The majority of our panel concludes that the district court properly refused to give a jury instruction for the lesser offense of abusive sexual contact and that the district court properly refused to grant a Daubert hearing on the admissibility of polygraph evidence supporting the defendant’s professed innocence. The majority justifies its conclusion by ruling that the defendant did not properly preserve the jury instruction issue for appeal. The majority has further ruled that the polygraph evidence was inadmissible under Fed.R.Evid. 403. I disagree on both issues. The majority interprets precedent to require an unnecessarily high standard of specificity when lawyers request jury instructions during trial. In addition, Rule 403 is an improper basis for affirming the district court’s ex-elusion of the polygraph evidence: the polygraph evidence was relevant, and the district court erred when it failed to hold a Daubert hearing on the test’s reliability.
BACKGROUND
On September 23, 1998, a jury convicted Clifton Waters of the aggravated sexual abuse of his seven-year-old daughter, M.W., primarily on the basis of testimony about one December evening around Christmas 1996.5 Before indictment, the FBI administered a polygraph examination on Waters. During this exam, an FBI agent asked Waters whether he had committed elements of aggravated sexual abuse: the questions were specific, targeted at the essence of the crime, and highly relevant. The agent asked the following:
A. Did you ever place your fingers in [the victim’s] vagina? ...
B. Did you ever touch [the victim’s] private areas in a sexual way? ...
App. at 17.
Waters answered both questions in the negative. The examiner determined that his answers were nondeceptive. Before trial, defendant requested information about the polygraph test from the government.6 The government ignored the discovery request. Both before trial and during trial, the defense requested that the polygraph evidence be admitted. The district court ruled that the defense had not satisfied its burden of showing that a Dau-bert hearing was necessary; the court did not take notice of the federal government’s abuse of the discovery process by refusing to turn over evidence in its possession concerning the polygraph exam taken at the government’s behest. TT 144-45.
*934At trial, the victim’s testimony reflected her reticence and confusion about the details of the abuse. Despite the confusion, all of the other witnesses indicated that, during the sexual abuse of M.W., at least one other man, Duane Fire Thunder, was present in the room where the abuse occurred. TT 27. Fire Thunder’s presence that night placed the victim’s already equivocal identification of Waters as the perpetrator in further doubt because Fire Thunder could have committed the crime. After trial, the victim recanted her trial testimony and identified Fire Thunder as the man who had abused her.
As the trial came to a close, the defendant requested a jury instruction for the lesser included offense of abusive sexual contact. The district judge denied the request, finding that no rational jury could convict the defendant of abusive sexual contact, and not convict on the aggravated sexual abuse charge.
Instruction on the Lesser Included Offense of Abusive Sexual Contact
As a procedural matter, the majority holds that the defendant did not properly preserve this issue for appeal because he failed to specify facts from the victim’s direct examination that supported his request for an instruction. Such a holding misconstrues the meaning of the phrase “specific fact situation.” Under United States v. Oakie, 12 F.3d 1436 (8th Cir.1993), a defense attorney must articulate to the presiding judge the “specific fact situation” that constitutes grounds for a lesser included instruction to the district judge. The defense must rely on that “fact situation” and the rationale stated at trial when arguing its case on appeal. See Oakie, 12 F.3d at 1442 (citing Fed.R.Crim.P. 30).
In this case, Waters’ request for an instruction complied with the Oakie requirements. Although the defendant now broadens the number of references to the record, he has presented substantially the same facts on appeal that he did at trial to support the legal theory he used to make his original request. TT 164-69.7 The context of the conversation between the judge and defense counsel indicates that counsel was referring to the victim’s entire testimony when pointing out facts that supported giving an instruction on the lesser charge.8 Without a daily transcript, the trial court, which also has heard the evidence, should not require an enumeration of every statement of fact, only a general “fact situation.” In this case, the judge was aware of the inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony but improperly relied on the weight of the evidence and also rejected portions of the testimony because the defendant testified that he was innocent.9
*935While a district court has wide discretion in formulating jury instructions, a defendant is entitled to a jury instruction “if the request is timely, the evidence supports the [instruction], and the proffered instruction correctly states the law.” United States v. Brown, 33 F.3d 1002, 1004 (8th Cir.1994).
