an integral role in the transportation of the waste. The issue of whether section 6928(d)(1) applies to receivers of hazardous waste has no bearing on the outcome of this ease, so any discussion concerning the act of simply receiving hazardous waste is dictum.