Abusive sexual contact is a lesser included offense of aggravated sexual abuse. United States v. Two Bulls, 940 F.2d 380, 381 (8th Cir.1991). The difference between the two crimes turns upon whether there is a forced “sexual act” — -necessary for aggravated sexual abuse — or “sexual contact” — required for abusive sexual contact. To receive the instruction, the defendant must show that the proof is sufficiently in dispute that the jury could find the defendant innocent of the greater and guilty of the lesser included offense. United States v. Eagle Hawk, 815 F.2d 1213, 1215 (8th Cir.1987). Under federal law, a “sexual act” involves either penetration or touching the genitalia10 underneath the clothing of a person younger than sixteen years old; “sexual contact” involves only touching — either directly or over the clothes — of the genitalia and other specified body parts, such as the buttocks. See 18 U.S .C. § 2246(2), (3) (1998) (emphasis added). To succeed, the defendant must show that the jury could have found him guilty of sexual contact but not guilty of engaging in a forced sexual act. See Two Bulls, 940 F.2d at 381.
M.W. testified on direct examination that Waters had penetrated her vaginal area with his fingers and, in fact, his whole hand. However, on cross-examination she testified that he had not penetrated her. TT 54. Most importantly, it was unclear from her testimony whether he had touched her underneath her clothing at all. TT at 40-43. If a rational jury could find that Waters had not penetrated M.W., nor had he touched her genitalia beneath her clothing but that he had engaged in sexual contact, then the defendant satisfied his burden. There existed a reasonable doubt about whether he committed aggravated sexual abuse. Failure to give the instruction amounted to an abuse of discretion because, in light of the victim’s entire testimony and its inconsistencies, a rational jury could have found the lesser and not the greater offense. Where the single witness to the crime was a seven-year-old victim — confused and traumatized not only the abuse, but by the trial as well — who could not clearly and consistently articulate what had happened to her, a lesser included offense instruction, under the evidence in the case, should have been submitted to the jury.11 *936The error, was harmful to the defendant and should be reversed.
The Polygraph Evidence
Polygraph test results take on special importance when evidence is sparse and the primary witness’s testimony is highly unreliable: In such situations, polygraph exams that are performed with the latest techniques and that inquire into the central elements of the crime charged become increasingly relevant because they add to the jury’s otherwise minimal knowledge base. Polygraph test results should be treated as highly relevant, as in a case such as this one, when very little consistent evidence is presented to the jury.
The Polygraph Test and Rule 702
Although the Supreme Court has upheld per se exclusions of polygraph evidence in the military, see United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 118 S.Ct. 1261, 140 L.Ed.2d 413 (1998), per se exclusion of polygraph evidence is not the rule of the Eighth Circuit, nor in other circuits in a nonmilitary context. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 95 F.3d 723 (8th Cir.1996). Polygraph test results may be admissible when the indices of reliability are present. Studies have shown that polygraph results can be accurate as much as 97.5% of the time, and even critics of the polygraph place its accuracy at 70%. The Supreme Court has articulated particular factors that affect polygraph reliability, such as: the examiner’s integrity, independence, choice of questions, or training in the detection of deliberate attempts to provoke misleading physiological responses. See Scheffer, 118 S.Ct. at 1276 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Reliability of polygraph test results will also depend on the polygraph technique used; there are a number of different questioning tactics that use different logical assumptions to detect lies. See United States v. Gilliard, 133 F.3d 809, 812-14 (11th Cir.1998). Another index of reliability, present in this case, is the type of result: exculpatory polygraphs are more reliable than inculpatory ones because the test tends to create false positives rather than false negatives. 118 S.Ct. at 1276.
Because the reliability of any polygraph exam must be assessed in a particularized inquiry, a Daubert hearing will generally be required to determine admissibility. The district court’s failure to grant a hearing based on a generalized “lack of consensus” about the reliability of polygraph evidence creates a de facto per se exclusion, and as such, commits an error of law. TT 2, 144-47. The district court must enable the parties to develop the facts necessary to make a particularized determination of reliability. Such is the role of “gatekeeper” required by Daubert. See Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, —— U.S. -, -, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 1175, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591, 113 S.Ct. 2786).
Some statements in the record suggest that the district court may have denied the Daubert hearing because the defense did not establish sufficient foundation for the claim that this particular exam was reliable. If that were the court’s rationale, then the district court erred in failing to require the prosecution to give the defense the information it requested under Fed. R.Grim.P. 16(a)(1)(D) (1999). Because the particularized inquiry into the particular polygraph examination sits at the crux of the matter, the government clearly obstructed the defendant’s burden of establishing a foundation for a Daubert hearing when it did not produce the polygraph evidence requested by defendant. Such government action borders on infringement of the Brady rule. See Brady v. *937Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).
A Daubert hearing need not be granted as a matter of course before a Rule 702 determination can be made on a polygraph exam; however, the basic information necessary to determine the reliability of a polygraph exam should be present and available to the court. In this case, it was clear that the government possessed the relevant information but declined to disclose essential facts. When such facts could be made readily available, but are not, a court should presume that further investigation and discussion of the matter is necessary.
This court cannot know whether the polygraph evidence was sufficiently reliable to warrant admission into trial because the government never revealed, and the district court never heard, the information necessary to determine such reliability. One wonders, however, why the government so often uses polygraph tests if it believes its results are unreliable. Justice Stevens notes this very point in his Schef-fer dissent: “It is incongruous for the party that selected the examiner, the equipment, the testing procedures, and the questions asked of the defendant ... to challenge the competence of the procedures that it has developed and relied upon in hundreds of thousands of cases.” 118 S.Ct. at 1278. The government cannot administer polygraph tests to whomever it chooses, and then, depending on the outcome, decide whether those results should be admitted at trial. It may be that, when the government administers the polygraph exam, the district court should employ a presumption of reliability of the polygraph results.
The rejection of polygraph evidence on the basis of Fed.R.Evid. 403 seems inappropriate when the foundation and background of the tests remain hidden. Rule 403 reads:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
The polygraph test could be extremely relevant and under proper instructions, would not unfairly prejudice the government, confuse the issues, cause delay or waste time. Obviously the evidence would not be cumulative. However, the Rule 403 issue would need to await the results of the Daubert hearing.
CONCLUSION
The trial judge sentenced Waters to fourteen years imprisonment for a crime in which his guilt remains in serious question. Accordingly, I would grant him a new trial on the lesser included offense instruction issue and require the prosecution to provide discovery for a Daubert hearing on the admissibility of the polygraph evidence.
. Most of the government's evidence focused on one evening during December 1996, although the government also presented some testimony that sexual abuse occurred one evening in the summer of 1996. TT 29-30, 33.
. This request asked for information such as: the full listing of all questions asked of defendant by examiner, the examiner's training and experience in administering polygraph exams, and information regarding the type of polygraph procedures used.
.At trial, defense counsel stated the following upon being asked to "outline the facts scenario” that would justify the giving of a lesser included offense instruction:
It's my recollection based on notes I took during the alleged victim’s direct testimony, ... that [Waters] allegedly asked her to take off her pants and started touching her front and back. Then a guy came up. There was no testimony of any penetration of any kind at that point.
She described another time at her house in Rockyford in the trailer house; said [Waters] told her to take off her pants, touched both private places. Still no evidence of any penetration of any kind.... Based on that direct testimony from the alleged victim, there is no evidence of aggravated sexual abuse.... And by the way, she also testified [Waters’] clothes were on in both incidents. TT 168.
. Some of the facts necessary for defendant to make a successful argument arose through cross-examination of the victim. To the extent that her answers on cross-examination impeached the victim's testimony, the jury could disregard some of M.W.’s assertions.
. After allowing the government to rebut the defense counsel's argument, the district court stated:
In this case the Court believes that there is no evidence that could possibly support a conviction on the lesser included offense of abusive sexual contact. The defendant took the stand; he steadfastly denied any touching of any kind, either sexual contact or sexual abuse. He now wishes to improve *935on his theory of defense which was that nothing happened, but in isolation hang his hat on a simple statement about contact about touching on the butt.... [TJhere was ... overwhelming evidence of penetration of the vaginal area indeed to the extent that the hymenal ring had completely disappeared. ... [T]he victim testified that the sexual act was committed on her and if the jury credits her testimony, it would be compelled to find aggravated sexual abuse which, of course, was confirmed by Dr. Lori Strong.... [T]he defendant has professed complete innocence so his testimony could not support a conviction on either offense. TT 170-71.
. Under 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2)(D) (1998), a sexual act does not include the intentional touching of the buttocks.
. The district court justified its decision, in part, by drawing an analogy to United States v. Two Bulls, 940 F.2d 380 (8th Cir.1991). The district court cited Two Bulls for the proposition that if a defendant professes complete innocence, the defendant cannot ask for an instruction on a lesser included offense. TT 171-72. This is not the rule of Two Bulls, nor is it the general rule upon which district judges should determine whether to give a lesser included instruction. In Two Bulls, the victim claimed that Two Bulls and another man raped her, while the defendant claimed he was absent when the victim was raped. The victim clearly identified the defendant as the perpetrator, and the evidence showed that rape had occurred. No evidence of abusive sexual contact existed. See Two Bulls, 940 F.2d at 382. In a situation like that in Two Bulls, no rational jury could find that abusive sexual contact, but not rape, had occurred: the defendant insisted he was not present during the crime, but the crime committed was clearly rape. This case is distinguishable *936for three reasons: (1) the victim's own testimony raised the question of whether the greater or lesser offense occurred; (2) the evidence presented did not clearly show that aggravated sexual abuse and not abusive sexual contact had occurred; and (3) the defendant did not claim to be absent at the time of the offense — he merely maintained that he did not commit the act charged.